Professional negligence reconsidered by DeVries, Ubaldus R M Th
PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
RECONSIDERED
An analysis of the duty and 
standard of care of the 
professional service provider 
in Ireland
By
Ubaldus R.M.Th de Vries
Thesis submitted June 1996 m  satisfaction 
of requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy This work was completed at 
Dublin City University Business School, 
under the supervision of Dr David N 
Tom k m  The thesis is based on the 
candidate's own work
DECLARATION
I hereby certify that this material, which I now 
submit for assessment on the programme of study 
leading to the award of Doctor in Philosophy is 
entirely my own work and has not been taken from 
the work of others save and to the extent that 
such work has been cited and acknowledged within 
the text of my work.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to express my indebtedness and appreciation to the 
following persons Dr David Tomkm for his wonderful 
supervision and to whom I am sincerely grateful for both 
his belief m  me and support throughout the last years The 
members of staff, colleagues and friends m  the Business 
School, m  particular Mr Raymond Byrne, Serge and Teresa 
for their useful comments Helen Fallon of Dublin City 
University library, Margaret Byrne of the Law Society 
library and the staff members of the Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies (London) for their friendly advice Angela, 
Sheila, Ellen, Niamh, Carolyn, Fiona, Deidre and Gary for 
their time, effort and gentle corrections From a distance, 
I thank my parents for their faith m  me And last but not 
least I thank Brona, for her continuing support m  every 
respect
Throughout this thesis please assume that where 
appropriate "he" embraces "she"
1 1 1
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the concept of professional 
negligence In doing so, it aims to find the distinguishing 
factors that characterize professional negligence as 
against other types of negligence It seeks to emphasize 
the functions, duties and activities of professional 
people, rather than any examination of their status The 
thesis demonstrates that this concept is based on a "broad- 
spectrum" duty of care with specific obligations, 
particular to professional conduct
Consequently, this thesis argues whether society is 
looking at some change to the presumed responsibilities of 
a particular socio-economic grouping m  Ireland or whether 
the law of tort merely seeks to accommodate technical and 
other changes by imposing liability m  different ways
The thesis is arranged into three parts In Part A, 
the thesis examines the existing literature on professional 
negligence to provide the context and background against 
which it explores the characteristics of professional 
negligence It also justifies, m  Chapter Three, what is 
meant by "professions" It examines the nature and function 
of professions and emphasizes, m  particular, their 
autonomous nature, and the demand of professional judgment 
In Part B the thesis examines the standard of care 
Chapter Four examines the tests as used m  Ireland and 
England Chapters Five and Six review the paramount Irish 
and English cases dealing with the alleged negligence of, 
m  particular, medical practitioners and solicitors The 
objective of Part B is the description of a model or 
concept of professional negligence m  Ireland
Part C examines, in Chapter Eight, the nature of the 
professional relationships underlying the interaction 
between clinicians and their patients, solicitors and their 
clients, and auditors and their companies for which they 
fulfil the requisite statutory and other functions
It also examines, m  Chapter Nine, the imposition of 
a duty of care towards third parties This involves a 
discussion of the development of negligence generally
Finally, m  Chapter Ten, the thesis examines recent 
implications with regard to professional responsibility and 
professional discretion m  Ireland
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Chapter One
General Statement of Aims
1 .1 . The Argument
T h is  t h e s is  r e v ie w s  th e  r e c e iv e d  o r  presum ed in c id e n t s  
o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  I t  su g g e s ts  t h a t  no co h e re n t 
p r i n c ip l e  e x is t e d  to  d e s c r ib e  th e  co n cep t o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  
n e g lig e n c e  m  I r e la n d  I t  aim s t h e r e fo r e  to  d e f in e  and 
d e s c r ib e  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  I t  a ls o  aim s to  a s c e r t a in  
th e  d is t in g u is h in g  f a c t o r s  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  I t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  from  o th e r  s o r t s  o f  
n e g lig e n c e  I t  co n c lu d e s  t h a t  th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  and th e  
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  a re  th e  two most c r i t i c a l  e lem en ts  o f  
p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e
T h is  t h e s is  d e m o n s tra te s  t h a t  th e  co n cep t o f
p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  i s  ch an g in g  Though th e  co n cep t o f  
p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  may ap p ear to  be based  upon a 
"b ro ad - sp e c tru m " d u ty  o f  c a r e ,  i t  w i l l  be shown t h a t ,  m  
f a c t ,  th e  co n cep t o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  has become 
d e f in e d  b y  th e  o b l ig a t io n s  and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  
v a r io u s  i n d i v id u a l  p r o fe s s io n s  I t  i s  t h e r e fo r e  t r u e ,  as we 
s h a l l  show, t h a t  th e  s p e c i f i c  d u t ie s  and a c t i v i t i e s  o f 
p r o f e s s io n a l  p e o p le  a re  em phasized , r a t h e r  th a n  th e  f a c t
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t h a t  such  p e rso n s  a re  d e s c r ib e d  a s , o r  d e s c r ib e  th e m se lv e s  
as p r o f e s s io n a l  p e o p le  In  o th e r  w ords, i t  i s  th e  cond uct 
and a c t i v i t y  m  w h ich  p r o f e s s io n a l  p e rso n s  engage, r a t h e r  
th an  t h e i r  s t a t u s ,  w h ich  i s  c r u c i a l  to  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
b o th  th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  and th e  a p p l i c a t io n  o f  th e  s p e c i f i c  
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re
T h is  d i s t i n c t io n  may be o f  p a r t i c u l a r  im p o rtan ce  i n  
ca se s  w here th e r e  i s ,  p r i o r  to  th e  com m ission  o f  an a l le g e d  
t o r t ,  an e x is t in g  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een  th e  p a r t i e s  (as  
opposed to  th o se  s i t u a t io n s  w here no such  p r i o r  c o n n e c t io n  
o b ta in s )
I t  c o u ld  be argued  t h a t  th e  law  o f  t o r t  i s  m  many 
w ays, e s p e c i a l l y  p o l i t i c a l l y  and s o c i a l l y ,  r e s p o n s iv e  to  
changes m  th e  econom ic s t r u c t u r e  o f  s o c ie t y  A re  we 
lo o k in g  a t  some change to  th e  presum ed r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  
a p a r t i c u l a r  so c io - eco n o m ic  g ro u p in g  i n  I r e la n d ,  o r  does 
th e  law  o f  t o r t  m e re ly  seek  to  accommodate t e c h n ic a l  and 
o th e r  changes by im pos ing  l i a b i l i t y  m  d i f f e r e n t  w ays, as 
l i f e  i t s e l f  ch an g es? I s  th e r e  a l o g i c a l  c o n n e c t io n  betw een 
th e  a n a lo g y  o f  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  d e f e c t iv e  m e d ic a l t re a tm e n t 
and th e  s n a i l  m  th e  g in g e r  b e e r ?
1 .2  The O u t l in e  and S t r a t e g y
T h is  t h e s is  i s  d iv id e d  in t o  th r e e  p a r t s  I t  commences 
w ith  a com m entary on th e  e x is t in g  e x te n s iv e  l i t e r a t u r e  on 
th e  v a r io u s  a s p e c ts  o f p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  (C h a p te r
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Two) T h is  a n a ly s is  and d is c u s s io n  fo l lo w s  th e  r u b r ic s  
l i s t e d  i n  th e  T a b le  o f  C o n te n ts  o f  th e  t h e s is  In  C h ap te r 
T h re e , th e  t h e s is  e x p la in s  and d is c u s s e s  th e  r e s e a r c h e r 's  
use o f  th e  te rm  " p r o f e s s io n " ,  s t r e s s in g  i t s  param ount 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and a rg u in g  t h a t  th e  te rm  co n n o tes  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  f u n c t io n  i n  th e  so c io - eco n o m ic  r e a l i t y  o f  to d a y  
T h is  C h ap te r  w i l l  d is c u s s  what i s  meant b y  " p r o f e s s io n a l  
judgm ent" and how t h i s  te rm  i s  u sed , and w i l l  r e l a t e  to  th e  
fu n c t io n  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  autonom y and c o n t r o l  w i t h in  th e  
co n cep t o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  Thus, P a r t  A form s th e  
c o n te x t  and background  a g a in s t  w h ich  th e  t h e s is  e x p lo re s  
th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e
In  P a r t  B , t h i s  t h e s is  exam ines th e  p r i n c ip a l  E n g l is h  
and I r i s h  c a s e s  These form  th e  c o rn e rs to n e  o f  th e  presum ed 
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  to  th e  c o n s t r u c t  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  
n e g lig e n c e  i n  I r e la n d  C h ap te r  Fo u r d is c u s s e s  th e  t e s t  
w h ich  i s  used  i n  En g lan d  and I r e la n d  to  a s s e s s  th e  s ta n d a rd  
o f  c a re  r e q u ir e d  o f  a p r o f e s s io n a l  p e rso n  T h is  C h ap te r 
seeks  to  i d e n t i f y  c e r t a in  f ix e d  p o in t s  t h a t  d is t in g u is h  
p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  from  o th e r  ty p e s  o f  n e g lig e n c e
C h ap te rs  F iv e  and S ix  r e v ie w  I r i s h  and E n g l is h  ca se s  
w h ich  d e a l s p e c i f i c a l l y  w ith  th e  a l le g e d  n e g lig e n c e  o f ,  m  
k p a r t i c u l a r ,  m e d ic a l p r a c t i t i o n e r s  and s o l i c i t o r s  From t h i s  
a n a ly s i s  and d is c u s s io n  i t  ap p ea rs  as i f  c e r t a in  te rm s a re  
o f  k e y  im p o rta n ce , f o r  exam ple th e  co n ce p ts  o f ,  i n t e r  a l i a , 
"o b v io u s  in h e r e n t  d e f e c t s " ,  a d v ic e  and in fo rm a t io n ,  and 
s c i e n t i f i c  d is p u te s
C h a p te r  Seven  moves from  th e  e x a m in a tio n  o f  s p e c i f i c
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in s ta n c e s  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  to  a c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  
th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  betw een  p r o fe s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  and o th e r  
s o r t s  o f  n e g lig e n c e  The t h e s is  i d e n t i f i e s  c e r t a in  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  w h ich  a re  e x c lu s iv e  o r  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
r e le v a n t  to  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  ca s e s  T h is  a n a ly s i s  i s  
ta k e n  f u r t h e r  m  P a r t  C
P a r t  C o f  th e  t h e s is  (commencing w ith  C h ap te r  E ig h t )  
exam ines th e  u n d e r ly in g  p r o f e s s io n a l  r e l a t io n s h ip  betw een  
th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  p e rso n  and h is  c l i e n t ,  p a t i e n t ,  o r  m  th e  
case  o f  an a u d i t o r ,  th o se  r e t a in in g  h is  s e r v i c e s  w h e th e r 
d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  I t  seeks  to  p ro v id e  an i n t e l l e c t u a l  
r a t io n a le  f o r  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  
r e l a t io n s h ip  and, s u b s e q u e n t ly , th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a d u ty  o f 
c a re  The t h e s is  th en  t e s t s  w h e th e r th e  su g g es ted  r a t io n a le  
i s  m  f a c t  p ro v a b le  by a p p ly in g  i t  to  s p e c i f i c  ca se s  
in v o lv in g ,  r e s p e c t i v e ly ,  a m e d ic a l p r a c t i t i o n e r ,  a 
s o l i c i t o r  and an a c c o u n ta n t  a c t in g  as an a u d it o r
The t h e s is  w i l l  show th a t  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  in t e r e s t in g  
c o n f l i c t  a r i s e s  betw een  th e  g e n e ra l d u ty  to  ta k e  c a re  
(endem ic to  a l l  n e g lig e n c e  a c t io n s )  and th e  s p e c i f i c  
e x c e p t io n s , o r  more p r o p e r ly ,  in c id e n c e s  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  
n e g lig e n c e ,  such  as th e  b a r r i s t e r ' s  l im i t e d  im m un ity from  
s u i t  The a n a ly s i s  o f f e r e d ,  su g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  c o u r t s ' 
p e r c e p t io n  o f  th e  fu n c t io n  o f  th e  co n cep t o f  n e g lig e n c e  i s  
t i e d  to  th e  im p o s it io n  o f  th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  and th e  q u e s t io n  
o f  t h i r d - p a r t y  l i a b i l i t y  Each  o f  th e s e  i n t e r a c t s  w ith  th e  
c o u r t s '  a ssessm en t o f  th e  r o le  and fu n c t io n  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  
n e g lig e n c e  and, s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  th e  s o c i e t a l  e x p e c ta t io n s
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In  C h ap te r  Ten, th e  t h e s is  i d e n t i f i e s  c e r t a in  
d eve lop m en ts  w h ich  may be d e t r im e n ta l  to  th e  s t a tu s  o f  
p r o f e s s io n a l  p e o p le  and to  t h e i r  autonomous fu n c t io n  m  
s o c ie t y  I t  ap p ea rs  t h a t  p r o fe s s io n s  a re  le s s  l i k e l y  to  
ta k e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  t h e i r  own a c t io n s  As a 
conseq uence , i t  seems th a t  a p r o f e s s io n a l  p e rso n , m  
f o l lo w in g  th e  law , c o n tra v e n e s  h is  p r o f e s s io n 's  e t h i c a l  o r  
p r o f e s s io n a l  code o f  cond uct
required of the professional
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PART A.
The L i t e r a t u r e  R e v ie w
2.1. In t r o d u c t io n
C h ap te r  One p ro v id e d  th e  argum ent and o u t l in e  T h is  
C h ap te r  exam ines and comments on th e  r e le v a n t  l i t e r a t u r e  on 
p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  and a l l i e d  is s u e s  The o u t l in e  o f  
t h i s  C h ap te r  f o l lo w s  b ro a d ly  th e  g e n e ra l s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  
t h e s is  The com m entary on each  a r t i c l e , book o r  p ap e r 
f o l lo w s  th e  r u b r ic s  m  th e  T a b le  o f  C o n te n ts
2.2 The Presum ed Model o f  P r o f e s s io n a l
N e g lig e n c e  m  I r e la n d  and En g lan d  
The S ta n d a rd  o f  C are
2.2.1. T h is  s e c t io n  o f  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  r e v ie w  a d d re sse s  
th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  m  p r o fe s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  I t  r e v ie w s  
th e  l i t e r a r y  comments on th e  v a r io u s  a s p e c ts  o f  th e  BOLAM 
t e s t  I t  a ls o  r e v ie w s  th e  academ ic p o s i t io n  m  I r e l a n d  I t  
r e v ie w s  some g e n e ra l rem arks w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  use  o f  a 
s e p a ra te  t e s t  m  p r o fe s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  c a s e s
In  a d d i t io n ,  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  r e v ie w  d is c u s s e s  comments,
Chapter Two
n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e a l t  w ith  m  th e  t h e s i s ,  m  r e l a t i o n  to  
com puter m a lp r a c t ic e  and th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  o f  m en ta l 
h e a l t h  p r o f e s s io n a ls  The f e a tu r e s  o f  a p r o f e s s io n a l  
n e g lig e n c e  t e s t  ap p ea r to  cau se  p rob lem s m  th e s e  two 
a re a s
The BOLAM t e s t
2 2.2. A m a jo r i t y  o f  com m entators c r i t i c i z e  th e  t e s t  
d e ve lo p ed  m  BOLAM v  FR IER N  HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
[1957] 2 A l l  E R 118 I t  i s  s a id  to  be to o  o b je c t i v e  m
i t s  a p p l i c a t io n ,  w ith o u t  r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  in t e r e s t s  o f  th e  
p a t ie n t  in v o lv e d  I t  does n o t r e f e r  to  th e  re a s o n a b le n e s s  
o f  th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  p e r s o n 's  con d u ct I t  le a v e s  th e  c o u r t  
w ith o u t  a l e g a l  d e te rm in a t io n  o f  th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re
A m in o r i t y  b e l ie v e s  t h a t  th e  BOLAM t e s t  i s  th e  p ro p e r  
t e s t  in  t h i s  a re a  o f  n e g lig e n c e  They j u s t i f y  t h i s  by 
r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  e x p e r t is e  t h a t  u n d e r l ie s  th e  
p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s  con d u ct and th e  p a t i e n t 's  r e l i a n c e  upon i t
2.2.3. G o ld r e m  (1994) q u e s t io n s  th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  BOLAM 
t e s t  f o r  t o d a y 's  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  ca s e s  He c la im s  
t h a t  th e  t e s t  c a r r i e s  two u n d e s ir a b le  conseq uences  F i r s t ,  
th e  t e s t  i s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  as to  th e  th r e e  s e p a ra te  avenues 
o f  a n a ly s i s  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  co n d u c t, l  e r i s k ,  p r e c a u t io n  
and a b a la n c e  betw een  them Second , t h e r e  i s  an 
in c o n s is t e n c y  betw een  th e  c o u r t s '  a t t i t u d e  to  and th e  use 
o f p r i n c ip l e  m  g e n e ra l c a se s  o f  t o r t  on th e  one hand and
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m  m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  ca se s  on th e  o th e r  Thus, e x p e r t  
w itn e s s e s  m  m e d ica l n e g lig e n c e  ca s e s  eschew  th e  " i n t e r n a l  
lo g i c "  o f  m e d ic a l o p in io n  m  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  f a c t u a l  nexus, 
and s t r i v e  to  propound some a b s t r a c t  z e n ith  o f  " a c ce p te d  
p r a c t i c e "  1
G o ld r e m  su g g e s ts  a t e s t  b ased  on t r u e  t o r t  
p r in c ip l e s  2 T h is  t e s t ,  to  d e te rm in e  th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re ,  
in v o lv e s  th e  assessm en t o f  th r e e  c r i t e r i a  3
( I )  The m agn itude o f  th e  r i s k ,  by r e f e r e n c e  to  th e  
s e r io u s n e s s  and l i k e l ih o o d  o f  th e  r i s k  on th e  one hand, and 
th e  d eg ree  o f  c a re  on th e  o th e r  hand 4
( I I )  The p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  o f  s a f e t y  m easu res , what i s  
f e a s ib le  and what i s  r e a s o n a b le ?5
( I I I )  G e n e ra l and ap p roved  p r a c t i c e  T h is  i s  a r e l i a b l e  
d e te rm in a n t , b u t th e r e  must be a l i m i t  to  i t s  r e le v a n c e ,  i t  
can n o t be c o n c lu s iv e  6 I t  rem a in s  up to  th e  ju d g e  to  d e c id e  
w h e th e r s a f e t y  m easures ( l  e what p r a c t i c e )  sh o u ld  have
1The t h e s is  a rg u es  th a t  t h i s  in c o n s is t e n c y  i s  j u s t i f i e d  
by M cN a ir  J  r e f e r r i n g  to  th e  p re se n ce  o f  a s p e c ia l  s k i l l ,  
see  i n f r a  Su b p arag rap h  4 2 2
2The e x is te n c e  o f  a d u ty  o f  c a re  i s  based  on p r o x im ity  
(G o ld r e m , 1994 1238)
3G o ld r e m  (1994 1237)
4Cf P A R IS  v  STEPNEY BOROUGH COUNCIL [1951] A C 367
5G o ld r e m  r e l i e s  h e re  on Munkman (1990 44)
6Ib i d  , a t  45 G o ld r e m  r e f e r s  to  th e  p ro v e rb  th a t  
' [n] e g le c t  o f  d u ty  does n o t ce a se  by r e p e t i t i o n  to  be 
n e g le c t  o f  d u t y ' ,  see  CARPENTERS' CO v  B R IT IS H  MANUAL 
BANKING CO LTD [1937] 3 A l l  E R 811 a t  820, p e r  S le s s e r  
L J  In  I r e l a n d  th e  t e s t  i s  s u b je c te d  as to  w h e th e r  th e  
g e n e ra l and ap p ro ved  p r a c t i c e  c a r r ie d  an y in h e r e n t  d e fe c t s  
w h ich  s h o u ld  have been a p p a re n t , see  DUNNE v  NATIONAL 
MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1989] I  R 91
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been c a r r ie d  o u t . 7 8
Kennedy & Grubb (1994) i d e n t i f y  and comment on th e  
d is c r e p a n c y  betw een  m e d ic a l autonom y and j u d i c i a l  d e c is io n  
m aking. They to o  e x p la in  t h a t  in  a s u b t le  way, c o u r ts  have 
empowered th e  m e d ic a l p r o fe s s io n  to  b o th  d e te rm in e  what th e  
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  sh o u ld  be, and w h e th e r o r  n o t i t  has been 
b rea ch ed  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e . The j u d i c i a r y  empower th e  
p r o fe s s io n  to  e n fo rc e  th e  p r o f e s s io n 's  own d e te rm in a t io n s .  
B u t Kennedy and Grubb p o in t  o u t , and th e  t h e s is  c a r r i e s  
t h i s  p o in t  f u r t h e r , 9 t h a t  th e  t r i a l  o f  a n e g lig e n c e  a c t io n  
in v o lv e s  w hat i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  - even  in  so s p e c ia l iz e d  an 
a re a  as m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  - a l e g a l  judgm ent. Thus, th e  
judgm ent o f  what i s  re a s o n a b le  (th e  e sse n ce  in  t o r t  law ) 
sh o u ld  n o t be made by th e  d o c to r ;  a u n an im o u s ly  app roved  
p r a c t i c e  i s  n o t n e c e s s a r i l y  r e a s o n a b le .10
As to  th e  id e a  t h a t  a d i f f e r e n c e  o f  o p in io n  amongst 
d o c to rs  i s  n o t som eth ing  t h a t  can  be d e c id e d  upon in  c o u r t ,  
th e  w r i t e r s  a rg u e  t h a t  th e  BOLAM t e s t  i s  w ro n g ly  
in t e r p r e t e d .  In  t h e i r  v ie w  th e  c o u r t  i s  v e r y  w e l l  a b le  to  
p r e f e r  one p r a c t i c e  o v e r  th e  o th e r  by em p h as iz in g  what was 
re a s o n a b le  in  th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  th e  c a s e .
In  Kennedy & G ru b b 's  v ie w , t h e r e fo r e ,  ad h e ren ce  to  a
7See a ls o :  BOLITHO v .  C ITY  HACKNEY HEALTH AUTHORITY
[1993] 4 Med. L .R .  381.
8G o ld r e in  d is c u s s e s  a n o th e r  im p o rta n t  is s u e  in  h is  
a r t i c l e :  th e  r o le  o f th e  c o u r t  and c o n f l i c t i n g  e x p e r t
e v id e n c e . T h is  is s u e  i s  ta k e n  in t o  th e  t h e s i s ;  s e e : i n f r a  
Su b p arag rap h  5 .5 .3 .
9S e e ! i n f r a  Su b p arag rap h  4 .2 .2 .  and 4 .4 .3 .
10Kennedy & Grubb (1994: 449-450 ).
s ta n d a rd  a c ce p te d  p r a c t i c e  i s  n o t c o n c lu s iv e  as to  th e  
re a s o n a b le n e s s  o f  th e  p r a c t i c e  Hence, a d o c to r  can  s t i l l  
be h e ld  n e g l ig e n t  i f  he ad h e red  to  an a c ce p te d  p r a c t i c e  
t h a t  th e  c o u r t  c o n s id e r s  u n re a so n a b le  The c o u r t  sh o u ld  
d is t in g u is h  betw een  what i s  o r d in a r i l y  done and what ought 
to  be done, t a k in g  in t o  acco u n t th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  
p l a i n t i f f  (and s o c ie t y  a t  la r g e )  The c o u r t 's  o m iss io n  to  
do t h i s  may be e x p la in e d  m  term s o f  th e  c o m p le x ity  o f  th e  
ca se  and th e  w ish  to  a v o id  c r e a t in g  an atm osphere o f  
d e fe n s iv e  p r a c t i c e  11
T h is  l i n e  o f  th o u g h t i s  su p p o rte d  b y  M o n tro se  (1958) 
N e g lig e n c e  i s  abou t what ought to  have been done by th e  
d e fen d a n t I t  i s ,  even  m  th e  c o n te x t  o f  i t s  j u d i c i a l  u se , 
a co n cep t w ith  an e t h i c a l  component r a t h e r  th an  one w h ich  
i s  m e re ly  s o c i o l o g i c a l l y  d e s c r ip t i v e  The BOLAM t e s t ,  
t h e r e fo r e ,  la c k s  an im p o rta n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n  Nam ely, th e  
re q u ire m e n t t h a t  i t  i s  up to  th e  c o u r ts  to  d e c id e  w h e th e r 
't h e  o r d in a r y  p r a c t i c e  o f  th o se  p o sse ssed  o f  " s p e c ia l  s k i l l  
and co m p eten ce ", i s  r e a s o n a b le  and p ru d e n t ' 12 C o n fo rm ity  
i s  e v id e n c e  t h a t  a p r a c t i c e  i s  n o t n e g l ig e n t  How ever, i t  
can n o t be c o n c lu s iv e
T h is  v ie w  i s  sh a re d  by S t a l l y b r a s s ,  who s t a t e s  t h a t  
' th e  g e n e ra l p r a c t i c e  i t s e l f  may n o t conform  to  th e  
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  r e q u ir e d  o f  a r e a s o n a b le  p ru d en t man In  
such  a ca se  i t  i s  n o t a good d e fe n ce  t h a t  th e  d e fen d a n t
11I b i d  , a t  461-462
12M o n tro se  (1958 262)
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a c te d  m  a cco rd an ce  w ith  th e  g e n e ra l p r a c t i c e '  13
Jo n e s  (1991) a g re e s  w ith  S t a l l y b r a s s  on t h i s  p o in t  He 
a s s e r t s  t h a t  t h i s  i s  th e  t r u e  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  th e  
d e c is io n  m  HUNTER v  HANLEY [1955] S C 200 T h e re , Lo rd  
C lyd e  r e f e r r e d  to  th e  re a s o n a b le  com petent man T h is  t e s t  
i s  co n ce rn ed  w ith  what ought to  be done by r e fe r e n c e  to  a 
r e a s o n a b le  d o c to r  The BOLAM 's o r d in a r y  s k i l l e d  man r e f e r s  
to  m e d ic a l o r  p r o f e s s io n a l  s ta n d a rd s  and must be r e s e rv e d  
as an im p o rta n t i n d i c a t o r  14
Comyn (1987) p o in ts  o u t t h a t  m e d ic a l p r a c t i t i o n e r s  a re  
g e n e r a l l y  und er a g r e a t e r  p r o t e c t io n  th an  th e  law , m  f a c t ,  
p e rm its  them to  be U nder th e  BOLAM t e s t  th e  d e fen d a n t may 
to  a f a r  g r e a t e r  e x te n t  r e l y  on r e s p o n s ib le  c o l le a g u e s  th an  
a s im i la r ly - c ir c u m s ta n c e d  d e fen d a n t m  a g e n e ra l n e g lig e n c e  
ca se  Thus, th e  m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  r u le s ,  as  a p p l ie d ,  o f f e r
i
g r e a t e r  p r o t e c t io n  to  m e d ic a l p r a c t i t i o n e r  d e fe n d a n ts  th an  
g e n e ra l n e g lig e n c e  r u le s  a f f o r d  o th e r  d e fe n d a n ts  15 
C l i n i c i a n s '  r u le s  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  con d u ct even  e x te n t  to  
p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  l i t i g a t i o n ,  b o th  e x p r e s s ly  and by 
im p l ic a t io n
T h is  i s ,  a c c o rd in g  to  Comyn, a dangerous deve lopm ent 
The c o u r t s  sh o u ld  be a b le  to  e x e r c is e  a ' j u d i c i a l  o r
13S t a l l y b r a s s  (1945 437)
14 Jo n e s  (1991 59)
15Comyn (1987 139) The t h e s is  p o in t s  o u t t h a t  th e re
i s  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  g r e a t e r  p r o t e c t io n ,  by 
r e fe r e n c e  to  L o rd  D e n n in g 's  d e c is io n  m  ROE v  M IN ISTR Y  OF
HEALTH [1954] A l l  E R 131, see  i n f r a  Su b p a rag rap h  4 2 7
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j u d ic io u s  c h o ic e ' betw een  d i f f e r e n c e s  m  e x p e r t  o p in io n  16 
I t  i s  n o t a p p ro p r ia te  to  cu rb  th e  c o u r t 's  power to  a c ce p t  
one s e t  o f  e v id e n c e  o v e r  th e  o th e r  I t  can  do i t  m  o th e r  
n e g lig e n c e  c a se s
In  most c a s e s  e x p e r t  e v id e n c e  i s  o f f e r e d  w ith o u t ,  
a c c o rd in g  to  Comyn, th e  e x p e r ts  h a v in g  e x p e r ie n c e d  th e  
c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  th e  ca se  O n ly  th e  c o u r t  can  w e ig h  th e  
su p p o rt f o r  th e  d e fen d a n t a g a in s t  th e  o th e r  e v id e n c e  and 
th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  th e  ca se  The c o u r t  must be l e f t  w ith  
a rea so n ed  c h o ic e  betw een  f a c t  and o p in io n  and to  c o n s id e r  
a l l  th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  th e  ca se  and n o t be fo r c e d  to  f in d  
f o r  th e  d e fe n d a n t 17
2.2.4. Mason & M c C a ll Sm ith  (1987) s e t  o u t a n o th e r  
u n fo r tu n a te  consequence o f  th e  BOLAM t e s t  A s t r i c t  
a p p l i c a t io n  o f  th e  BOLAM t e s t  im p l ie s  t h a t  th e  n o v ic e  
m e d ic a l p r a c t i t i o n e r  i s  a s s e s s e d  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  same 
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  as h is  e x p e r ie n c e d  c o u n te rp a r t  The 
o b je c t i v e  n a tu re  o f  th e  t e s t  re n d e rs  th e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  
a d o c to r  (o f  e q u a l s p e c ia l i z a t io n )  i r r e l e v a n t  18
A j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  may, how ever, be found  m  th e  
p u b l ic  e x p e c ta t io n  and demand to  be p ro v id e d  m e d ica l 
s e r v i c e s  by r e a s o n a b ly  com petent p r a c t i t i o n e r s  19
16 Comyn (1987 139)
17Jjb id  , a t  140
18Mason & M c C a ll Sm ith  (1987 173)
19Cf W ILSH ER  v  ESSEX  AREA HEALTH AUTHORITY [1986] 3 
A l l  E R 801
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Mason & M c C a ll Sm ith  su g g est t h a t  t h i s  c o m p lic a t io n  
can  be overcom e The n o v ic e  i s  r e q u ir e d  to  c o n s u lt  more 
e x p e r ie n c e d  d o c to rs  to  meet th e  p ro p e r  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  20 
In  o th e r  w ords, he must r e a s s u re  h im s e lf  w h e th e r he i s  
c a p a b le  o f  d o in g  what he i s  asked  o r  o b l ig e d  to  do I f  he 
i s  u n a b le  to  do t h i s ,  he must c o n s u lt  o th e r ,  more 
e x p e r ie n c e d  d o c to rs
2.2.5. Howie (1983) com pares th e  d e c is io n  m  BOLAM w ith  
th e  d e c is io n  m  HUNTER v  HANLEY [1955] S L T 200 He 
makes two o b s e r v a t io n s  21 F i r s t ,  th e  d e c is io n  m  HUNTER 
r e q u ir e s  a h ig h e r  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  from  th e  m e d ica l 
p r a c t i t i o n e r  th an  th e  BOLAM t e s t  Under HUNTER th e  d o c to r  
i s  n e g l ig e n t  i f  no p r a c t i t i o n e r  o f  l i k e  s p e c i a l i z a t io n  
w ou ld  have done what th e  d e fen d a n t d o c to r  d id  22 Under 
BOLAM r e fe r e n c e  i s  o n ly  made to  a " r e s p o n s ib le  body o f  
o p in io n "  23
20Mason & M c C a ll Sm ith  (1987 174) In  I r e la n d ,  t h i s
is s u e  was ad d re sse d  m  DUNLEAVY v  MCDEVITT AND ANOTHER 
[1995] P N L R 362 In  t h i s  c a s e , th e  p l a i n t i f f  a l le g e d  
th a t  th e  f i r s t  d e fen d a n t was n e g l ig e n t  m  n o t h a v in g  
s u f f i c i e n t  e x p e r ie n c e  to  c a r r y  o u t a p a r t i c u l a r  o p e ra t io n  
( t h i s  more c o m p lic a te d  o p e ra t io n  was p reced ed  by a le s s  
c o m p lic a te d  o p e ra t io n  t h a t  had f a i l e d )  The Supreme C o u rt 
d is m is s e d  th e  c la im , s t a t in g  t h a t  when a d o c to r  f a c e s  a 
p rob lem  d u r in g  t r e a tm e n t ,  th e  d e c is io n  t h a t  has to  be made 
i s  a t  h is  d i s c r e t io n  and r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  See a ls o  B y rn e  & 
B m c h y  (1992 556-557)
21Howie (1983 200)
22HUNTER v  HANLEY [1995] S L T 200 a t  205, p e r  L o rd
C lyd e
23T h is  i s  a rg u ed  by N o m e  (1987) The r e f e r e n c e  to  
" o r d in a r y  c a r e "  o r  " r e a s o n a b le  c a r e "  i s  n o t r e le v a n t  He 
a rg u es  t h a t  th e  c o u r ts  lo o k  f o r  a s ta n d a rd  t h a t  i s  ' l e g a l l y  
a c c e p t a b le ' , { s u p r a ,  a t  162) He comments t h a t  b o th  term s
13
Second , th e  BOLAM t e s t  c a r r i e s  a c o n t r a d ic t io n  o f  
th o u g h t M cN a ir  J  r e f e r r e d  to  th e  " r e a s o n a b le  man" as th e  
p o in t  o f  d e p a r tu re  and p u t th e  r e a s o n a b le  man in  a m e d ica l 
c o n te x t  How ever, M cN a ir J  s u b s e q u e n t ly  a s s e s s e d  th e  
d e fe n d a n t 's  co n d u ct by r e fe r e n c e  to  m e d ic a l o p in io n ,  n o t by 
r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  re a s o n a b le n e s s  o f  h is  co n d u ct As a r e s u l t  
m e d ic a l su p p o rt f o r  th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  co n d u ct r e l i e v e s  him 
from  l i a b i l i t y
T h is  begs th e  f o l lo w in g  q u e s t io n  Howie ask s  w h e th e r 
th e  c o u r t s ,  und er th e  BOLAM t e s t ,  d e te rm in e  i f  th e  p r a c t i c e  
th a t  i s  fo l lo w e d  and ap p roved  o f  by m e d ic a l o p in io n  i s  a ls o  
r e a s o n a b le ,  o r  w h e th e r t h i s  p r a c t i c e  i s  ip s o  f a c t o  
r e a s o n a b le  H av in g  re v ie w e d  a number o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  
n e g lig e n c e  c a s e s , Howie a s s e r t s  t h a t  th e  BOLAM t e s t  l i e s  
betw een  th e  " o r d in a r y  c a r e "  t e s t  (HUNTER) and th e  more 
g e n e ra l " r e a s o n a b le "  t e s t  T h is  im p l ie s  t h a t  th e  BOLAM t e s t  
does n o t o f f e r  an a b s o lu te  d e fen ce  i f  th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  
con d u ct i s  su p p o rte d  by p r o f e s s io n a l  o p in io n  24
2.2.6. Khan & Robson (1995) a s s e r t  t h a t  th e  BOLAM t e s t  
begs th e  q u e s t io n  w hat i s  meant by a " r e s p o n s ib le  body o f  
m e d ic a l o p in io n " ?  Does i t  r e f e r  to  q u a l i t y  o r  q u a n t i t y  In  
DE FR E IT A S  v  O 'B R IE N  [1993] 4 Med L  R 128, th e  c o u r t
h e ld  t h a t  a body o f  r e s p o n s ib le  o p in io n  must r e f e r  to  th e  
q u a l i t y  o f  th e  o p in io n  o f f e r e d  In  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  c a s e , th e
have been  and a re  used  c o n c u r r e n t ly  in  j u d i c i a l  a n a ly s i s  o f  
p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e
24Howie (1983 222)
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d e fe n d a n t was an o r th o p a e d ic  su rgeon  s p e c ia l i z in g  m  s p in a l  
s u rg e r y  He was o n ly  one o f  e le v e n  " s p in a l  su rg eo n s " m  th e  
c o u n tr y  o u t o f  a g roup  o f  1,000 o r th o p a e d ic  su rg eons The 
q u e s t io n  was w h e th e r th e  e v id e n c e  e s t a b l is h e d  t h a t  th e  
d e fen d a n t a c te d  m  a cco rd an ce  w ith  a r e s p o n s ib le  group o f  
m e d ic a l o p in io n  The c o u r t  answ ered  t h i s  m  th e  a f f i r m a t i v e  
r e f e r r i n g  to  th e  s u p e r- s p e c ia l is m  o f  s p in a l  s u rg e ry
T h is  im p l ie s ,  a c c o rd in g  to  Khan & Robson, t h a t  th e re  
i s  a h ig h e r  s ta n d a rd  th a n  th e  o r d in a r y  s p e c i a l i s t  C r u c ia l  
th e n , as a p r e l im in a r y  q u e s t io n , i s  m  what c a te g o ry  a 
d e fen d a n t s p e c i a l i s t  f i t s  o r d in a r y  s p e c ia l is m  o r  "su p e r-  
s p e c ia l i s m " ?
B u t as Khan & Robson (1995) p o in t  o u t th e  t e s t  co u ld  
a ls o  be d e f in e d  as c o n s is t in g  o f  a s u b s t a n t ia l  g roup o f  
m e d ica l o p in io n  25 T h is  w ou ld  mean t h a t  " s u b s t a n t i a l "  must 
be eq u a ted  w it h  q u a n t i t y  The q u e s t io n  i s  th e n , a c c o rd in g  
to  Khan & Robson, w h e th e r e le v e n  s p e c i a l i s t s  c o n s t i t u t e  a 
s u b s t a n t ia l  g roup o f  m e d ic a l o p in io n
Keown (1995) c r i t i c i z e s  th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  th e  E n g l is h  
c o u r ts  w h ich  r e l y  on th e  BOLAM t e s t ,  t h a t  t h e r e  co u ld  be no 
n e g lig e n c e  w ere an a c ce p te d  p r a c t i c e  to  be fo l lo w e d  O n ly  
r e c e n t l y ,  m  two c a s e s ,26 th e  c o u r ts  w ere w i l l i n g  to  a s s e s s  
w h e th e r co n d u ct a l le g e d  to  be n e g l ig e n t  was b o th  an
25 (1995 122) See , f o r  exam ple, th e  d e c is io n  m  H IL L S
v  POTTER [1983] 3 A l l  E R  716 T h is  argum ent i s  no t
sh a re d  b y  t h i s  r e s e a r c h e r ,  see  i n f r a  Su b p a rag rap h  4 2 3
26SMITH v  TUNBRIDGE WELLS HEALTH AUTHORITY [1994] 5
Med L R 334 and M CALLISTER V LEWISHAM AND NORTH 
SOUTHWARK HEALTH AUTHORITY AND OTHERS [1994] 5 Med L R
343
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a c ce p te d  p r a c t i c e  and a r e a s o n a b le  p r a c t i c e  In  d o in g  so , 
th e  q u e s t io n  o f  what c o n s t i t u t e d  n e g lig e n c e  rem ain ed  w i t h in  
th e  am b it o f  th e  c o u r t s ,  r a t h e r  th an  r e l y in g  on m e d ica l 
judgm ent 27
B o th  ca s e s  d e a l t  w ith  th e  i n s u f f i c i e n t  d is c lo s u r e  o f  
in fo rm a t io n  As a m a tte r  o f  c a u s a t io n  i t  had to  be shown m  
each  ca se  t h a t  i f  th e  p l a i n t i f f  was p r o p e r ly  in fo rm ed  he 
w ou ld  n o t have undergone th e  t re a tm e n t ,  and such  tre a tm e n t 
w ould  n o t have  been t o r t io u s  In  n o t f o l lo w in g  a m e d ica l 
judgm ent t e s t ,  th e  c o u r ts  w ere p re p a re d  to  a c co rd  th e
p l a i n t i f f  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  th e  doubt In  d o in g  so , th e y  
r e l i e v e d  some o f  th e  bu rden  o f  p ro o f  t h a t  r e s t e d  on th e  
p l a i n t i f f  28
The I r i s h  P o s i t io n
2 .2 .7 .  The t e s t  as i t  a p p l ie s  m  I r e la n d  has been
commented upon by a number o f  w r i t e r s  Most w r i t e r s  comment
on s p e c i f i c  e lem en ts  o f  th e  t e s t  and th e s e  w r i t e r s  a re  
d is c u s s e d  e ls e w h e re  How ever, a number o f  g e n e r a l  rem arks 
can  be o f f e r e d  a t  t h i s  s ta g e
The s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  m  m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  i s  d e f in e d  
on th e  b a s is  o f  two q u e s t io n s ,  a c c o rd in g  to  B in c h y  (1 995 ), 
d is c u s s in g  th e  d e c is io n  m  DUNNE v  NATIONAL MATERNITY 
HOSPITAL [1989] I  R 91 F i r s t ,  d id  a d o c to r  con fo rm  to  a
27Keown (1995 32)
2QIbid
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cu s to m ary  p r a c t i c e ? 29 Second , i f  so , d id  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  have 
any o b v io u s  in h e r e n t  d e f e c t s ?
The second  q u e s t io n  sub m its  th e  m e d ic a l (and o th e r )  
p r o fe s s io n s  to  th e  n o t io n  t h a t  th e  c o u r ts  may a t  a l l  t im e s  
have a f i n a l  s a y  m  th e  m a tte r  30 F o r  th e  re m a in d e r , th e  
p r o fe s s io n s  a re  s a id  to  be com petent to  s e t  t h e i r  own 
s ta n d a rd s  A l l  t h a t  i s  r e q u ir e d  i s  t h a t  a d o c to r  sh o u ld  
e x e r c is e  r e a s o n a b le  c a re  and s k i l l  w ith  r e g a rd  to  d ia g n o s is  
and t re a tm e n t  by r e fe r e n c e  to  a g e n e ra l and a c ce p te d  
p r a c t i c e  An e r r o r  o f  judgm ent i s  e x c u s a b le , as  w e l l  as a 
d i f f e r e n c e  o f  o p in io n ,  as lo n g  as t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  no t 
based  on an 'u n re a s o n a b le  b e l i e f  as  to  th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  
a p a r t i c u l a r  mode o f  t r e a tm e n t ' 31
W ith  r e g a rd  to  in fo rm ed  co n sen t c a s e s  th e  im p o rta n t 
a s p e c t  d e a ls  w it h  w hat s ta n d a rd  in fo rm a t io n  ought to  be 
d is c lo s e d  The DUNNE t e s t  a p p l ie s  H ow ever, th e  o b s e r v a t io n  
o f  F i n l a y  C J  m  DUNNE v  NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL
[1989] I  R 91 e x p r e s s ly  r e s e rv e d  power to  th e  j u d i c i a r y  to  
r e t a in  th e  f i n a l  s a y  m  th e  d e te rm in a t io n  o f  what 
c o n s t i t u t e s  n e g lig e n c e ,  a comment w h ich  was a ls o  made m  
BEST  v  WELLCOME FOUNDATION LTD [1993] 3 I  R 421 32
T h is  p o s i t io n  in d ic a t e s ,  a c c o rd in g  to  B in c h y ,  'a
29The answ er to  t h i s  q u e s t io n  i s  d eb a ted  The t h e s is  
does n o t a g re e  w ith  B in c h y  on t h i s  p o in t ,  see  i n f r a  
Su b p arag rap h  7 1 2
30B m c h y  (1995 4) The t h e s is  a d d re s s e s  t h i s  is s u e  in
more d e t a i l ,  see , i n f r a  Su b p arag rap h  4 3 5
31B m c h y  (1995 4-5)
32See  i n f r a  Su b p arag rap h  5 5 3
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s e n s i t i v i t y  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  d is c lo s u r e  o f  r i s k s  to  
p a t ie n t s  in v o lv e s  is s u e s  ra n g in g  beyond m a tte rs  o f  m e d ica l 
judgm en t' 33 T h is  p o s i t io n  i s ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  m  l i n e  w ith  th e  
ap p ro ach  ta k e n  m  A m erica  and A u s t r a l i a , 34 and i s  s im i l a r  
to  th e  d is s e n t in g  judgm ent o f  L o rd  Scarm an m  SIDAWAY v  
BETHLEM ROYAL HOSPITAL GOVERNORS [1985] 1 A l l  E R 643 35
The im p lie d  term  w ith  re g a rd  to  d ia g n o s is  and 
tre a tm e n t w i t h in  a d o c to r - p a t ie n t  r e l a t io n s h ip ,  w h e th e r in  
c o n t r a c t  o r  o th e rw is e ,  i s ,  a c c o rd in g  to  Tomkm & H a n a fm  
(1 9 9 5 ), th e  u n d e r ta k in g  t h a t  r e a s o n a b le  c a re  and s k i l l  
s h a l l  be d ep lo ye d
H ow ever, i f  an a c t io n  i s  based  on c o n t r a c t ,  th e  a c t io n  
may be co v e re d  by th e  S a le  o f  Goods and S u p p ly  o f  S e r v ic e s  
A c t ,  198 0 H e re , th e  d o c to r  re g a rd s  th e  p a t ie n t  as a 
consum er and may, und er s e c t io n  40 o f  th e  A c t ,  e x c lu d e  h is  
l i a b i l i t y  i f  t h i s  i s  r e a s o n a b le  and e x p r e s s ly  made known to  
th e  p a t ie n t  36
In  most c a s e s  in v o lv in g  m e d ica l d e c is io n - m a k in g , th e
33B m c h y  (1995 12)
34In  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  s ee , f o r  exam ple, th e  r e c e n t  
d e c is io n  m  LARGEY v  ROTHMAN (1988) 110 N J  204, 540 A
2d 504 In  A u s t r a l i a ,  see  ROGERS v  WHITAKER [1992] 16
B M L R 148
35The a s p e c t  o f  " in fo rm e d  c o n s e n t ” i s  a d d re sse d  m  
d e t a i l  m  Su b p arag rap h s  2 3 7 f f
36Tomkm & H a n a fm  (1995 66) I f  t h i s  i s  so , t h i s
co u rs e  o f  a c t io n  may, a c c o rd in g  to  t h i s  r e s e a r c h e r ,  be 
r e le v a n t  w here goods a re  used  as p a r t  o f  th e  t r e a tm e n t ,  
l  e p ro th e s e s ,  a r t i f i c i a l  h e a r t s  o r  even , i t  i s  su g g es ted , 
t r a n s p la n t a t io n  m a t e r ia l
The t h e s is  a s s e r t s  t h a t  th e  r e l a t io n s h ip  i s  based  on 
more th a n  p u r e ly  c o n t r a c t u a l  a rra n g e m en ts , see  i n f r a  
Su b p arag rap h  8 2 1
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im p lie d  term  w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  be ta k e n  from  t o r t  re a s o n a b le  
c a re  and s k i l l  The d o c to r  i s  s a id  to  be n e g l ig e n t  because  
he 'h a s  f a i l e d  to  do c o m p e te n tly  what s h o u ld  have been 
done ' 37 L i t i g a t i o n  i s  in c r e a s in g ,  and d e c is io n s  must be 
made betw een  two p a ra m e te rs  th e  su p p o rt o f  m e d ica l 
deve lopm ent w ith o u t  f e a r  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  and th e  consequences 
o f  f a i l u r e  f o r  th e  dependent p a t ie n t
The d eg ree  o f  c a re  and s k i l l  i s ,  m  I r e la n d ,  
d e te rm in ed  by com p arison  to  what i s  u s u a l in ,  o r  demanded 
b y , th e  p r o fe s s io n  o r  s p e c i a l i z a t io n  Thus, m  I r e la n d  th e  
d o c t o r 's  con d u ct i s  a s s e s s e d  by r e fe r e n c e  to  g e n e ra l and 
ap p roved  p r a c t i c e  o f  a p e rso n  o f  th e  same q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  
and e x p e r ie n c e  as t h a t  o f  th e  d e fen d a n t H e re , th e  I r i s h  
j u d i c i a r y  d i f f e r  from  t h a t  o f  En g lan d , a c c o rd in g  to  Tomkin 
& H a n a f in  In  En g lan d , th e  d o c t o r 's  v ie w  on d ia g n o s is ,  
t re a tm e n t  and in fo rm a t io n  d is c lo s u r e  i s  m easured by 
r e fe r e n c e  to  some h y p o t h e t ic a l  body o f  re a s o n a b le  
o p in io n  38 In  a d d it io n ,  th e  t e s t  m  I r e la n d  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  
o n ly  to  th o se  p r a c t i c e s  t h a t  do n o t c a r r y  an y  o b v io u s  
in h e r e n t  d e fe c t s  A c c o rd in g  to  Tomkin & H a n a f in ,  th e  I r i s h  
c o u r ts  h o ld  t h a t  some in h e r e n t ly  d e f e c t iv e  p r a c t i c e s  w i l l  
be ip s o  f a c t o  in h e r e n t ly  n e g l ig e n t  39
In  a r e c e n t  P a p e r , Tomkin (1995) s e t s  o u t th e  two 
p o s s ib le  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  F i r s t ,  i t  may
37Tomkm & H a n a f in  (1995 70)
38C f BOLAM v ,  FR IER N  HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
[1957] 2 A l l  E R 118
39Tomkm Sc H a n a f in  (1995 74)
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mean th a t  a d o c to r  i s  n e g l ig e n t  i f ,  on c o n s id e r a t io n ,  he 
w ould  n o t have adop ted  th e  p r a c t i c e  he fo l lo w e d  Second , 
th e  c o u r t  may h o ld  t h a t  th e  p r a c t i c e  m  q u e s t io n ,  w h ich  th e  
d o c to r  f a i l e d  to  exam ine, c a r r ie d  an in h e r e n t  d e fe c t  o f  
w h ich  he ought to  have been aw are B y  im p l ic a t io n ,  th e  
d o c to r  must a t  a l l  t im e s  c o n s id e r  c u r r e n t  p r a c t i c e s  to  see 
w h e th e r th e y ,  m  h is  v ie w , c a r r y  an y  in h e r e n t  d e f e c t s  40
H e a ly  (1995) a rg u es  as to  w h e th e r m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  
i s  a s s e s s e d  by th e  o r d in a r y  p r in c ip l e s  o f  n e g lig e n c e  o r  
w h e th e r i t  depends on some g e n e ra l and ap p ro ved  p r a c t i c e  
T h is  ap p ea rs  to  be o f  p a r t i c u l a r  r e le v a n c e  w ith  re g a rd  to  
" in fo r m a t io n  d is c lo s u r e "  ca se s
U nder th e  DUNNE t e s t , 41 H e a ly  a g re e s  t h a t  th e  le g a l  
s ta n d a rd  o f  r e a s o n a b le  c a re  and s k i l l  i s  d e te rm in ed  by 
r e fe r e n c e  to  a g e n e ra l and ap p roved  p r a c t i c e  I t  m in im izes  
p r o p o r t io n a l l y  more a f in d in g  o f  n e g lig e n c e  th an  a s ta n d a rd  
m  o th e r  n e g lig e n c e  ca s e s  I t  has e f f e c t i v e l y  d is a b le d  th e  
c o u r ts  to  f in d  f o r  a p l a i n t i f f  on an y p r o f e s s io n a l  judgm ent 
t h a t  i s  m  l i n e  w ith  'a  le g i t im a t e  s ch o o l o r  p r a c t i c e  
w i t h in  th e  m e d ic a l p r o f e s s io n ' 42
H ow ever, H e a ly  a rg u es  t h a t  two o th e r  c a s e s  in d ic a t e d  
some r e c o g n i t io n  f o r  th e  a p p l i c a t io n  o f  th e  o r d in a r y  
n e g lig e n c e  p r in c ip l e s  In  DAN IELS v  H ESK IN  [1954] I  R 73
40Tomkm (1995 4) T h is  p o in t  ap p ea rs  a ls o  to  be
r e le v a n t  w it h  r e g a rd  to  th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  co n d u ct o f  
s o l i c i t o r s  The t h e s is  c a r r i e s  T o m k m 's  argum ent f u r t h e r ,  
s e e , i n f r a  P a ra g ra p h  5 2
41C f DUNNE v  NATIONAL MATERNITY H O SPITAL [1989] I  R
91
42Healy (1995 196)
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)
th e  t e s t  was a p p l ie d  w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  d is c lo s u r e  o f  
in h e r e n t  r i s k s ,  a lth o u g h  th e  C h ie f  J u s t i c e  (d is s e n t in g )  
found  f o r  th e  p l a i n t i f f  d e s p it e  e x p e r t  o p in io n  A g a in , m  
WALSH v  FAM ILY PLANNING SER V IC ES  LTD [1992] 1 I  R 486
th e  t e s t  was a p p l ie d ,  d e s p it e  th e  em ergence o f  th e  A m erican  
d o c t r in e  o f  in fo rm ed  co n se n t (a p p ly in g  th e  "p ru d e n t p a t ie n t  
t e s t " ) ,  th e  c o n s id e r a t io n s  m  SIDAWAY v  BETHLEM ROYAL 
HOSPITAL GOVERNORS [1985] 1 A l l  E R 643 and, a c c o rd in g  to  
H e a ly , M cC a rth y  J  ' s em pathy m  WALSH w it h  th e  p ru d en t 
p a t ie n t  t e s t  43
H e a ly  a rg u es  t h a t  th e  outcome o f  th e  I r i s h  t e s t  does 
no t m a t e r i a l l y  d i f f e r  from  th e  p ru d en t p a t ie n t  t e s t  The 
l a t t e r  i s  s u b je c t  to  " t h e r a p e u t ic  p r i v i l e g e "  w h ich  
m in im iz es  th e  e f f e c t  o f  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t io n  In  
a d d it io n ,  th e  c o u r t  must m  b o th  t e s t s  r e l y  on s p e c ia l iz e d  
c l i n i c a l  judgm ent and m e d ic a l th e o ry  as to  th e  d e f in i t i o n s  
o f  g e n e ra l and s p e c i f i c  r i s k s  In  d o in g  so th e  outcome 
rem a in s  s u b je c t  to  m e d ic a l p a te rn a l is m  A ca se- b y- case  
ap p ro ach  as to  d is c lo s u r e  o f  m a t e r ia l  r i s k s  w i l l  underm ine
43Jjb id  , a t  197, 199 In  FARRELL v  VARIAN, U n re p o rte d , 
H igh  C o u rt , 19 Sep tem ber 1994, O' H an lon  J  , i t  was a 
g e n e ra l p r a c t i c e  n o t to  d is c lo s e  a p a r t i c u l a r ,  m in u te  r i s k  
(th e  o c c u r re n c e  o f  R e f le x  S ym p a th e t ic  D ys tro p h y  a f t e r  
s u rg e ry  on th e  hand) Ju d g e  O 'H a n lo n  found  f o r  th e  
d e fe n d a n t, s t a t in g  t h a t  th e  d is c lo s u r e  o f  in fo rm a t io n  must 
p r im a r i l y  be a m a tte r  o f  c l i n i c a l  judgm ent, ex cep t where 
d is c lo s u r e  i s  so 'o b v io u s ly  n e c e s s a ry  to  an in fo rm ed  c h o ic e  
on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  p a t ie n t  t h a t  no re a s o n a b ly  p ru d en t 
m e d ic a l man w ou ld  f a i l  to  make i t '  (U n re p o rte d , H ig h  C o u rt , 
19 Sep tem ber 1994, a t  page 51 o f  O 'H a n lo n  J  ' s  judgm ent) 
H ow ever, m  BOLTON v  THE BLACKROCK C L IN IC , U n re p o rte d , 
H igh  C o u rt , 20 December 1994, Geoghegan J  h e ld  t h a t  th e  
d is c lo s u r e  o f  in fo rm a t io n  does n o t depend on an y g e n e ra l o r  
ap p ro ved  p r a c t i c e  b u t , in s te a d ,  on th e  o r d in a r y  p r in c ip l e s  
o f  n e g lig e n c e
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l e g a l  c e r t a in t y
W here th e  two t e s t s  d i f f e r  i s  in  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  
s t a r t i n g  p o in ts  The p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  t e s t  fo c u s e s  
on th e  d o c t o r 's  d u ty , w hereas th e  p ru d e n t p a t ie n t  t e s t  
r e l i e s  on th e  p a t i e n t 's  r i g h t  to  be in fo rm ed  I f  no t 
f r u s t r a t e d  by th e  e x c e p t io n  o f  t h e r a p e u t ic  p r i v i l e g e  and, 
more im p o r t a n t ly ,  p ro x im a te  c a u s a t io n ,  th e  l a t t e r  w ould  
demand more r ig o ro u s  re q u ire m e n ts  o f  d is c lo s u r e
H e a ly  a s s e r t s  t h a t  th e  d u ty  to  d is c lo s e  i s  p a r t  o f  th e  
g e n e ra l p r o f e s s io n a l  d u ty  to  e x e r c is e  re a s o n a b le  c a re  and 
s k i l l  T h is  d u ty  i s ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  s u b je c t  to  th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  
n e g lig e n c e  t e s t  as l a i d  down m  DUNNE v  NATIONAL MATERNITY 
HOSPITAL [1989] I  R 91 A b re a ch  o f  t h i s  d u ty  i s ,
a c c o r d in g ly ,  d e te rm in ed  by r e fe r e n c e  to  g e n e ra l and 
app roved  p r a c t i c e  o r ,  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  by r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  
e x c e p t io n  o f  in h e r e n t  d e fe c t s  to  a g e n e ra l and app roved
p r a c t i c e  T h is  im p lie s  t h a t  a d o c to r  may be n e g l ig e n t  i f
th e  d u ty  to  d is c lo s e  w ould  have been so o b v io u s  to  any 
p e rso n  who had g iv e n  th e  m a tte r  due c o n s id e r a t io n  44
G e n e ra l Rem arks
2.2,8. Jo n e s  (1991) s e t s  o u t a number o f  is s u e s
c o n c e rn in g  m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  ca se s
F i r s t ,  Jo n e s  a rg u es  t h a t  a lth o u g h  th e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  
d o c to rs  m  n e g lig e n c e  i s  based  on th e  p r i n c ip l e  o f  f a u l t  
l i a b i l i t y ,  i t  does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y  f o l lo w  t h a t  a n e g l ig e n t
44Healy (1995 224)
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d o c to r  i s  m o ra l ly  b lam ew o rth y  The q u e s t io n  ad d re sse d  by 
th e  law  i s  r a t h e r  what ty p e  o f  m e d ic a l a c c id e n ts  sh o u ld  be 
com pensated The assessm en t o f  l i a b i l i t y  - a lth o u g h  
o b je c t i v e  - depends to  a la r g e  e x te n t  on an ex  p o s t  f a c t o  
a n a ly s i s  o f  th e  f a c t s  o f  th e  ca se  A c c o rd in g  to  Jo n e s , th e  
t o r t  judgm ent can n o t fo cu s  on b ro a d e r  q u e s t io n s ,  such  as to  
how m e d ic a l c a re  can  be im proved  and a c c id e n ts  be a vo id e d  
T h is  can  o n ly  be done by th e  m e d ic a l p r o fe s s io n  i t s e l f  by 
a d h e r in g  to  e s t a b l is h e d  l i a b i l i t y  r u le s  and t h e i r  c r i t i c a l  
r e - a p p r a is a l  45
Second , th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  d e te rm in e s  w h e th e r th e  typ e  
o f  lo s s  s u f f e r e d  by th e  p l a i n t i f f  i s  a c t io n a b le  as a m a tte r  
o f  p o l i c y  The s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  i s  a m easure o f  th e  a c t u a l  
a l le g e d  n e g l ig e n t  cond uct
The d u ty  q u e s t io n  i s  o n ly  r e a l l y  r e le v a n t  m  
s i t u a t io n s  w here a p r o f e s s io n a l  p e r s o n 's  a l le g e d  n e g lig e n c e  
i s  n o t based  on a p r e - e x is t in g  r e la t io n s h ip  H e re , th e  
e x is te n c e  o f  a d u ty  o f  c a re  demands f u r t h e r  e x a m in a tio n  
b e fo re  th e  c o u r ts  can  a d ju d ic a t e  w h e th e r th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  
p e rso n  i s  n e g l ig e n t  and, s u b s e q u e n t ly , l i a b l e
H ow ever, m  th e  d o c to r - p a t ie n t  r e l a t io n s h ip  a d u ty  o f 
c a re  i s  o f t e n  e a s i l y  e s t a b l is h e d  The s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  i s  
th e  param ount f e a tu r e  m  m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  ca s e s  The 
d o c to r  must a c t  w ith  r e a s o n a b le  c a re  m  a l l  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  
In  o th e r  w ords, what ought to  have been done i s  com pared 
w ith  w hat i s  a c t u a l l y  done, by r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  re a s o n a b le  
d o c to r ,  common p r o f e s s io n a l  p r a c t i c e ,  th e  a c t u a l  cond uct
45Jones (1991 1-2)
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co m p la in ed  o f ,  c o m p lia n c e / d e v ia t io n  o f  common p r a c t i c e  and 
p o l i c y  46
A c c o rd in g  to  Mason & M c C a ll Sm ith  (1 9 8 7 ), th e  c o u r ts  
make a b a la n c e  betw een  th e  in t e r e s t s  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l  
p a t ie n t  and th e  r e lu c ta n c e  to  aw ard  damages a g a in s t  
d o c to rs  T h is  r e lu c ta n c e  i s  based  on p o l i c y  c o n s id e r a t io n s ,  
th e  p a t ie n t  i s  su p p o rte d  by r e l i e v i n g  th e  burden  o f  p ro o f  
m  some m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  ca se s  47
These p o l i c y  c o n s id e r a t io n s  d e te rm in e  t h a t  a d o c t o r 's  
conduct must be jud g ed  by r e fe r e n c e  to  what i s  s ta n d a rd  
p r a c t i c e  w i t h in  h is  segment o f  th e  m e d ic a l p r o fe s s io n  
Thus, a t r i a l  o f  fo rc e p s  d e l i v e r y  w h ich  r e s u l t s  m  a 
m e d ic a l m isa d ve n tu re  w i l l  r e q u ir e  e x p la n a t io n  by r e fe r e n c e  
to  s ta n d a rd  o b s t e t r i c a l  p r a c t i c e  T h is  does n o t ex h au st th e  
l e g a l  in q u i r y  I t  must th en  fo cu s  on w h e th e r th e  t r i a l  o f  
fo rc e p s  was w e l l  o r  b a d ly  h a n d le d , a q u e s t io n  r e l a t i n g  to  
th e  s ta n d a rd s  o f  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  p r a c t i t i o n e r ,  and s c a r c e ly  
r e le v a n t  to  g e n e ra l g y n a e c o lo g ic a l  custom  and p r a c t i c e  48
The s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  rem a in s  c o n s ta n t  I t  i s  th e  
r e a s o n a b ly  com petent d o c to r  I t  a p p l ie s  a t  each  in s ta n c e  o f 
th e  o v e r a l l  m e d ic a l in t e r v e n t io n  th e  d ia g n o s is  and 
t re a tm e n t ,  d e v ia t io n  from  s ta n d a rd  p r a c t i c e  i f  an y , 
in n o v a t iv e  te c h n iq u e s , k ee p in g  a b re a s t  w it h  s c i e n t i f i c  
d eve lo p m en ts , and a n y th in g  s i m i l a r l y  r e le v a n t  The BOLAM
A6I b i d  , a t  62, 68
47Mason Sc M c C a ll Sm ith  (1987 165)
48Jjb id  , a t  170-172 They r e f e r  to  th e  d e c is io n  m  
WHITEHOUSE v  JORDAN [1980] 1 A l l  E R 650
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t e s t  a d d re s se s  a d iv a g a t io n  o r  d e p a r tu re  from  custom  and 
p r a c t i c e  from  th e  p r o fe s s io n  49
2.2.9. K id n e r  (1991) p ro v id e s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  argum ent to  
j u s t i f y  th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  m  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e
He a s s e r t s  t h a t  th e  c o u r ts  a t t r i b u t e  c e r t a in  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  to  th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  These 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a re  based  on th e  p a r t i c u l a r  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  
o f  th e  ca se  and th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  s p e c i f i c  d u t ie s  o r  
o b l ig a t io n s  w h ich  d e r iv e d  from  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  u n d e r ly in g  
r e la t io n s h ip  T h is  r e l a t io n s h ip  i s  based  on p r o x im ity  In  
" o r d in a r y "  n e g lig e n c e  ca s e s  (c a s e s  o f  p h y s ic a l  damage) th e  
d eg ree  o f  p r o x im ity  i s  n o rm a lly  a s s e s s e d  th ro u g h  th e  
f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  o f  damage T h is  im p l ie s  t h a t  th e  c o u r ts  lo o k  
a t  th e  so u rce  o f  th e  o b l ig a t io n  - th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  - to  
a s s e s s  th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  50
H ow ever, m  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  ca s e s  th e  
r e l a t io n s h ip  i s  n o rm a lly  based  on som eth ing  more 
s u b s t a n t ia l  th a n  o r d in a r y  p r o x im ity  I t  r e q u ir e s  more th an  
re a s o n a b le  f o r e s ig h t  m  a g e n e ra l sen se  The r e la t io n s h ip  
must a t  each  tim e  be re - c o n s id e re d , and i t s  c r i t i c a l  
f e a tu r e s  a s s e s s e d  to  form  th e  r e q u ir e d  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  51 
T h is  im p l ie s  an e x a m in a tio n  in t o  th e  s p e c i f i c  o b l ig a t io n s
49Mason & M c C a ll Sm ith  (1987 167)
50K id n e r  (1991 6)
51T h is  i s  made i n  c l e a r  i n  th e  t h e s is  b y  r e f e r e n c e  to  
th e  f a c t u a l  s i t u a t io n  o f  w h ich  Mr W a lsh  a l le g e d  to  have 
been n e g l ig e n t l y  in fo rm ed  (WALSH v  FAM ILY PLANNING 
SER V IC ES  [1992] I  R 4 9 6 ), see  i n f r a  Su b p a rag rap h  5 6 1
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and d u t ie s  o f  th e  d e fen d a n t to  a s s e s s  th e  r e q u ir e d  s ta n d a rd  
o f  c a re  T h is  r a i s e s  th e  q u e s t io n  as to  th e  p o s i t io n  o f  th e  
d e fen d a n t and th e  s ta n d a rd  sh o u ld  be t h a t  w h ich  th e  
d e fen d a n t h o ld s  h im s e lf  ou t as p o s s e s s in g  52
A c c o r d in g ly ,  K id n e r  su g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  
r e l a t io n s h ip  t e l l s  us w h e th e r th e  d e fe n d a n t co u ld  have 
a c te d  d i f f e r e n t l y  th an  he d id  The s ta n d a rd  o f  c a r e ,  
t h e r e fo r e ,  must a ls o  be c o n s id e re d  from  th e  p o in t  o f  v ie w  
o f  th e  d e fen d a n t
A c c o rd in g  to  t h i s  v ie w , i t  i s  su b m itte d  by t h i s  
r e s e a r c h e r ,  th e  v i o l a t i o n  o f th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  by th e  
d e fen d a n t demands an e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  c o n te n ts  o f  th e  
d u ty  o f  c a re  T h is  i s  n o th in g  new How ever, K id n e r  s t r e s s e s  
th e  p o in t  t h a t  m  s i t u a t io n s  w here th e  r e l a t io n s h ip  i s  le s s  
o b v io u s  th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  i s  n o t d e te rm in ed  by 
re a s o n a b le  c a re  a lo n e  In  th e s e  s i t u a t io n s  th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  
c a re  i s  d e te rm in e d  b y  r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  b re a ch  o f  s p e c i f i c  
d u t ie s  t h a t  e s t a b l is h e d  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een  th e  
p l a i n t i f f  and th e  d e fen d a n t T h is  p o in t  m  p a r t i c u l a r  i s  
p ic k e d  up b y  t h i s  r e s e a r c h e r  and th e  t h e s is  c a r r i e s  
K id n e r 's  argum ent f u r t h e r  53
The S ta n d a rd  o f  C are  o f  Com puter C o n s u lta n ts  and M e n ta l 
H e a lth  P r o f e s s io n a ls
2 .2 .1 0 , A new a re a  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  may be
52K id n e r  (1991 22-23)
53See  i n f r a  Su b p arag rap h  4 4 2
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found  i n  com puter m a lp r a c t ic e  T o g e th e r  w ith  th e  n e g lig e n c e  
o f  m en ta l h e a l t h  p r o f e s s io n a ls ,  d is c u s s e d  b e lo w ,54 a 
g e n e ra l p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  t e s t  p ro v e s  p ro b le m a t ic  m  
t h i s  a re a  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  The f e a tu r e s  o f  such  
a t e s t , as  sum m arized i n  th e  t h e s i s , 55 do n o t ta k e  in t o  
a cco u n t th e  s p e c i f i c  n a tu re  and p o s i t io n  o f  p r o f e s s io n a ls  
m  th e s e  two a re a s
2 . 2 . 1 1 .  Condo (1991) e x p lo re s  th e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  a com puter 
c o n s u lt a n t  who f a i l s  to  a d v is e  a c l i e n t  c o m p e te n tly  as to  
com puter system s The q u e s t io n  i s  how a p r o f e s s io n a l  
n e g lig e n c e  s ta n d a rd  a p p l ie s  m  such  a n o v e l f i e l d
The u n d e r ly in g  p rob lem  i s  t h a t  th e  com puter c o n s u lta n t  
has n o t y e t  been subsumed w i t h in  th e  c o n f in e s  o f  th e  term  
"p r o f e s s io n "  Y e t  th e  o c c u p a t io n  i s  one w h ich  r e q u ir e s  
autonom y o f  judgm ent and w here f a i l u r e  to  m a in ta in  h ig h  
s ta n d a rd s  can  le a d  to  econom ic lo s s  B u t th e r e  i s  no 
u n ifo rm  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  p ro ce d u re  f o r  com puter c o n s u lt a n ts  
T h e re fo re ,  r e f e r e n c e  to  " e q u a l ly  com petent men" w ould  be 
m is le a d in g , co m p ariso n s  a re  d i f f i c u l t  to  make m  th e  
ab sen ce  o f  u n ifo rm  s ta n d a rd s  o f  e d u c a t io n , t r a in in g  and 
p r a c t i c e  56
One a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  to  a v o id  a p p ly in g  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f
54See  i n f r a  Su b p a rag rap h  2 2 12
55See i n f r a  Su b p arag rap h  4 4 2
56Condo (1991 323) E q u a l ly ,  r e f e r e n c e  to  th e  BOLAM o r
th e  DUNNE t e s t  w i l l  be p ro b le m a t ic  These t e s t s  r e f e r ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y  to  a "body o f  r e s p o n s ib le  o p in io n "  o r  an 
"a c c e p te d  and ap p ro ved  p r a c t i c e " ,  see  i n f r a  Su b p a rag rap h s  
4 4 2 and 4 4 3
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"p r o f e s s io n s "  a t  a l l  to  such  ca se s  and in s t e a d  to  s e a rc h  
f o r  a n o th e r  b a s is  on w h ich  th e y  may be r e s o lv e d  The c o u r ts  
c o u ld  c o n s id e r  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  r e l a t io n s h ip  betw een  c l i e n t  
and s e r v i c e  p r o v id e r  upon th e  s u b je c t  m a t te r  o f  th e  
t r a n s a c t io n  and th e  d eg ree  o f  r e l i a n c e  o f  th e  c l i e n t  57
Y e t  a n o th e r  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  p roposed  by Condo, w ou ld  be 
to  a p p ly  th e  id e a  o f  im p lie d  w a r r a n t ie s  to  s e r v ic e  
p r o v id e r s ,  in c lu d in g  com puter c o n s u lt a n ts  T h is  su g g e s ts  
t h a t  th e  p ro v id e d  s e r v ic e s  c a r r y  an im p lie d  w a r r a n ty  th a t  
th e y  a re  p e rfo rm ed  c o m p e te n tly  As a r e s u l t  i t  g e n e r a l iz e s  
th e  co n cep t o f  m a lp r a c t ic e  (o r  n e g lig e n c e )  and c o v e rs  a l l  
ty p e s  o f  n o n - p ro fe s s io n a l s e r v ic e s  58
W h eth er th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  m a lp r a c t ic e  s ta n d a rd  sh o u ld  
be ex tend ed  to  com puter p r o f e s s io n a ls  depends, a c c o rd in g  to  
G ra z ia n o  (1991) , on th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  damage and th e  n a tu re  
o f  th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  con d u ct She a g re e s  w ith  Condo (s u p ra )  
t h a t  to  e s t a b l i s h  t h i s  th e r e  must be some s o r t  o f  
u n i f o r m it y  w i t h in  th e  p r o fe s s io n ,  based  on e d u c a t io n a l  o r  
l i c e n s in g  s ta n d a rd s  U n t i l  t h i s  i s  a c h ie v e d  th e  o r d in a r y  
n e g lig e n c e  r u le s  sh o u ld  a p p ly  59
57Condo (1991 327-328) See , f o r  exam ple, th e  d e c is io n
in  D IV E R S IF IE D  GRAPHICS LTD v  GROVES (1989) 868 F 2d
293
T h is  ap p ro ach  su g g e s ts  th e  a p p l i c a t io n  o f  th e  r u le s  
l a i d  down m  HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v  H ELLER  & PARTNERS 
LTD [1963] A l l  E R  575 and CAPARO IN D U STR IES  PLC v  
DICKMAN [1990] 2 A l l  E R 568, see  i n f r a  Su b p arag rap h s
9 4 2 and 9 4 3
58Condo (1991 333) He r e f e r s  to  th e  d e c is io n  m  
MELODY HOME MANUFACTURING CO V BARNES ((1 9 8 7 ) 741 S W
2d 349
59Graziano (1991 186)
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T h at a p r o f e s s io n a l  m a lp r a c t ic e  s ta n d a rd  in  t h i s  f i e l d  
depends on th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  lo s s  and th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  
d e fe n d a n t 's  con d u ct i s  a ls o  re c o g n iz e d  b y  Reed (1987) W ith  
re g a rd  to  th e  p r o v is io n  o f  com puter s e r v i c e s  p a r t i c u l a r  
le g a l  p rob lem s a r i s e  due to  d i f f e r e n t  s o f tw a re  te c h n o lo g ie s  
on th e  one s id e ,  and th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  lo s s  on 
th e  o th e r  60
The p rob lem  th a t  e x is t s  i s  w here a c l i e n t  o r  p l a i n t i f f  
r e l i e s  on th e  r e s u l t s  p rodu ced  by s o f tw a re  T h is  r e l i a n c e ,  
i f  m is p la c e d , may r e s u l t  m  huge lo s s e s  f o r  th e  c l i e n t  o r  
p l a i n t i f f  T h is  im poses an even  g r e a t e r  burden  on th e  
com puter p r o f e s s io n a l  The l im i t a t i o n s  on th e  im p o s it io n  o f  
a d u ty  o f  c a r e ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  must u l t im a t e l y  depend on th e  
l im i t i n g  c r i t e r i a  i n i t i a l l y  l a i d  down m  HEDLEY BYRNE & CO 
LTD v  H ELLER  Sc PARTNERS LTD [1963] 2 A l l  E R 575 61
2 . 2 . 1 2 .  I t  i s  o b v io u s  t h a t  m  s i t u a t io n s  w here a m e d ica l 
p r a c t i t i o n e r  owes a d u ty  to w ard s  t h i r d  p a r t i e s ,  th e  d u ty  
q u e s t io n  p la y s  an im p o rta n t r o le  m  th e  assessm en t o f  th e  
p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s  l i a b i l i t y  I t  p ro ve s  t h a t  th e  e x is te n c e  o f 
a d u ty  i s  im p o rta n t f o r  th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  r e q u ir e d  by 
m en ta l h e a l t h  p r o f e s s io n a ls  62
60Reed (1987 444)
61I b i d  , a t  445 See i n f r a  Su b p a rag rap h  9 4 2
62T h is  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e le v a n t  m  s i t u a t io n s  w here a 
m en ta l h e a l t h  p r o f e s s io n a l  i s  und er a d u ty  to  w arn  t h i r d  
p a r t i e s  o f  a dangerous p s y c h ia t r i c  p a t ie n t  F o r  more 
in fo rm a t io n  on th e  s p e c i f i c  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  th e  d u ty  
q u e s t io n  m  t h i s  a r e a ,  see Gammon & H u ls to n  (1995) and 
Jam es (1995)
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As to  th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  ex p ec ted  from  m en ta l h e a l t h  
p r o f e s s io n a ls  a number o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r i s e ,  a c c o rd in g  to  
L e e s f i e ld  (1987) The w r i t e r  a rg u es  t h a t  an a c ce p te d  
g e n e ra l p r a c t i c e  s ta n d a rd  i s  u n l i k e l y  The re a so n s  f o r  t h i s  
a re  th e  h u g e ly  c o n f l i c t i n g  s c h o o ls  o f  th o u g h t as to  what 
c o n s t i t u t e s  m en ta l i l l n e s s  and ty p e s  b o th  o f  d ia g n o s is  and 
t re a tm e n t  th e r e o f  T h is  i s  consonan t w ith  th e  d i s p a r i t y  o f  
o p in io n  among p r o f e s s io n a l  p e rso n s  w i t h in  th e  m en ta l h e a l t h  
p r o fe s s io n  63
The ca s e s  re v ie w e d  by th e  w r i t e r  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  m  
t h i s  f i e l d  th e  c o u r ts  m  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  ta k e  an 
in c re m e n ta l ap p ro ach  to w ard s  th e  im p o s it io n  o f  b o th  a d u ty  
and s ta n d a rd  o f  c a r e ,  depend ing  on v a r io u s  f a c t o r s  64 These 
f a c t o r s  in c lu d e  th e  f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  o f  r i s k  ( f o r  exam ple 
s u i c i d e ) , th e  l i k e l ih o o d  o f  i n j u r y  and th e  s o c i a l  u t i l i t y  
o f  th e  co n d u ct o f  th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  p e rso n
In  a s s e s s in g  th e s e  f a c t o r s  i t  m ust, a c c o rd in g  to  th e  
w r i t e r ,  be em phasized  t h a t  h ig h  l e g a l  and e t h i c a l  s ta n d a rd s  
must be m a in ta in e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y  m  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e  added 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  th e  more th a n  dependent m e n ta l ly  i l l  
p a t ie n t  65
A n o th e r  re a so n  n o t to  use  a g e n e ra l s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re
63L e e s f i e ld  (1987 57) A g a in , a g e n e ra l p r o f e s s io n a l
n e g lig e n c e  t e s t  such  as th e  BOLAM and th e  DUNNE t e s t  i s  
u n l i k e l y
64These f a c t o r s  w ere d is c u s s e d  in ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  TARASOFF 
v  REGENTS OF THE U N IV ER S IT Y  OF CALIFO RN IA  (1976) 551 P
2d 334, FR EESE  v  LEMMON (1973) 210 N W 2d 576 and
JA BLO N SK I v  UNITED STATES (1983) 712 F 2d 576
65Leesfield (1987 60)
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w ith  re g a rd  to  m en ta l h e a l t h  p r o f e s s io n a ls  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t ,  a c c o rd in g  to  M ich ak , to  make p s y c h ia t r i c  
p r e d ic t io n s  w ith  an y  deg ree  o f  c e r t a i n t y  66 T h is  i s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  p ro b le m a t ic  w here th e  is s u e s  in v o lv e  a 
p s y c h ia t r i s t / p s y c h o lo g is t  ow ing a d u ty  o f  c a re  to w ard s  
t h i r d  p a r t i e s  o f  d an g er to  them a t  th e  hand o f  p s y c h ia t r i c  
p a t ie n t s  th e  TARASOFF syndrome 67
In  a d d it io n ,  one must f i r s t  d e te rm in e  th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  
s t a tu s  o f  a m en ta l h e a l t h  p r o f e s s io n a l  b e fo re  one can 
im pose a d u ty  Thus, a h ig h e r  d eg ree  o f  c a re  i s  r e q u ir e d  
from , f o r  exam ple, a p s y c h i a t r i s t  th an  i t  i s  from  an 
(u n d e fin e d ) m en ta l h e a l t h  t h e r a p is t  68
Jo n e s  (1991) a rg u es  t h a t  th e  m en ta l h e a lth  
p r o f e s s io n a l 's  d u ty  to w ard s  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  sh o u ld  m  En g lan d  
be based  on th e  f o l lo w in g  c o n s id e r a t io n s ,  le a v in g  no space  
f o r  a u n iv e r s a l  s ta n d a rd  ( i )  th e  p s y c h i a t r i s t ' s  g e n e ra l 
d u ty  to w ard s  s o c ie t y ,  ( n )  th e  s p e c i f i c  r e l a t io n s h ip  
betw een  d o c to r  and p a t ie n t  t h a t  may u n d e r l ie  th e  " s p e c ia l  
r e l a t io n s h ip "  betw een  th e  d o c to r  and th e  t h i r d  p a r t y ,  ( i n )  
th e  d o c t o r 's  d u ty  to  c o n t r o l  th e  p a t ie n t  and h is  s p e c ia l  
know ledge abou t th e  p l a i n t i f f  and (i v ) th e  f o r e s e e a b i l i t y
66 (1986 346-348)
67C f TARASOFF v  REGENTS OF U N IV ER S IT Y  OF CALIFO RN IA  
(1976) 551 P 2d 334
68M ich ak  (1986 348-349) How ever, th e  BOLAM t e s t  and
th e  DUNNE t e s t  a p p ly  to  th o se  who h o ld  th e m s e lv e s  o u t as 
h a v in g  a s p e c ia l  s k i l l , f o r  ex am p le , p s y c h i a t r i s t s , 
p s y c h o lo g is t s  and o th e r  t h e r a p i s t s , see  BOYLE v  MARTIN 
(1932) 66 I  L  T R 187, i n f r a  Su b p a rag rap h  4 3 3
31
o f i n f l i c t i n g  harm 69 Hence, Jo n e s  fa v o u rs  an in c re m e n ta l 
ap p ro ach  m  t h i s  a re a  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e
Jo h n so n  (1991) su g g e s ts  a " p r o f e s s io n a l  judgm ent" 
s ta n d a rd  to  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r th e  d u ty  was b rea ch e d  He 
r e j e c t s  th e  " p r o f e s s io n a l  m a lp r a c t ic e "  t e s t  T h a t t e s t  
com pares th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  con d u ct w ith  t h a t  o f  h is  p e e rs  
U nder th e  fo rm e r, th e  q u e s t io n  i s  w h e th e r th e  d e fen d a n t 
a c te d  m  a c co rd a n ce  w ith  i d e n t i f i e d  c r i t e r i a  These 
c r i t e r i a  r e l a t e  to ,  f o r  exam ple, w h e th e r th e  p a t ie n t  was 
com m itted  v o l u n t a r i l y  o r  i n v o lu n t a r i l y  o r  was an o u t ­
p a t ie n t  In  a d d i t io n ,  t h i s  ap p ro ach  p ro v id e s  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  
s o lu t io n  to  th e  p rob lem  o f  w h e th e r dangerous b e h a v io u r  o f  
a p s y c h i a t r i c  p a t ie n t  i s  fo r e s e e a b le  o r  n o t 70
Jo h n s o n 's  t e s t  p u rp o r ts  to  prom ote more e f f e c t i v e  
t r e a tm e n t ,  w ith o u t  ex p o s in g  th e  p u b l ic  to  undue r i s k s  
Thus, h is  p ro po sed  s ta n d a rd , i t  seems, has m  mind a 
b a la n c e  betw een  th e  w e ll- b e in g  o f  th e  p o t e n t i a l l y  h a rm fu l 
p a t ie n t ,  and th e  p r o t e c t io n  o f  th e  p u b l ic  a t  la r g e  
How ever, t h i s  e q u a t io n  may o v e r lo o k  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  some 
im p o rta n t is s u e s ,  such  as t h a t  o f  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  and th e  
n a tu re  o f  p s y c h ia t r i c  t re a tm e n t ,  m  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w ith  
r e s p e c t  to  co m m itta l p o l i c i e s
69Jo n e s  (191 41-45)
70Jo h n so n  (1991 242)
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2.3. The Standard Examined
2 .3  1. T h is  s e c t io n  re v ie w s  th e  comments on s p e c i f i c  
a t t r ib u t e s  o f  th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  m  p r o fe s s io n a l  
n e g lig e n c e  I t  im m e d ia te ly  becomes a p p a re n t t h a t  th e  
" in fo r m a t io n  d is c lo s u r e "  c a se s  p ro vo ke  academ ic d eb a te  The 
i n t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  "s ta n d a rd  a c ce p te d  p r a c t i c e "  i s  a ls o  an 
is s u e  t h a t  r e q u ir e s  c o n s id e r a t io n
T h is  r e s e a r c h e r ,  how ever, must p o in t  o u t t h a t  t h i s  
P a ra g ra p h  (2 3 )  o v e r la p s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  w it h  th e  p re v io u s  
P a ra g ra p h  (2 2 )  In  a d d it io n ,  th e  argum ents o f  a number o f  
com m entators a re  d is c u s s e d  m  th e  t h e s is  i t s e l f  und er th e  
r e le v a n t  r u b r ic s
S ta n d a rd  A cce p te d  P r a c t i c e 71
2 3 .2 .  The t h e s is  p o in t s  o u t t h a t  th e  c o u r ts  r e l y  on 
some s o r t  o f  s ta n d a rd  p r a c t i c e  m  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  
c a s e s  They r e f e r  e i t h e r  to  a body o f  r e s p o n s ib le  o p in io n  
(BOLAM) to  a s s e s s  th e  p r a c t i c e ,  o r  th e y  r e f e r  to  w h e th e r 
th e  p r a c t i c e  i s  g e n e ra l and a c ce p te d  (DUNNE) 72
B y  some, "s ta n d a rd  a c ce p te d  p r a c t i c e "  i s  a ls o  r e f e r r e d
71T h is  su b -h ead in g  r e l a t e s  to  th e  f o l lo w in g  r u b r ic s  
( i )  "O b v io u s  In h e re n t  D e f e c t s " ,  ( n )  E r r o r s  o f  ( C l i n i c a l )  
Judgm ent, ( m )  D i f f e r e n c e  o f  P r o f e s s io n a l  O p in io n  and (i v ) 
S c i e n t i f i c  D is p u te s
72See  i n f r a  C h ap te r  Fo u r
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to  as cu s to m ary  p r a c t i c e  73 How ever, a c c o rd in g  to  K in g  
(1 9 7 5 ), th e  fo rm er d i f f e r s  from  custom  in  a number o f  ways 
S ta n d a rd  a c ce p te d  p r a c t i c e  i s  c o n t r o l le d  by th e  members o f ,  
f o r  exam ple, th e  m e d ic a l p r o fe s s io n s  A c c o rd in g  to  K in g , 
th e  m e d ic a l p r o fe s s io n  i s  ' in s t r u m e n t a l '  m  d e f in in g  th e  
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  i n  m e d ic a l m a lp r a c t ic e  74 In  o th e r  w ords, 
th e  m e d ic a l p r o fe s s io n  p r e s e rv e s  th e  hegemony o f  th e  
p r o fe s s io n  and e n s u re s , a t  th e  same t im e , a h ig h e r  q u a l i t y  
o f  c a re  th a n  does custom  T h is  im p lie s  t h a t  th o se  p r a c t i c e s  
th a t  a re  a c c e p te d  by th e  p r o fe s s io n  a re  c o n t r o l l in g  and a re  
som eth ing  o f  g r e a t e r  f o r e n s ic  im p o rtan ce  th a n  mere 
cu sto m ary
The s ta n d a rd  i s  a p p l ic a b le  to  n o v e l s i t u a t io n s  I t  
does n o t , u n l ik e  custom , lo o k  a t  h i s t o r i c a l  co n d u ct bu t 
r a t h e r  a t  p re s e n t  d eve lop m en ts  F u rth e rm o re , th e  s ta n d a rd  
i s  based  on what ought to  be done I t  may, on o c c a s io n , 
d e v ia t e  from  a u n iv e r s a l  b e l i e f  and f o l lo w  a r e s p e c te d  
m in o r i t y  o f  th e  m e d ic a l p r o fe s s io n  75
The t e s t  sh o u ld  be c o n c lu s iv e  e v id e n c e  m  a s s e s s in g  
th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  l i a b i l i t y , 76 a lth o u g h  e x c e p t io n s  rem a in  m  
"common se n se " c a s e s ,77 in fo rm ed  co n se n t c a s e s ,78 and th o se
73See , i n t e r  a l i o s ,  McMahon & B m c h y  (1990 259) T h is
is s u e  i s  a ls o  ad d re sse d  m  th e  t h e s i s ,  see  i n f r a  
Su b p arag rap h  7 1 2
74 (1975 1236)
7SI b i d  , a t  1238-1239
76C f H ELLIN G  v  CAREY (1974) 83 Wash 2d 514, 519 P 
2d 981
77K m g  (1975 1257) "O b v io u s  in h e r e n t  d e f e c t s "  under
I r i s h  la w ?
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ca s e s  h o ld in g  t h a t  a d o c to r  sh o u ld  s im p ly  e x e r c is e  h is  b e s t  
j  udgment
The endorsem ent o f  an a c ce p te d  p r a c t i c e  s ta n d a rd  o f  
c a re  must be based  on th e  id e a  t h a t  m e d ic a l d e c is io n s  a re  
n o t g e n e r a l l y  a m a tte r  o f  common sen se , to  be answ ered  by 
th e  l a y  ju d g e  o r  j u r y  T h is  i s  su p p o rte d , i n t e r  a h a ,  by 
th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  "b en d in g " o f  h a rd  m e d ic a l e v id e n c e  by th e  
l a y  j u r y  o r  ju d g e  co u ld  underm ine th e  a l l o c a t io n  o f  m e d ic a l 
r e s o u rc e s  In  a d d it io n ,  a p r o f e s s io n a l  s ta n d a rd  o f f e r s  
c e r t a in t y  as to  th e  outcome o f  o n e 's  (th e  d o c t o r 's )  a c t io n s  
and may p r e v e n t ,  by im p l ic a t io n ,  d e fe n s iv e  p r a c t i c e  79 I t  
o f f e r s  a h ig h e r  l e v e l  o f  m e d ic a l c a re  80
T h is  ap p ro ach  b e a rs  two co n seq u en ces , a c c o rd in g  to  
t h i s  r e s e a r c h e r
F i r s t ,  i t  p r e s e rv e s  th e  b ases  o f  t o r t  o f  n e g lig e n c e  
no l i a b i l i t y  w ith o u t  f a u l t  How ever, " f a u l t "  must be v ie w ed  
i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  m e d ic a l o r  p r o f e s s io n a l  n e g lig e n c e  and 
r e l a t e s  o n ly  to  what th e  m e d ic a l p r o fe s s io n  re g a rd s  as 
s o c i a l l y  u n a c c e p ta b le  b e h a v io u r  by one o f  i t s  members m  
th e  e x e r c is e  o f  h is  d u t ie s
Second , i f  t h i s  i s  a c ce p te d , th e r e  i s  a dangerous 
im p l ic a t io n  I t  c o u ld  mean t h a t  p r o f e s s io n a l  con d u ct o r
78K m g  (1975 1261) T h is  i s  c o n t r a r y  to  th e  p o s i t io n
und er E n g l is h  and I r i s h  law , see  SIDAWAY v  BETHLEM ROYAL 
HOSPITAL GOVERNORS AND OTHERS [1985] 1 A l l  E R 643 and
WALSH V FAM ILY PLANNING SER V IC ES  LTD [1992] 1 I  R 486
79The co n cep t o f  d e fe n s iv e  p r a c t i c e ,  m  th e  c o n te x t  o f  
th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a r e ,  i s  d is c u s s e d  b e lo w  I t  ap p e a rs  t h a t
an e scap e  in t o  d e fe n s iv e  p r a c t i c e  can  le a d  to  s u r p r is in g
co n seq u en ces , see  i n f r a  Su b p arag rap h  2 3 5
*
80K m g  (1975 1244)
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m isco n d u ct may be e v id e n c e  o f  n e g l ig e n t  con d u ct T h is  w ould  
b lu r  th e  l i n e  betw een  n e g lig e n c e  (a  m a t te r  f o r  th e  c o u r t  to  
d e c id e ) and p r o f e s s io n a l  m isco n d u ct (a  m a t te r  f o r  th e  
m e d ica l p r o fe s s io n  to  r e s o lv e )  81
R e fe re n c e  to  "custom " o r  "common p r a c t i c e "  i s  n o rm a lly  
r e le v a n t  and a d m is s ib le  The s ta n d a rd  i s  a com m unity 
s ta n d a rd , and i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  an ' i n d i c a t i o n  o f  c o n fo r m it y ',  
a c c o rd in g  to  K ee to n  e t  a l  82 To be r e le v a n t  i t  must be 
'r e a s o n a b ly  b ro u g h t home to  th e  a c t o r 's  l o c a l i t y  and must
be so g e n e r a l ,  as  w e l l  as  known, t h a t  th e  a c t o r  may be
ch a rg ed  w it h  know ledge o f  i t  o r  w i t h  n e g l ig e n t  
ig n o ra n c e ' 83 In  t h i s  sen se  "custom " i s  d e f in e d  by F lem in g  
as a 'p r a c t i c e  a c ce p te d  as norm al and g e n e ra l by o th e r  
members o f  th e  com m unity m  s im i l a r  c ir c u m s ta n c e s ' 84
U s in g  t h i s  s ta n d a rd , th e  bu rden  o f  p ro o f  s h i f t s  to  th e  
d e fe n d a n t I f  i t  has been d em o n stra ted  t h a t  he d id  n o t a c t  
a c c o rd in g  to  a custom , i t  i s  up to  him  to  j u s t i f y  h is  
con d u ct H ow ever, t h i s  p resu m p tio n  o f  custom  i s  no t 
c o n c lu s iv e  O th e rw is e , new methods can n o t be c r e a te d  85 
Opponents to  t h i s  s ta n d a rd  a rg u e  t h a t  -
[ t ] h e r e  a r e ,  no doub t, c a se s  where c o u r ts  seem to  
make th e  g e n e ra l p r a c t i c e  o f  th e  c a l l i n g  th e
s ta n d a rd  o f  p ro p e r  d i l ig e n c e ,  we have in d eed
81See  a ls o  i n f r a  Su b p arag rap h  8 3 10
82 (1984 195)
Q3I b i d
84 (1992 119)
85Cf HUNTER v  HANLEY [1955] S C 200 a t  206
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g iv e n  some c u r r e n c y  to  th e  n o t io n  o u r s e lv e s  
[ ] In d eed  m  most c a se s  r e a s o n a b le  p rud ence
i s  i n  f a c t  common p ru d e n c e , b u t s t r i c t l y  i t  i s  
n e v e r  i t s  m easure, a w ho le  c a l l i n g  may have 
u n d u ly  lag g ed  m  th e  a d o p t io n  o f  new and 
a v a i l a b l e  d e v ic e s  I t  may n e v e r  s e t  i t s  own 
t e s t s ,  how ever p e r s u a s iv e  be i t s  u sages  C o u rts  
must i n  th e  end s a y  what i s  r e q u ir e d ,  th e r e  a re  
p r e c a u t io n s  so im p e ra t iv e  t h a t  even  t h e i r  
u n iv e r s a l  d is r e g a r d  w i l l  n o t excuse  t h e i r  
o m is s io n  86
2 3.3. How do th e  p r in c ip l e s  a t t r ib u t e d  to  m e d ica l 
n e g lig e n c e  d i f f e r  from  g e n e ra l n e g lig e n c e  p r in c ip l e s ,  m  
p a r t i c u l a r  w i t h  r e g a rd  to  th e  r e q u ir e d  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a r e ?  
The t h e s is  p o in t s  o u t t h a t  th e  p re s e n ce  o f  a s p e c ia l  s k i l l ,  
p r o f e s s io n a l  o p in io n  and th e  autonomous p o s i t io n  o f  
p r o f e s s io n a l  p e rso n s  a re  th re e  m a jo r d is t in g u is h in g  
f a c t o r s  87
M cCoid  (1959) to o , r e c o g n iz e s  th e  p re se n ce  o f  a 
s p e c ia l  s k i l l  as  e s s e n t ia l  i n  m e d ica l n e g lig e n c e  ca se s  He 
a rg u es  t h a t  th e  s ta n d a rd  i n  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  c a r r i e s  b o th  
s u b je c t iv e  and o b je c t i v e  e lem en ts  The s ta n d a rd  becomes 
more s u b je c t i v e ,  s h i f t i n g  from  th a t  o f  th e  o r d in a r y  p ru d en t 
man to  e x ig e n c ie s  o f  th e  s p e c i f i c  d e fe n d a n t , h o ld in g  
h im s e lf  o u t to  p o sse ss  some s p e c ia l  s k i l l  o r  com petence 
How ever, a t  th e  same tim e  th e  s ta n d a rd  w i l l  be form ed o r  
s e t  by ob j e c t i v e  m e d ic a l o p in io n  th e  o r d in a r y  d eg ree  o f 
s k i l l  and com petence e x e r c is e d  by p h y s ic ia n s  o f  e q u a l
86L e a rn e d  Hand m  THE T J  HOOPER (1932) 60 F 2d 737 
a t  740
87See  i n f r a  Su b p arag rap h  4 4 2
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s ta n d in g  who p r a c t i c e  m  th e  same o r  s im i l a r  com m unity (th e  
1 l o c a l i t y "  - r u le )  88
A c c o rd in g  to  M cCoid , ad h e ren ce  to  a g e n e ra l  a c ce p te d  
p r a c t i c e  p r o t e c t s  th e  d o c to r  from  l i a b i l i t y  I t  p ro v id e s  
c o n c lu s iv e  e v id e n c e  o f  due c a re  N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e  a d o p tio n  
o f  a p r a c t i c e  em braced by a d is t in g u is h e d  m in o r i t y  does no t 
a u to m a t ic a l ly  r e l i e v e  a d o c to r  from  l i a b i l i t y  T h ere  must 
be p ro o f  t h a t  th e r e  i s  some a c t u a l  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  o p in io n  
and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  e x p e r t  su p p o rt f o r  th e  p r a c t i c e  fo l lo w e d  
by th e  d e fe n d a n t 89
M cCoid  p o in t s  o u t t h a t  th e re  a re  c e r t a in  p r in c ip l e s  o f  
p a r t i c u l a r  im p o rtan ce  m  th e  c o n te x t  o f  m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  
These p r in c ip l e s  e x e m p lify  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a d i s t i n c t i v e  
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  They in c lu d e  th e  d u ty  to  keep up to  
d a t e ,90 s p e c ia l  r u le s  c o n c e rn in g  m e d ic a l e x p e r im e n ta t io n
(how ever, i t  i s  su g g es ted  by t h i s  r e s e a r c h e r  t h a t  t h i s  i s
m e re ly  a d e v ia t io n  from  th e  a c ce p te d  p r a c t i c e  s ta n d a rd  and 
sh o u ld  be a s s e s s e d  a c c o r d in g ly ) , 91 and, above a l l ,  th e  d u ty  
to  in fo rm  and d is c lo s e  f a c t s  w h ich  d e r iv e s  from  th e  q u a s i- 
f i d u c i a r y  r e l a t io n s h ip  betw een  d o c to r  and p a t ie n t  92
The m easure o f  th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  o f  a c ce p te d  
p r a c t i c e  a p p e a rs , a t  l e a s t  h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  to  be s e t  by 
custom , a c c o rd in g  to  M cCoid (1959) T h is  m easure i s
88M cCoid  (1959 558-559)
89I b i d  , a t  565
90I b i d  , a t  575
91I b i d  , a t  581
92Ibid , at 586
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j u s t i f i e d  by th e  p r o p o s it io n s  t h a t  th e  l e g a l  f i c t i o n  o f  
custom  had been d eve lo p ed  b e fo re  an y  co h e re n t  co n cep t o f  
th e  t o r t  o f  n e g lig e n c e  e x is t e d ,  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  
e v a lu a t io n  o f  m e d ia l f a c t s  i s  n o t e a s i l y  done by a l a y  j u r y  
o r  ju d g e  and th e  'p e c u l i a r  n a tu re  o f  th e  " p r o f e s s io n a l "  
a c t i v i t y '  93 H ow ever, one c r i t i c i s m  rem a in s  i t  does no t 
d is c lo s e  w h e th e r th e  p r a c t i c e  o r  custom  i s ,  m  f a c t ,  
r e a s o n a b le  94
2.3.4. R o b e rtso n  (1981b) a rg u es  t h a t  th e  d e c is io n  m
WHITEHOUSE v  JORDAN [1981] 1 A l l  E R 267 shows what i s
wrong w it h  m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  l i t i g a t i o n  In  t h i s  ca se  th e  
House o f  L o rd s  had th e  o p p o r tu n it y  to  d is c u s s  m  g e n e ra l 
term s th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  r e q u ir e d  i n  m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  
One can  even  a rg u e  t h a t  th e  House o f  Lo rd s  had th e  
o p p o r tu n it y  to  d is t in g u is h  th e  BOLAM t e s t  and r e p la c e  i t  
f o r  a more " p a t ie n t - c e n t r e d "  ap p roach
F i r s t ,  R o b e rtso n  c o n s id e rs  th e  c o u r t 's  app roach  
r e g a rd in g  an " e r r o r  o f  c l i n i c a l  judgm ent" They u p h e ld  th e  
d e c is io n  m  th e  C o u rt o f  A p p ea l t h a t  th e  d e fen d a n t was 
n e g l ig e n t  How ever, th e  Law Lo rd s  d is a g re e d  w ith  Lo rd  
D enn ing  M R who s t a t e d  t h a t  an e r r o r  o f  judgm ent can  n e v e r  
be n e g l ig e n t  The House o f  L o rd s  a p p re c ia te d  L o rd  D e n n in g 's  
co n ce rn , a c c o rd in g  to  R o b e rtso n , to  p r o t e c t  't h e  
p r o f e s s io n a l  r e p u t a t io n  o f  th e  d o c to r ' 95 H ow ever, th e
92I b i d  , a t  608
94I b i d  , a t  606
95 (1981b 459)
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House o f  L o rd s  found t h a t  one can n o t d i s t in g u is h  an e r r o r  
o f  judgm ent from  n e g lig e n c e  In  t h e i r  v ie w , such  an e r r o r  
must s t i l l  be a b le  to  s ta n d  th e  BOLAM t e s t  b ecau se  some 
e r r o r s  may be c o n s is t e n t  w ith  th e  due e x e r c is e  o f  
p r o f e s s io n a l  s k i l l  w h i le  o th e r  e r r o r s  may f a l l  b e low  ' th e  
s ta n d a rd  o f  th e  o r d in a r y  s k i l l e d  su rgeon  e x e r c is in g  and 
p r o fe s s in g  to  have th e  s p e c ia l  s k i l l  o f  a su rg e o n ' 96
Second , th e  d e c is io n  rem a in s  a p ro - d e fe n d a n t d e c is io n  
R o b e rtso n  d is a g re e s  w it h  th e  c o u r t 's  a t t i t u d e  to w ard s  th e  
e v id e n c e  p ro d u ced  m  f i r s t  in s ta n c e  and a c c e p te d  by th e  
t r i a l  ju d g e  t h a t  th e  d e fen d a n t was n e g l ig e n t  m  p u l l in g  
't o o  h a rd  and to o  lo n g ' 97 The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  th e  
r e v e r s a l  o f  th e  f in d in g  o f  f a c t  by th e  C o u rt o f  A p p ea l and 
th e  House o f  L o rd s  can  o n ly  be fou nd , a c c o rd in g  to  
R o b e rtso n , m  p o l i c y ,  to  p r o te c t  th e  m e d ic a l p r o f e s s io n 's  
p r o f e s s io n a l  r e p u t a t io n  and th e  f e a r  o f  A m erican  l i t i g a t i o n  
p r a c t i c e s  98 G e n e r a l ly ,  R o b e rtso n  w elcom es p o l i c y  d e c is io n s  
as a u s e fu l  t o o l  o f  d e te r r e n c e  a g a in s t  p l a i n t i f f s  B u t , 
c o n t r a r y  to  th e  C o u rt o f  A p p e a l 's  b e l i e f ,  p o l i c y  must o n ly
96WHITEHOUSE v  JORDAN [1981] 1 A l l  E R 267 a t  269
See a ls o  Jo n e s  (1991 77) and Ja c k s o n  & P o w e ll (1992 509-
510)
97WHITEHOUSE v  JORDAN [1981] 1 A l l  E R 567 a t  268
98T h is  p r e ju d ic e  i s  u n j u s t i f i e d  T e f f  (1985) a rg u es  
t h a t  A m erican  m a lp r a c t ic e  l i t i g a t i o n  d i f f e r s  on a t  l e a s t  
th r e e  a c co u n ts  F i r s t , m e d ic a l s e r v ic e s  a re  p ro v id e d  on a 
more p r i v a t e  o r  f e e - f o r - s e r v ic e  b a s is  Second , th e  a t t i t u d e  
o f ,  m  p a r t i c u l a r ,  s p e c i a l i s t s  i s  more e n t r e p r e n e u r ia l ,  and 
s p e c i a l i s t s  s ta n d  n o rm a lly  m  d i r e c t  c o n ta c t  w i t h  p a t ie n t s  
T h ird ,  th e  A m erican  l e g a l  system  w ith  i t s  j u r y  t r i a l s ,  
c o n t in g e n c y  f e e s ,  and th e  l i b e r a l  r u le s  r e g a rd in g  s ta n d in g  
and d is c o v e r y ,  d i f f e r s  from  th a t  in  En g lan d  See a ls o  
Kennedy (1988)
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be used  m  co m b in a tio n  w ith  th e  c a s e 's  own m e r it s  99 I f  
t h i s  was done, th e  outcome m  WHITEHOUSE m igh t have w e l l  
been d i f f e r e n t  The ca se  shows th e  7 u n d e r ly in g  in d ic tm e n t  
o f  th e  p re s e n t  system  o f  com pensa tin g  v ic t im s  o f  m e d ica l 
a c c id e n t s ' 100 I t  shows a l l  t h a t  i s  wrong w ith  m e d ica l 
n e g lig e n c e  l i t i g a t i o n  c o s t l y ,  le n g th y ,  u n c e r t a in  and 
u n p r e d ic ta b le
2 .3 .5 .  S p e c ia l  a t t e n t io n  must be g iv e n  to  th e  co n cep t o f  
" d e fe n s iv e  p r a c t i c e ” m  th e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  r e q u i s i t e  
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  Th roughout th e  ca se  law  and l i t e r a t u r e  
t h i s  co n cep t i s  p u t fo rw a rd  as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  to  r e l i e v e  
th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  p r a c t i t i o n e r  from  l i a b i l i t y
An e x p la n a t io n  f o r  t h i s  r e fu g e  in t o  d e fe n s iv e  p r a c t i c e  
i s  o f f e r e d  b y  Mason (1992) He a rg u es  t h a t  th e  g e n e ra l 
p r in c ip l e s  o f  t o r t  ( t h a t  s t i l l  r u le  p r o f e s s io n a l  l i a b i l i t y )  
do n o t ta k e  in t o  acco u n t f a c t o r s  t h a t  in f lu e n c e  th e  
d e c is io n  m aking p ro c e s s  w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  
and p r o v is io n  o f  t re a tm e n t  101 These f a c t o r s  in c lu d e  an 
in t e r a c t io n  b etw een , i n t e r  a l i a ,  th e  e v e r  in c r e a s in g  c o s ts  
o f  m e d ic a l h e a l t h  c a re  and th e  in c r e a s in g  com pensa tion  
m e n t a l i t y  t h a t  re n d e rs  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  in t o  e x e r c is in g  
"d e fe n s iv e  p r a c t i c e "
" T h i s  i s  c o n t r a r y  to  Lo rd  S ca rm a n 's  o p in io n  m  SIDAWAY 
v  BETHLEM ROYAL HOSPITAL GOVERNORS [1985] 1 A l l  E R 643, 
a c c o rd in g  to  Lee  (1985) P o l i c y  m a tte rs  must be l e f t  to  th e  
l e g i s l a t o r s ,  c o u r ts  a re  co n ce rn ed  w ith  l e g a l  p r in c ip l e s
100R o b e rts o n  (1981b 457)
101Mason (1992 133)
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A t th e  same t im e , a t t i t u d e s  have changed and
p r o f e s s io n a l  s e r v ic e s  a re  no lo n g e r  a c c e p te d  a t  f a c e - v a lu e  
The p u b l ic  p e r c e p t io n  does n o t meet th e  p r o f e s s io n a l  id e a l  
T h is  i s  in d u ced  b y , f o r  exam ple, th e  c l e a r  p re se n ce  o f
p r o f i t - i n c e n t i v e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y  m  th e  b ig g e r  a c co u n ta n cy  
and s o l i c i t o r  f irm s  T h is  u n h e s i t a t in g  lu s t  f o r  money seems 
to  in f lu e n c e  th e  q u a l i t y  s ta n d a rd  o f  th e  p ro v id e d
p r o f e s s io n a l  s e r v i c e  A t th e  same t im e , th e  p re s s u re  o f
l i t i g a t i o n  fo r c e s  p r o fe s s io n s  to  ta k e  re fu g e  in t o
"d e fe n s iv e  p r a c t i c e "  102
T r ib e  & Korgaonkann (1991) a rg u e  t h a t  "d e fe n s iv e  
p r a c t i c e "  i s  m isu n d e rs to o d  and may le a d  to  a h ig h e r  
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  r e q u ir e d  by p r o f e s s io n a ls  M e d ic a l
p r a c t i t i o n e r s  a re  und er th e  m is c o n c e p t io n  as to  what i s  
meant w ith  m e d ic a l n e g lig e n c e  and r e la t e d  a s p e c ts ,  m  
p a r t i c u l a r  th e  a p p r o p r ia te  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re
A g a in s t  th e  background  o f  in c r e a s e d  l i t i g a t i o n ,  th e  
consequence o f  t h i s  m is c o n ce p tio n  i s  th e  a d o p t io n  o f
u n j u s t i f i e d  and d e fe n s iv e  m e d ic a l p r a c t i c e s
D e fe n s iv e  p r a c t i c e  m  t h i s  co n cep t i s  d e f in e d  as 
u n j u s t i f i e d  m e d ic a l c a re  to  red u ce  th e  t h r e a t  o f
l i t i g a t i o n  In  o th e r  w ords, th e  'd o c t o r 's  p r o f e s s io n a l  
judgm ent i s  in f lu e n c e d  by l e g a l  r a t h e r  th a n  c l i n i c a l  
c o n s id e r a t io n s  ' 103
H ow ever, th e  BOLAM t e s t  a s s e r t s  t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  
p r a c t i c e  does n o t amount to  n e g lig e n c e  i f  a d o c to r  f a i l s  to
102I b i d  , a t  134
103T n b e  & Korgaonkann (1991 2)
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p e rfo rm  i t  and a r e s p o n s ib le  body o f  o p in io n  re g a rd s  t h i s  
p r a c t i c e  as u n n e c e s s a ry  N e v e r th e le s s ,  th e  more u n n e ce s s a ry  
p r a c t i c e s  a re  ad op ted  by m e d ic a l p r a c t i t i o n e r s  th e  more 
th e y  may le a d  to  a c ce p ta n ce  o f  an (even  more r e s t r i c t i v e )  
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  They w i l l ,  a c c o r d in g ly ,  s ta n d  th e  BOLAM 
t e s t  As a r e s u l t ,  th e  t e s t  may become p r o g r e s s iv e ly  more 
r ig o r o u s ,  r e s u l t in g  m  an in c r e a s in g  f i n a n c i a l  bu rden  f o r  
b o th  th e  h e a l t h  s e r v ic e s  and th e  p a t ie n t
"D e fe n s iv e  p r a c t i c e "  m  m e d ic a l c a re  must be a vo id e d  
T h is  w i l l  be a c h ie v e d , i f  one i s  p re p a re d  to  u n d e rs ta n d  and 
a p p r e c ia t e  th e  o b je c t iv e s  and p h ilo s o p h y  t h a t  u n d e rp in s  th e  
deve lopm ent o f  m e d ic a l s e r v ic e s  104
)
Consent and In fo rm a t io n  D is c lo s u r e
2.3.6. B e fo r e  th e  e v o lu t iv e  d o c t r in e  o f  " in fo rm e d  
c o n s e n t " ,  th e  d u ty  to  d is c lo s e  in fo rm a t io n  had been 
a c ce p te d  in t o  th e  common law , a c c o rd in g  to  M cCoid , on th e  
b a s is  o f  th e  q u a s i- f id u c ia r y  r e l a t io n s h ip  betw een  th e  
d o c to r  and p a t ie n t  105
104See a ls o  O 'S u l l i v a n  (1991) He a rg u es  t h a t  w ith o u t  
such  an u n d e rs ta n d in g  c o s t  management and re s o u rc e  
a l l o c a t io n  can n o t ta k e  p la c e  T h ere  must be c l a r i t y  betw een  
th e  ends and means C ost c o n t r o l  must go hand m  hand w ith  
s e r v ic e  q u a l i t y ,  in s t e a d  o f  r e g a rd in g  i t  as  an u l t im a te  and 
s e p a ra te  g o a l To a c h ie v e  t h i s ,  th e  p r o f e s s io n a l
r e l a t i o n s h ip  must be p e rs o n a l and in t im a te  The s e r v ic e  
must be u n d e rs to o d  on a p e rs o n a l l e v e l ,  l  e th e  p a t ie n t  - 
d o c to r  r e l a t io n s h ip  T h is  must be sa fe - g u a rd e d  and
em phasized  T h is  i s  even  more a p p a re n t , a c c o rd in g  to  t h i s  
r e s e a r c h e r ,  t a k in g  in t o  acco u n t th e  in c r e a s in g
im p e r s o n a l iz a t io n  o f  and th e  d e c re a s in g  r e l i a n c e  on th e  
" f a m i ly  d o c to r "
105 (1959 586)
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The e x is te n c e  o f  such  a d u ty  ap p eared  to  be h e lp f u l  to  
a p l a i n t i f f  m  a t  l e a s t  th re e  s i t u a t io n s  106 The d u ty  to  
d is c lo s e  was r e le v a n t  ( 1 ) w ith  re g a rd  to  a p a t i e n t 's  c la im  
f o r  m a lp r a c t ic e  t h a t  m  th e  o r d in a r y  co u rse  w ou ld  a l r e a d y  
have been s t a tu te - b a r r e d ,  ( 1 1 ) w here i n s u f f i c i e n t  
d is c lo s u r e  re n d e re d  th e  co n sen t i n e f f e c t i v e  ( t h i s  may have 
cau sed  th e  d o c to r  to  be sub ] e c te d  to  a c la im  o f  
u n a u th o r iz e d  t re a tm e n t )  and ( 1 1 1 ) w here a c la im  was based  
on th e  b re a c h  o f  th e  d u ty  to  in fo rm , a f a i l u r e  to  d is c lo s e  
f a c t s
The d is c h a rg e  o f  t h i s  d u ty  i s  s u b je c te d  to  m e d ica l 
p a te rn a l is m  and t h i s  i s ,  a c c o rd in g  to  T e f f  (1 9 8 5 ), 107 
s a n c t io n e d  b y  th e  c o u r ts  m  ca s e s  l i k e  BOLAM v  FR IERN  
HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE [1957] 2 A l l  E R 118 and
SIDAWAY v  BETHLEM ROYAL HOSPITAL GOVERNORS [1985] 1 A l l
E R 643 M e d ic a l p a te rn a l is m  i s  a r e a s o n a b le  ap p ro ach  when 
i t  comes to  d ia g n o s is  and t re a tm e n t  How ever, w ith  re g a rd  
to  a d v ic e  and th e  d is c lo s u r e  o f  in fo rm a t io n  th e  ap p ro ach  i s  
open to  a number o f  q u e s t io n  m arks O th e r  th a n  p u re  m e d ica l 
c o n s id e r a t io n s  may be r e le v a n t  The d u ty  to  d is c lo s e  must 
be based  on th e  p a t i e n t 's  r ig h t  to  d e c id e
In  a d d it io n ,  t h i s  p a t e r n a l i s t i c  ap p ro ach  i s  somehow 
c o n f r o n t a t io n a l  T h is  c o n f r o n t a t io n a l  n a tu re  has burdened  
a more m ature  c o n c e p t io n  o f  in fo rm ed  co n se n t due, m  p a r t ,  
by th e  e x c e p t io n  o f  t h e r a p e u t ic  p r i v i l e g e  and th e  em phasis
106I b i d  , a t  586-592
107T h is  i s  a ls o  i d e n t i f i e d  m  th e  t h e s i s ,  w h ich  c a r r i e s  
T e f f ' s  argum ent f u r t h e r ,  see  i n f r a  Su b p a rag rap h  5 6 4
44
on quantity rather than quality of disclosure
Teff suggests that there are reasons to promote a less 
confrontational approach based on enhanced communications 
that aims at 'establishing a "therapeutic alliance"' 108 
This alliance aims, instead, at some sort of mutual
understanding or perception regarding the proposed 
treatment and allied factors Informed consent should 
therefore entail a -
genuine dialogue [ ] facilitating a broad
appreciation by the patient of the seriousness of 
his illness, the anticipated benefits and risks 
of proposed treatment and any reasonable 
alternatives, bearing m  mind the particular 
patient's values and objectives 109
Harris too sees the BOLAM test as out-moded in this
specific area 110 It served its function well m  a time 
where medicine was less complicated and sophisticated
It appears also as if the expert's evidence as to what 
should have been done did not always conform to that
expert's own evidence about his or her practice Since this 
is so, the courts must take this fact into consideration 
and use their power more frequently to overrule expert 
defence opinion 111
Harris also suggests another area of reform A large
108Teff (1985 434) See also Gutheil, et al (1984)
109Tef f (1985 443)
110 (1992 105) His reasons are discussed m  the thesis,
see infra Subparagraph 5 6 4
111 Ibid , at 106
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group of plaintiffs can not afford to undertake action and 
are not eligible for legal aid To overcome this hurdle,
Harris suggests a limited form of contingency fee
arrangement for these people, without threatening the
strict control of the means by which legal aid is
granted 112
2.3.7. Some commentators view the decision m  SIDAWAY v 
BETHLEM ROYAL HOSPITAL GOVERNORS [1985] 1 All E R 643 as
an extension of the BOLAM test 113 This extension is based 
on the fact that the Law Lords m  SIDAWAY allowed the 
disclosure of substantial risks of grave consequences They 
made an exception for the non-disclosure of substantial 
risks bearing grave consequences In other words, this 
exception would hint towards a "prudent patient" test
Jones rejects this view 114 In his view the BOLAM test 
is also applied m  the "disclosure of information" cases, 
notwithstanding the different points of view on the subject 
matter that were expressed m  SIDAWAY
According to Jones, the minority view would contravene 
the BOLAM test, because its objective nature allows the 
courts 'to determine, ultimately, what constitutes 
negligence on the basis of the evidence presented' 115 
Evidence of common professional practice is not conclusive
112Ibid , at 107
113See, inter alios, Kennedy (1988 201, infra)
114 (1991 239)
115 JJbid
46
The so-called "exception" is rather an instance where the 
court can condemn a particular practice as negligent
Grubb (1985) argues that the existence of a risk m  
medical treatment is a matter of professional judgment 
However, its disclosure, where appreciated by the 
clinician, is at least arguably obligatory The reason for 
the application of the BOLAM test m  SIDAWAY is, therefore, 
not convincing, the patient has a right to know and this 
right is protected by the 'reasonable doctor' 116
At least one aspect could generate further litigation 
It has been said that questions must be answered 
truthfully According to Grubb (1985), a failure then, 
could amount to actionable negligent misrepresentation 
However, the scales are tipped m  favour of an attitude 
which could be excoriated as medical paternalism This is 
the doctrine of therapeutic privilege m  disguise 117
On analysis, Kennedy (1988) argues, contrary to Jones 
(supra) , that the House of Lords decision m  SIDAWAY 
attempted to free from BOLAM the law relating to the 
doctor's duty to inform his patients Lord Scarman accepted 
the doctrine of informed consent So did Lords Bridge and 
Templeman, but to a lesser extent It proves that the 
common law is adaptable and the BOLAM test is not 'set m  
stone' 118
The disclosure of information is an ethical concept
116Grubb (1985 200)
117See also Brahams (1985)
118Kennedy (1988 202)
47
and entails the doctor's respect for the patient's 
autonomy With regard to the amount of information, the 
ethical principle demands disclosure of what the patient 
would regard as material The balance must be struck 
between medical paternalism and 'patient's sovereignty',119 
this balance is shifting all over the common law world m  
favour of the latter 120 The parties must reach an optimum 
of 'shared decision-making' 121
As we have seen, it is generally accepted from the 
literature that elements of the doctrine of informed 
consent have been incorporated into English law 122 The 
principle of therapeutic privilege allows the doctor to 
exercise a proper discretion concerning the disclosure of 
information In addition, according to Kennedy (1988), the 
doctrine would, contrary to common belief among 
practitioners, be m  conformity with judicial respect for 
the doctor-patient relationship This harmonizes with its 
underlying aspects confidence and trust
119Ibid , at 178
120See, for example, the recent decision m  ROGERS v 
WHITAKER [1992] 16 B M L R 148
121Kennedy (1988 178) See also Teff (1985) , supra
Subparagraph 2 3 6
McDonough, et al (1995) stress that the concept of 
safety has changed over recent years, This change has 
partly come about due to patient consumerism and the stress 
on quality improvement They emphasize the need for 
documentation by the doctor of the informed consent, as 
well as the need for a verification procedure that the 
patient was informed and did agree to the proposed 
treatment
122This view is interpreted m  two ways, see infra 
Subparagraph 5 6 4
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2.3.8, As to the idea of "therapeutic privilege", 
Epstein asks himself what is to be gained by the hostility 
against it 123 The courts often seek to justify the 
doctrine Epstein offers a convincing rationale for the 
espousal by various courts of criticism of this doctrine 
The vindication of individual self-determination is central 
to the common law of both tort and contract, to the 
questions regarding the type of risks that must be 
disclosed and the extent of the disclosure itself 124
However, a form of generalized consent enables the 
medical practitioner to exercise his discretion to use his 
best judgment as to information obtained during an 
operation In addition, is it wise to inform a patient, 
prior to a serious operation, of 'a catalog [ue] of horrors' 
he might face?125 The exercise of discretion and common 
sense of both patient and doctor must be recognized and 
awarded Epstein proposes that explicit rules governing 
their relationship - the terms and conditions of the 
relationship - should be encouraged prior to the 
commencement of the actual relationship or administration 
of treatment 126
But the therapeutic privilege must be confined within 
bounds, according to Jones (1991) It does not allow a 
doctor simply to be silent about material risks if he
123 (1976 122)
12*Ibid , at 119
125JJbid , at 125
126Ibid , at 127
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thinks that disclosure would prompt the patient to forego 
the operation If it would extend to this, the 'exception 
might become so wide as to undermine the requirement of 
disclosure' 127
2.3.9 The decision m  ROGERS v WHITAKER [1992] 175
C L R 479 emphasized the need to look m  each case to the 
particular patient with regard to the disclosure of 
information 128 This emphasis underscores, however, 
according to Kerridge & Mitchell (1994) , the 
misinterpretation of the idea of consent as a single event 
The decision m  ROGERS only reflected superficial changes 
(a fuller disclosure of information and the doctor should 
be reasonably aware what a specific patient might want to 
hear), it omitted to address the nature of consent as a 
process Therefore, the court m  ROGERS missed the 
opportunity to guide doctors as to what is ethically 
needed a shift towards an understanding of the process of 
information provision and shared decision making 129
In this process, the patient's autonomy and interests 
must guide clinical management of the patient's problem or 
illness Doctors must be regarded as 'advocates for their
127Jones (1991 236)
128Apart from its decision concerning the disclosure of 
risks, ROGERS is significant m  the context of this thesis 
for its explicit rejection of the BOLAM test, see infra 
Paragraph 7 2
129Kerndge & Mitchell (1994 242)
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patients' health' 130
2.3.10. Merz points out that the doctrine of informed 
consent, m  the United States, serves four goals 131 First, 
an ethical goal that emphasizes the patient's autonomy 
Second, a decision-making goal, here, the law champions the 
patient's ability to make a decision on the basis of 
provided information Third, a regulatory goal that 
controls the doctors' disclosure practices Fourth, a 
compensatory goal to provide the patient with pecuniary 
compensation m  the case of loss
However, the goals are not equally met Merz (1993) 
argues that the courts at each time find a compromise 
between them They employ different standards to assess the 
doctor's conduct Some courts emphasize the patient's right 
to autonomy, while others support a professional-centred 
and paternalistic approach
Merz argues that all goals can be achieved fully if 
the informed consent inquiry is directed 'to the adequacy 
of information to support patient decision-making' 132 This 
involves a better understanding of what information is 
material and wanted by the specific patient What are the 
requirements for making decisions? Thus, the adequacy of 
disclosure must not be judged by the particular risk that 
may materialize but should be judged taking into account
130 Jjbid , at 243
131 (1993 231)
132 Jjbid
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how the disclosure of the whole body of information would 
have influenced the decision
Daar (1995) points out that the legal idea of consent 
is changing m  the United States This change will affect 
the parameters of disclosure within the doctor-patient 
relationship These parameters are, on the one side, 
medical paternalism and, on the other side, patient 
autonomy
Recently, m  two cases, the issue came up whether 
disclosure of non-medical information falls within the 
scope of informed consent 133 For example, should a
physician disclose his sero-positive status to his client 
or provide statistical life expectancy information to a 
cancer patient, to enable the patient to come to an 
"informed choice"?
Daar argues whether the physician is only confined to 
assess the patient merely qua patient or whether he has an 
obligation to disclose information that is unrelated to the 
patient's treatment options The decisions m  recent cases 
emphasize the relevance of this information The courts 
stressed the importance of disclosure of information with 
regard to the physicians' interests, on the basis that 
details of, for example, the physician's health or economic 
records may affect the physician's medical judgment and 
performance
Daar does not receive this development with open arms
133Daar (1995 188) These two cases are ARATO v
AVEDON (1993) 858 P 2d 598 and FAYA v ALMARAZ (1993) 620 
A 2d 327
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She ponders whether the provision of this type of 
information will actually help the patient to come to a
more informed choice 134
Robertson (1991) appears to be sceptical about the 
reception of the professional judgment test m  REIBL v 
HUGHES (1978) 21 0 R 2d 14 In his view the case did not 
have a significant impact on medical malpractice 
litigation Its true effect may be the symbolic importance 
It reflects a fundamental change m  the doctor-patient 
relationship
2.3.11. Kibble-Smith & Hafner (1986) set out one of the 
consequences of the increased use of computers and data 
banks for the provision of information
They argue that the general principle of tort
liability must undergo a change due to this increase, for 
example, the requisite standard of care The efficiency of 
these data banks imposes a greater burden on the doctor to 
keep up to date with relevant information for his
specialization 135
Kibble-Smith & Hafner also point out that this has 
necessary consequences for the procedures by which informed 
consent is obtained Improved access to computer
information will broaden the doctor's duty m  this area He 
will have a higher duty to search for and report on side-
134 (1995 208-209)
135Kibble-Smith & Hafner (1986 70)
53
effects and other treatment options 136
2.3 12. A different look at the doctor's duty to disclose 
is offered by Jakobovits (1989), the former Chief Rabbi He 
submits that, from the perspective of Jewish law, those who 
are qualified to provide medical services have a moral and 
religious obligation to do so This duty is absolute As a 
consequence, a doctor does not need to obtain consent m  
life-saving treatment, among his tasks is the preservation 
of life
The implication of Jacobovits' argument which has 
powerful adherence, not just among the Jewish religion but 
among those of fundamental persuasion generally, is that 
the role of consent is of diminished importance The 
primary responsibility of a patient who agrees with this 
view is to preserve life by consenting to life-saving 
treatments The underlying religious basis is that our body 
is not our property Consent is merely a safeguard for the 
treating clinician
Informed consent is regarded by the former Chief Rabbi 
as a cloak for relinquishing what is essentially the 
doctor's responsibility m  decision making The patient is 
not competent to take the necessary decisions which must be
136Ibid , at 87 This researcher argues that access to 
computer provided information may evoke the question 
whether a medical practitioner is limited to inform his 
patient only of treatments which are not excluded from 
medical professional opinion This may mean that a doctor 
has a duty to inform a patient about treatment options 
which lie outside the traditional area of medicine, l e 
homeopathy, acupuncture and other options
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left to those with appropriate professional judgment
2 4 Specific Attributes of the Standard of
Care of Solicitors
2.4.1. The thesis addresses the standard of care of a 
solicitor m  Ireland m  a separate Chapter (Chapter Six) 
It stresses that the DUNNE test equally applies to 
solicitors However, it appears that the Irish courts have 
a greater input into the decision making process This is 
particularly relevant with regard to the exception of 
"obvious inherent defects"
This Paragraph deals with some issues that are 
generally relevant to the conduct and standard of care of 
solicitors, for example, representation and information 
provision These issues of solicitors' negligence are 
surpassed m  the literature by others aspects, for example, 
the duty question with regard to third parties 137
2.4.2. Client representation is one of the primary 
duties of a solicitor Munneke & Loscalzo hold that the 
essence of the provision of advocacy services is the 
presentation of accurate information 138
Ex hypothesi, the essence of misrepresentation (and 
thus, conflict) is miscommunication 111 advice leads to a
137See infra Subparagraph 2 7 8
138 (1989 391)
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lack of informed decision making that may result m  loss 
Relating this to the doctrine of informed consent in 
medical malpractice cases, the authors pose the question 
whether an informed consent action should be recognized m  
legal malpractice 139 Relying on the agency nature of the 
relationship between lawyers and their clients, Munneke & 
Loscalzo infer that a common law duty exists with regard to 
the provision of information and the requirement to obtain 
informed consent as to the scope of the exercise of the 
lawyers' responsibilities
However, it should be limited to situations where the 
courts have already established the client's right to make 
a decision, for example, with regard to settlement offers, 
conflicts of interest and mediation This right should not 
be expanded A client should not be entitled to control all 
aspects of the representation It cannot, contrary to 
medical malpractice, depend on 'an ill-defined right to 
autonomy' 140
Informed consent must also be distinguished from cases 
involving misrepresentation The crucial difference lies m  
the fact that m  the former the quality of the information 
is inadequate The latter involves a false statement of 
fact upon which the client relies 141
139Ibid , at 392-393 This argument is addressed m  the 
thesis, see infra Subparagraphs 6 2 4 and 6 2 5
140Munneke & Loscalzo (1989 430)
141Ibid , at 397
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2.4.3. In some American States, the attorney is measured 
by a higher standard if he holds himself out as a 
specialist, according to Rensberger (1990) A parallel can 
be drawn with medical specialists 142
This development, first recognized m  WRIGHT v 
WILLIAMS 121 Cal Rptr 194, went hand m  hand with a 
relaxation of the advertisements regulations for legal 
practitioners Accordingly, the standard refers to 'one who 
holds himself out as a legal specialist [performing] m  
similar circumstances to other specialists but not to
general practitioners of the law' 143
Thus, according to Rensberger, there are two standards 
of care One for general or ordinary practitioners,
predicated on an implied representation of general skill 
and care and one for specialists, predicated on an express 
representation of some superior standard of skill and 
care 144
In other words, the standard that must be used appears 
to depend primarily on whether or not a practitioner holds 
himself out as a specialist This could, among other 
things, be established by referring to the advertisement 
tactics of the practitioner m  question
2.4.4. The decision m  WHITE v JONES [1995] 1 All E R
691 has also consequences for the standard of care of
142Rensberger (1990 24)
143121 Cal Rptr 194 at 199
144Rensberger (1990 27)
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solicitors, according to Kessel (1995) 145
The decision m  WHITE demanded the application of
practical justice In this case a disappointed plaintiff 
would otherwise be left without any remedy for her losses 
Neither contract, nor the pure HEDLEY BYRNE principles 
could apply m  the absence of, respectively, a contract 
between the solicitor and the beneficiary, or reliance of
the beneficiary under HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER &
PARTNERS LTD [1963] 2 ALL E R 575 146
The desire to fill the gap is, according to Kessel, 
twofold First, the desire to compensate an innocent third 
party who had no remedy m  contract Second, the injustice 
whereby an obviously careless lawyer would escape 
liability
If this was so, it would have further consequences for 
the solicitor's role m  the community The general public 
relies and expects a certain standard of care of people 
with a special skill This is especially so with regard to 
hidden defaults m  wills Kessel suggests that some form of 
consumer protection is politically necessary 147
2.4.5. Crowley suggests that the solicitor's autonomous 
position, both as a professional and agent, requires from 
him an independent attitude as to the required standard of
1450ther aspects of the WHITE case are discussed 
elsewhere, see infra 2 7 8
146Kessel (1995 500)
1A1Ibid
58
According to Crowley, the solicitor is under a 'heavy 
onus' to exercise the necessary skill and care which is 
required to safeguard his client's interests 148 He has a 
general duty to exercise the degree of care that can be 
expected from a reasonably careful and skilful solicitor m  
the circumstances of the case This is, however, qualified 
The solicitor does not act reasonably if he automatically 
and mindlessly follows the practice of others 149
This means, according to Crowley, that a solicitor 
will not escape liability by relying, for example, on a 
common conveyancing practice At each time, he must 
consider the practice he wishes to follow from the 
perspective of the circumstances of the case,150 taking 
into account the relevant legislation and regulations 151
Consequently, it can be argued that Crowley considers 
the standard of care as being partially subjective 
Although the solicitor defendant will be compared with a 
reasonably careful and skilful solicitor, the defendant 
solicitor's own actions are assessed without reference to 
the prudent solicitor where it is argued that he mindlessly 
followed the practice of others His autonomous position 
allows him to deviate from accepted practice within
care
148 (19 8 7 9 5)
149Cf ROCHE v PE I LOW [1986] I L R M 189 at 197, per 
Henchy J
150Cf MCGRATH v KIELY [1968] I R  97
151Crowley (1987 95)
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established parameters In this situation the question is 
whether the defendant made up his mind as to what practice 
to follow If he did, he is not negligent 152
2.5 Recent Developments A Different Standard
2.5.1. This section first reviews the literature that 
came about after the decision m  the Australian High Court 
m  ROGERS v WHITAKER [1992] 16 B M L R 148 This case
rejects the BOLAM test as a means of conclusively 
determining the negligent conduct of a medical practitioner 
or any other professional person
This section also reviews some of the literature with 
regard to alternative compensation schemes Many 
commentators share the belief that the law of tort is at 
present aimless,153 it cannot deal sufficiently with its 
underlying concepts, such as deterrence and compensation 
This aspect is addressed m  detail m  Paragraph 2 7
Voices have come up to address this problem 
differently, m  particular m  the area of medical 
negligence, and suggest alternative compensation measures 
This is not specifically dealt with m  the thesis, but this 
researcher believes that these alternatives demand a brief 
examination
152This argument is also set out m  the thesis, see 
infra Subparagraph 6 4 1
153See, inter alios, Steele (193) and Howarth (1991), 
infra Subparagraph 2 7 3
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ROGERS V WHITAKER
2.5.2. The decision m  ROGERS v WHITAKER [1992] 
B M L R 148 is welcomed by Jones (1994) This case rejects 
the BOLAM test with regard to information disclosure cases 
It applies the reasonable standard demanded by law, to be 
decided by the court the reasonable prudent patient, so 
Jones says 154
Jones points out that one of the deficiencies of BOLAM 
is that, if adopted, it disentitles a court from ever
holding that a commonly accepted practice can never be 
negligent Since it can be argued that doctors make a 
regular practice of withholding information on therapeutic 
grounds, it must follow that this can never constitute 
professional negligence This is obviously wrong It is to 
deny the patient his or her rights This has two 
consequences
First, it follows from Jones' reasoning that both
under BOLAM and ROGERS, the onus is on the patient who 
requires satisfactory answers, to pose only questions
which, according to accepted medical practices, clinicians 
must answer 155 This begs a vital question, how does the 
patient, as a lay person, know which questions conform to 
this criterion?
Second, it also follows from Jones' reasoning that
BOLAM certainly and ROGERS possibly, if followed literally,
154 (1994 183)
15SIbid , at 185
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entitle the courts to hand over the definition of 
reasonable professional conduct to the professions 
themselves
Tomkin & Hanafin (1995) are less critical The 
decision m  ROGERS v WHITAKER, they argue, could well be 
a guide for the Irish courts m  adjudicating cases 
involving the non-disclosure of medical risks 156 The 
Australian test refers to the reasonable patient as the 
determinant of which risks are material and therefore to be 
disclosed This reasoning may find favour m  the Irish 
courts, taking into account the judgment of O'Flaherty J 
m  WALSH v FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES LTD [1992] 1 I R
486, where the alleged negligent disclosure of information 
for elective surgery was determined along the ordinary 
principles of negligence 157 Both m  ROGERS and m  WALSH 
the respective judges did not depend m  their decision on 
professional opinion or accepted practice Instead, what 
was determined was the reasonableness of disclosure
2.5.3. It is clear from Australian medical negligence 
cases, that the courts there reject the BOLAM test as the 
test of the standard of care, m  particular with regard to
156Tomkm & Hanafin (1995 75)
157Also relevant here, is the dissenting judgment of 
Lord Scarman m  SIDAWAY He stated, according to Tomkin m  
a recent Paper (1995 6-7), that disclosure must be
determined by the 'court's view as to whether the doctor m  
advising the patient gave the considerations which the law 
requires him to give' In other words, the question is 
7 did the patient obtain enough information m  the 
appropriate way to make up his or her mind?', (supra, at 
7)
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cases concerning the disclosure of medical information 158 
The implicit ramification of the decision m  ROGERS is, 
according to McDonald & Swanton, that the patient's need 
for information is assessed from his perspective rather 
than from the perspective of medical opinion 159 Where a 
question becomes more difficult, the courts will need more 
assistance from expert evidence However, the disclosure of 
medical information is not such a question A general 
practice or shared opinion among practitioners may not 
conform to the standard required of the reasonable man 160
Tickner (1995) gives three reasons why the court m  
ROGERS did not apply the BOLAM test
First, the nature of the decision m  SIDAWAY v 
BETHLEM ROYAL HOSPITAL GOVERNORS [1985] 1 All E R 643 was 
discordant,161 although the BOLAM test was applied, the Law 
Lords (Lords Scarman, Bridge and Templeman) appeared to be 
generous towards the patient These qualifications 
undermine the test 162 In addition, ROGERS, contrary to 
SIDAWAY or BOLAM, dealt with the doctor's duty to answer 
questions
Second, the rationale of applying the BOLAM test would
158See ALBRIGHTON v ROYAL PRINCE ALFRED HOSPITAL 
[1980] 2 N S W L R 542, FLORIDA HOTELS PTY LTD V  MAYO
(1965) 113 C L R 588 and MERCER v COMMISSIONER FOR ROAD
TRANSPORT (1936) 56 C L R 580 See also Skene (1995
108)
159 (1993 147)
160 J J b id
161Tickner (1995 111)
162See also Dunn (1993)
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be flawed 163 There is a fundamental difference between 
diagnosis and treatment on the one hand and information 
disclosure on the other hand Only the latter deals with 
communication skills 164 ROGERS did not deal with a medical 
issue Consequently, referring to medical practice totally 
disregards the patient's right to chose and abdicates what 
professions stand for 165
Third, the application of the BOLAM test m  England is 
out of line with other English decisions that do emphasize 
the patient's autonomy, according to Tickner 166 An example 
is the decision m  RE T (ADULT REFUSAL OF TREATMENT) 
[1992] 3 W L R 782 She suggests that the House of Lords
should look at the complex factors of each individual 
medical negligence case and to give weight to the needs and 
characteristics of the patient involved In doing so the 
House of Lords will not have to adopt the prudent patient 
test but is able to reject the BOLAM test 167
2.5.4. Cassidy (1992) suggests that the Australian 
standard of care test does not do justice to the concept of
163Tickner (1995 112)
164But m  fact communication skills lie at the centre 
of the practice of all medicine First m  respect of the 
acquisition of information from the patient by which 
diagnosis is made and m  the way therapeutic options are 
retailed Second, diagnosis and treatment themselves 
represent skills learned from scientific communications of 
various sorts
165See also Thacker (1993)
166 (19 9 5 115)
167Ibid , atfc 118
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medical negligence The dissenting judgment of Lord Scarman 
m  SIDAWAY is also incorrect as to the proper assessment of 
medical negligence, even with regard to information 
disclosure cases The BOLAM test remains m  the author's 
view the proper test Cassidy justifies this with three 
arguments
First, the case law m  England suggests that the BOLAM 
test applies authoritatively to the standard of care of all 
professional persons 168 In particular where the defendant 
has exercised his duties m  accordance with professional 
opinion The test is generally applicable whenever the 
defendant professes a special skill
Second, with regard to the duty of disclosure of 
information, Cassidy argues that it is not a question 
whether a duty to warn or disclose is owed, but rather what 
the extent is of this duty 169 Here, the source of this 
duty is no different from that of the medical 
practitioner's other duties (diagnosis and treatment) This 
source is skill, competence and reasonable care, not the 
right of the patient's bodily integrity asserted by Lord 
Scarman m  SIDAWAY
Finally, the question of breach of the duty of care is 
not a question of law but a question of fact 170 The 
defendant breached his duty if he had not conformed to a 
certain practice It cannot be decided upon what the
168Cassidy (1992 72)
169Ibid , at 85
170Ibid , at 85-86
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defendant ought to have done If this is accepted, 'nothing 
other than the Bolam [sic ] test can be applied' 171
Alternative Compensation Schemes
2.5.5. According to Maguire (1993), the present 
compensation system for medical negligence does not suffice 
the demands of the patient The patient wants to find out 
what went wrong, whether his doctor was incompetent and 
whether he can obtain compensation for his loss The tort 
system has become too slow, expensive, burdensome and 
uncertain to provide a proper answer to the above 
questions 172
He agrees with others that a "no-fault" scheme would 
overcome the identified difficulties under the present tort 
system However, he also warns against the disadvantages 
Such a scheme, as m  New Zealand,173 does not have a 
deterrent effect the tort system suggests to have 174
McLean (1988) examines the possibility of legislation 
by referring to a no-fault liability scheme as it exists m
171Jjbid , at 86 (Cassidy's italics)
172Maguire (1993 250) In his article Maguire refers, 
inter alia, to the proposals suggested by the Pearson 
Commission (Report of the Royal Commission on Civil 
Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury, H M S 0 , 
Comnd 7054) These proposals are considered elsewhere by 
McLean (supra)
173See McLean (supra)
174Maguire (1993 251)
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New Zealand 175
In England, the medical profession objected to the 
Pearson Commission's proposals 176 The medical profession 
indicated that the fault liability principle as it exists 
today is # one of the means whereby doctors could show their 
sense of responsibility and, therefore, justly claim 
professional freedom' 177 In addition, the profession felt 
that a no-fault liability scheme would create an intrusion 
m  and a bureaucratization of medical practice
According to McLean, there are, nevertheless, valid 
reasons to consider such a scheme The scheme as it exists 
m  New Zealand avoids higher insurance premiums and 
"defensive practice" for one thing It also covers more 
cases than just cases resulting form negligent conduct, 
cases of medical accidents are widely covered Contrary to 
the scheme, litigation is costly, time-consuming and 
compensation is often not there when it is needed Finally, 
litigation undermines the doctor-patient relationship 178
However, m  New Zealand, the scheme has proven to 
include some obstacles First, one may encounter problems 
as to who is eligible under the scheme 179 Second, whether
175The Accident Compensation Act, 1972
176The Royal Commission on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Personal Injury, H M S 0 , Cmnd 
7054/1978
117Ibid , para 1342
178McLean (1988 14 8-150)
179The scheme covers loss from accidental injury and is 
not restricted to medical accidents, see McLean (1998 
150)
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medical accidents are covered depends on the interpretation 
of "error", "mishap" or "medical misadventure" In one case 
a medical error was defined as a failure to observe 'a 
standard of care and skill reasonably to be expected of 
[the doctor] ' 180 The test is similar to that m  
negligence, but it is said to be coinciding A medical 
mishap has been accorded a wider interpretation It is -
an intervention or intrusion into the 
administration of medical aid, care or attention 
of some unexpected and undesigned incident, event 
or circumstance of a medical nature which has 
harmful consequences for the patient 181
Finally, a last obstacle regards how the no-fault 
scheme deals with issues of informed consent McLean argues 
that this is a central problem to the scheme It fails to 
respect the patient's bodily integrity and right to self- 
determination regarding the inadequate disclosure of risks 
and alternative methods Only those risks are compensated 
which are unexpected But unexpected by whom? It is not 
enough for the patient that he did not know about them, if 
it is known to the doctor, although he did not inform the 
patient, the patient is not compensated 182 In addition, 
Mclean points out that under the scheme compensation aims 
at loss of earnings, it does not compensate for an insult
180Jjbid , at 154
1Q1Ibid , at 155
182Jjbid , at 156-157
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to bodily integrity 183
The problem of consent and bodily integrity m  no­
fault schemes has also been recognized by Epstein (1976) 
Nevertheless, Epstein stresses that a no-fault liability 
scheme takes seriously the idea that the law is an 
allocator of losses and spreads these losses over the
entire class of consumers of medical services 184 He also 
accepts the difficulties identified by McLean (1988), 
including the definition of the 7 compensable event' m
relation to causal complexities 185 This leads to his 
conclusion that the question of fault cannot be avoided, 
even m  a no-fault scheme 186
The same and other difficulties are identified by
Murphy (1989) Not all cases of medical negligence appear 
to be covered by the New Zealand scheme, for example, 
damage that has occurred as a result of disease infection, 
such as V D (Venereal Diseases) Administrative and moral 
difficulties have resulted from distinguishing accidents 
from disease causes However, Murphy argues that the basic 
aim is met by the scheme - simplifying compensation for 
accident victims, and that existing difficulties are of an 
administrative nature rather than a threat to the basic 
concept 187
183Ibid , at 158
184 (1976 141)
185Jjbid , at 143
186Jjbid , at 147
187Murphy (1989 217)
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Bolt (1989) provides a general outline of the proposal 
of the Council of the British Medical Association to set up 
an alternative, no-fault compensation scheme for medical 
accidents The tort of negligence is m  the Council's view 
inappropriate to deal with loss resulting from medical 
health care 188
In the medical profession's view, compensation should 
depend on the need for it, not on the proof of negligent 
conduct A no-fault scheme relieves the victim of the 
burden of proving culpability It does not imply that a 
medical mishap is without fault In doing so, the proposal 
increases the number of compensable events However, on the 
other hand, the hint of litigation disturbs the 
professional relationship which is avoided under the 
alternative scheme 189
The proposal is intended to be supplementary and it is 
generally confined to physical injury It does not include 
loss resulting from progress of the underlying disease Nor 
does it include injuries arising from diagnostic error 
which is judged reasonable by a panel of experts The 
recognized complications of any procedure competently 
performed (disclosed inherent risks) are also excluded The 
actual compensation concentrates upon identifiable 
financial loss and takes into account other sources of
188Bolt (1989 109) It is said to be unfair and slow
The burden of proof limits compensation and the customarily 
provision of lump sums disregard the needs of both the 
victim, the N H S and the Social Services
1Q9Ibid
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reimbursement that are or have been made available to the 
victim 190
Another proposal is discussed by Witcomb (1991) This 
proposal establishes a Compensation Board that is composed 
of representatives from the legal and medical professions, 
and consumer organisations 191 It is chaired by a High 
Court judge It aims at speedy handling of claims on a more 
equitable basis Once compensated, the victim, however, 
must give up any other legal rights m  relation to his 
loss
According to Witcomb, the proposal replicates two 
problems that already exist m  medical negligence 
litigation 192 (i) the burden of proof (causation) , this
remains m  any no-fault scheme, and (n) the provision of 
financial compensation alone does not benefit all the 
interests of the victim or claimant
In addition to compensation, victims often demand an 
explanation of what has happened and demand accountability 
of the doctor or doctors m  question In doing so, the 
Board would be able to seek the explanations and apologies 
and may refer the doctor to a disciplinary tribunal The 
waiver of legal rights after acceptance leaves the victim 
astray and is left with the unsatisfactory existing 
disciplinary tribunals procedures
190Ibid , at 109-110
191Witcomb (1991 109)
192Ibid
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2 . 5 . 6 .  In the United States attempts have been made to 
reform the system for claims for medical injuries
King (1975) explains that m  the nineteen seventies, 
the adoption of a strict or no-fault liability system was 
rejected Such a system was thought of as being inapt to 
reduce the costs of litigation The difficult causation 
issue remained The added expense of additional recoverable 
injuries or losses were also problematic In addition, a 
no-fault plan would enhance a 'distributive justice' 
question 193 It would burden those who needed health care 
the most, due to their medical condition, m  the absence of 
a national health plan
Since then tort reform has taken place on two levels 
Although it is not proposed to examine m  great detail the 
reform m  this area, some general remarks must be made
Furrow et al (1995) point out that the huge increase 
m  medical malpractice litigation necessitated reform 194 
They describe the current situation as a 'malpractice 
"crisis"' 195 This crisis has coincided with a crisis of 
insurance availability, putting a financial burden on 
medical health care providers
One level of reform addresses changes m  the structure 
of the insurance industry New types of insurance providers
193 (1975 1228)
194This increase was due to, inter alia, higher levels
of medical treatment, the complexity of medical treatment, 
and the unrealistic expectations of the patient (Furrow et 
al., 1995 333).
195 (1995 334)
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have emerged,196 and the type of policy has changed 197
A second level involves changes to the litigation 
process 198 These changes were intended to reduce the 
frequency of 'malpractice litigation by, for example, 
reducing the filing of claims, or limiting the size of the 
settlement or judgment awarded to plaintiffs Other changes 
reflect an alteration of the plaintiff's burden of proof
In addition to these reforms, voices have been heard 
proposing an alternative system for compensating victims 
The rationale for this is based on a growing critique of 
the current system the administrative costs are too high, 
compensation is not effectively achieved for many medical 
injuries, juries are inefficient, the role of the judgments 
as a deterrent is unclear,199 the awarding of damages bears 
little relationship with the defendant's negligence and 
access to medical services is m  rural areas m  America 
impaired due to the inability of physicians to pay their 
premiums 200
At least seven proposals are discussed by Furrow et
196Furrow et al (1995 33 9) name, for example, joint
underwriting associations, reinsurance exchanges, hospital 
self-insurance programs, state funds and provider owned 
insurance companies
197Policies are written on a claims-made basis rather 
than on an occurrence basis (Furrow et al , 1995 339)
198Furrow et al (1995 340-346)
199See also Saks (1992) He states 'Where a deterrence 
system directly touches only a fraction of the cases it is 
intended to have impact upon, it needs to find a way to 
make up for the reduced probability that any potential 
injurer will feel its effect (supra, at 1286)
2o°Furrow et al (1995 349-351)
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al 201 In Florida and Virginia, a limited no-fault system 
has been implemented with regard to birth-related 
neurological injuries The system excludes, m  Virginia, 
all other tort remedies except where the birth-related 
neurological injury was caused intentionally or wilfully by 
the medical practitioner Compensation is for net economic 
loss only, compensation for pain and suffering, as well as 
expenses covered by insurance are excluded Participation 
is voluntary However, due to its limiting range, the 
system is regarded as a failure the definition of those 
losses covered by the system is too narrow, and most of the 
patients eligible for compensation die as infants
Medical adversity insurance covers certain expenses 
and losses of medical outcomes which are listed as 
compensable Outcomes that are not listed are subjected to 
the normal routes of litigation or arbitration
Another proposal prefers a contractual approach to 
liability Here, providers of medical services contract 
with insurers to cover certain outcomes which, if they 
occur, would be paid on a no-fault basis The patient 
contracts too, with the provider, to accept those amounts 
on possible outcomes listed m  the policy
The American Medical Association has proposed an 
administrative system to resolve malpractice claims This 
system is based on the physician's negligence It aims to 
compensate small claims In addition, it aims at the 
enhancement of quality control, every liability
201 Ibid , at 354-362
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determination can give rise to an initial screening of the 
practice of the defendant physician as reported by the 
claimant Thus, the system covers both aspects of 
compensation and deterrence 202
Other proposals concern a system of enterprise 
liability, changing the locus of liability for patient 
injuries, and a persuasive system of social insurance 
Under the first proposal the focus of malpractice
litigation shifts Instead of the individual medical
practitioner, the health care organization under whose 
auspices the patient is treated, will be liable to the 
affected patient 203 A negative aspect of this proposal is 
that it affects the medical practitioner's autonomy He 
becomes merely an employee of the health care institution
with an 'attendant loss of power' 204
With regard to a system of social security, society 
must bear the costs of adverse outcomes Furrow et al 
refer here to the Accident Compensation Act, 1972 m  New 
Zealand This has already been discussed by McLean 
(1988) 205
These alternatives to the existing tort system appear 
to be favoured by Furrow et al They make sense,
202A critical analysis of this proposal is offered by 
Paglia (1991)
203This proposal is developed more fully by Abraham & 
Weiler (1994) See also Priest (1985), for an historical 
analysis of enterprise liability
204Furrow et al (1995 359)
205See supra Subparagraph 2 5 5
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'particularly if reform is combined with changes m  the 
reimbursement of health care' 206 However, this means that 
the quality of care must go hand m  hand with cost- 
effective care
It is not proposed to offer a further discussion on 
the secondary literature on the health care system m  the 
United States, as it is expressly outside the scope of this 
thesis
2.6. The Professional Relationship
2.6.1. This section discusses various aspects of the 
professional relationship which are relevant to the Irish 
situation The thesis addresses the problems that 
professionals face m  Ireland m  negotiating incidences of 
the professional relationship with their client or patient 
The thesis points out that the relationship between a 
professional and his client or patient reaches further than 
pure contractual terms It follows Dahrendorf's (1984) 
argument that the relationship implies some sort of a 
social contract This contract makes the professional 
accountable and responsible for his actions, either inside 
or outside the professional relationship 207
The literature review first examines a number of 
incidences of the professional's responsibility, such as
206Furrow et al (1995 362)
207See infra Subparagraph 8 2 1
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the balance of power, discipline and confidentiality
The medical profession, m  particular the role of the 
Medical Council m  Ireland, is subject to criticism 
However, there appears to be a gap m  the exist ing 
literature m  Ireland with regard to the role and function 
of the medical practitioner as a professional
The position of lawyers has also been subject to 
criticism with regard to their increasingly different role 
m  society The literature review focuses on the lawyer's 
responsibilities and responses to the changing environment 
m  which they provide their services, as well as the role 
and function of the codes of conduct which regulate the 
lawyer's behaviour
Since the decisions m  CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v 
DICKMAN [1990] 1 All E R 586 the position of auditors has 
been re-examined
This section precedes the discussion on third-party 
liability It commences with some general remarks and
comments on the professional relationship of the medical 
practitioner, the solicitor and the auditor
General Remarks
2.6.2. Within a professional relationship, it is argued 
that both parties are not dealing with each other on an 
equal footing There is an element of dependency on the 
professional service provider through the need for 
knowledgeable advice Consequently, the professions are
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able to set standards of performance (what ought to be 
done) over what is actually done
According to Lane (1966) , the increase of knowledge 
and changes of ways of thought and thought processes 
influence and alter decision-making mechanisms The gap
that then exists creates 'within the profession a kind of
strain towards remedial action' 208 As a result 
professional persons and their associations have 'a role m  
the preformulation of policy [ ] , generally responsive to
the needs of society' 209
This may explain the distinction between business and 
professional practice According to Behrman (1988), the 
aspect of social responsibility is inherent to the
professions and the professional relationship In the
author's view, professions as a socio-economic group are 
founded upon and delineated by ethical considerations, 
their particular skill and knowledge is more the basis for 
differentiating professional roles 210
Although the word "profession" has become meaningless 
and alienated from its original concept, Behrman still 
identifies some characteristics 211 To name but a few, he 
mentions a defined field of expertise, education and 
training, selection, testing and licensing, social 
dedication/obligation (altruism), services for income or
208Lane (1966 657)
209Ibid , at 662
210Behrman (1988 96)
211Ibid , at 97-98
78
without charge for the indigent, a sliding scale of fees, 
self-regulation, ethics and self-surveillance
In his view medicine and the law are clearly 
distinctive as being professional groups pur sang, due to 
their distinct and unique roles m  society However, 
Behrman also identifies that the medical and legal 
professions do not act as professions any more, due to, 
inter alia (1 ) an increased specialization, which 
distances the relationship between professional and client 
or patient and (1 1 ) an increased mobility of the individual 
members of society This leads to the inability to develop 
an enduring professional relationship 212
The distinction between professions and business 
remains relevant Behrman provides four reasons 213 First, 
the appearance of the unique quality of esoteric knowledge 
and practice is still present as a most important factor 
Second, there is still an overwhelming and, often 
involuntary, need for this knowledge and practice Third, 
professions benefit society as a whole and those who cannot 
financially afford them must be served as well Hence, the 
idea of differential pricing As an ideological 
consequence, the price of the service is disengaged from 
the quality of the service Finally, the expertise is the 
basis for licensing by the State and the basis to set rules 
of behaviour towards the society or the demanding public
On a final note, Behrman discusses the role of
212Ibid , at 102-103
212Ibid , at 99-100
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professional and ethical codes of conduct 214 Many 
professionals are dissatisfied with the role and function 
of these codes The codes cannot deal with the complexity 
of issues They also have created, in many instances, a gap 
between what professions desire and what society 
demands 215 However, Behrman argues that the codes of 
conduct are said to be a necessary requirement to enforce 
self-discipline The need for codes are given m  by, inter 
aha, the willingness to lie or deceive, the absence of 
ethical training, the prevalence of "group-thinkingn 
(sharing responsibility for unethical decisions), and the 
need for g a m  without responsibility to the society at 
large Professionals must learn to take responsibility for 
their own actions, particularly within the professional 
relationship
2.6.3. The element of dependency on knowledge bears its 
consequences with regard to abuse of the dominant position 
This is particularly relevant with regard to sexual 
exploitation, according to Allen (1996) He describes the 
remedies that a client or patient may have m  common law 
against sexual exploitation When is intervention justified 
and on what grounds?
As we have identified, the paramount aspect within the 
professional relationship is that the parties do not stand
214Ibid , at 154 ff
215An example of this can be found m  the Medical 
Council's attitude towards the decision in RE A WARD OF 
COURT [1995] 2 I L R M 401, see infra Subparagraph 2 6 7
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on an equal footing Allen contrasts this with the common 
belief that m  tort the parties are independent and equal, 
and are concerned with their own interests 216 There ought 
to be a balance between power and dependency The 
justification to implement a civil duty is where this 
balance is disturbed,217 the patient's or client's choice 
is impaired (no consent), harm is suffered or the trust m  
the relationship given by the victim is breached These 
aspects may give rise to either an action m  battery or 
negligence However, these remedies are, according to 
Allen, inadequate to fully compensate for the damage 
suffered by the victim m  a variety of circumstances In 
battery, the issue of consent is ambiguous, while m  
negligence the harm suffered is not always actionable
Jorgenson & Sutherland (1993) provide a number of 
reasons that explain the vulnerability of a client within, 
for example, the relationship between him or her and his or 
her lawyer In addition to the instability of the 
relationship m  terms of power and knowledge, the nature of 
the legal problem, the disclosure of confidential 
information, the idealization of the lawyer and the stress 
of the litigation process demonstrates the importance of a 
well-balanced relationship
With regard to the dependent nature of the 
professional relationship, particularly within a doctor-
216Allen (1996 77) He refers here to the decision m
NORBERG v WYNRIB (1992) 92 D L R (4th ) 449
217Allen (1996 58-61)
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patient relationship, confidentiality must be maintained 
The public intervention of Dr Browne concerning the 
controversy surrounding Father Michael Cleary,218 raised 
new questions regarding medical confidentiality, according 
to Scally (1995) 219 Does the very intimacy of the subject 
matter mean that the given advice transcends the boundaries 
of friendship and enters the realms of professional 
practice?
Scally indicates that there are four exceptions to the 
confidentiality rule (1 ) the court directs the doctor to 
do so, (1 1 ) the patient has explicitly consented to 
disclosure, (1 1 1 ) to prevent the patient from causing harm 
to society or others, ( i v ) to prevent patients from doing 
harm to themselves
However, situations do exist where both the 
maintenance and breach of the confidentiality rule may 
cause harm, 1 e where HIV or AIDS patients whose partners 
who wish to start a family risk infection In these cases 
there must be a balance between the public interest and the 
right to confidentiality 220
218Father Cleary sought help from Dr Browne The former 
was the father of the child of Mrs Phyllis Hamilton who 
also was a patient of Dr Browne
219Conf identiality is also one of the lawyer's 
contractual duties This duty extends to the lawyer's 
staff The use of computer based data poses, however, a 
problem, according to Barry (1991) Maintenance of computer 
systems exposes the data to others such the maintenance 
engineer or mechanic who is able to copy the data and use 
it for improper or fraudulent purposes
220See, for example, X v Y AND OTHERS [1987] 3 B M L R
1, W v EGDELL AND OTHERS [1989] 4 B M L R 96 and R v
CROZIER [1990] 8 B M L R 128
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Having regard to the doctor's primary ethical 
responsibility - non-maleficence f a new culture of 
transparency is required, according to Scally This culture 
must provide patients with all the required information on 
all aspects of their treatment This transparency is also 
m  the interest of the health care professional According 
to Scally, it has been indicated that medical litigation 
can, to a large extent, be traced back to some 
communication failure between patient and doctor, rather 
than the latter's incompetence or negligence
2 6.4. Epstein characterizes the doctor-patient 
relationship as consensual 221 This consensual nature forms 
the basis of the obligations of both parties m  the 
relationship The sources of these obligations are found m  
tort and contract Medical malpractice illustrates the 
importance of these two sources Epstein states that to 
recognize the interaction between tort and contract in 
medical malpractice litigation one may come to a better 
understanding of the boundary line between them 222
Consequently, he argues that to determine liability it 
is wrong to look merely at the rules of tort Instead, one 
should focus on the possibility that the parties m  the 
relationship can vary the rules inter se, by their mutual
221 (1976 94)
222 Ibid
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agreement 223 Greater emphasis should be placed on private 
initiative and control rather than an increase m  
government 224 This increase may result m  a wider gap 
between legal rules and the contractual norm
Thus, Epstein favours a position where the 
professional service provider and the client or patient may 
come to an agreement as to the limitation of liability
However, James (1987) argues that professional persons 
may limit or exclude their liability But the limitation or 
exclusion must be reasonable 225 Among other things, the 
writer argues that where the service provider limits the 
service through a two-tier service system, the provider may 
exclude liability by emphasising the limits of the service 
to the client m  clear and unambiguous terms
The question is then, when is exclusion or limitation 
reasonable? Apart from the guidelines provided by the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, 226 James argues that the 
reasonableness may be assessed by reference to (i ) 
insurance, 227 and (n) the operation of a two-tier 
service 228
223This has also been identified by Furrow et al, as one 
of the tort reform proposals, see supra, Subparagraph 
2 5 6
224Epstem (1976 95)
225See section 2(1)&(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act, 1977 (England)
226See, for example, section 11 of the Act and Schedule 
2, accompanying the Act
227James (1987 289 ff )
226Ibid , at 292 ff
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Under (1 ), it can be argued that professional persons 
may limit their liability, particularly in the absence of 
a compulsory indemnity insurance This limitation is 
reasonable insofar as it regards the strength of each 
party, the obligations that are accepted, the apportioning 
of risk, whether the plaintiff was covered by insurance and 
the wording of the limitation (whether it is clear and 
unambiguous) Great emphasis is put on the equal bargaining 
power of the parties However, it has already been 
recognized that with regard to professional services this 
power is, m  most cases, absent due to the nature of the 
professional service and the superior knowledge of the 
provider 229
The Medical Practitioner
2 6,5. Perhaps the most surprising gap m  the existing 
literature appears to be any hard data, relevant to the 
Irish situation, on the role and function of the medical 
practitioner as a professional person, apart from text-book 
material 230
The literature discusses m  great detail the way m  
which the medical practitioner is qualified, licensed, is 
subject to ethical and legal control, and may be censured 
or disqualified But these are all attributes, there is
229See supra Subparagraph 2 6 3
230See, inter alios, Hensey (1988) and Tomkm & Hanafm 
(1995)
85
little up-to-date m  Ireland about the doctor as a 
professional person This indicates the paucity of material 
and also, the importance of this thesis as a contribution 
to debate in such a vital area
2.6.6, The articles selected for review deal with three 
central aspects of the medical practitioner's role The 
first article deals with the recognition of the legal 
problem concerning a doctor as an independent contractor or 
employee
Though throughout the common law world, there has been 
a great deal of judicial analysis of the doctor's 
employment position, the central question remains one of 
liability In Ireland, it is well accepted that for the 
purpose of medical negligence, the hospital is vicariously 
liable for the torts of its doctors, the same is true m  
England 231
By way of exempl1fication, we here mention the 
Canadian position, discussed by Fridman (1980) This 
important article stresses a change m  the area of the 
liability of hospitals for wrongs committed by its 
staff 232 Fridman holds that the changes m  hospital health
231See McMahon & Binchy (1990 754-755)
232The traditional Canadian approach, embodied m
FLEMING V SISTERS OF ST JOSEPH OF THE DIOCESE OF LONDON
(1937) 0 R 512, (1938) S C R  172, was that the hospital
was vicariously liable for the negligently performed acts 
of its employees m  this case, the incorrect application 
of diathermy, which was part of a nurse's routine duties
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care provision, for one thing its public nature, 233 mean 
that liability should be grounded less in outmoded concepts 
derived from "master and servant law" Instead, it should 
be based on principles deriving from administrative law, 
statutory duty or simply tort This suggestion reflects the 
minority decision of two judges of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal m  YEPREMIAN v SCARBOROUGH GENERAL HOSPITAL (1979) 
3 L Med Q 278, (1980) 28 0 R 2d 494
The consequence of this is that failure by the 
hospital to provide non-negligent care is actionable on the 
basis of breach of a "public duty" In other words, the 
hospital can be held directly liable and owe a personal, 
public duty to the recipients of health care provisions In 
doing so, it is suggested that it widens and enlarges the 
scope of the hospital's liability 234 Fridman's perception 
of hospital liability is particularly interesting and 
relevant m  the current climate of financial emasculation 
of public health providers and the concomitant necessity to 
ration services 235
233Fridman states that public duties may give rise to 
liability and regulate as to how hospital bodies carry out 
their activities (1980 85)
234Fridman (1980 83)
235According to Bettle (1987) , three options are open 
to render a hospital liable for negligent conduct of its 
staff Apart from vicarious liability, a hospital could be 
held liable on the basis of a ' non-delegable duty of 
care7 (1987 573) This can exist in a duty with regard to
the organisation of the hospital For example, to provide 
sufficient qualified and competent staff, cf WILSHER v 
ESSEX AREA HEALTH AUTHORITY [1986] 2 All E R 801 It also 
may exist m  a non-delegable duty to take reasonable care 
This is wider and may render a hospital liable for the 
negligence of a private practitioner providing medical
87
The literature has largely failed to take up Fridman's 
very important point about the application of 
administrative law to medical negligence and professional 
conduct generally His suggestion that failure by a 
hospital to provide non-negligent care carries considerable 
weight m  societies where access to health care has been 
subject to overriding financial and other constraints 
Though it may appear to be something of a huge jump, the 
issues outlined by Fridman have not been judicially taken 
up by the English courts until the decision in R v 
CAMBRIDGESHIRE HEALTH AUTHORITY, EX PARTE B (A MINOR) 
[1995] 3 B M L R 5 and the decision in X v BEDFORDSHIRE
COUNTY COUNCIL [1995] 3 W L R 152
In the former case the Court of Appeal considered 
whether it could interfere with the Health Authority's 
discretion with regard to its public duty of the allocation 
of health care services 236 Although the Court of Appeal 
recognized that a local authority was under a public duty 
to provide medical services, it stated that it could not 
interfere with the Authority's decision as to how to spend 
its money The Court of Appeal stated that the judge m  
first instance was not, on an application of judicial
services from the hospital Bettle argues that this duty 
should be restricted to organizational aspects of hospital 
management
236In this case, the Health Authority refused a ten year 
old girl, who suffered from acute myeloid leukaemia, life- 
saving treatment It was said that this treatment stood at 
the frontiers of medical science, had a low success rate 
and that medical opinion was divided as to whether this 
treatment was m  the best interest of the patient
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review, allowed to decide between conflicting medical 
opinion or how a local authority is to spend its budget 
with regard to the allocation of resources between opposing 
claims
A similar outcome was reached m  the BEDFORDSHIRE 
case 237 The House of Lords recognized the authority's 
public duties but it rejected a claim m  negligence for a 
breach of statutory duties
It shows that the judiciary m  England are, as of yet, 
not willing to afford compensation for the negligence of 
public authorities 238
Brodie (1996) explains this attitude, referring to the 
courts' introduction of public law elements such as 
discretion and vires In addition, the courts relied on the 
dichotomy between policy considerations and operational 
measures In doing so, they could offer a clearer 
indication as to the reasons for rejecting a claim m  
negligence against public authorities The decision as to, 
for example, the allocation of resources made by a 
democratic elected body should not, on the grounds of 
policy, be interfered with 239
The BEDFORDSHIRE case showed, according to Brodie,
237This case involved a number of appeals involving 
claims of breach of a number of statutory and common law 
duties against the statutory background of the Child Care 
Act, 1980 and the Education Act, 1981
238That this area of law is not as clear-cut as other
areas of negligence law has been recognized since the 
decision m  HOME OFFICE v DORSET YACHT CO LTD [1970] 
A C 1004
239Brodie (1996 132)
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that an action may succeed if the defendant exceeded the 
proper limits of his discretion 240
2.6.7 In Ireland, the medical practitioner is subjected
to codes of professional and ethical conduct These codes 
are governed by the Medical Council However, it appears 
that the role and function of the Medical Council is 
unclear with respect to the implementation and use of these 
codes This is also addressed m  the thesis 241
Again, this is an area of Irish law that demands 
further examination The recent decision m  RE A WARD OF 
COURT [1995] 2 I L R M 401 showed, as one commentator
observed, 242 that a medical practitioner, m  following the 
law, may be guilty of professional misconduct
Tomkm & Me Auley (1995a) argue that the medico-legal 
area demand legislative change This area appears to be 
full of gaps These gaps are paramountly present m  the 
statutes under which, for example, the Medical Council 
operates and issues guidelines 243
An example is the apparent lack of power of the 
Medical Council to sanction ethical conduct Thus, a 
medical practitioner who is accused of ethical misconduct 
and is punished accordingly, may seek to have his penalty 
squashed on the basis that the Medical Council does not
240 (1996 141)
241See supra Subparagraph 8 3 9
242See Tomkm (1995)
243T o m k m  & Me Auley (1996 20)
90
have the power to do so
The power to sanction professional misconduct is 
afforded to the Medical Council under section 45 of the 
Medical Practitioners Act, 1978 However, the Act and the 
Council are unclear as to what exactly constitutes 
professional misconduct
Tomkin & Me Auley discuss another, related problem 244 
Section 69(2) of the Medical Practitioners Act, 1978 
imposes on the Medical Council a statutory duty to issue 
guidelines of ethical conduct However, the Council does 
not have an obligation to issue guidelines addressing 
^professional conduct The writers argue that the Council 
may act ultra virus where those guidelines regulate, as 
they appear to do, professional conduct 245 As a 
consequence, a doctor who is accused of breaching those 
guidelines which attempt to regulate professional conduct, 
may have his case open for judicial review
In England, the General Medical Council has, according 
to Samuels (1986), broadened the concept of serious 
professional misconduct by including acts of negligent or 
gross negligent conduct Negligence then, involves serious 
professional misconduct if it is shown that the doctor, as 
well as breaching his common law duty of care, disregarded 
his professional duties or responsibilities as to raise a 
question of serious professional misconduct This means 
that the traditional distinction between the General
244 Ibid
245See also Tomkin (1995)
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Medical Council and the courts has blurred This is the 
distinction between 'moral turpitude' and professional 
negligence 246
2 6.8. A final observation is made by Barker (1995)
Health care provision m  England has become more 
competitive and consumenst m  nature, according to Barker 
The patients are afforded rights and health care is 
provided through contracts m  the N H S system 247 Barker 
argues that this new system affects the malpractice 
liabilities of health care providers 248
Patients are not part of the N H S contract However, 
this redefined contract and the recognition of patients' 
rights may lead to more successful negligence claims 
First, the contract may ease the burden of proof Second, 
the new system may raise the standard of care A doctor may 
be held to a higher standard if he, through his contract, 
represents himself as capable of conforming to this 
standard 249
Tormey (1992) adds to this that m  Ireland new drugs 
and medical technologies have dramatically changed the 
outlook for the individual patients The evaluation of 
these developments m  terms of human welfare and scientific
246Samuels (1986 461) See also McFarland (1989)
247See section 4(1) of the National Health Service and 
Community Care Act, 1990
248 (1995 161)
249Ibid , at 162
92
validity is a key role for the medical profession 250
In addition, the medical profession must bare m  mind 
that it ought to preserve its professional integrity with 
regard to the provision of medical services This means, 
according to Tormey, that medical practitioners must on 
ethical grounds guard against the presently existing 
incentives to preferentially treat private patients 
only 251
The Lawyer
2.6.9. The thesis sets out a number of aspects that are 
particularly relevant to the role and function of 
solicitors m  Ireland 252 The solicitor's role and function 
is, however, changing This has been recognized by many
A number of aspects, therefore, demand further 
examination This section of the literature review pays 
particular attention to the role of codes of ethical 
conduct m  the United States This aspect is underexamined 
m  Ireland In doing so, it reflects the problems analyzed 
m  the thesis with regard to the meaning of codes of ethics 
m  the world of the professions Although this may not be 
directly relevant m  the context of this thesis, it 
contributes to the question whether the use of ethical and 
professional codes may be relevant to the standard of care
250Tormey (1992 376)
2S1Ibid , at 3 77
: 252See infra Paragraph 8 4
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I
in the negligence inquiry This section of the literature 
review shows that this issue has been debated at length m  
the United States This is illustrated with a discussion on 
the perception of ethical codes by lawyers m  the United 
States
2.6.10, The lawyer owes responsibilities to his client as 
well as to others These responsibilities are often 
conflicting and lead to a higher accountability for lawyers 
and their conduct An anonymous article m  the Harvard Law 
Review (1994) points out that this constrains the lawyer 
He cannot act solely m  the interest of his client
The increase m  responsibilities are due to, inter 
a h a , the apparent connection of lawyers to misconduct of 
others, the changing nature and composition of the legal 
profession, the newly emerging business approach and, 
finally, the type of work or specialization Among those 
different parties are his clients, private third parties 
and the legal profession
A lawyer owes responsibilities towards his client and 
other third parties His responsibilities here, entail 
competent legal representation and is extended to 'intended 
beneficiaries' 253
253Anon (1994 1552) The article suggests that the
current tort system dealing with legal malpractice claims 
is not sufficiently working m  America Its two main 
functions - compensation and deterrence - are under 
scrutiny Victims appear to be undercompensated and the 
deterrence factor is nullified through insurance safety 
nets Legislative tort reform, the increase m  
administrative costs and litigation procedures have 
contributed also to the decline of the current system,
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The lawyer's responsibilities to his profession entail 
the adherence to its code of ethics and professional 
conduct The enforcement of these codes are m  the hands of 
the profession's associations Thus, the profession itself 
has an important voice m  its own regulation 254 However, 
this must be reconsidered m  the light of recent 
developments These developments show a shocking contrast 
between the content of the rules and the reality of the 
lawyer's discipline This is partly caused by the 
interpretation problems of some of the rules, 255 and the 
inefficient control mechanisms
The article suggests that the ethical rules need more 
consistency and certainty through reformation of the 
substantive rules, improvement of enforcement proceedings, 
as well as co-operation with others, 'including the public, 
to improve [the profession's] discipline and image' 256
The lawyers' responses to the increasing number of
(supra at 1574-1576)
The article, therefore, suggests an alternative an 
administrative fault-based compensation scheme Here, 
claims are assessed and awarded by an administrative board, 
replacing the adversarial system of tort litigation It is 
cost-efflcient and enables more people to be compensated 
and more people to gain access to the system, (supra at 
1579 ff )
254Anon (1994 1582) In America the enforcement of the 
codes is m  the hands of the American Bar Association The 
rules are laid down m, for example, the Canons of 
Professional Ethics (1908), the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility (1980) and the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (1983)
255For example, the rules governing the conflicts of law 
and the anti-contact rules
256Anon (1994 1604) This aspect is examined further, 
see infra Subparagraph 2 6 11
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responsibilities towards different parties aim at either 
restricting personal liability of lawyers, or covering 
their liability through insurance or indemnity clauses
This is, m  the short term, an easy option A 
reference to increasing standards of competence and clarity 
m  codes of conduct - a long term approach - has not been 
made, or attempts have failed The lawyers appear to be 
more concerned, according to the article m  the Harvard Law 
Review (1994), with the reallocation of financial loss 
caused by malpractice 257 This reallocation takes various 
forms and are here summarized
First, lawyers reallocate loss through professional 
liability insurance 258 However, the increase m  litigation 
and the concomitant increase m  size of awards have made it 
difficult for lawyers to obtain insurance In any event, 
the costs of the lawyer's services will rise (re- 
reallocation) or lawyers will avoid involvement m  "risky" 
areas of the law
Second, the law firm may be incorporated into a 
limited liability company, whereby the losses are born by 
the company, not the respective partners 259
A final option is to reallocate risks through
257Anon (1994 1652)
258Ibid
259Ibid , at 1658 However, this researcher argues that 
incorporation may appear to circumvent liability but, of 
course, it may be that subsequent courts will allow 
negligence claims against lawyer directors of law firm 
corporations
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contracting with the client 260 This can be achieved 
through, for example, indemnity clauses or to submit 
malpractice claims to binding arbitration tribunals
Feldman (1992) also identifies the tendency to view 
the profession as a business, at the expense of the public 
responsibilities of a lawyer and his function m  society 
Soliciting and advertising lie at the root of the 
problem,261 as well as the obstruction of access to legal 
aid He stresses that lawyers must realize that they pursue 
a 'Learned Art' and act m  the 'Public Interest' to 
'resolve conflicts of clients, often implicating issues 
that bind the very core of the hope for civilised 
existence' 262
2.6.11. According to Wilkins (1990), the traditional 
model of legal ethics does not disclose the effects of 
legal realism on the understanding of the role of the 
lawyer The question is how legal ethics should respond to 
reality, taking into account the legal realist's claim that 
the law is indeterminate 263
Within the traditional model the lawyer's duties are 
two-fold and are often conflicting First, the lawyer has
260Anon (1994 1664)
261Cupel (1995) argues that advertising has adversely
affected the legal profession Clients are now exposed to
the promotion of lawyers as 'fungible products', {supra, at
71)
262Feldman (1992 219)
263Wilkms (1990 470)
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his responsibilities towards his client Second, he has a 
public duty as an officer of the court The model aims at 
a balance between private interests and public obligations 
client representation within the bounds of the law and the 
lawyer's professional ethics and responsibilities Wilkins 
calls this the 'boundary claim' 264 Within this model legal 
rules are said to be objective, consistent and legitimate 
This is rejected by the legal realists They claim 
that the law is indeterminate The reasons are 
threefold 265 First, there are different theories and 
sources that may provide a legal answer to an ethical 
dilemma Second, many legal terms are vague and ambiguous 
("good faith", "proximity", "reasonableness", etc ) This 
may lead to contradictory interpretations Third, 
indeterminacy results from the discrepancy between the 
general nature of a rule and its practical application
Therefore, as the lawyer is engaged m  practice for a 
particular purpose, he will pursue the interpretation of a 
legal rule that suits his client's interests Although this 
is sanctioned by the rules of professional conduct, this 
partisanship may become unacceptable where controversial 
issues are closer to the boundary claim This may, 
subsequently, lead to legal nihilism, according to Wilkins, 
where any construction is acceptable without 'restrictions 
of zealous advocacy' 266
264Ibid , at 471
265Ibid , at 478 ff
266Ibid , at 484
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The effect of legal realism, however, is modified 
because it is not the practical experience of the 
practising lawyer There are meaningful constraints There 
is a legal culture that brings coherence of legal 
interpretation, for example, established custom Lawyers 
are able to predict the outcome of the action of the legal 
decision makers 267 Finally, indeterminacy is limited by 
the lawyer's practical desire and ability to engage m  
legal argument 268
Nevertheless, legal realism undermines the normative 
foundation of the boundary claim because lawyers can 
manipulate it Within the traditional framework zealous 
advocacy is limited by finetuning the regulatory system 
This, however, maintains the existence of partisanship as 
an underlying force of the boundary claim 269
Wilkins argues that this assumption of partisanship 
should be modified and replaced as reference point for 
interpreting legal boundaries 270 He suggests that lawyers 
should be more supportive to the essential and public 
purposes and the social role of the legal rules, including
261 Ibid , at 4 90 However, according to Wilkins {supra
492-493), this prediction may exceed the boundary of the
law and may lead to a breach of professional ethics,
through knowledge of external, non-legal circumstances is
a rule enforced, is there enough man power, etc ?
268Here, the question whether boundaries are legitimate
depends on factors other than pure democratic principles,
i e economic disparity
269Wilkins (1990 4 97-498)
270Jjbid , at 505
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ethics (7purposivism') 271 This means that lawyers must 
accept their responsibility as playing an important role m  
the preservation of society, act m  good faith and use 
their discretion over the contents of legal rules 
accordingly
But this can only work with the assistance of some 
form of pressure This could be achieved, according to 
Wilkins, by taking into account the context m  which 
lawyers interpret and apply legal ethics, and, 
subsequently, modify this incremental, case-by-case 
approach through the developments of 'middle-level 
principles' 272 These principles isolate and respond to the 
relevant differences m  social and institutional contexts 
and provide 'a structural foundation for a widespread 
compliance m  the areas where they apply' 273
Although it is submitted by Wilkins that this approach 
entails difficulties, he believes that it is the best 
alternative of professional regulation It 'incorporates 
the truth about legal realism for lawyers while maintaining 
a commitment to systemic values' 274 It provides a 
meaningful way to assist individual lawyers, balancing 
purposive advocacy against, among other things, the private 
interests of their clients
211Ibid
212Ibid , at 516
273 Jjbid
214Ibid , at 523
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2.6.12. In America the Code of Professional 
Responsibility is an authoritative guideline for 
professional ethical conduct of lawyers 275 The Code 
expressly asserts that it does not purport to be a standard 
of care m  negligence claims 276
However, courts have frequently applied the Code as a 
standard m  itself,277 especially m  the areas of conflicts 
of interest 278 Some courts assume that the Code embodies 
the common law duties between counsel and client 279 It is 
asserted that the impact of being labelled "unethical" may 
prejudice the defendant m  a negligence claim 280
Getter (1983) asserts m  that to use ethical 
guidelines as a standard of care m  professional negligence 
claims is unhelpful He argues that it removes the 
discretionary power of a lawyer to use his own professional 
judgment as to the ethicality of the particular 
relationship with the particular client 281
However, a recent anonymous article m  the Harvard Law
275Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980)
276This is supported by many commentators, including 
practising lawyers, see, inter alios, Mallen & Calladine 
(1995) and Munneke & Loscalzo (1989) These commentators 
maintain that ethical rules are not intended to be used m  
a civil action but merely require disciplinary procedures
277Cf PRESSLEY v FARLEY (1991) 579 So 2d 160 See 
also Mallen & Calladine (1995 20)
278Cf NOLAN v FOREMAN (1982) 665 F 2d 738
279LIPTON v BOESKY (1981) 313 N W 2d 163
280See Mallen & Calladine (1995 20)
281Getter (1983 1323)
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Review (1996) refutes the present justification that the 
ethical codes, as they exist for attorneys, 282 should not 
be extended to the malpractice context
This justification is founded on the basis that 
ethical rules are present for the protection of the legal 
profession and the public at large, not for the individual 
claimant m  aid for his action 283 The courts claim, inter 
alia, that the nature of ethical codes preclude their role 
m  malpractice litigation (the codes are rules of 
discipline and are not parliamentary represented) In 
addition, the rules' application is problematic Many 
judges fear that the codes only provide vague guidelines, 
and the standard of care that would be derived from them 
would be too broad 284
This is rejected Ethical rules could be useful m  
helping to establish the standard of care m  malpractice 
suits The ethical codes express the duties to which an 
attorney is bound and they provide evidence of the existing 
duties between the plaintiff and defendant The use of 
ethical rules should be at the discretion of the judiciary, 
maintaining fairness to the defendant lawyer and allowing 
clients 'to hold attorneys to the same standard to which
282See, for example, the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (1983) and the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility (1980) of the American Bar Association
283Cf HIZEY v CARPENTER (1992) 830 P 2d 646 at 653-
654
2 84Anon (1996 1106)
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attorneys hold themselves 7 285 
The Accountant as Auditor
2.6.13. The thesis points out that the auditor exercises 
his functions on behalf of the members of the company At 
the same time he must co-operate with the Board of 
Directors As well as this menage a trois, the auditor also 
owes duties to outsiders This may, occasionally cause 
friction 286
Lasok & Grace identify this problem as to the 
auditor's relationship with both the members and directors 
They point out that the accountancy profession must 
exercise its functions, demonstrating on the one hand some 
degree of flexibility and on the other maintaining required 
professional standards with a degree of rigidity This can 
lead to unsatisfactory results The auditor can exercise 
too much flexibility and thus fail to properly discharge 
his functions Too much rigidity may obscure the truth and 
may compromise the advent of a fair view of the audited 
accounts 287
The solution (to remain within the bounds of 
flexibility and rigidity) demands courage and discipline 
from the regulatory accountancy bodies It cannot and must 
not rely on a set of definitive rules In this accountants
285Anon (1996 1119)
286See ♦ infra Paragraph 8 5
287Lasok & Grace (1993 132)
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differ from lawyers Lawyers, according to Lasok & Grace, 
are bound by the rigidity of legal rules Within auditing, 
the law only determines the parameters m  which auditors 
function and defines their task Accounting standards 
should not be interpreted as legal rules They are a guide 
for the auditor, so that he can ultimately form his opinion 
whether the company's accounts give a true and fair view 
To give them legal force would render them too rigid and 
inappropriate After all, the standards are a distillation 
of professional expertise and experience sub]ect to 
interpretation and individual opinion 288
Percival (1991) refers to the perception of the 
auditor's role by outsiders, including the general public 
According to Percival, there is an expectation gap between 
the auditor's understanding of his responsibilities under 
company law and the perception of outsiders or the general 
public as to what constitute these responsibilities 289 The 
outsider and the public at large both believe that the 
auditor's watchdog role is ineffective This is recognized 
by the accountancy bodies, especially with regard to the 
growing take-over mentality However, steps to improve the 
public's perception have, as of yet, not been undertaken or 
have failed
This resulted m  an attack on the profession's 
objectivity and independence The accounts became a weapon 
to sell off the company or to protect it against take­
288Jjbid , at 131
289 (1991 743)
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overs Corporate clients tend to switch financial advisers 
This commercial activity resulted m  a number of negligence 
claims that were decided on a all-or-nothing approach with 
regard to the imposition of the duty of care 290
The question is whether this existing framework is 
sufficiently equipped to deal with commercial life 
According to Percival, all parties involved aspire a 
compromise Investors seek "privity letters" to establish 
sufficient proximity The auditor acknowledges the fact 
that the investor relies on the accounts Other examples 
include the proposal of a statutory liability cap 291
2.6.14. As a result of the increasing litigation, Savage 
(1983) argues that the auditor escapes into insurance to 
avoid potentially devastating actions against them, rather 
than seeking an up-to-date statement of their 
responsibilities 292 As a result his responsibilities 
remain the subject of speculation, creating a gap between 
the public expectations and the auditor's idea of his 
function (for example with regard to his role m  the 
detection of fraud) The court cannot fill this gap because
230 Ibid See, for example, the decisions m  MORGAN 
CRUCIBLE CO PLC v HILL SAMUEL & CO LTD [1991] 2 W L R 
655, JAMES MCNAUGHTON PAPER GROUP V  HICKS ANDERSON & CO 
[1991] 2 W L R 641, AL NAKIB INVESTMENTS (JERSEY) LTD v 
LONGCROFT [1990] 1 W L R  13 90 and CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC 
v DICKMAN [1990] 2 W L R 358, [1990] 1 All E R 568
291Percival (1991 744-745)
292 (1983 187-188) This line of thought has already
been uttered with regard to the liability of lawyers, see 
supra Subparagraph 2 6 10
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most actions are, subsequently, settled out of court
Two levels fuel, according to Savage, the discrepancy 
m  the perception of the auditor's role
First, it appears that the auditor's duties extend 
beyond matters arising out of his statutory duty These 
duties reflect the increasing corporate and personal 
accountability of directors with regard to company funds 
and directors' dealings, and the detection of fraud 293
Second, the auditor's independence is vital to 
corporate accountability It is central to the profession 
and has always been regarded as a state of mind by the 
auditing profession and governing bodies However, the 
decline of the credibility of auditors is partly due to the 
fact that this independency is only apparent, not real It 
lacks a clear code of conduct or legislative provisions 294 
Finally, Mitchell (1995) critically assesses the 
function of the Auditing Practices Board and sets out what 
is wrong with it His conclusions are sharp and to the 
point 295 He argues that there was no internal or external 
consultation on forming the Board The Board remains the 
captive of the major firms Its structures are undemocratic 
and its decisions are not accountable and contested
Mitchell suggests the creation of a new body that is 
accountable to Parliament and which represents the 
plurality within the accountancy profession
293Savage (1983 188-189)
294Jjbid , at 196
295Mitchell (1995 76)
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I
Liability and Immunity
2 7.1. This section of the literature review discusses 
the consequences of modern tort development for both the 
auditor and solicitor m  Ireland and England
It reviews the existing literature on important and 
influential negligence cases It discusses the concept of 
duty and other elements such as proximity and 
foreseeability It also considers the influence of policy 
considerations with regard to the liability question The 
literature review identifies how this development is 
received m  Ireland
Against this background the literature review 
discusses the consequences of modern tort development for 
both the auditor and the solicitor m  England and Ireland 
It also sets out some of the implications of recent 
decisions affecting the liability of the auditor
Finally, the literature review discusses briefly the 
issue of immunity m  advocacy The debate concerning 
advocates7 immunity has recently been highlighted by two 
cases awaiting judgment m  the English Court of Appeal 296
Modern Tort Development
Foreseeability, Proximity and Public Policy
2.7.2. The courts, both m  Ireland and England, struggle
2.7. Tort Development Third-Party
296See Slapper (1996)
107
with the concept of duty It appears that the courts often 
justify the imposition of a duty of care with the help of 
policy considerations
The thesis shows that the concept of duty is developed 
as a means to limit or expand liability on justified 
grounds It stresses that one of these grounds is the need 
to compensate loss 297 This need is largely based on policy 
considerations 298 The thesis asserts that this policy 
aspect renders the outcome of negligence claims uncertain 
or even arbitrary
This has also been identified m  the literature One 
of the questions relates to what the underlying notion is 
of the duty of care The literature has debated extensively 
the question of the nature of duty m  tort Is it ethical, 
does it have a connotation with morality, or is it a 
pragmatic concept based on utility to promote enterprise?
Harper (1932) points out that historically the concept 
of duty bore elements of moral blameworthiness He argues 
that this idea of moral blameworthiness is closely 
connected to the existence of a duty of care Both aspects 
are interrelated, emphasizing the importance of the nature 
of the defendant's conduct Harper stresses that the 
existence of a duty of care is only constructive where a 
defendant is 'morally culpable' 299 In Harper's view "duty" 
is primarily a moral concept He stated that ' it
297See infra Paragraph 9 2
29QIbid , Paragraph 9 3
299Harper (1932 1013)
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misdescribes the character of the defendant's conduct m  
cases where there is no moral fault' 300
This implies that negligence as a proper cause of 
action ought to be reserved m  cases where the defendant is 
morally wrong However, case law shows that this is not so 
Harper here identifies the core problem of the tort of 
negligence the helplessness of the courts to justify the 
imposition of a duty of care m  the absence of fault as a 
moral concept
Kretzmer (1994), however, argues that at the close of 
the nineteenth century the imposition of a duty of care 
bore the nature of utility The courts' attitude shifted 
from causation as the basis of liability towards the idea 
that the defendant ought to have avoided the loss Imposing 
a duty, the courts struck a balance between risk-generating 
and cost-avoidance factors
Kretzmer sets out how this change came about 301 He 
argues that the causation rule examined the abnormal factor 
that accounted for the plaintiff's loss and whether this 
factor could have been ascribed to a deliberate act or 
activity of the defendant However, the important question 
became whether the defendant ought to have behaved 
differently than he did This shift was due to, inter alia, 
the introduction of the steam engine and other consequences 
of the industrial revolution Industrialization changed the
300Ibid , at 1014
301 (19 9 4 7 6 - 77)
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nature of the risk-generating conduct of the defendant 302 
It could no longer be maintained that each time an engine 
generated a risk the defendant was liable simply because he 
owned or used the engine These defendants, for example, 
railway companies, had, at the same time, a statutory power 
to use these engines Therefore, if this inherent
contradiction was not addressed and the old causation 
principle was not changed the courts argued that enterprise 
would have been 'stifled' 303 304
The notion of due care, expressed m  cases such as 
BLYTH v BIRMINGHAM WATERWORKS (1856) 156 Eng Rep 1047,
solved this problem The test of reasonableness became the 
general test of negligence In doing so, the courts were
capable to strike the balance between the protection of
personal interests and freedom of action In other words, 
some risks were excusable, others demanded compensation
However, the nature of a duty of care was not based on 
morally blameworthy conduct, according to Kretzmer The law 
had to concern itself with man's external behaviour 'rather
302Another development, discussed by Kretzmer (1994 80-
85) was the introduction of the "assumption of risk" 
theory, developed m  RYLANDS v FLETCHER (1868) L R  3 H L 
330
303Kretzmer (1994 47) From this point of view it can
be argued, according to this researcher, that this change 
was inspired by policy considerations, whereby the interest 
of the individual plaintiff gave way for the interest of, 
ultimately, the common good
304See also Magnus (1996) He stresses that fault lies 
at the basis of liability However, the presumption of 
fault is not exclusive anymore It fitted the Zeitgeist of 
the 19th century Now it has become objective and 
supplemented with notions of, for example, strict liability 
{supra, at 430-431)
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than man's innermost thoughts' 305 The imposition of a duty 
of care was based on "fault" but the defendant's conduct 
was assessed as to whether he ought to have avoided the 
loss-generating conduct by reference to the "reasonable 
man" The end-result was, according to Kretzmer, that 
liability questions were solved on the basis of a normative 
evaluation of the defendant's conduct 306 307
2 . 7 . 3 .  Kretzmer's outline of the development of 
negligence perhaps shows the difficulties the courts face 
m  striking the right balance between excusable and 
inexcusable risks This century has shown that this balance 
can shift both ways The decision m  DONOGHUE laid down the 
"neighbour" principle This principle has, accordingly, 
been interpreted m  favour of the plaintiff m  ANNS v 
MERTON LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL [1978] A C 728 and recently 
m  favour of the defendant m  MURPHY v BRENTWOOD DISTRICT 
COUNCIL [1990] 2 All E R 908 and CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v 
DICKMAN [1990] 1 All E R 568 308
Steele (1993) examines this aspect of the law of 
negligence further She argues that, though it is obvious,
305Kretzmer (1994 47)
306This was made clear m  STANLEY v POWELL [1891] 1
Q B 86
307The thesis stresses that the recognition of a duty 
of care was first identified m  situations where there was 
already an underlying relationship flowing from, for 
example, a propriety relationship or contract or quasi- 
contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, see 
infra Paragraph 9 2
308See infra Subparagraph 9 3 2
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it has been consistently overlooked when it comes to the 
analysis of professional obligations Dworkm argues, 
according to Steele, 309 that the common law is both 
constraint and flexible Dworkm supports the traditional 
argument, much beloved by tort lawyers, that the 
development of negligence has a logic of its own 310
Steele's contribution is to indicate some of the ways 
m  which the development of tort is governed less by the 
constraints of an interior logic than by conflicting and 
irreconcilable requirements of policy She illustrates this 
by arguing that the retreat from the ANNS' approach was a 
reinstatement of principle However, this retreat of 
principle to limit liability was m  itself a policy aim In 
addition, criteria such as proximity are described has 
being merely a label, although still applied as principle 
by the courts 311
Steele's comparison of ANNS and CAPARO shows with some 
elegance that whereas the former case pushes the boundaries 
outwards, the latter maintains and even retrenches these 
This comparison does not depend on the fact that ANNS 
relates to economic loss, and CAPARO to liability (two 
separate questions) It shows, according to Steele, 312 that 
it is impossible to find a particular aim that the tort of
309 (1993 440)
310See Dworkm (1986)
311See CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v DICKMAN [1990] 1 All
E R 568
312 (1993 437)
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negligence fulfils But taking Steele's general point, this 
thesis examines the reasons implicit m  CAPARO'S limitation 
of liability, carrying Steele's argument further 313
The recent decisions m  MURPHY v BRENTWOOD DISTRICT 
COUNCIL [1990] 2 All E R 908 and CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v 
DICKMAN [1990] 1 All E R 568 overruled ANNS and retrenched 
the boundaries of liability 314
Howarth (1991) argues that the new line of thinking is 
hollow and cannot be said to offer a clear guideline as to 
what is understood with the concept of negligence Howarth 
considers m  particular whether the concept of the duty of 
care is a ' superfluous notion' 315
As Steele did, Howarth too identifies that the courts 
do not know what to do with the tort of negligence This 
explains the reigning confusion about the meaning of
313See infra Paragraph 9 4
314P n o r  to the decisions m  MURPHY and CAPARO, a number 
of dissenting judgments indicated a dissatisfaction with 
the Wilberforce test See, for example, the dissenting 
judgment of Lord Brandon m  JUNIOR BOOKS v VEITCHI [1983] 
A C 520, Lord Keith m  GOVERNORS OF THE PEABODY FOUNDATION 
v SIR LINDSAY PARKINSON & CO LTD [1985] A C 210 and the 
unanimously approval of Lord Brandon's dissent m  JUNIOR 
BOOKS by the Australian High Court m  LEIGH AND SILLAVAN v 
ALIAKMON SHIPPING CO [1986] A C 785
315 (1991 6 8) Howarth adopts here the words of Buckland
(1935) m  his attack on the concept of duty Buckland 
argues that the duty of care is 'certainly a part of our 
law, but [ ] an unnecessary fifth wheel on the coach,
incapable of sound analysis and possibly productive of 
injustice', (supra at 639) In his view, a duty exists not 
to harm others and this duty is owed to everyone This is 
different than a duty not to be careless One has a right 
to be as careless as one likes If not, the breach of one's 
duty would imply a remedy, but only for nominal damages 
'But m  fact that there is no action apart from actual 
damage' , {supra at 641) The duty question is one of 
remoteness
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negligence deterrence or compensation? Howarth offers two 
explanations First, he argues that recent case law shows 
that negligence does serve neither deterrence nor 
compensation aims Instead, it appears that the categories 
of liability are closed and that the tort of negligence is 
only applied successfully where there is a 'settled 
expectation that negligence law will apply' 316
Second, at the same time the courts' present 
apprehension to negligence shows their fear that expansion 
under ANNS may have resulted in an attitude that loss was 
expected to be compensated This line of argument offers an 
explanation for the sign of the times m  which negligence 
operates from indulgence to self-reliance In addition, 
the retreat to self-reliance is fed by the courts' 
prejudiced fear of American litigation numbers 317
But the courts themselves are also to blame This time 
with regard to their conceptualization of the duty of care 
Howarth argues that a normative premise must be re­
introduced to consider whether a situation is a duty 
situation 318 In doing so, it will help to bridge the gap 
between what is done and what ought to be done He 
continues, and blames the courts of a lack of willingness 
to discuss the normative premise, m  particular where this 
premise is controversial Instead, the courts attempt to 
justify the existence of a duty to bring the case within
316Howarth (1991 64)
211Ibid , at 66
31sIbid , at 69
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the facts of a previous case m  which a duty was held to 
exist 319 That this is also disguised with the ré­
introduction of proximity is merely an excuse for the 
courts7 passive attitude to analyze precisely the 
underlying notion of the defendant's conduct Howarth 
argues that
the main functions of "proximity" are to give a 
less controversial, more factual sounding name to 
Lord Wilberforce7 s second stage [ ], and to
provide an excuse for the intellectual laziness 
of those who cannot be bothered to analyze 
carefully the precise normative force of the 
points they make 320
Howarth asserts that proximity is nothing more than 
7 an allusion to proximate cause [or] remoteness7 and is 
used to cover public policy elements, i e the second stage 
of the Wilberforce test 321 He argues that the relationship 
between the auditor and the plaintiff m  CAPARO INDUSTRIES 
PLC v DICKMAN [1990] 1 All E R 568 was, de facto,
319This has been abundantly made clear by Lord Bridge 
in CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v DICKMAN [1990] 2 W L R 358 at 
365 See also Brennan J m  the Australian High Court7 s 
decision m  SUTHERLAND SHIRE COUNCIL v HEYMAN (1985) 60 
A L R 1 at 43-44, who stated 7 It is preferable, m  my 
view, that the law should develop novel categories of 
negligence incrementally and by analogy with established 
categories7
320Howarth (1991 72)
321Ibid , at 82 Martin (1990) interprets the proximity 
element by analogy He argues that the courts, by 
reintroducing the proximity element, sought to justify the 
imposition of a duty of care on principle A duty falls m  
recognized categories by analogy In doing so the courts 
equated proximity with duty and as a result proximity has 
become a meaningless requirement
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nothing more than an issue of remoteness
This ties m  with the argument, put forward m  the 
thesis m  Paragraph 9 3 , that negligence at present has 
all to do with policy who deserves to be compensated, not 
because of a underlying normative premise but by reference 
to the allocation of financial resources If this is really 
the case, the tort of negligence may be accused as being 
nothing more than a political mechanism
As well as the absence of a normative premise, the 
duty concept is also flawed m  that it implies a certain 
standard that is known m  advance by the defendant But,
this means that the standard of care must have been
formulated independently This is not done by the courts, 
according to Howarth In many instances the courts confuse 
breach and duty 322
The above criticism does not mean that Howarth 
suggests that negligence law is outmoded He agrees with
Calabresi (1978) that tort law serves its function m  a
society that is sceptical to both state regulation and 
self-regulation as separate avenues 323 It offers a 
combination of both, it leaves room for society to order
322 (1991 72-73) Howarth illustrates this point
further, referring to the decision m  SMITH v LITTLEWOODS 
LTD [1987] A C 241
323According to Calabresi tort law and the liability 
rule m  particular, is the 'paradigmatic law of the mixed 
society7, (1978 521) It fits between two opposing
theoretical ideologies libertarianism which focuses on 
contractual freedom, and collectivism that aspires complete 
state control through criminal sanctioning of any conduct
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itself without excluding some degree of state 
regulation 324 If this is accepted, the role of duty must 
be re-addressed Howarth submits that the courts' role will 
become much clearer All duty cases are, accordingly, cases 
that may give the defendant an immunity against liability 
Thus, for example, the purpose of the audited accounts m  
CAPARO may render the auditor immune against an action of 
an investor or shareholder This duty can be absolute or 
limited If a duty exists, the other issues refer, 
subsequently, to carelessness (the standard of care or the 
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct), remoteness 
(proximity and foreseeability) and causation (for example, 
reliance on the audited accounts)
If this system works, judges can explain the normative 
premise upon which a defendant is held liable In this 
system the notion of proximity can be forgotten as a 
precondition for the existence of a duty and interpreted as 
an aspect of remoteness
2 . 7 . 4 .  Stanton argues that recent case law indicates a 
decline of tort liability for professional negligence 325 
Tort law, m  particular with regard to financial loss and 
professional liability, has departed from general 
principles laid down m  cases such as DONOGHUE v STEVENSON
324Howarth (1991 91-92)
325(1991 83) He refers to the decisions in, inter
alia, SMITH v ERIC S BUSH and HARRIS v WYRE FOREST 
DISTRICT COUNCIL [1989] 2 All E R 514, CAPARO INDUSTRIES
PLC v DICKMAN [1990] 1 All E R 568 and MURPHY v
BRENTWOOD DISTRICT COUNCIL [1990] 2 All E R 908
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[1932] All E R  1 and HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & 
PARTNERS [1963] 2 All E R 575 Instead, the courts pay
more attention to analogous cases and develop the law on an 
incremental basis Consequently, the law on professional 
liability has become unpredictable
Stanton explains this unpredictability by reference to 
the difficulty m  professional negligence cases to draw the 
line between professional functions Stanton argues that it 
does not make sense to distinguish between professional 
functions solely for liability purposes 326 Is there a 
difference between drafting a will and advising a client? 
And, reviewing the case law m  this area, 327 Stanton states 
that the courts' interpretation of the decision m  CAPARO 
was subjected to other sentiments than just the application 
of the facts by analogy to the decision m  CAPARO
Stanton offers an explanation for this decline of tort 
law He refers to three possible causes
First, the decline of tort law is a result of the 
changing political climate Here, the idea of the social 
welfare state is vanishing and the balance between 
collectivism and libertarianism strikes m  favour of the 
latter 328
Second, the law was unfairly prejudiced against the
326Stanton (1991 89)
327See JAMES MACNAUGHTON PAPER GROUP LTD v HICKS
ANDERSON & CO [1991] 1 All E R 134 and MORGAN CRUCIBLE
CO PLC v HILL SAMUEL & CO LTD [1991] 1 All E R 148
328Stanton (1991 99-100) See also Calabresi (1978)
and Howarth (1991)
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professions Their response to the excessive expansion of 
professional liability may have influenced the courts'
attitude to this expansion In particular the huge increase 
m  costs for the professional and the threat of defensive 
practice may have contributed to the new line of 
thought 329
Stanton, however, does not believe that the above two
explanations can stand on their own In his view, the
change is based on the doctrine of legal principle 330 In 
this doctrine tort and contract have their predefined role 
and cases must be decided accordingly
Where the thesis emphasizes the influence of policy in
the decision making process m  professional negligence
cases, 331 Stanton explains that the type of damage must be 
assessed on the basis of the underlying relationship
between the defendant and plaintiff In this view, the 
neighbour principle is, according to Stanton, effectively 
reserved for personal injury Contract will offer recovery 
m  cases involving financial loss 332 The decision m
HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & PARTNERS LTD will be 
restricted to what Stanton calls 'neo-contractual 
relationships' 333 The decision m  ROSS v CAUNTERS offers 
a justification for a limited extension of contract to
329Stanton (1991 101-103)
330Ibid , at 103
331See infra Paragraph 9 4
332Stanton (1991 103)
333Ibid , at 105
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protect the beneficiary on the basis of a contractual 
expectation derived from the consideration given by the 
testator to the solicitor 334
Third Party Liability and Economic Loss, the Imposition of 
a Duty of Care Auditors and Solicitors
2 . 7 . 5 . The thesis makes a clear distinction between 
forms of reliance 335 In the narrow approach, reliance 
means that a third party relied and acted upon the 
representation of a professional person The wider approach 
describes reliance as an expectation that a professional 
person exercises his functions with due care and skill
The thesis asserts that the first interpretation is 
confined to the principles initially set out m  HEDLEY 
BYRNE [1963] 2 All E R 575 The latter interpretation
embraces the DONOGHUE principles
The literature is divided Some see the HEDLEY BYRNE 
principles as an extension of DONOGHUE Others prefer to 
differentiate between HEDLEY BYRNE and DONOGHUE
2 . 7 . 6 . It appears that the literature m  the nineteen 
eighties made a clear distinction between the principles 
laid down m  DONOGHUE and HEDLEY BYRNE
Lord Denning first recognized a remedy for negligent 
misrepresentation His dissenting judgment m  CANDLER v
334 Jjbid
335See infra Subparagraph 9 4 1
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CRANE CHRISTMAS & CO [1951] 2 K B  164 was approved m  
HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & PARTNERS LTD [1964] 
A C 465 He argued, according to Charles, that the 
DONOGHUE principles justified an examination into the 
viability of a remedy for negligent misstatements 336
Charles identifies two elements that demanded a 
different approach from DONOGHUE First, the nature of the 
defendants conduct words Second, the absence of a 
contractual or fiduciary relationship, or a sufficient 
degree of proximity 337 At the same time, the plaintiff 
relied on the statement and the defendant's professional 
competence
The different approach or justification was found m  
the notion of the nature of the voluntary assumption of 
responsibility Under DONOGHUE it is interpreted as 
foreseeability of damage and the proximity between the 
parties In HEDLEY BYRNE the plaintiff had to prove the 
existence of a "special relationship" This relationship 
exists, according to Charles, if the defendant has reason 
to believe that the plaintiff would reasonably rely on his 
statements for a particular transaction 338
Greer & Harkeness (1985) also stress the importance of 
a "special relationship" with regard to the liability for
336 (1988 23)
331 Ibid See also Cane (1981) He stresses another
important distinction that justified a different approach 
under HEDLEY BYRNE, DONOGHUE was concerned with physical 
loss, HEDLEY BYRNE was concerned with economic loss
338 (19 8 8 2 3)
121
negligent misstatements It restricted the degree of 
proximity and, therefore, liability The special 
relationship demanded a closer degree of proximity 339 The 
defendant ought to know that people could rely on him 
Under DONOGHUE, the defendant would be liable if he could 
reasonably foresee that the plaintiff could suffer damage 
This would imply that the defendant could be liable for 
losses suffered by unidentifiable plaintiffs
In this view, Greer & Harkeness distinguish acts from
words Words would pose a threat to the defendant m  that
he could be liable to anyone who had relied on him Acts, 
on the other hand, are normally addressed to one specific 
person This is seen as the basis for the differentiation 
between DONOGHUE and HEDLEY BYRNE
Cane (1981) explains what the real significant
distinction is between DONOGHUE and HEDLEY BYRNE He argues 
that this distinction lies m  the nature of the loss 
physical or economic Unlike other writers, he stresses 
that we do need a different liability test for both types 
of losses, but that we do not need 'separate tests
according to whether the loss was caused by words or 
deeds' 340
Cane (1989) stresses m  a later article that the 
interpretation of the term "reliance" m  HEDLEY BYRNE is 
important with regard to liability for economic loss, 
because it is this reliance that eventually will trigger
339Greer & Harkeness (1985 17)
340Cane (1981 862)
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off the loss It is essential, but Cane argues that it is 
not legally significant 341 He asserts that reliance goes, 
m  fact, to causation It is, m  his view, not an element 
of the special relationship Reliance is only relevant as 
a means to prove damage, damage, not words, is the gist of 
the tort of negligence 342
Normally, under DONOGHUE, reliance means that people 
expect others to behave m  a certain way, for example, road 
users If damage occurs, the defendant will be liable if he 
could reasonably foresee this damage Under HEDLEY BYRNE 
reliance is subjected to a much more narrow interpretation 
Here, a person relies on a statement or particular conduct 
of the defendant to the extent that the latter acts m  a 
particular way as part of an undertaking towards another 
According to Cane (1989) reliance is not a necessary 
condition There are cases where a plaintiff got a remedy 
without any reliance at all 343 Its real function, m  its 
narrow sense, is to limit the number of plaintiffs 344
In addition, however, Cane asserts that "reliance" as 
a basis for recovery of economic loss is obscure It is an 
attempt to justify compensation for economic loss 
sufferers Cane argues also that the term "reliance" itself 
is far from obvious The task left for the courts is to
341 (1989 202), see also Cane (1981 863)
242Ibid
343Cane illustrates this argument with the decision m
ROSS V CAUNTERS [1980] Ch 297, (1989 202)
344Cane (1989 202)
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find some rule that defines the proper role of tort m  
compensating for economic loss 345
2.7.7. More recent literature favours an approach that 
unifies the HEDLEY BYRNE principles with DONOGHUE
Huxley (1990) discusses the conceptual ideas of the 
English appeal courts m  the nineteen eighties with regard 
to the duty of care m  economic loss cases and the 
relationship between the "neighbour" principle and the 
decision m  HEDLEY BYRNE & LTD v HELLER & PARTNERS LTD 
[1963] 2 All E R 575 He argues whether economic loss
cases are now also recoverable under the "neighbour" 
principle, m  adopting the new three-stage test to cases 
argued under HEDLEY BYRNE
Huxley reviews the decided cases m  the nineteen 
eighties He concludes that there are two options 346
Some judges are willing to extend the three-stage test
to cases of pure economic loss 347 They seem willing to
incorporate the HEDLEY BYRNE criteria of reliance and the 
special relationship within the criteria of reasonable 
foresight and proximity Huxley justifies this attitude 348 
First, he argues that professional negligence no longer 
finds its rationale m  an implied contractual term between
345Jjbid , at 212-213
346Huxley (1990 375-376)
347Cf SMITH v ERIC S BUSH AND HARRIS V WYRE FOREST
D C [1989] 2 W L R 790
348 (1990 375)
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defendant and plaintiff 349 Second, the analysis of cases 
shows that there is no longer a clear distinction between 
negligent misstatement and negligent activity 350
Others hold the decision m  HEDLEY BYRNE as an 
independent tort 351 For them the assumption of 
responsibility forms the crucial element for negligent 
misstatements The more the relationship approaches a 
contractual nature, the more likely the courts will assume 
such an assumption At the same time, they accept that a 
category of cases, such as ROSS v CAUNTERS [1980] Ch 297, 
are an extension of DONOGHUE This approach is described by 
Huxley as the 'quasi-professional negligence approach' 352
Murphy (1996) goes a step further and suggests a 
return to principle He demonstrates that the proximity 
element divided the House of Lords m  WHITE AND ANOTHER v 
JONES AND OTHERS [1995] 2 A C  704 At the same time he
suggests that the case could have been easily solved if the 
Law Lords had applied the principles laid down m  DONOGHUE 
v STEVENSON [1932] All E R 1
The problem that divided the Law Lords was, according 
to Murphy, 'the nature of the assumption of responsibility
349Cf NAYLOR v PRESTON HEALTH AUTHORITY [1987] 1
W L R 958
350The preparation of the audited reports by the auditor 
m  CAPARO can under DONOGHUE be described as "failing to 
take care m  conducting an audit" Under HEDLEY BYRNE it 
can be described as '"negligently misstating the company's 
current financial position ,f' , (Huxley, 1990 375)
351Cf Gibson L J m  REID v RUSH & TOMKINS [1989] 3
All E R 228 at 230
352 (1990 375)
125
considered to be necessary to create the requisite "special 
relationship"' 353 In other words, what is the requisite 
degree of proximity necessary to establish the existence of 
a duty of care Is it the absence of any other remedy for 
the beneficiary, 354 the assumption of responsibility for a 
particular task - to draw up a will and do it correctly, 355 
or the display of mutuality where both 'the plaintiff and 
defendant played an active part m  the transaction ' ? 356
Murphy argues that a retreat to principle, rather than 
relying on an incremental approach by analogy of decided 
cases, would have offered a better alternative The 
question must be was the plaintiff m  WHITE "closely and 
directly" affected by the omission of the solicitor?
In applying the DONOGHUE test the assumption of 
responsibility would not have been an issue Although the 
undertaking was initially directed to the testator, his 
daughters were closely and directly affected after the 
testator had died because only then the will took 
effect 357
Murphy reiterates here the problem m  recent tort law 
This problem involves the inability of the courts to 
address tort problems on principle to ascertain certainty
353 (1996 46)
354WHITE v JONES [1995] 2 A C * 207 at 268, per Lord
Goff
3SSIbid , at 274, per Lord Browne-Wilkmson
356Jjbid , at 283, per Lord Mustill
357Murphy (19 96 53)
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and consistency
2 . 7 . 8 .  The decision m  WHITE v JONES was preceded by 
the decision m  ROSS v CAUNTERS It is interesting to note 
that the literature is impressed with the decision m  ROSS 
and its subsequent approval m  the WHITE case In addition 
to their significance for solicitors, 358 the decision m  
WHITE may, as Murphy has set out, 359 indicate a return to 
principle
Banakas (1985) argues that the decision m  ROSS 
carries two implications
First, ROSS allowed the beneficiary to a will a remedy 
for economic loss Without the presence of any "reasonable 
reliance" the judge m  ROSS could not rely on HEDLEY BYRNE 
Instead, he applied directly the DONOGHUE principle of 
reasonable foreseeability 360 This implies that Banakas 
adopts the position that the decision m  ROSS justifies the 
application of DONOGHUE m  economic loss cases
Second, this could suggest that the decision m  HEDLEY 
BYRNE is made redundant Banakas argues that this is not 
so In ROSS the beneficiary did not rely on the defendant's 
professional skill and expertise This is, however, a 
precondition under HEDLEY BYRNE Banakas concludes that 
HEDLEY BYRNE forms a distinct category of negligence
358See infra Subparagraphs 9 4 6 and 9 4 7
359See supra Subparagraph 2 7 7
360As interpreted under ANNS, (Banakas, 1985 3 73)
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law 361 It is capable of operating as an independent source 
of professional liability Economic loss sufferers can find 
a remedy if they relied on the negligent performance of 
professional skill
Consequently, the decision m  HEDLEY BYRNE is equal to 
DONOGHUE as to the recovery of economic loss, an 
alternative source of negligent liability, independent from 
DONOGHUE 362
Evans originally suggested that the decision m  ROSS, 
prior to its approval m  WHITE, was not good law 363
First, m  ROSS the plaintiff did not rely on the 
solicitor and the degree of proximity was subjected to the 
two-stage test m  ANNS v MERTON LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL 
[1978] A C 728 This test has subsequently been overruled 
by the House of Lords 364
Second, Evans argues that there was no loss, merely an 
expectation of g a m  Evans asserts that this is only 
recoverable m  contract As a consequence Evans argues that 
the decision m  ROSS is too wide It undermines the privity 
of contract This may render a person liable m  all cases 
where there was a contract between two parties for the 
benefit of an identified third person 365 366
361 (19 8 5 3 7 4) See also Jones (1994 188)
362Banakas (1985 372)
363 (1991 137)
364Cf MURPHY v BRENTWOOD DISTRICT COUNCIL [1990] 2
All E R 908
365Evans (1991 140)
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Evans (1993) accepts, after the decision m  WHITE, 
that ROSS is approved and extended However, Evans still 
remains convinced that both decisions carry some problems 
He is again particularly worried with regard to situations 
where the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant 
is less obviously close For example, where the solicitor 
is not aware of the identity of the intended 
beneficiaries 367
Jones (1994) argues that the decision m  ROSS is an 
example where tort fills the gap of contract law The 
person who suffered the damage but who had not the remedy 
was afforded one The decision was affirmed in the WHITE 
case
The WHITE case m  particular shows that the three-step 
test - foreseeability, proximity and justice and 
reasonableness - does not carry any real content, according 
to Jones (1994) It is an example where the courts 
spuriously look for circumstances upon which 'to pin the 
labels "proximity" or "just and reasonable" 368 If tort law 
is about weighing pro's and cons of imposing liability,
366According to Baughen (1992) , the decision m  ROSS has 
been extended m  SMITH v CLAREMONT HAYNES & CO , The 
Times, 3 September 1991 In this case the testator
requested a solicitor to draw up a new will The testator 
died and the new will was never completed The 
beneficiaries were known to the solicitors This implies, 
according to Baughen, that a solicitor owes a duty of care 
towards intended beneficiaries from the moment the 
solicitor's client, the testator, asks him to draw up a 
will
367Evans (1993 172)
368Jones (1994 194)
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Jones suggests that the courts are better off to articulate 
more on policy instead of toying with the duty issue 369
The decision m  WHITE goes too far It justifies 
compensation to any person who suffered loss and is without 
a remedy 370 But, m  reality this is not true Jones refers 
here to the absence of a remedy for home owners for 
economic loss m  the context of defective buildings 371 
Therefore, Jones concludes that the WHITE case may only be 
applied as a limited solution to defective wills
Weir (1995) picks up this point 372 He speculates 
whether the decision is exceptional or principled and will 
have the far-reaching consequences as DONOGHUE had for 
physical damages 373 It depends, according to Weir, on the 
court's underlying justification for imposing a duty of 
care If the courts accept to impose a duty on the basis 
that a solicitor must assume legal responsibility m  the 
exercise of his functions, the consequences could be, 
indeed, far-reaching This responsibility is owed to the
369Ibid
370Jjbid , at 195 This viewpoint is not shared m  the 
thesis The thesis' justification is that the person 
reasonably relied on the fact that a solicitor generally 
carries out his functions with reasonable care and skill, 
see infra Subparagraph 9 4 1
371For example, latent defects discovered by subsequent 
purchasers have no remedy against the builder The original 
owner has a remedy, but he has not suffered any loss
(Jones, 1994 195) Cf D & F ESTATES LTD v CHURCH
COMMISSIONERS FOR ENGLAND [1988] 2 All E R 992 and MURPHY
v BRENTWOOD DISTRICT COUNCIL [1990] 2 All E R 908
372In fact, Weir suggests that the proper solution
should have been found m  the law of wills (1995 359)
373Weir (1995 357)
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client, the testator, on the basis of mutuality This is, 
accordingly, extended to the intended beneficiaries of the 
testator Consequently, the decision reflects the 
expansionist approach of ANNS but Weir argues that its 
consequences will not be as far-reaching 374
Marshall (1994) asserts that in ROSS and WHITE the 
underlying relationship between the solicitor and the 
testator existed for the purposes of the third party, the 
beneficiary This is contrary to, for example, the 
relationship between the company and the auditor A 
solicitor who is negligent and frustrates the expectations 
of the third party is, accordingly, held to be liable if 
this third party is readily identifiable and has no other 
remedy 375
The WHITE case also applied the new three stage test 
laid down m  CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v DICKMAN [1990] 1 All 
E R 56 8 Marshall indicates the discrepancy here The 
WHITE case extended liability for solicitors, while the aim 
m  CAPARO was to limit the liability of auditors on the 
"just and reasonable" grounds 376
However, Marshall rejects the idea that liability 
under WHITE is expansionist m  nature He argues that under 
the third CAPARO condition (is it just and reasonable to 
impose a duty of care?), a solicitor may go scott-free 
Marshall illustrates this, referring to the decision m
374Ibid , at 362
375Marshall (1994 155)
276 Ibid
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HEMMENS v WILSON BROWNE (A FIRM) [1993] 4 All E R 826
Here, the attempt to increase the solicitors' liability, 
this time with regard to a negligently drafted inter vivos 
transaction, failed The transaction could be altered, 
there was an alternative remedy 377
McDonald & Swanton perceive the decision m  WHITE v 
JONES [1993] 3 All E R 481 as representing 'an indirect
and surreptitious erosion by tort of the retrenched 
contractual principles' 378 Tort has increasingly expanded 
into the economic loss area, formerly the exclusive domain 
of contract law
McDonald & Swanton argue that this is hard to 
reconcile with the common law principles of obligations 
They identify a series of difficulties 379 the solicitor 
owes his duty solely to his client, liability is limited 
through the retainer, no contract exists between the 
solicitor and the beneficiary, the damage is not typical 
tort loss, the beneficiary has no claim m  contract In 
addition, the testator does not owe a duty to the 
beneficiary, so why should the solicitor owe a duty to him 
or her? Finally, the testator's estate increases at the 
expense of the solicitor
No doubt, McDonald & Swanton recognize that tort law 
has overcome these problems It aims at the relationship 
between the plaintiff and defendant to deduce a sufficient
377Jjbid
378 (1995 576)
219Ibid , at 576-577
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degree of proximity to impose liability McDonald & Swanton 
support the thesis' assertion that m  cases such as the 
WHITE case the testator and the plaintiff both relied on 
the defendant solicitor's care and skill 380 This 
underlines the importance of duty m  professional 
negligence In other words, a professional person is said 
to owe a duty of care to anyone he could reasonably foresee 
would rely on his expertise, either to act on it or to 
expect something from it This is more than a voluntary 
assumption of responsibility It is inherent to the nature 
of the function of professions
Greenfield & Osborn (1995) argue that the decision m  
WHITE v JONES [1993] 1 All E R 481, together with the
recent decision m  SPRING v GUARDIAN ASSURANCE PLC [1994] 
3 All E R 129 , 381 indicate a new approach of the House of 
Lords towards the tort of negligence The ramification of 
the decision m  SPRING and WHITE is as of yet unclear 
However, the authors argue that the extension of HEDLEY 
BYRNE criteria and the use of the just-and-reasonable rule 
m  SPRING and WHITE may indicate a retreat to ANNS The 
decision m  SPRING was made by a 'revitalized House of 
Lords, [ ] willing to apply notions of policy m  a
380See infra Subparagraph 9 4 1
381In this case the House of Lords allowed the subject 
of a reference a remedy m  negligence against the referee, 
his former employer It held that the defendant's negative 
opinion was honest but unreasonable The House of Lords 
indicated that it was fair, just and reasonable to do so 
The responsibility of a referee to provide a proper and 
careful reference serves, according to Allen (1994 113-
114), the public interest and leads to more accuracy See 
also Weir (1993) and O'Dair & Halson (1996)
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pragmatic and sympathetic way7 382 It suggests a retreat to 
ANNS and may m  particular threaten the liability of 
professional advisers
Passmore (1996) too argues that the solicitor's 
liability towards third parties is expanding He asserts 
that the justice and reasonableness critenum is not used 
m  recent case law to limit the liability of a solicitor 
with regard to negligent statements 383 He refers also to 
the decision m  WHITE v JONES [1995] 2 A C 207
In addition, Passmore argues that m  another recent
case, MCCULLAGH v LANE FOX & PARTNERS (1995) The Times, 22
December 1995, the court re-emphasized the importance of 
the assumption of responsibility as the underlying notion 
of liability 384 The judgment of Hobhouse J m  this case, 
although obiter, indicated a retreat from the policy 
argument, laid down m  GRAN GELATO LTD v RICHCLIFF 
(GROUP) LTD [992] Ch 560, not to impose lability 385 The 
assumption of responsibility m  GRAN GELATO was overlooked 
m  favour of the fact that it was not fair and reasonable
to impose a duty 386
2 . 7 . 9 .  Donnelly (1996) argues that the Irish courts have
382Greenfleld & Osborn (1995 57)
383Passmore refers to three unreported judgments (1996
410)
384See also HENDERSON v MERRETT SYNDICATES LTD [1994] 
3 W L R 761, discussed by Haydon (1995 239)
385Passmore (1996 410)
286Ibid See also infra Subparagraph 9 4 6
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recently moved away from the limited interpretation of the 
HEDLEY BYRNE principles, laid down by Kenny J m  BANK OF 
IRELAND v SMITH [1966] I R 646 387 In this case Judge 
Kenny stated that the relationship between defendant and 
plaintiff needed to be equivalent to contract 388
It is a clear sign that the' Irish courts are not 
reluctant to expand liability and have done this for 
negligent misstatements also Contrary to the position m  
England, the development of negligent misstatement m  
Ireland indicates an expansionist approach of liability 
issues Donnelly too, accepts this view The ANNS approach 
is still favoured by the Irish courts 389
Donnelly indicates that the public policy argument 
that may prevent the existence of a duty of care must, m  
Ireland, be 'extremely serious' 390 For this reason, 
Donnelly concludes that the Irish courts will allow a 
finding that the subject of a reference is owed a duty of
387Cf POTTERTON LTD v NORTHERN BANK LTD [1993] 
I L R M 225, MCANARNEY v HANRAHAN AND OTHERS [1993] I R 
492 and DONNELLAN v DUNGOYNE LTD [1995] 1 I L R M 388
388Donnelly (1996 126)
389This is also recognized by Byrne & Binchy (1992 
553) Reviewing the decision m  DOHERTY TIMBER LTD v 
DROGHEDA HARBOUR COMMISSIONERS [1993] I L R M 401, they 
conclude that this case 'afford no weight to the argument 
of those who contend that' the Irish courts too will 
retreat from the application of the "two-stage" test, 
{supra)
390 (1996 125) See, for example, the decision in MULALLY
v BUS ElREANN [1992] I L R M 722
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care by the referee 391
McMahon (1982) suggests that the Irish courts are 
generally favourable to the plaintiff Although McMahon 
stated this fourteen years ago, it still appears to be true 
that the floodgates arguments, or the 'opening of Pandora's 
box, have not impressed or intimated the Supreme Court' 392 
0 Ceidigh also recognizes this Irish attitude 393 The 
existence of a duty of care therefore, is differently 
recognized m  Ireland and England 394 This divergence in 
the law of negligence results from the different 
interpretation m  both jurisdictions of terms such as 
"principle", "test" and "standards" 395
Kerr (1988) previously, recognizes that McCarthy J , 
although citing English authorities which feared a too
391Cf SPRING v GUARDIAN ASSURANCE PLC AND OTHERS 
[1994] 3 W L R 354 This case has been discussed m  the
literature review by Greenfield & Osborn (1995) and Allen 
(1994), see supra Subparagraph 2 7 8
392McMahon (1982 3)
393Although Costello J referred m  the High Court to 
the new "just and reasonable" test (WARD v MCMASTER AND 
OTHERS [1985] I R 29) the Supreme Court on appeal was
reluctant to approve this part of Costello J 's judgment 
The Supreme Court (per McCarthy J ) rather interpreted the 
liability test according to the rationality m  ANNS There 
must be proximity and foreseeability A remedy is only 
denied if there is a 'compelling exemption based upon
public policy' (WARD v MCMASTER [1988] I R 337 at 349, 
per McCarthy J )
394See also Cherniak & Stevens (1992) They assert that 
the ANNS approach is sound and accepted m  CANADA In that 
jurisdiction the test is broader and has a more sensitive 
focus It is a mechanism that does justice to the 
compensable aim of tort law Under ANNS the Canadian
courts, contrary to the English, can take into account 'a
wider range of social expectations', (supra at 179)
3950 Ceidigh (1990 123)
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literal application of the ANNS test , 396 allowed an action 
m  negligence to succeed once foreseeability and proximity 
are established Policy consideration must be very powerful 
to deny the plaintiff a remedy 397
Kerr welcomes the consistency of the Supreme Court m  
its approach to negligence 398 He typifies the range of 
decisions as 'both rational and intelligible' 399
Byrne & B m c h y  (1988) argue that McCarthy J 's lack of 
enthusiasm for a reversal of ANNS was due to, inter alia, 
his insistence to hold on to the power of a general 
principle to answer future and novel liability questions 
For this reason Byrne & Bmchy welcome the decision m  WARD 
v MCMASTER However, at the same time they warn against 
the continuing endorsement of English decisions which have 
been repudiated by subsequent English decisions, and the 
lack of a proper analysis of principle of these cases by 
the Irish courts
396Cf GOVERNORS OF THE PEABODY FOUNDATION FUND v SIR 
LINDSAY PARKINSON & CO LTD [1985] A C 210 and YUEN KUN 
YEU v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF HONG KONG [1988] A C  175
397An aspect also recognized by Byrne & B m c h y  (1988
407)
Stapleton (1991) argues that m  essence the decision 
of ANNS does not materially differ from the recent 
"retrenchment" decisions The principles are similar and 
equally applied Where ANNS differs from the recent 
decisions is that policy has changed m  favour for the 
defendant (supra at 294)
398In cases such as PURTILL v ATHLONE U D C [1968]
I R 2 05, MCNAMARA v E S B [1975] I R 1 and FINLAY v 
MURTAGH [1979] I R 249
399Kerr (1988 187)
137
Specific Attributes to the Duty Question and Auditor's 
Liability
2 . 7 . 1 0 .  Case law showed that the liability of an auditor 
is limited At the same time, the solicitor's duties are 
extended to intended beneficiaries This has been 
discussed 400
The divergence with regard to the imposition of 
liability to a solicitor and an auditor lies m  the courts' 
attitude to tort law As we have identified, the courts 
employ an incremental approach towards professional 
liability 401 What are the specific consequences for the 
auditor of the decision m  CAPARO INDUSTRIES LTD [1990] 1 
All E R 568?
CAPARO states that the existence of a duty depends on 
foreseeability, proximity and justice and reasonableness 
Weir (1995) recognizes that this contains general 
principles with regard to the tort of negligence However, 
he argues that a general principle does not provide the 
solution to each liability question 402
The novelty of CAPARO, however, is that it 
characterizes the courts' refusal to impose liability on 
auditors by categorizing the different cases of auditors'
400See supra Subparagraph 2 7 8
i01Ibid , Subparagraph 2 7 4
402 (19 9 0 2 1 2) Weir argues that categories of
negligence are not subject to one principle The cases in 
one category may have common factors but 'the categories 
themselves have no common denominator', (supra at 213)
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liability The House of Lords did not consider m  CAPARO 
the special relationship between the parties nor did it 
consider the assumption of responsibility Instead, the 
House of Lords established new factors for the assessment 
of the existence of a duty of care It rather emphasized 
the precise form of reliance, not whether it was 
reasonable In doing so, the court looked at the nature of 
the transaction or the purpose of the representation 403
Weir suggests that the plaintiff (Caparo Pic ) should 
have sued the directors of Fidelity Pic for fraud or 
breach of contract Weir appears thus to emphasize the 
importance of a "special relationship", overlooked by the 
House of Lords m  CAPARO At the same time he suggests that 
people who can afford it should consider their investment 
options m  these cases He argues that, contrary to other 
cases, the investor was not 'wet behind the ears', nor was 
it an individual who had invested his or her savings m  a 
government supported investment scheme 404
Morris (1991) argues that, with regard to the 
liability of professional advisers, the law remains 
unsatisfactory
The trial judges have gained more discretion to decide 
cases either on narrow variations of proximity or on the 
broader issues of policy Thus, apparent analogous cases
403The result of this examination was that their
Lordships held that the purpose for relying on the accounts 
was that the shareholders could exercise informed control 
over the management of the company
404Weir (1995 214)
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are distinguished on narrow issues, for example, the 
economic status of the plaintiff and defendant, 405 or the 
availability of insurance 406
He argues that these factors are not for the courts to 
decide, particularly m  the absence of a contractual 
relationship Within such a relationship the parties could 
allocate the risks among themselves within the confines of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 407
However, others do not hesitate to emphasize that the 
courts must take into account the economic status On the 
one hand there is a difference between the individual 
professional and the manufacturer of market products, and 
on the other there is a difference between professional 
investors and consumers of market products Fleming (1990) 
argues that professional investors are m  a better position 
to protect themselves against risks and often benefit 
freely from the advise, manufacturers can spread their 
costs, while the auditor normally deals with one client at 
the time 408
405Morns (1991 46) Morris illustrates this with the
different approaches undertaken m  SMITH v ERIC S BUSH (A 
FIRM) AND HARRIS v WYRE FOREST D C [1989] 2 All E R 514
and JAMES MCNAUGHTON PAPER GROUP LTD v HICKS ANDERSON AND 
CO [1991] 2 W L R 641
406This was considered by Hoffman J m  MORGAN CRUCIBLE 
CO v HILL SAMUEL BANK LTD [1990] 3 All E R 330 at 336
407Morns (1991 47)
408See also Bishop (1980) He argues that statements are 
made from different economic considerations These 
considerations allow the courts to discriminate more 
precisely between cases Hence, liability can be excluded 
or imposed based on the realization of an 'optimal 
allocation of scarce resources among competing ends7,
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2 . 7 . 1 1  The auditor7s liability, according to Mulcahy 
(1994), is determined largely on policy accountability of 
the auditor's work to those who rely on it and limitation 
of liability, i e to whom is a duty of care owed the 
unknown plaintiff, the class of the plaintiff or the 
specific plaintiff who relied on the misrepresentation
This policy has shifted m  favour of the auditors 
since the decision m  CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v DICKMAN
[1990] 1 All E R 568, basically limiting their liability
for negligent misstatements contained m  auditors' reports 
to the shareholders m  general meeting 409
Mulcahy points out, comparing the decision m  CAPARO 
with some recent Canadian authorities, 410 that the extent 
of liability depends on whether emphasis is put on 
financial information disclosure and investor protection or 
upon the need to protect a professional grouping against 
disaffected stakeholders of a company 411
According to Chua (1993, 1995), the public policy
considerations could also be used to extend the liability 
of auditors towards, for example, individual shareholders 
Chua illustrates this with two examples 412
(supra at 3 63) See also Chapman (1992) and Chef fins
(1991)
409Mulcahy (1994 195) See also Pugh-Thomas (1990
1467)
410He refers to, inter a h a , HAIG v BAMFORD [1976] 
D L R (3d ) 68
411 (1994 297)
412 (1995 16, 1994 38)
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Shareholders who buy inflated shares due to a 
negligently prepared report suffer loss They sell the 
shares after the discovery of the negligence However, they 
do this before the initiation of the action against the 
auditor They are thus without a remedy The other 
shareholders, however, can as an organ of the company sue 
the auditor Subsequently, they are, according to Chua, 
enriched if the action is successful at the expense of the 
defenceless shareholders who sold their stake
Equally, shareholders could be unjustifiably enriched 
if they had bought shares prior to the publication of the 
negligently prepared report and benefit from an action of 
the company against the auditor
Contrary to the decision m  CAPARO, Chua argues that 
the annual accounts should be public documents Persons who 
deal or wish to deal with the company m  good faith will 
have constructive notice of their contents Hence, the 
auditor should be responsible if these public documents 
were negligently prepared 413
Finally, Stephenson (1990) argues that audited 
accounts have a legal and commercial dimension The legal 
aspect consists of the exercise of informed control The 
commercial aspect is that audited accounts will frequently 
provide a basis for existing shareholders to increase or 
decrease their shareholding This approach suggests that at 
least existing shareholders should be able to sue an 
auditor for the negligent representation of the audited
413Ibid , at 20, (1994 40)
accounts
Immunity
2 . 7 . 1 2 .  The thesis now discusses the barrister's immunity 
from suit 414 It sets out the law as it is m  England In 
Ireland, this issue has not been fully addressed The 
thesis emphasizes the unique nature of the advocate's 
functions However, the arguments m  RONDEL v WORSLEY 
[1967] 3 All E R 993 appear not fully convincing
Currently, two cases m  the English Court of Appeal 
are challenging the immunity of barristers 415 Slapper 
(1996) argues whether it is such a bad thing to reopen a 
case where someone has been imprisoned due to the lawyer's 
negligence This question becomes even more apparent if the 
dissatisfied client has been released and there is "fresh 
evidence" of the lawyer's negligence Slapper perceives the 
immunity rule as anachronistic, where there is a wrong, 
there must be a remedy
Gill (1987) reviews the consequences of the expansion
■i
of professional liability for lawyers He does not address 
directly the issue of immunity but the review implies that 
this expansion may eventually limit the lawyer's immunity 
According to Gill (1987), the expansion of liability 
with regard to professional people was due to the
414See infra Subparagraph 9 5
415See Slapper (1996) See also Greenfield & Osborn 
(1995 57)
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elimination of the principle of privity of contract, the 
subsequent establishment of liability towards third parties 
and the principles governing negligent misstatements and 
economic loss This expansion went hand in hand with the 
awareness of "consumer rights" 416
The response of the legal profession m  Australia to 
these developments is, according to Gill, minimal m  the 
absence of any alternatives They do not have much options 
to avoid liability, other than to avert negligent conduct, 
to minimize costs through compulsory indemnity schemes and 
to lobby for appropriate limitations of liability 417
Osborne (1986) contests the reasons m  RONDEL to grant 
immunity Since the decision m  HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v 
HELLER & PARTNERS LTD [1963] 2 All E R 575 the omission
of a contract is no justification for not suing a 
barrister
The barrister's higher duty to the court is no excuse 
It is rather a caution as to the standard of care required 
by him with regard to the administration of justice He 
will not be liable if his conduct was justified to fulfil 
this higher duty
Defensive practice is speculation, as well as the 
warning that the capacity to sue an advocate would lead to 
an increase m  litigation
The obligation to act with due care exceeds the 
advocate's obligation to accept clients (the advocate holds
416Gill (1987 552)
417Jjbid , at 561
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himself out to possess a special skill)
The fear that a negligence action will lead to a re­
trial of the original procedure is unfounded Osborne 
points out that an action for negligence will normally 
focus on a detail of the original procedure rather than the 
procedure itself
Finally, the decision m  SAIF ALI v SIDNEY MITCHELL 
& CO [1978] 3 All E R 1033 restricted the barrister's
(and solicitor's) immunity to pre-trial work and advocacy 
Zander (1979) argues that this restrictive 
interpretation may pave the way to narrow immunity even 
further 418 Osborne (1986) , however, argues that the 
decision m  SAIF ALI hints towards a greater protection of 
the consumers' interests of services Osborne argues that 
m  Canada the public interest is not served when damage 
remains uncompensated The nature of the legal profession 
m  Canada justifies the imposition of a duty of care 419
2 . 8 .  Professional Autonomy and Responsibility
2 . 8 . 1 .  Doctors need to make practical decisions, 
according to Freeman (1988) Their outcome may have 
consequences for the particular patient, the doctor and for 
society at large These decisions are often to be made m
418 (1979 323-324)
419See, for example, DEMARIO v UNGARO (1979) 21 0 R 
(2 ed ) 673
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a legal context, especially where it involves decisions 
regarding ethically controversial cases, for example, 
contraceptive advice to the underaged 420
If this results m  a conflict, the courts are regarded 
as the arbiters, the legislature is reluctant to intervene 
m  these areas, being afraid of political repercussions and 
consequences of moral conflict And, if there is 
legislation, it is often a compromise which does not entail 
the solutions which were required m  the first place 421 In 
some instances problems are solved through self-regulation 
within the medical profession However, it appears that 
doctors are less likely to take responsibility for certain 
decisions
This problem is examined m  Chapter Ten of the thesis 
It discusses the implications of the recent decision m  RE 
A WARD OF COURT [1995] 2 I L R M 401 The interpretation
of the different medical terms such as P V S (Permanent 
Vegetative State) and "treatment", and the court's analysis 
of the relevant constitutional rights may indicate that the 
Supreme Court, unwillingly, permits euthanasia m  a 
disguised form
420Freeman (1988 1) See GILLICK v WEST NORFOLK &
WISBECH AREA HEALTH AUTHORITY [1986] A C 112
In Ireland, controversial cases were, inter alia the 
"Right to Die" case (RE A WARD OF COURT [1995] 2 I L R M
401), the "X-"case (ATTORNEY GENERAL v X [1992] 1 I R 1,
[1992] I L R M 401) and the "Abortion information" cases 
(ATTORNEY GENERAL (S P U C (IRELAND) LTD v OPEN DOOR 
COUNSELLING LTD [1988] I R  593 and, more recently, RE THE 
REGULATION OF INFORMATION (SERVICES OUTSIDE THE STATE FOR 
THE TERMINATION OF PREGNANCIES) BILL, 1995 [1995] 2
I L R M 81)
421Freeman (188 1-2)
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This and other implications reflects the profession's 
problems m  solving matters of professional and ethical 
conduct The case may imply a decline m  the autonomy of 
the medical profession
The literature review sets out the reception of RE A 
WARD OF COURT m  Ireland and its implications for the 
future 422
2.8.2. As of yet the decision m  RE A WARD OF COURT has 
not produced the required quantity of academic comment it 
demands The available literature stresses the importance 
of the decision, both m  its narrow and wider context The 
decision is also criticized
Tomkin & Me Auley (1995c) argue that the distinction 
between euthanasia and withdrawal of treatment does not 
work m  this particular case This is due to the court's 
description of artificial nourishment and hydration as 
medical treatment Tomkin & Me Auley, however, stress that 
not all treatment was withdrawn from the ward The doctors 
maintained providing her with medicine to 'ease her 
passage' 423 This part of the decision is 'contentious' and 
the writers assert that as a result it may not be accepted 
m  other jurisdictions 424 425
422The reaction of the Medical Council and its 
consequences has already been discussed in the context of 
the role of the Medical Council, see supra Subparagraph 
2 6 7 See also, infra Subparagraph 10 6 2
423Tomkm & Me Auley (1995c 1235)
424Jjbid , at 1234
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Tomkin & Me Auley also examine other parts of the 
Supreme Court's decision Three points demand attention
The first point of criticism is that the majority 
judges did not debate fully whether the ward was m  a 
P V S state Judge Egan made a point about this m  his 
dissenting judgment because the withdrawal of treatment 
would subsequently involve an assessment of the quality of 
the ward's life The writers regret that this point was not 
taken up further by the other judges 426
Second, the proceedings were adversarial rather than 
inquisitorial The writers argue, and the thesis agrees 
with them on this point, 427 that the latter form of 
procedure must be favoured m  this type of cases They 
agree with Blayney J on this point Tomkin & Me Auley 
stress that the court's function m  this case was to make 
a decision on all relevant facts ' " m  loco parentis"' 428
Finally, the writers welcome the judicial analysis as 
to the tests used by the Supreme Court judges m  the WARD 
case Although the Supreme Court applied the "best 
interest" test, the authors appreciate Lynch J 's
425An editorial m  the Irish Law Times (1995) stresses 
that m  permitting the continued provision of palliative 
care and the withdrawal of artificial feeding the Supreme 
Court recognizes what is reality m  other jurisdictions A 
doctor is allowed to relieve pain, even if the ultimate 
effect results m  the death of the patient This has been 
justified by 'the doctrine of "double effects"', (supra, at 
205)
426Tomkin & Me Auley (1995c 1234)
427See infra Subparagraph 10 5 4
428 (1995c 1235)
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compromise m  his High Court judgment429 between the "best 
interest" test and the "substitute judgment" test 430
Feenan (1996) agrees with much of the analysis offered 
by Tomkin & Me Auley (1995c) Feenan stresses that its 
immediate effect underlines the shortcomings of the law to 
regulate professional conflicts, the decision to follow the 
court order may render a practitioner guilty of 
professional misconduct The powerful judicial supremacy 
under the parens patriae jurisdiction implies, according to 
Feenan, a demise m  medical autonomy 431
In addition, Feenan criticizes the court's analysis of 
individual autonomy and self-determination He argues that 
despite the popularization of self-determination m  other 
areas of the law, the Supreme Court, m  using the "best- 
mterest" test, ignored 7 the much needed exploration of 
patient values' 432 It rather preferred the traditional 
paternalistic approach
However, according to this researcher, it must be 
argued whether the "best interest" test was m  fact 
paternalistic m  nature The thesis asserts that the test 
is "child-centred", the wishes of the family for example,
429RE A WARD OF COURT, Unreported, High Court, 5 May 
1995, Lynch J
430 According to Feenan (1996 91), the Supreme Court's
greatest dilemma was to overcome the divergence between the 
recognition of autonomy and proxy decision-making This 
dilemma was, logically, not justified m  applying the "best 
interest" test
431 (1996 94) This point is taken up by the thesis in,
infra Subparagraph 10 5 1 , and discussed further
432Feenan (1996 at 93)
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were not prevalent m  the court's consideration 433
The decision has wider implications too It recognizes 
a shift to a more pluralist and secular society, according 
to Feenan It is an example of the dynamic nature of the 
Irish Constitution It acknowledges the unenumerated rights 
to privacy, self-determination and bodily integrity In 
doing so these rights will alter the doctor-patient 
relationship m  counteracting the medical paternalistic 
approach and recognizing the patient's right to consent or 
refuse treatment 434
An editorial m  the Irish Law Times (1995) stresses 
that the importance of the Supreme Court decision lies m  
the attempt to respond to the demands of a pluralist 
society Reflection and debate must now pave the way for 
legislative change 435
2.9. Summary
The literature review clearly showed that the 
development of the tort of negligence is under continued 
criticism This criticism included, as most relevant 
factors, the issue of third-party liability and economic
433See infra Subparagraph 10 5 3
434Feenan (1996 91)
435In another article Tomkin & Me Auley (1995b 50)
propose that the State should nominate a forum that will 
facilitate medical practitioners which are wiling to 
withdraw treatment See also Cullen (1995)
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loss (the duty question) and the standard of care m  
relation to professional conduct, m  particular with regard 
to the doctor's task to provide information and advice of 
medical treatment and allied matters
In addition, the literature review included issues 
that are not discussed m  this thesis but are considered by 
this researcher to be relevant m  the context of 
professional negligence, such as the role and nature of 
ethical and professional rules or codes of conduct and 
alternative compensation schemes
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Chapter Three
The Idea of a Profession A Justification
3 . 1  Introduction
3 . 1 . 1 .  Recent years have shown a vast increase m  
negligence litigation involving people who are presumed to 
have gained a certain professional status m  society 1 This 
type of negligence appears to differ from ''ordinary" 
negligence m  a number of ways, and indeed this can be said 
to have been the real incentive for writing this thesis
The review of thé presumed professional negligence 
cases will show that the Irish and English courts rely on 
certain characteristics which, it is asserted, are inherent 
to the nature of a profession These characteristics 
include
(I) professional judgment, the courts rely on professional 
judgment or professional opinion m  the assessment of the 
alleged negligent behaviour of the professional person,
(II) an accepted or approved practice, this suggests that 
there is a connection between theory and practice, and the
According to Steven Grundy of the Medical Protection 
Society, Ireland has become the MU S A  of Europe" m  suing 
doctors An Irish consultant is between 10 to 2 0 times more 
likely to be sued than fellow members of the Society m  40 
other countries, (Anon (1995))
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(III) individual autonomy, a practitioner may deviate from 
an accepted practice within accepted parameters
This has been identified by a number of writers, 
including McMahon & Binchy, who observe that 'professions 
are regarded by the courts as being substantially competent 
to determine and require a satisfactory standard of 
competence m  the performance of professional duties' 2
This raises an obvious but nevertheless important 
question Why are the professions - by reference to a 
certain practice, their presumed professional autonomy and 
professional opinion - regarded as competent to set their 
own standard m  the performance of their duties? This is 
above all a sociological issue An answer involves an 
examination into the nature and function of the professions 
m  the socio-economic environment m  which their members 
provide the professional service
However, as Freidson (1988) points out, the word 
"profession" is not easily defined A single and unified 
definition cannot be given and has as of yet not been 
given Therefore, caution is required A number of reasons 
justify this and are, amongst others, identified by 
Freidson He perceives the word as descriptive and 
evaluative The definition differs m  terms of the 
application, depending on the occupation involved, and the 
purpose or intent of the definition is either malignant or
manner m  which professionals are educated,
2 (1990 259)
analytical 3
Freidson, therefore, does not attempt to define 
professions but rather reveals to the reader whatever the 
writers have in mind when they use the term -
to indicate the definition upon which their 
exposition is predicated and, for even greater 
clarity, examples of the occupations they mean to 
include and those they mean not to include 4
Adopting Freidson's approach, the thesis puts a 
definition or description of professions in the context of 
professional negligence In this context those occupations 
can be presumed to be professions which are regarded by the 
courts as 'substantially competent to determine and require 
a satisfactory standard of competence' 5 Examples of these 
professions are the medical, legal and accountancy 
profession These professions are used throughout the 
thesis to clarify the arguments m  the context of the 
characterization of professions, the professional 
relationship and professional negligence
3.1 2 This Chapter examines first the process of
"professionalization" and identifies the importance of 
autonomy and dominance in the context of professional
3(1988 3-4)
4 (1983 35) It must, according to Freidson, be treated
as 'an empirical entity about which there is little ground 
for generalising as an homogenous class or a logically 
exclusive conceptual category', (supra, at 3 3 )
5McMahon & Binchy (1990 259)
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negligence Second, the chapter examines the variety of 
definitions given by sociologists and lawyers to find some 
consensus on relevant traits or attributes inherent to the 
professions The aim of this examination is the 
identification of certain characteristics which are said to 
be inherent to what professions are and the manner m  which 
professional status is gained
3.2. Professionalization
3.2 1. It is m  man's nature to divide the society in
which he lives into various hierarchical groupings This 
phenomenon has been observed by writers such as Dahrendorf 
(1959), Bottomore (1966) and Mayer & Buckley (1969) 
Professions can be regarded as being part of such hierarchy 
and, within the Western market-economy, two hierarchical 
frameworks underlie the notion of profession and 
professionalization
3.2.2. The first viewpoint is primarily represented by
Parsons (1939), who suggests that professional practice 
must be seen as separate from any business activity 
Although some goals may coincide, such as personal 
achievement, material g a m  and recognition, the difference 
between a professional practitioner and a business man is 
'determined by the differences m  [their] respective
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The key-note m  business enterprise is predominately 
the pursuit of profit This pursuit of self-interest 
dominates the modern economic system, what Parsons terms 
the 'acquisitive society' 7
Professional practice places the disinterested service 
to its clients at a premium, on the basis of a fixed fee or 
tariff The practitioner is presumed to be more altruistic 
than egotistic Within this context professions 'were seen 
to have a stabilising effect on industrial societies, which 
are competitive, commercial and individualistic' 8 The 
reason for this is that professions modify the dominant 
ethos and organization of capitalism, where the making of 
profit is foremost
This approach describes professions as vocations 
'based upon universalism, disinterested service and 
affective neutrality' 9 It emphasises the notion of ethical 
behaviour The professional motivation lies m  the 
commitment to the ethics of responsibility The profession 
itself portrays altruistic or selfless values because 
professions are 'within the social division of labour, 
officially committed to various forms of personal service
occupational situations' 6
6Parsons (1939 464) That this difference is at
present blurred m  relation to the legal profession is 
identified by Mason, see supra Subparagraph 2 3 5 and 
Wilkins (1990), see supra Subparagraph 2 6 11
7Parsons (1939 458)
8Turner (1985 38)
9Turner (1987 133)
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and community welfare' 10 Its role embodies, according to 
Turner, a 'disinterested commitment to community values' 
and may be characterized by its ethical qualities, the 
service to the individual and its basis m  technical 
knowledge 11
Hence, adherence to a list of certain traits or 
characteristics distinguishes a profession from other 
occupations To "become" a profession (professionalization) 
an occupation simply acquires those traits or 
characteristics Millerson includes m  this list 12 
theoretically based skills, a period of education and 
training, formal examinations, codes of practice with 
respect to the professional integrity, internal regulations 
(professional associations aiming at the regulation of the 
activities of its members), and, finally, public services, 
the services are said to be for the public good
This view describes a profession as an occupation with 
a number of traits, wherein the dominant features are 
knowledge and ethics It distinguishes itself from the 
'business economy' or the 'profit system7 through 
disinterestedness and altruism 13
3,2.3. The second viewpoint radically alters the idea of 
professions and professionalization This view is
10Ibid , at 131
11 Ibid
12 (1964 9-16)
13Turner (1985 46)
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represented by writers like Freidson (1988) and Hughes 
(1958) They challenge the idealistic view of professions 
In their view professionals are privileged workers who, by 
virtue of their activities, are able to apply certain 
strategies to limit competition In doing so they preserve 
'their elite control over occupational prestige' 14
In this context the concept of professions is 
described as those occupations that obtain professional 
autonomy through strategic market control rather than 
adherence to a list of traits In this description social 
groups attempt to maintain their place m  the market and 
'the status and power of professions depends on their 
ability to maintain a market situation and access to 
appropriate clients' 15
It is argued that the social distance m  a 
relationship between a professional person and his client 
depends on the 'social and economic dependence' within the 
professional relationship 16 An increase m  this dependency 
results, on the one hand, m  a greater helplessness of the 
client and, on the other hand, m  an increased autonomous 
position for the profession Turner and Johnson detect 
three systems of professional relationships 17
First, a system of collegiate control In this system 
it is the service provider who defines the needs of the
14 Ibid
15Turner (1987 140)
16Johnson (1972 41)
11 Ibid , at 45-46, Turner (1987 136-137)
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client and the way those needs are satisfied Through a 
corporate system of regulation and surveillance the 
profession controls itself
Second, a patronage system, where clients define their 
own needs and determine the nature of the satisfaction of 
those needs This is either oligarchic or corporate
Third, mediation through intervention of a third party 
(often the State) Here, the third party regulates and 
controls the practice of professional men and the service 
provided to the client
Tomkm & Hanafm (1995) assert that the collegiate 
model is used by the medical profession This control 
mechanism holds, according to the authors, two 
implications (1 ) professions control the education of new­
comers and (1 1) professions are self-directive and self- 
regulatory 18
The three systems also indicate certain processes 
which may involve changes m  the nature of professions 
This change may indicate either more control and prestige 
or may imply 7 de-professionalization or prolitariani- 
zation' 19 This "de-professionalization" is effected 
through (i) bureaucratization, which undermines the 
professional autonomy and decreases the professional status 
of the profession, (n) socialization and development of 
knowledge, which may lead to the division of a profession 
into specific groupings (fragmentation) and (in) pressure
18 (1995 12)
19Turner (1985 39) See also Oppenheimer (1973 213)
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from new and para-professional groupings to take over
3 . 2 . 4 .  So far, professional dominance has been created 
through power and the application of market control 
strategies Turner, however, explains that the presence of 
a body of esoteric knowledge cannot be ignored Instead, it 
is a vital attribute to the issue of professional status 
and should not be overlooked as something obvious to the 
nature of professions
The reason for this assertion is the fact that a 
profession must attempt to maintain and extend its 
clientele by creating a monopoly m  its field of expertise 
Market control mechanisms are not enough There must be a 
gap between knowledge and the application of knowledge (the 
specialized skill) If such a gap does not exist 'knowledge 
can be routinely applied without the intervention of 
professional judgment7 20 The importance of knowledge m  
this model is therefore the 7 range and necessity of 
professional judgment7 21 With respect to the medical 
profession, Turner defines dominance as -
a set of strategies requiring control over the 
work situation, the institutional features of 
occupational autonomy within the wider medical 
division of labour, and finally occupational 
sovereignty over related occupational groups 22
20Turner (1985 42)
2lIbid , at 46
22 (19 8 7 1 41)
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Accordingly, he identifies three strategies of 
occupational control through power and knowledge 23 First, 
subordination where professional persons delegate certain 
activities to others This results m  less independence, 
autonomy and self-regulation for those other occupations, 
for example, nursing and midwifery
Second, professional dominance is created through 
limitation This involves a form of limitation to, for 
example, m  medicine, a specific part of the body or a 
specific therapeutic method, for example, dentistry, 
optometry and pharmacy
Finally, professional dominance is created through 
exclusion Other related occupations, offering alternative 
practices, are not allowed legitimate access by denying 
their registration, for example, chiropractic and the 
clergy, the latter being excluded from psychological 
counselling
3.3. Definitions and Descriptions of
the "Profession"
3.3.1 It will be immediately apparent that we are
dealing with two types of characterizing professions (l) 
definitions and (n) descriptions by characteristic, 
function or attribute Furthermore, some definitions or 
descriptions are narrow and exclusive while others are
23 Ibid
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J3 3.2. Freidson (1988) describes professions by 
function, within the division of labour m  the socio­
economic environment He emphasizes the social organisation 
of the profession, rather than using discriminants such as 
norms, attitudes or ethics As an occupation it is 
autonomous or self-directing, and it has 'assumed a
dominant position m  a division of labor [sic], so that it
gains control over the determination of the substance of 
its own work' 24
Freidson does not attach any specific characteristics 
to the word "profession" He suggests that the word can be 
applied to those occupations who have obtained a degree of 
independence m  the division of labour This independence 
is a consequence of being m  command over other
occupations The result is that the profession is 
autonomous and self-directing Its dominant position is
granted through the 'trustworthiness7 of its members, which 
includes 'ethicality' and 'knowledgeable skill' 25 The 
important feature m  this definition is the role of power 
According to Turner, Freidson's idea of a profession is 
that it is 'ultimately defined by its autonomy from 
external control and this autonomy is determined by power
inclusive and cover a wide range of occupations
24Freidson (1988 xv)
25 Ibid
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conflicts and not by the elaboration of knowledge' 26
Thus, Freidson sees professions as an independent and 
autonomous body of knowledgeable skill m  an economic 
context This autonomous position has been acquired through 
the use of power to dominate other occupations This has 
been characterized as a position of 'occupational control 
of market strategies', that aims at autonomy and 
dominance 27
Carr-Saunders defines a profession as 'an occupation 
based upon specialized intellectual training, the purpose 
of which is to supply skilled advice and service to others 
m  return for a definite fee or salary' 28 The two 
principal elements m  this definition - high level of 
specialized expertise and a remuneration accordingly - 
reflect a capitalistic division of labour It is not the 
nature of the occupation that is paramount, but rather the 
level of expertise This, m  relation to other professions 
or occupations, determines the fee or salary Accordingly, 
any occupation providing a specialized service falls within 
this definition of a profession
Others, such as Wickenden, characterize professions as 
'a body of knowledge or of art' 29 They uphold standards of
26 (1985 38) However, it must be understood, m  the
opinion of this researcher, that without the existence of 
a body of knowledge the role*of power cannot satisfy the 
public's demand for professional services
27Turner (1985 39)
28 (193 7 63)
29Lewis & Maude (1952 55)
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conduct and qualifications (a self-defining oligarchy) and 
enjoy a recognition of status This status is 'an implied 
contract to serve society over and beyond all specific 
duty to client or employer m  consideration of the 
privileges and protection society extends to the 
profession' 30 Wickenden emphasizes the importance of the 
vocational aspect or altruism, which denotes the 
aforementioned "implied contract", the professional duties 
are owed to the specific client as well as to society at 
large It is obvious that m  this context ethicality is a 
paramount feature m  the definition of professions As a 
"body of knowledge or of art" professions are well capable 
of giving specialized advice, but the reward for this 
advice is more than just pecuniary Through the ethical 
regulation of their behaviour, professional men contribute 
more to society than simply the resolution of a particular 
and individual problem They are rewarded accordingly Not 
only through a high remuneration but also through the 
recognition of their status and protection of their 
standard of competence They also enjoy certain privileges 
They are sellers of knowledge, but they are also guardians 
of a body of knowledge and expertise
Among lawyers, a consensus on what professions are has 
not yet been found McMahon & Binchy confine professions to 
the so-called learned professions the church, medicine and 
law 31 This traditional view characterizes professions as
20Ibid , at 56
31 (1990 258)
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(i) providing specialized intellectual work, (1 1 ) owing a 
moral (and overriding) duty to the general public, and
(1 1 1 ) enjoying a high social status m  society Jackson & 
Powell add to this view a fourth characteristic collective 
organisation 32 However, McMahon & Binchy do recognize that 
this characterization seems 'arbitrary, elitist and 
undemocratic' 33
Others exclusively emphasize the presence of a special 
skill and thereby pave the way for a wider application 
Professions are distinguished from those occupations which 
involve 'substantially the production or sale or 
arrangements for the production or sale of commodities' 34 
This professional skill is obtained through 'some special 
qualifications derived from training or experience' 35 In 
BOLAM v FRIERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE [1957] 2 All
E R 118, McNair J also emphasized the notion of skill m  
the assessment of negligence of a medical practitioner 
' [t]he only question is really a question of professional 
skill' 36
3.3.3. Thus far, it can be asserted that there is 
consensus with regard to at least three distinguishing
32 (19 9 2 2)
33McMahon & Binchy (1990 258)
34Cf COMMISSIONERS OF INLAND REVENUE v MAXSE [1919]
1 K B  647 at 657, per Scruton L J
35Cf CARR v INLAND REVENUE COMMISSIONERS [1944] 2
All E R 163 at 166-167, per Du Parq L J
36 [1957] 2 All E R 118 at 121
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factors describing or defining professions as distinct from 
other occupations or trades
The first distinguishing feature is the presence of 
specialized skill, based upon intellectual training and 
knowledge The intellectual content separates professions 
from trades and other crafts The professional men are the 
providers or sellers of that skill The remuneration, 
however, gives rise to two separate views on professions 
It is either pecuniary or involves more than that
The second distinguishing feature is the ethicality of 
professional behaviour or social altruism This aspect 
considers the ethical paramountcy of the interests of the 
client or patient, collegiality among professional men of 
the same specialization and professional responsibility 
Professional men owe not only a duty to the individual 
client or patient, but owe that duty to society as a whole 
It emphasizes not only the vocational aspect It also means 
that this duty towards society is sometimes wider, and may 
surpass the duty owed to their clients or patients
The third distinguishing feature is professional 
autonomy It is said to be self-directive and self- 
regulatory This aspect is reflected m  the importance the 
courts grant to the significance of "professional 
judgment"
a Profession
3 4 1 The previous sections reviewed and synopsized
some ideas of professions and professionalization A number 
of characteristics were identified which were common to 
several definitions of professions and to the process of 
professionalization This section describes those and other 
characteristics in the context of professions m  Ireland 
and m  the context of professional negligence It is not 
the intention to describe and examine whether particular 
occupations are regarded as professions Instead, it seeks 
to exemplify the particular position of professions m  the 
context of professional negligence, as explained m  the 
introductory paragraph
3.4.2. The first characteristic is that professions are 
m  some sense "public" Thus, the services m  question are 
or should be generally and directly available to members of 
the public Alternatively, professional services are either 
provided directly to the State or to a State agency 
(forensic scientists, pathologists) and only indirectly 
involving members of the public as clients
Medicine is an example of a service which is 
predominantly provided publicly Hence, the entire 
population of Ireland is eligible for hospital services m
3.4, Typical Characteristics of
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the public wards of public hospitals 37
In each case, the public interest is perceived to be 
served by the existence of an independent profession The 
bar is an excellent example because, although the barrister 
may have an individual client to whom he owes a duty of 
care and skill, this duty is subject to an overriding duty 
to the court and indirectly to society 38 On a practical 
level, it is suggested that the obligations of the 
professional person, within the professional relationship 
between him and his client, reach m  most instances much 
further than the implicit and explicit contractual 
responsibilities mirrored m  such a relationship
3 . 4 . 3 .  The second feature of professions is that many 
writers identify the code of practice or rules of conduct
as somehow critical to professional status These rules
involve not only questions of best practice and rates of 
pay, but rather seek to amplify and thus resolve 
difficulties inherent m  the practice of the profession 
For example, m  questions where a conflict of interest m  
respect to a duty may be discerned,39 these rules can cover
37Accordmg to Tomkin & Hanafin (1995 234-235) , many
V H I members are both privately insured and are entitled 
to public hospital services at the State's expense In 
addition, personal income tax relief is available under 
section 145 of the Income Tax Act, 1967 Thus, according to 
the same authors (supra), 'some private spending is 
supported indirectly from the public purse'
38Cf RONDEL v WORSLEY [1967] 3 All E R 993
39In Ireland the medical profession is subject to the
guidelines issued by the Medical Council under section 
69(2) of the Medical Practitioners Act, 1978
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both professional and ethical behaviour 40
In many cases, the code itself will reflect the fact 
that the profession is somehow identified as being 
important to some sense of public order or cohesive society 
or common good In such cases, codes or regulations will 
attempt to draw a balance between the practitioner, the 
client, society and its organs or institutions, and suggest 
how such professional dilemmas should be resolved In many 
cases, the dilemmas are not only important and age-old, but 
are incapable of satisfactory simple resolution, viz the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from the terminally 
ill 41
3 . 4 . 4 .  Third, the thesis explained that the element of 
skill or craft is critical to several views of what 
constitutes a profession It is composed of intellectual 
and/or manual ability By some it is regarded as 'the chief 
distinguishing feature m  professions' 42 It is acquired as 
a result of intellectual training and the desire of 
professional man to solve practical problems through 
academic or scientific research
It is secured through selection and entrance into the
40The meaning of professional ethics goes beyond 
aspects such as pride of workmanship or devotion or 
altruism The job is more than just a mere condition of 
wages According to Lewis & Maude (1952 59), professional
ethics derive from ancient oaths They are expressed m  the 
individual relationship between the professional person and 
his client or patient
41Cf RE A WARD OF COURT [1995] 2 I L R M 401
42Carr-Saunders & Wilson (1964 307)
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Xprofession, specialization and expertise or experience 
through practical training 43
3.4.5. The fourth is that professions are seen as 
identifiably structured, typically with a professional body 
at its apex,44 a live register of qualified persons and 
usually, but not always, a disciplinary code, administered 
m  conformity with the requirements of natural and 
procedural justice by an established committee of the 
professional body It also holds an education programme 
which includes both the training of new entrants and the 
continuing education of existing practitioners For 
clarity's sake we are here emphasizing not so much the type 
of structure, but rather that the profession is formally 
structured
The purpose of the formal organization can be said to 
be two-fold It aims to protect members from non-members as 
a means of occupational control In doing so the public is 
protected against the unqualified practitioner and the 
qualified practitioner is safe to discharge his 
professional responsibilities without fear This is 
achieved through the monopolization of the professional 
service rather than through economic interests
^Specialization is a necessary consequence of a 
complex and demanding society and the constant development 
of professional skill and technique
44A profession is said to exist only where there are 
'bonds between the practitioners', (Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 
1964 298), and the desire for 'social intercourse' with
contemporaries, (supra, at 3 01)
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\Additionally, the formal organization emphasizes the 
protection of competence, honour and material interests and 
the development and maintenance of private and public 
activities 45 46
3 . 4  6 The fifth category relates not to the fact that
the profession is typically structured, but a feature of 
most or some of these structures The m a m  point here, is 
that the profession restricts entry into the profession by 
means of autonomic control This, for example, permits 
entrants to the profession and existing practitioners to be 
controlled by disciplines or codes of practice within the 
profession
3 . 4 . 7 .  The sixth is that professional status is 
perceived as something socially desirable the possessor is 
marked out as being distinctive from others without such 
skill or qualification This may be reflected m  earnings, 
or earnings may be a function of professional status
This status is either granted through common consent 
or through statutory regulations recognizing the high 
intellectual calibre inherent to the profession However, 
m  view of occupational control, the profession gains its
45Carr-Saunders & Wilson (1964 301)
46The Law Society of Ireland and the Medical Council 
are both examples of formalized structured professions 
Both are created by statute, and govern with statutory 
powers the registration, education, professional and 
ethical conduct of its members, see the Medical 
Practitioners Act, 1978 and the Solicitors Act, 1994
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status by maintaining an open access with its clients 
through, for example, subordination, exclusion and 
limitation 47
It is also perceived as important that the profession 
preserves its professional integrity This is relevant with 
regard to health services and the provision of health care 
to public and private patients m  Ireland Reiman proposed 
four suggestions to maintain this integrity for medical 
practitioners 48 First, they should guard against referring 
patients to institutions where they have no professional 
control but where they do have a financial interest 
Second, they should avoid making arrangements with "for- 
profit" organisations for referral of specific patients 
Third, they should avoid working directly for commercial 
hospitals In other words, they should remain self-employed 
as to maintain clinical responsibility and to be able to 
pursue a personal policy, rather than being constrained m  
some outside interests which may impose on the quality of 
their service Finally, the doctor should avoid the 
acceptance of rewards to not treat patients, either 
directly or indirectly
3 4.8. The seventh is the connection between the 
professions and various intellectual bodies whose input is 
something more than regulatory In other words, many 
writers identify a close proximity between professional
47See Turner (1987 155)
48 (1988 784)
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education and education at universities, or other third 
level institutions 49 The precise nature of this 
relationship is uncertain
Thus, m  some jurisdictions, the possession of a 
university degree ipso facto entitles the possessor to 
practise In others, a university degree is a requirement 
to enter some further professional training course Often 
these are run by or with input from the professions Within 
this category are included professions such as medicine and 
law (where the subjects of study are regarded as part of 
the curriculum of any humane university faculty), and 
others, such as accountancy, where a university degree m  
certain subjects entitles the possessor to claim exemption 
from some or other subjects taken as part of a professional 
course, administered not by the university, but by a 
professional training school
However, one can argue that today the relationship 
between the professions and universities is, at most, a 
necessity to obtain a professional licence to practice 
Universities and colleges provide students with the 
possibilities of sitting examinations, which, if 
successfully passed, result m  the obtainment of a degree 
This degree, m  its turn, is a prerequisite for entry into 
a profession
3.4.9, The eighth factor is that of State regulation or
49See, for example, Carr-Saunders & Wilson (1964) See 
also Birks (1996)
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interference At first, this characteristic may seem to be 
at odds with some of those previously identified How may 
a profession be autonomous and subject to State control or 
regulation? Nevertheless, there are obvious examples Thus, 
the Medical Council is composed of statutorily appointed 
State representatives, its functions, officers, powers and 
duties are statutorily defined 50 But, within the extensive 
and liberal boundaries of statute, the profession may and 
does regulate itself The point here is that a function of 
the professions may be that the parameters are described by 
the State, or, as Dahrendorf suggests, the professions 
themselves are subsumed into State control 51 52
However, these parameters may at times be subject to, 
for example, judicial review An example can be found m  
the recent High Court decision regarding the exemption of 
Northern Irish law students from sitting the entrance exams 
of the Incorporated Law Society 53
The High Court held m  this case (where 35 Belfast
50See the Medical Practitioners Act, 1978
51 (1984 178) According to Dahrendorf, the foundations
of liberty of the professions will be threatened, once the 
State interferes m  the provision of important services 
' [b] y substituting the State for society, it prevents the 
natural osmosis between the professions and the general 
public', (1984 184)
52Carr-Saunders & Wilson (1964 3 07) argue that once a
profession is statutorily regulated the formal association 
representing the profession becomes an organ of the State, 
commissioned m  the mechanism of administration It loses 
its freedom and is dependant on being employed to undertake 
effective action They are 'limited to protective functions 
and public activity', (supra)
53BLOOMER v INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY OF IRELAND, 
Unreported, High Court, 22 September 1995, Laffoy J
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students sought damages from the State and the Law Society 
of Ireland) that the Belfast graduates had been 
discriminated against under E U law They were not 
exempted from the entrance exams of the Law Society, m  
contrast to those students who had obtained a law degree m  
the Republic However, it was also held that the 
legislation under which the exemptions were granted was 
invalid It was held that the legislation was ultra virus 
the powers of the Law Society 54 The judge stated that it 
had technically contravened with the prohibition on 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality m  Article 6 
of the Treaty of Rome, 1957 The High Court had no 
jurisdiction to enact an alternative regulation to 
Regulation 15 55 There was no evidence that the Society 
knew it was acting ultra virus m  making the said 
Regulation The case fell
As a result, it appears that students m  the Republic, 
having obtained a law degree must sit the entrance exams 
also 56 A significant incidental factor for the Law Society 
is the reaction of students with an Irish law degree, who 
thought they had secured free entry into the course It 
might now be argued that these students enjoy a "legitimate 
expectation" that their assumption of free entry will be 
upheld Currently, this is argued by the law students m
54Regulation 15 of the Apprenticeship and Education 
(Amendment No 2) Regulations, 1992, S I 360/1992
55Cf MHICMHATHUNA V  IRELAND [1995] 1 I L R M 69
56See Morgan (1995)
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3 . 4 . 1 0 .  The ninth factor is that the professions form a 
stable yet evolutionary force within society, regulating 
and monitoring change Professional activities are an 
important mechanism m  maintaining a 'relative balance of 
stability [in a] dynamic and precariously balanced 
society' 57 Professional men are able to overcome the 'gap 
between state-created laws and the actual condition of 
social life' 58 An example of this occupational morality is 
the way the medical profession has dealt with the problem 
of euthanasia m  the Netherlands Initially, euthanasia was 
forbidden by statute, but permitted by judge-made law after 
a careful balancing of medical ethics, the law and the 
interests of the patient This resulted m  a public debate 
leading up to a set of rules, created by the legal 
profession, allowing a doctor to carry out euthanasia m  
certain conditioned circumstances 59
The introduction of pharmacologically dynamic 
substances into the pharmacopoeia is not permitted without 
rigorous professional clinical trials In Ireland the 
position with regard to non-therapeutic research on human 
beings is controlled by the Control of Clinical Trials and 
Drugs Act, 1987 and 1990
the High Court
57Parsons (1954 385)
58Cotterrell (1984 90)
59See Dillmann & Legemaate (1994) and Van Der Wal & 
Dillmann (1994)
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Pound & Llwellyn describe the legal profession as 
playing an important role m  social integration, because it 
promotes legal values and juristic method 60 However, on 
the other hand, it can be argued that the legal profession 
is regarded as undermining legal stability by pursuing high 
compensation claims with regard to, for example, medical 
accidents on a "no-win-no-fee" basis This may imply a 
reluctance to provide a disinterested service
3 4 1 1 .  The tenth factor is the nature of the 
relationship between a professional man and his client or 
patient This relationship, it is asserted m  this thesis, 
is based on a collegiate model, where the professional man 
determines and satisfies the needs of the individual 
client The profession controls itself through a 'corporate 
system of regulation and surveillance' 61
3 . 5 .  Conclusion
In the assessment of professional negligence the 
courts rely much on "professional judgment" as a 
distinguishing feature This judgment is subject to the 
presence of a specialized intellectual technique or special 
competence which is based on an esoteric body of knowledge 
It is the gap-filling practical application of scientific
60Quoted by Cotterrell (1984 90)
61Turner (1987 136)
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or academic research As a result, the profession is able 
to create a degree of independence m  providing specialized 
services and, subsequently, a dependency on those services 
by the public As a result, autonomy is maintained through 
the application of certain control mechanisms A successful 
application results m  a domineering position with regard 
to the exclusive supply of certain knowledge to the public 
In addition, it is a reliable source for the courts m
assessing alleged negligent conduct of professional men
It can, therefore, be asserted that the courts only
regard those occupations as professions where the standard
of care is said to be a matter of professional judgment 
This judgment is based on some sort of accepted practice or 
shared professional opinion In order words, the activity, 
undertaken by the professional man, is autonomously 
defined
In this context it is suggested that a model of 
professions should be established, not on particular 
occupations m  society distinct from others, but on aspects 
of the behaviour of a professional person m  relation to 
the special skill he has exercised Thus, it may be
relevant, prior to an assessment of liability, to determine 
whether the conduct of a professional person included the 
exercise of a special skill
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PART B.
The Presumed Model of Professional 
Negligence m  Ireland and England 
The Standard of Care
4.1. Introduction
Chapter One of this thesis provided the argument and 
outline Chapter Two reviewed the existing literature 
Chapter Three described what is meant by "professions" m  
this thesis and emphasized the importance of professional 
autonomy and judgment Thus, Part A formed the background 
against which the concept of professional negligence is 
explored
Part B examines the standard of care m  professional 
negligence cases This element, and the duty of care are 
the two decisive elements in which professional negligence 
distinguishes itself from other types of negligence
Chapter Five examines the specific attributes that can 
be inferred from the professional standard of care Chapter 
Six addresses specific attributes to the negligent conduct 
of solicitors
This Chapter (Chapter Four) reviews the received or 
presumed standard of care m  professional negligence as
Chapter Four
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described by McMahon & Binchy 1 It examines the grounds on 
which negligent conduct is assessed and, more importantly, 
it seeks to identify the decisive factors of the standard 
of care and its underlying principles
The cases which underlie this examination, together 
with some more recent cases m  the same area, may 
reasonably be termed "professional negligence cases" 
Indeed, one could argue that the point of this thesis is 
that prior to it no coherent principle existed that 
distinguished professional negligence cases from other 
types of negligence cases It appears that this type of 
negligence is retained for specific professional groupings, 
whether or not they exercise their respective specialized 
expertise or skill
The questions this examination raises relate to the 
tortfeasor as a professional person, the grounds that 
determine his conduct to be negligent or not, and by whom 
these grounds are determined Is the standard of care a 
matter of professional or legal judgment? The conclusions 
that derive from this examination are useful to identify 
the typical characteristics of professional negligence and 
to identify the methodological changes of the judiciary m  
assessing negligent conduct
1 (1990 258-281)
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4 . 2 . 1 . It is asserted here, and by others,2 that the 
presumed or received standard of care has derived from the 
decision m  BOLAM v FRIERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
[1957] 2 All E R 118 This case was predated by two 
earlier decisions, both dealing with the alleged negligent 
conduct of a medical practitioner ROE v MINISTRY OF 
HEALTH [1954] All E R 131 and HUNTER v HANLEY [1955] 
S L T 213
These cases are examined and compared with the 
position m  Ireland In Ireland, the position derives from 
the "summary" decision m  DUNNE v NATIONAL MATERNITY 
HOSPITAL [198 9] I R 91 3 The outcome shows that the point 
of departure is largely similar m  both countries The 
difference lies m  the application of the tests
4 . 2 . 2 . In BOLAM v FRIERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
[1957] 2 All E R 118 McNair J set out the fundamentals of 
a professional negligence test In this case the plaintiff, 
who suffered from a mental illness, was advised to undergo 
electro-convulsive therapy During the course of the 
therapy he suffered injuries He sued the defendants for 
damages for negligence m  the administration of the
2See, inter alios , McMahon & Binchy (1990 260) and
Heuston & Buckley (1992 237)
3The Supreme Court in DUNNE relied on and summarized 
two earlier cases it had dealt with These cases were 
0' DONOVAN v CORK COUNTY COUNCIL [1967] I R  173 and 
DANIELS v HESKIN [1954] I R 73
4.2. The Initial Model The BOLAM test
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treatment The plaintiff's counsel stated that his client 
had not been warned of the risks inherent to the treatment 
and, secondly, that he had not been administered a relaxant 
drug or some form of manual control to reduce the risk of 
injury
The court made preliminary points First, the medical 
evidence showed that the medical doctors differed m  
opinion as to the application of the chosen treatment 
(whether to use relaxant drugs or some form of manual 
control) Second, electro-convulsive therapy was at that 
time a treatment m  development There was 'no standard 
settled technique to which all competent doctors [would] 
agree' 4
These two observations induced the court to state that 
the defendants could not be negligent if they had followed 
a certain practice m  preference to another practice and 
both practices were approved of by medical practitioners 
Thus, although there was no consensus as to the application 
of a particular type of treatment, it was not asserted that 
one treatment was inherently flawed There was merely a 
difference of opinion 5
The question which had to be answered in this case
4[1957] 2 All E R 118 at 120, per McNair J
5This was recently reaffirmed m  BOLITHO v CITY 
HACKNEY HEALTH AUTHORITY [1992] 13 B M L R 111 See also 
ADDERLEY v NORTH MANCHESTER HEALTH AUTHORITY [1995] 25
B M L R 42 at 42 it is not enough to show that there is 
'a body of competent professional opinion that considers 
that there was a wrong decision if there also exists a body 
of professional opinion, equally competent, which supports 
the decision as reasonable in the circumstances'
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related to the professional conduct of a medical 
practitioner and was, according to McNair J , 'really a 
question of professional skill' 6 For this reason the judge 
argued that negligent behaviour of a doctor cannot be 
judged along the lines of "common" negligence - the 
"ordinary man" approach The judge justified this departure 
m  that the "ordinary man" or "the man m  the street" did 
not possess such professional skill "Common" negligence - 
conduct not subjected to a particular skill - could only be 
understood as -
[s]ome failure to do some act which a reasonable 
man m  the circumstances would do, or doing some 
act which a reasonable man m  the circumstances 
would not do, and if that failure or doing of 
that act results m  injury, then there is a cause 
of action 7
In this line of thought the assessment of negligence 
depends on the common sense of a reasonable man m  the 
specific circumstances of the case The defendant is held 
to have acted negligently if his conduct was not similar, 
that is, reasonable to what the ordinary man would have 
done under the same circumstances 8 He breached his duty of
6[1957] 2 All E R 118 at 121
7 Ibid
8In tort law much is argued about what constitutes 
"ordinary" and "reasonable" The former may relate to a 
certain standard of behaviour, while the latter is 
normative and refers to what ought to be done In both 
approaches the outcome is often similar However, many, 
including McNair J , do not distinguish one from the other 
See also Howie (1983), supra 2 2 5
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care and this is decided upon by the court as a matter of 
judicial judgment without reference to the nature of the 
defendant's behaviour
McNair J continued and examined the conduct of the 
defendant m  a professional context He agreed with counsel 
for the defendants that negligence must be defined here as 
'a failure to act m  accordance with the standards of 
reasonable competent medical men' 9 He stated that the 
professional negligence test is 'the standard of the 
ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that 
special skill', and he should exercise 'the ordinary skill 
of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular 
art' 10
At first sight it appears that the test is more 
subjective than the test used m  "ordinary" negligence 
cases There, the conduct of the defendant is compared to 
the hypothetical reasonable man, whatever his disposition 
may be With respect to professional negligence, however, 
the reasonable man is confined to the reasonable acting man 
able, or holding himself out, to exercise a particular 
skill This is the distinguishing factor between the two 
tests and for this reason it appears to be more subjective
However, what the reasonable skilled doctor would have 
done m  the circumstances of the case is determined by 
reference to medical opinion m  BOLAM The defendant's 
behaviour is assessed to what is common by other doctors
9 [1957] 2 All E R 118 at 121
10Ibid
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They, m  fact, determine the standard to which the 
defendant has or has not adhered to Thus, the defendant 
was not negligent, according to McNair J , 'if he had acted 
with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of 
[professional] men skilled m  that particular art' 11
Reference is made to the reasonable skilled 
professional person (a reasonably skilled medical 
practitioner) and medical or professional opinion Although 
the test appears to be subjective by reference to a 
reasonable skilled man, the test is, m  fact, objective
because the standard which is used is not exposed to
subjective elements It therefore 'eliminates the
personality of the judge' 12 The assessment of the
professional person's conduct is a clinical operation by 
reference to professional opinion Adherence to it relieves 
the professional person from liability
The test merely asks what do professions do? If a 
responsible body of professional men does X, then it is not 
negligent to do X Here, it fundamentally differs from the 
approach m  general negligence cases The "general 
negligence test" suggests that there can be reasonable and 
unreasonable acts and the latter may result m  a finding of 
negligence The justification is made by the court based on 
the evidence of the case, while m  a case of professional
i
negligence the court merely determines whether there is a 
standard, set by the profession, to which the behaviour of
11 Ibid , at 122
12See Rogers (1989 111)
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the tortfeasor may fit If so, he is not negligent In 
doing so, the test is "professional-centred" and disregards 
the interests of the client or patient
4 . 2 . 3 .  What can be regarded as a responsible body of 
medical or professional men? Is it the quality of the 
opinions advocated or the number of the adherents? The 
answer is intangible in that, at least m  BOLAM, a 
responsible body is not defined any further Must one 
conclude that if a professional person, alleged to have 
acted negligently, finds a body of responsible men whose 
practice is similar to the alleged negligent practice, he 
is therefore not negligent? If so, who is to test that this 
practice is authoritative, both as a body and m  its 
judgment?
The answers are closely related to the fact that the 
standard of care is a matter of professional (in this case 
medical) judgment 13 McNair J clarified this link m  BOLAM 
as follows He stated that -
it is not essential for you [the jury] to decide 
which of two practices is better practice, as 
long as you accept that what [was done] was m  
accordance with a practice accepted by reasonable 
persons 14
The question of what constitutes a responsible body of 
opinion was recently addressed m  the decision m  DE
13The duty of care is imposed by law
14 [1957] 2 All E R 118 at 122
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FREITAS v O'BRIEN [1995] 25 B M L R 51 In this case the 
plaintiff alleged that his medical practitioner was 
negligent The treatment he provided did not have any 
clinical justification m  the context of his specialism, 
orthopaedic surgery However, the defendant regarded 
himself as a "super-specialist", specializing m  spinal 
surgery He was one of eleven spinal surgeons out of a 
group of 1,000 orthopaedic surgeons m  England
The question was whether the defendant had acted m  
accordance with a responsible body of medical opinion The 
court answered he had, referring to the sub-specialism of 
spinal surgery The court emphasized that it was not the 
quantity of the adherents that constituted a responsible 
body of opinion Otton L J agreed with the trial judge 
that ' [i] t was sufficient that there was a responsible 
body' ,15 it did not need to be substantial That would be 
a wrong interpretation of the BOLAM test A reference to a 
" substantial" body of opinion has only been made, m  
England, by Hirsh J m  the decision m  HILLS v POTTER 
[1983] 3 All E R 716 16
Brahams points out that the extension of the BOLAM 
test to its outer limits could prove 'a double edged sword
15 [1995] 25 B M L R 51 at 61
16He stated '[i]n every case the courts must be
satisfied that the standard contended for on their own 
behalf accords with that upheld by a substantial body of 
medical opinion, and that this body of medical opinion is
both respectable and responsible7, ([1983] 3 All E R 716
at 728)
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for defendant doctors m  the future' 17 This researcher 
argues whether the BOLAM test should have been applied in 
this case In DE FREITAS the defendant's conduct was hard 
to assess under BOLAM because the defendant had a virtually 
"intellectual" monopoly m  his field The phrase "a 
responsible body of opinion" has meaning only where it 
relates to a specialism and not a super-specialism or is 
counterpoised by other or minority opinions
4.2 4 Under the BOLAM test a professional person enjoys
a certain degree of autonomy m  the exercise of his duties 
However, a personal belief that a particular technique is 
best is no defence, unless it is based on reasonable 
grounds Therefore, one cannot continue with a particular 
practice or technique, according to McNair J , 'if it has 
been proven to be contrary to what is really substantially 
the whole of informed medical [or professional] opinion' 18 
In effect, McNair J appears to suggest m  BOLAM that 
a certain practice advocated by a responsible body of 
medical men is always correct Thus, as long as there are 
expert witnesses who express the opinion that the practice 
exercised by the defendant is medically accepted, he cannot 
be held negligent, regardless of the damage suffered by the 
plaintiff Although it is reasonable to argue that, because 
of the special skill involved, it should be left to the 
professions to set the standard, the weakness is that the
17 (1995 5)
18 [1957] 2 All E R 118 at 122
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court merely becomes the "nodding-donkey" of the 
professions It should, instead, be able to give a valid 
judgment whether an act is also reasonable or not by 
reference to the defendant's conduct
4.2 5. BOLAM v FRIERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
[1957] 2 All E R 118 dealt with three issues which related 
to the doctor's duties with regard to diagnosis, treatment 
and information or advice
The first issue concerned the failure to give a 
warning with regard to some inherent risks of the proposed 
treatment Applying the professional negligence test on the 
circumstances of this issue, McNair J concluded that 'the 
practice of saying very little and waiting for questions 
from the patient',19 was a proper standard of competent 
professional opinion
The second and third issue dealt with the actual 
treatment, whether it was negligent not to use a relaxant 
drug or some sort of manual control With regard to both 
issues, there were two recognized schools of thought This 
appeared from the expert evidence Thus, it became evident 
that the defendant doctor could not be negligent m  BOLAM 
for choosing one practice rather than the other, as long as 
the practice or treatment he administered was m  accordance 
with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of 
professional medical men
19I b i d  , at 124
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4 . 2 . 6 .  Historically, the decision m  HUNTER v HANLEY 
[1955] S L T 213 is important m  the understanding of the 
BOLAM test The decision m  this case by the Lord President 
(Lord Clyde) expressed a view similar to that of McNair J 
m  BOLAM v FRIERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE [1957] 2
All E R 118
In HUNTER a general practitioner was alleged to have 
acted negligently by not using a suitable hypodermic needle 
when, after a series of injections, the needle broke Part 
of it remained m  the patient's hip It was alleged that 
the doctor's conduct amounted to negligence because he did 
not follow a normal practice Two issues were dealt with m  
this case (i) what were the circumstances that indicated 
negligence and (n) were there degrees of negligence?
It was directed by the presiding judge m  the jury 
trial m  First Division that ' [t] here must be such a 
departure from the normal and usual practice of general 
practitioners as can reasonably be described as gross 
negligence' 20 Both the counsel for the pursuer (the 
patient) and the Lord President could not agree with this 
direction, especially with regard to the reference to 
"gross negligence" However, both argued the direction on 
different grounds
Counsel argued that a medical man was not m  a special 
position The foundation of all negligence was fault 
without any degree It was just a simple breach of a duty 
to take reasonable care There was no authority on the
20 [1955] S L T 213 at 215
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professional negligence of medical men, gross negligence 
was not a test which was applied m  England Counsel 
referred to an earlier Scottish case where the court 
preferred the ordinary concept of negligence, ' [w]hether 
the defendant, m  violation of his duty to the pursuer, 
negligently failed to give sufficient and proper attention 
and care' 21
The Lord President argued that there must be a 
deviation from reasonable care, but this did not have to 
lead to gross negligence He argued that to establish 
liability there must be a breach of a duty to take care, a 
duty which is required by law The degree of want of care 
could vary, depending on the circumstances of the case In 
a normal situation those circumstances were more precise 
and clear-cut, but where professional conduct was concerned 
it was different In establishing negligence in these cases 
the true test was whether a doctor 'has been proved to be 
guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would 
be guilty of if acting with ordinary care' 22 Therefore, he 
cannot be held negligent 'merely because his conclusion 
differs from that of other professional men, nor because he 
has displayed less skill or knowledge than others would 
have shown' 23
Gross negligence only indicates a departure from the 
normal standard of conduct m  relation to a lack of
21FARQUHAR v MURRAY [1901] S L T 45 at 46
22 [1955] S L T 213 at 217, per Lord Clyde
23 J jb id
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ordinary care which a professional man must display It 
cannot mean that there are degrees of negligence and that 
simply departing or deviating from a normal practice
amounts to (gross) negligence There must be something more 
than that to establish negligence of professional men
Lord Clyde suggested three requirements, necessary to 
examine whether a doctor was negligent if he deviated from 
a normal practice (1 ) there is a usual and normal 
practice, (1 1) the defendant has not employed that
practice, (1 1 1) the practice the doctor did use was one 
'which no professional man of ordinary skill would have 
taken if he had been acting with ordinary care' 24
The extent of the deviation is not the test It is 
rather whether or not the deviation is of a kind that 
satisfies the third requirement 25
4 . 2 . 7 .  Both the BOLAM test and the decision m  HUNTER 
leave it up to the medical profession to set the standard 
In doing so, the decision whether a doctor is negligent has 
become a matter of medical judgment
A justification for this proposition is found m
McNair J 's reference m  BOLAM to the decision m  ROE v
MINISTRY OF HEALTH [1954] 2 All E R 131 26 In this case,
Lord Denning emphasized that there are always risks
24 I b i d
25The test laid down by Lord Clyde m  HUNTER v HANLEY 
[1955] S C 200 was recently applied m  FISHER v MCKENZIE 
[1994] 26 B M L R 98
26 [1957] 2 All E R 118 at 128
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involved m  the administration of treatment Therefore, one 
should guard against being 'wise after the event and to 
condemn as negligence that which was only a 
misadventure7 27
A proper balance must be found between an ordinary 
skilled doctor and what is expected of him m  society 
Denning L J stated m  the ROE case that -
[w]e should do a disservice to the community at 
large if we were to impose liability on hospitals 
and doctors for everything that happens to go 
wrong Doctors would be led to think more of 
their own safety than of the good of their 
patients Initiatives will be stifled and 
confidence shaken 28
This is a warning m  two ways First, one should not 
disregard the interests and good of the patients or 
clients, medical opinion cannot reach that far as to accept 
those practices that are inherently unreasonable Second, 
"defensive" medicine should not be promoted at the expense 
of the individual patient or the public at large
Lord Denning set out the parameters of professional 
conduct In assessing alleged negligent professional 
conduct, one must consider the interests of the profession 
and the individual professional person, as well as the 
victim of the professional practice and the public at 
large The balance can be, at one time, m  favour of the 
victim In other situations, the professions benefit It
27 [1954] 2 All E R 131 at 137, per Denning L J
28 Ibid
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appears that, at least under the BOLAM test, the 
professions enjoy the benefit of the doubt
4.2.8. One question remains unanswered and relates to 
the liberty of the professions, m  particular the medical 
profession, to set their own standards m  professional 
negligence litigation Although this issue shall be
addressed m  more detail, a number of inferences can be
drawn from the BOLAM case
First, it has been said that there is a logical 
connection between theory and practice Professional 
opinion is formed by a responsible body of men It is based 
on theory and is taught to the professional persons through 
specialized education by a formalized professional 
representative body or organisation 29 By means of 
examinations entry is restricted In this approach a
profession is made up of a grouping with a set of traits 
and attributes by which they can be distinguished
However, there is a need to distinguish between kinds 
of practices The first distinction is a moral one is 
something good or bad, optimal or careless? Another 
distinction is whether or not the practice is one 
recommended by a professional body or imposed by law The 
third distinction is whether or not the practice m
question is adopted by "all", "most", "some" or "no" 
doctors Finally, a fourth distinction is whether or not 
the practice m  question is an acceptable or pragmatic
29See Tomkin & Hanafm (1995 10)
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balance between the rigorous demands of untrammelled 
theory, (an optimum) and the exigencies of the 
circumstance, a "reasonable man" test The problem appears 
to be that the cases are enigmatic m  regard to the various 
methods of evaluation of human behaviour m  the context of 
the provision of services
The third distinction is essentially a sociological 
approach what is done, and what justification is there for 
departure from the majority view? Essentially the BOLAM 
test lies m  this category The question m  this category 
is would the course of conduct be approved of by a body of 
professional opinion of those professionals skilled m  the 
particular art?
Second, there is an interaction between the 
professional body and the professional person The latter 
is obliged to act according to specific standards or 
formalized regulations These are devised, codified, 
implemented and often policed by the relevant profession 
and taught to the individual member He can be charged for 
misconduct by a disciplinary board if and when he violates 
those sets of standards m  such a way that he causes a 
client or patient to complain about him qua professional 
It may even give rise to civil litigation m  which he can 
be held negligent This aspect, as part of the 
organizational structure and functions, is said to be a 
typical characteristic of a profession 30
Third, by reference to professional opinion, the court
30See s u p r a Subparagraph 3 4 3
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can mediate between what is done and what can be done 
(optimum) or what ought to be done (reasonableness) The 
professional body represents, on the one hand, professional 
opinion because it has authorized the creation of practice 
On the other hand, the profession must not only be seen as 
embracing a certain practice, but also as representing the 
individual professional person who practices according to 
professional opinion
From this it follows that accepted practice is 
determined by the professional persons themselves through 
expert evidence, representing the professional body of 
which they are presumed to be a member They do this either 
individually or collectively By determining this practice 
they also set the standard of skill and competence by which 
they are obliged to act This freedom of autonomous 
behaviour, within accepted parameters, is another 
characteristic inherent to the concept of a profession
In each negligence case the court looks for a 
criterion by which it can judge liability The question is 
where this criterion can be found m  professional 
negligence cases Does the court look for guidance m  valid 
professional opinions, (is it told which practice is 
accepted as proper), or does the court impose a rule upon 
professional persons, whatever their view may be? Under the 
BOLAM test the court's role is minimized to observe whether 
the defendant7 s conduct was m  line with accepted 
professional opinion
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4 . 3 .  The Irish Position as Represented
m  the DUNNE case
4 . 3 . 1 .  In the general law of negligence there are
certain principles which are of special interest to
professional persons lawyers, medical men, etc They have 
been set out m  DANIELS v HESKIN [1954] I R 73 and
0' DONOVAN v CORK COUNTY COUNCIL [1967] I R  173 The
principles were summarized by the Supreme Court m  DUNNE v 
NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1989] I R 91
The principles which are referred to m  these two 
older cases must be applied m  medical negligence cases to 
treatment, diagnosis and the provision of information
alike, according to the Chief Justice m  DUNNE 31
The Chief Justice also restricted, as did Lord Denning 
m  ROE v MINISTRY OF HEALTH [1954] 2 All E R 31, the
freedom of professional conduct, the principles must be 
developed and applied taking into consideration the
parameters, which 'underline their establishment' 32 In 
medical negligence cases these parameters are the 
importance of the development of medicine on the one hand, 
and the dependence of the patient on the practitioner's 
skill and care, and the gravity of his failure on the other 
hand
The principles raise questions with regard to 
professional negligence generally With regard to the
31 [1989] I R 91 at 109 
22Ibid , at 110
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professional status of the defendant they raise questions 
m  three situations m  particular These situations are 
where a practitioner (1) acts with ordinary care, (1 1) 
applies or deviates from a general and approved practice or 
(1 1 1) has a difference of opinion
4 . 3 . 2 .  In DANIELS v HESKIN [1954] I R 73 the plaintiff 
sued her doctor for damages for negligence It was alleged 
that the doctor was negligent and unskilful m  three ways
(I) He was negligent m  permitting and causing a needle to 
break at the time he was stitching the perineum of the 
plaintiff The plaintiff held that this was due to an 
imperfection of technique, rather than to a defect m  the 
instrument
(II) He was negligent m  permitting the broken needle to be 
left m  the body for considerable time and failing to 
remove it, instead of taking adequate steps to ensure that 
the needle would be removed (only six weeks later the 
broken portion was removed after the plaintiff was X- 
rayed)
(III) He was negligent m  failing to inform the plaintiff 
of the existence of the broken needle 33 Counsel submitted 
that there is an obligation to inform the patient when,
33The above three submissions relate (a) to treatment 
and (b) the overarching duty of professional care which 
involves the doctor's judgment, knowledge and opinion 
Submission 2 clearly reflects an overall duty to take care, 
which also involves a specific duty of medical opinion and 
judgment, while submission 1 reflects a specified duty 
towards treatment Submission 3 reflects a specified duty 
towards information This distinction is asserted
throughout the thesis
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during the course of an operation, a foreign object is left 
m  the patient's body which is normally not supposed to be 
left there An exception is, when it would be impairing the 
health of the patient to do so 34
The trial judge held that there was no evidence for 
the jury to consider that the defendant was negligent The 
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court It affirmed the 
decision of the trial judge, based on the following
grounds 35
With regard to the first submission, the evidence of 
the case showed that the breaking of the needle was not due 
to negligence on the part of the defendant The fracture 
must be put down to a flaw m  the steel of the needle, or 
a mishap which may happen to even the most skilful doctor 
Kmgsmill Moore7 J stated ' [t]o fall short of perfection 
is not the same thing as to be negligent' 36
This clearly shows that the standard of competence 
which is required from a doctor - a general practitioner or 
specialist, is not a standard of absolute perfection This 
may seem obvious, but at the same time the expectations of 
the plaintiff were not fulfilled She suffered additional 
injury and loss as a result The question could be asked 
whether or not this is justified That it is, is clearly 
illustrated by the parameters, set by both Lord Denning and 
Finlay C J The development of medical science is not
34Cf GERBER v PINES (1934) 79 Sol Jo 13
35Maguire C J dissenting ([1954] I R 73 at 75)
36 [1954] I R 73 at 84
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supported if a medical practitioner is under constant 
threat of litigation or is subjected to a strict liability 
regime 37
In a situation where a doctor, or any other person 
possessing a professional skill and exercising a certain 
technique, causes loss or injury to his patient or client, 
this additional suffering must be taken into account The 
interest of the patient/client must be weighted against the 
interests of the professional person The former will only 
be compensated when the skill or technique exercised by the 
doctor fell under a certain level of competence Maguire 
C J stated -
[a] medical practitioner is liable for injury 
caused to another person to whom he owes a duty 
to take care if he fails to possess that amount 
of skill which is usual m  his profession or if 
he neglects to use the skill which he possesses 
or necessary degree of care demanded or 
professed 38
It is clear from this statement the Chief Justice 
employs a "professional-centred" model to determine whether 
the professional person is negligent and the injured party 
can be compensated But who shall determine that level? The 
court, the profession, or the professional person?
In a "client/patient-centred" model negligence may be
37See also HUGHES v STAUNTON AND OTHERS [1995] 
P N L R 244 In this case Lynch J stated that these two 
principles underlie 7 the rights, duties and liabilities of 
medical practitioners m  relation to their patlents',
{supra, at 273)
38 [1954] I R 73 at 75
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determined by reference to the expectations of the client 
or patient A doctor can be held negligent when he violates 
those expectations, and those expectations were reasonable 
Another issue must be addressed here The Supreme 
Court did not clarify m  DANIELS the two grounds on which 
it decided that the defendant was not negligent with regard 
to the first submission (the breaking of the needle) It 
was either an inherent flaw m  the instrument used by the 
defendant, or a "mishap"
The Supreme Court omitted to distinguish the one from 
the other, instead it mentioned the two exemptions 
concurrently In other words, the Supreme Court (1 ) did 
not hold a doctor liable for damages for any inherent flaws 
m  the instruments he used, and (1 1) it acquitted a doctor 
who committed a 'mishap' The first argument is valid, but 
only when it is taken into consideration whether or not the 
doctor had applied the proper technique m  using that 
instrument But a mishap, rather than an inherent flaw, 
could be the reason that the instrument disfunctioned This 
should be taken into account whence deciding on the 
negligence of any professional person m  these 
circumstances The question is then, whether the "mishap" 
can be excused
The first submission, the way the patient was treated, 
related to the doctor's skill and technique The second and 
third submissions were related to each other and were of a 
different nature than the first submission These 
submissions were about professional judgment and opinion,
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not about skill and technique
The evidence showed that with regard to the second 
submission there were two methods of treatment open to the 
doctor when he discovered that he could not immediately 
find the broken portion of the needle The first option was 
to transport the plaintiff to a hospital to have the broken 
portion removed The second option was to continue the 
stitching and wait for six or seven weeks and then operate 
Both options were regarded by the expert witnesses as 
equally valid Therefore, there was nothing wrong with the 
doctor's decision to choose the second option In his 
professional opinion this was the right option at the time 
Accordingly, Kmgsmill Moore J stated -
[A] n honest difference of opinion between eminent 
doctors as to which is the better of two ways of 
treating a patient does not provide any ground 
for leaving a question to the jury as to whether 
a person who has followed one course rather than 
the other has been guilty of negligence It would 
be different if a doctor had expressed the 
opinion that the course adopted was definitely 
erroneous 39 40
The third submission dealt with the provision of 
information with regard to the two options of treatment 
available to master the complication and the choice between
39Xbid , at 84
40This has recently been reaffirmed m  BOLTON v THE 
BLACKROCK CLINIC LTD AND OTHERS, Unreported, High Court, 
20 December 1994, Geoghegan J It was held by the learned 
judge that a doctor is not negligent when he honestly 
differs m  opinion with another doctor as to which course 
of action is the better one, and he decides to follow one 
course rather than the other
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those options The question was, whether the doctor was 
obliged to provide this information and if so, was he 
negligent m  not doing so?
The Supreme Court expressed two views on this issue 
Both views, however, share the idea that the answer to this 
question is tied to the previous question regarding the 
choice of course the doctor had adopted
Maguire C J m  a dissenting judgment argued that the 
rule laid down m  GERBER v PINES (1934) 79 Sol Jo 13 was 
correct This rule embodies the idea that, 'a patient m  
whose body a doctor found that he had left some foreign 
substance was entitled to be told at once' 41 Exceptions 
did exist, but Maguire C J saw no reason 'why the 
defendant should be excused what seems to [him] to be his 
obvious duty' 42 The learned judge could not see any 
serious consequences of the disclosure of this information, 
and only those consequences should be regarded as an 
exception to the rule
One of the reasons for this opinion lay m  the fact 
that there were two options open for the doctor to follow 
These two options should have been disclosed to his patient 
(or next of kin) together with the opinion of the doctor on 
which course was best to follow This would have enabled 
the patient to make a choice This was, according to 
Maguire C J , 'the prerogative of the patient' 43 In
41DANIELS v HESKIN [1954] I R 73 at 76
42 JJbid
42I b i d  , at 77
203
denying this right the doctor acted negligently
It is clear that the Chief Justice put the interest of 
the patient first He applied a "patient-centred" approach 
and suggested that the patient has a definite right to 
choose between options on the basis of provided 
information Where a foreign body has been left m  the 
wound, the patient must be able to make a decision which of 
the proposed treatments or courses of action to follow An 
exception on this rule can only lie m  the interest of the 
patient
In this he differed from the second view, expressed by 
the majority of the Supreme Court This view widened the 
rule and emphasized the doctor's discretion with regard to 
the nature and extent of the provision of information 
Lavery J expressed the majority opinion that -
there are some matters which a doctor must 
disclose m  order to afford his patient an 
opportunity of deciding whether she accepts his 
view or wishes to consult another doctor and to 
make an opportunity to make a choice between 
alternative courses [ ] On the other hand
there are matters which the doctor must decide 
for himself having accepted the responsibility of 
treating his patient and having regard to his 
professional skill and knowledge upon which she 
relies 44
It is obvious that this is a "professional-centred" 
approach The learned judge left it to the doctor to 
determine the nature and extent of information to be 
disclosed In some circumstances he is obliged to provide
44Jjbid , at 80
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information, for example, a dangerous operation In other 
circumstances it is up to the doctor's professional 
judgment whether or not to inform the patient For example, 
complications m  the course of an operation and the fear of 
the patient's health when information is provided 45
Kmgsmill Moore J too, shares the opinion that it is 
the doctor's judgment whether to give advice or not, as 
long as this advice 'is honest and considered and if, m  
the circumstances known to him at the time, it can fairly 
be justified he is not guilty of negligence' 46
One reason given by the expert witnesses as to whether 
or not to inform a patient, correlated with the self- 
interest of the doctor Kmgsmill Moore J stated -
All the doctors who were examined were of opinion 
that it would be wise for a doctor to tell a 
patient or some member of her family of such a 
mishap - but wise m  a self-regarding way, so as 
to protect the doctor from the possibility of 
future vexatious actions 47
This is an example of a "professional-centred" 
approach The right of the patient to be informed, m  so 
far as such a right exists m  this line of reasoning, 
depends on the discretion of the doctor
The following can be concluded and summarized from 
this case First, the Supreme Court distinguished treatment
45This is called "therapeutic privilege"
46 [1954] I R 73 at 86-87
41 Ibid , at 87
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from care and advice The distinction lies in the fact that 
regarding the former, skill is a decisive factor, whilst 
care and advice deal with opinion and judgment
Second, the test whether a practitioner is negligent 
depends on which duty is violated a specific or an over­
arching and general duty to take care With regard to the 
specific duty of treatment, a doctor is negligent when he 
fails to exercise his skill on a certain accepted level 
Or, m  the words of Maguire C J
A medical practitioner is liable for injury
caused to another person to whom he owes a duty
to take care if he fails to possess that amount
of skill which is usual m  his profession or if 
he neglects to use the skill which he possesses 
or the necessary degree of care demanded or 
professed 48
With regard to medical judgment and opinion - another 
specific duty - a practitioner is negligent when, inter 
alia, his opinion differs from that of his contemporaries 
on the choice of course he wishes to follow and that
opinion is not honest and definitely erroneous
Finally, with regard to information, a practitioner is 
only negligent, according to the majority of the Supreme 
Court, when he does not disclose information m  serious 
matters (a dangerous operation) or when the non-disclosure 
caused damage And, according to Kmgsmill Moore J , a 
practitioner may be negligent m  cases where -
46I b i d  , at 75
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the nature of the judgment formed or the advice 
given is such as to afford positive evidence that 
the physician has fallen short of the required 
standard of knowledge and skill, or that his 
judgment could not have been honest and 
considered 49 50
Finally, it can be concluded from DANIELS that a 
medical practitioner, or any other professional person, has 
an overriding duty to take care This is again 
k unambiguously expressed m  DANIELS by Kmgsmill Moore J
A doctor owes certain well recognised duties to 
his patient He must possess such knowledge and 
skill as conforms to the recognised contemporary 
standards of his profession and, if he is a 
specialist, such further and particularised skill 
and knowledge as he holds himself out to possess 
He must use such skill and knowledge to form an 
honest and considered judgment as to what course, 
what action, what treatment is m  the best 
interest of his patient He must display proper 
attention m  treating, or m  arranging suitable 
treatment for, his patient 51
Both Maguire C J and Kmgsmill Moore J share the
i
opinion that one component of the test must be as expressed 
above the doctor-patient duty Where Maguire C J and 
Kmgsmill Moore J differ is m  relation to the emphasis 
that can be placed on the fact that one section of 
professional opinion (not necessarily the largest or the
49Ibid , at 87
50As to the duty to diagnose, Judge Moonan held m  
BOYLE v MARTIN (1932) 66 I L T R 187 that 7 an erroneous 
diagnosis was not evidence per se that would justify a jury
m  finding negligence, as a mere error of judgment was not 
negligence', (Judge Moonan7s italics)
51 [1954] I R 73 at 86
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most influential) would have supported the doctor's 
conduct, even if the procedure undertaken was not strictly 
the best way of carrying out the doctor-patient duty
4 . 3 . 3 ,  In O'DONOVAN v CORK COUNTY COUNCIL AND OTHERS 
[1967] I R 173 the plaintiff claimed that her husband's 
death was caused through negligence of the defendants 
during an operation for the removal of his appendix The 
facts were as follows
The county surgeon (the second defendant) authorised 
the house surgeon {the third defendant) m  a telephone call 
to carry out this operation At the conclusion of the 
operation, while closing the wound, the house surgeon 
discovered a seepage of blood He could not stop it and 
notified the county surgeon who left his home and arrived 
at the hospital some time later At the time of the 
doctor's arrival the patient developed convulsions The 
county surgeon and the anaesthetist (the fourth defendant) 
diagnosed these symptoms as ether convulsions The county 
surgeon closed the wound and gave advice to the 
anaesthetist The latter tried to stop the convulsion by 
increasing the supply of oxygen and stopping the supply of 
ether However, the anaesthetist did not administer a 
relaxant drug He did not think of doing so, although it 
was an accepted procedure m  these circumstances The 
convulsions continued and the patient died
It was held m  the High Court that the first, second 
and fourth defendants were negligent The defendants
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The plaintiff alleged that the second defendant was
/
negligent on two accounts (1) he was negligent m  allowing 
the third defendant to do the operation without his 
supervision and (1 1) he was negligent m  the treatment of 
the patient after the convulsions had started The fourth 
defendant was alleged to have been negligent m  that his 
treatment was inexpert omitting to administer a relaxant 
drug, it was not sufficient to only cut off the ether and 
to supply oxygen
It is clear from the allegations that the duty the 
second defendant owed to his patient was not a duty m  
skill or competence m  surgery but, according to Walsh J , 
'rather that he was lacking m  care for the patient' 52 It 
was also alleged that he was without the required 
competence and skill m  the field of anaesthetics Yet, the 
duty the fourth defendant owed to the patient was solely 
one of skill and competence m  his specialised field 
anaesthetics
To decide whether there was any negligence on the part 
of the defendants, the standard of care which is required 
by a medical man must be set out This standard must be 
based on expert evidence According to Lavery J there is 
no real difference between the general law of negligence 
and what can be called "professional" negligence In each 
case the person who owes a duty to another must 'discharge
appealed to the Supreme Court
52 [1967] I R 173 at 190
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that duty with reasonable care' 53 When the person claims 
to have a special skill or knowledge, and a duty arises 
from this special skill or knowledge, he must possess and 
exercise a reasonable degree of such knowledge and skill 54 
In other words, there is an overall duty to take 
reasonable care This duty exists m  "ordinary" negligence 
cases and negligence cases which involve a special skill or 
a certain degree of knowledge However, with regard to the 
latter, the test whether such duty is violated depends on 
a different standard With respect to medical negligence 
that standard is that of accepted medical practice A 
medical practitioner is not negligent if he exercised his 
duties m  accordance with general accepted practice
A deviation from that standard does not, however, 
imply that the defendant is automatically negligent This
idepends on three questions Here, Lavery J quoted Lord 
Clyde m  HUNTER v HANLEY 1955 S C 200 If a medical 
practitioner deviated from an accepted medical practice 
three questions must be answered to determine whether or
1
S3Ibid , at 183, per Lavery J
54Whether he actually possesses the required skill is 
irrelevant This was debated m  BOYLE v MARTIN (1932) 66
I L T R 187 Judge Moonan argued that a person who holds 
himself out to the public as being a competent doctor is m  
no different position from any other person holding himself 
out to the public as being competent m  a particular skill 
He stated that ' [a] watchmaker or motor repairer is m  
exactly the same position as a doctor or a solicitor', 
(supra, at 188) By holding themselves out to the public as 
being competent, they indicate that they possess a 
reasonable amount of knowledge and skill Each of those 
persons, possessing a certain skill and knowledge, may 
therefore be liable for injuries through negligence or 
sheer ignorance when they fall below that reasonable amount 
of skill and knowledge
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not he is liable -
First of all it must be proved that there is 
usual and normal practice, secondly it must be 
proved that the defender has not adopted that 
practice, and thirdly (and this is of crucial 
importance) it must be established that the 
course the doctor adopted is one no professional
man of ordinary skill would have taken if he had
been acting with ordinary care 55
The principle is settled now and the defendants must 
be judged on this principle This meant that, according to 
Lavery J , 'the defendants can only be held liable if there 
is*evidence that they acted or failed to act otherwise than 
m  a manner approved by a responsible body of opinion' 56 
This means that an accepted general practice and a 
responsible body of opinion do not necessarily have to
coincide If a doctor deviates from a general and approved 
practice, but a responsible body of medical opinion 
approves of it, he cannot be held negligent Here, the 
BOLAM test differs The BOLAM test does not refer to
"general accepted practice" or a deviation from it It 
merely asked whether the defendant's conduct was approved 
of by professional opinion
The bottom line m  O'DONOVAN v CORK COUNTY COUNCIL 
[1967] I R 173 is whether it can be inferred from the 
evidence that both the second and fourth defendant can be 
held negligent for deviating from a general accepted
55 [1967] I R 173 at 184
56Ibid , at 186
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practice If not, they are not negligent If so, the 
question is whether their procedure was unacceptable to a 
responsible body of medical opinion If it can be inferred 
it was unacceptable, it is for a jury to hold them 
negligent If not, the case should be withdrawn from the 
jury and a verdict should have been directed m  favour of 
the defendants
However, the proposition (to follow a general and 
approved practice as evidence of non-negligent conduct) is 
not without qualification This can be inferred from the 
judgment of Walsh J In his view it cannot be said that a 
practice which is 'widely and generally adopted over a 
period of time does not make the practice less 
negligent' 57 A general and accepted practice can be 
negligent if it 'carries inherent defects which ought to be 
obvious to any person given the matter due 
consideration' 58
The first allegation made against the second defendant 
(lack of care due to not being personally present during 
the operation) failed according to Walsh J The reason for 
this was that the practice conducted by the second 
defendant was a general and accepted practice and did not 
carry any obvious inherent defects And, if there was a 
conflict m  the evidence whether or not the followed 
practice was general and approved it cannot, as an issue of 
fact, be withdrawn from a jury for that very reason
57I b i d  , at 193
58 I b i d
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The second allegation against the second defendant 
must fail too, according to Walsh J This allegation dealt 
primarily with responsibility and the division of tasks 
Although he was m  charge of the operation when he arrived 
on the scene, it could not be said that he was immediately 
responsible for the administration of the anaesthetics, 
another field of medicine His primary duty lay m  his 
field surgery Lawfully he did not owe the patient a duty 
outside his field He was entitled to assume and rely on 
the skill and competence of his fellow doctor, until 7 he 
has a reason to believe otherwise' 59
With regard to the allegations against the fourth 
defendant, the anaesthetist, Walsh J expressed the 
opinion, and was supported by the Chief Justice, that on 
the evidence it was open to the jury to hold the 
anaesthetist negligent He stated that -
there was a general and approved practice 
applicable to the condition of the patient m  
question m  this case and it is not disputed that 
[the fourth defendant] did not follow that 
particular practice 60
This does not necessarily mean that he is negligent 
To initiate negligence it must be established that the 
practice that was followed by the fourth defendant 'was one 
which no anaesthetist of ordinary skill would have taken 
had he been taking ordinary care required from an
59Ibid , at 194, per Walsh J
60Ibid , at 199
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anaesthetist' 61 It was held he was
This case confirms that there is an overall duty to 
take care as well as a duty to possess a certain degree of 
skill and competence With regard to the latter it can be 
said that this degree does not have to be the highest 
degree of skill and competence A doctor specialised m  a 
particular field is, according to Walsh J , 'required to 
attain to an ordinary level of skill amongst those who 
specialise m  the same field' 62 With regard to the conduct 
of a professional person so far as care is concerned, this 
conduct must be judged 'in the light of the particular 
circumstances prevailing at the time when he is called upon 
to act, and the degree of care may vary m  proportion to 
the magnitude of the risk involved' 63
The violation of his duty to take care depends on 
whether he had followed a general and approved practice If 
so, a professional person is still negligent when such a 
general and approved practice carried an inherent defect 
which ought to be obvious to any person who had given the 
matter due consideration
If not, a professional person is negligent when (l) 
there is a usual and normal practice, (n) this practice is 
not adopted by him, and ( m )  he adopted a practice which 
no professional person of ordinary skill would have taken, 
if he had been acting with ordinary care
61 Ibid
62Ibid , at 190
63Jbid
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4 . 3 . 4 .  In DUNNE v NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1989]
I R 91 the plaintiff, a child (suing through his mother 
and best friend) , claimed that while he was m  his mother's 
womb he suffered severe brain damage due to the negligence 
of the defendants
In this case, Finlay C J set out the principles which 
cover the tort of negligence and are of special interest to 
professional people These principles have already been
recognized m  the previous two cases and are here 
summarized by the Chief Justice
The first principle gives the general rule for 
establishing medical or professional negligence Finlay 
C J stated -
The true test [ ] is whether [a medical
practitioner] has been proved to be guilty of 
such failure as no medical practitioner of equal 
specialist or general status and skill would be 
guilty of if acting with ordinary care 64
The test is an ordinary skilled doctor acting with 
ordinary care who follows a general and accepted 
practice 65 This practice does not need to be universal It 
is sufficient when it is approved of by a substantial
number of respectable practitioners holding the relevant 
qualifications
But, if it is proven that a general and approved
64 [1989] I R 91 at 109
65This was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court m  
EDWARDS v SOUTHERN HEALTH BOARD, Unreported, Supreme 
Court, 26 July 1994
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practice carries inherent defects, he will nevertheless be 
negligent when these defects ought to have been obvious to 
any person giving the matter due consideration
However, negligence can also be based on the 
allegation that the defendant has not acted m  accordance 
with a general and approved practice Instead, he deviated 
from a general and accepted practice He is allowed to do 
this within accepted parameters Nonetheless, he will be 
negligent if this deviation is proven to be one -
which no medical practitioner of like 
specialization and skill would have followed had 
he been taking the ordinary care required from a 
person of his qualifications 66
Doctors may differ m  opinion as to which treatment 
must be applied When this opinion is honest, it provides 
no ground 'for leaving a question to the jury as to whether 
a person who has followed one course rather than the other 
has been negligent' 67 It is honest when the course of 
treatment complies with 'the careful conduct of a medical 
practitioner of like specialization and skill to that 
professed by the defendant' 60 It is not important for the 
judge to decide which of the opinions or courses of 
treatment is favourable -
66DUNNE v NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1989] I R 91 
at 109, per Finlay C J
67 Jbid
68 Ibid
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This court as a court of appeal cannot and must 
not reach a conclusion or express a view as to 
which of two conflicting expert opinions it (the 
Court [sic] ) would prefer 69
In short, the prevalent rule is the professional 
person of equal specialist or general status and skill 
acting with ordinary care But where the defendant has not 
acted according to a general and approved practice, it must 
also be proved that the followed course is a course no man 
of equal skill would have followed And, when the defendant 
has acted according to a general and approved practice that 
practice must not carry inherent defects
Finally, within this context an honest difference of 
opinion is no ground to establish negligence 70
4 . 3 . 5 .  It can be concluded from the decision m  DUNNE v 
NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1989] I R 91 that there are 
three situations where a medical practitioner, (or any 
other professional person) might be negligent However, 
these three situations are not exclusive and they are also 
co-extensive
In the first situation, it can be said that a 
practitioner has at any time a duty to take ordinary care 
This duty will cover all other duties or obligations he 
might have This duty to take ordinary care derives from
69Ibid , at 108, per Finlay C J
70This was recently reaffirmed m  HEALY v NORTH 
WESTERN HEALTH BOARD, Unreported, High Court, 31 January 
1996, Flood J
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his position as someone who has a special skill Through 
this he distinguishes himself from the ordinary man It can 
be said that this special skill relates to the professional 
status of the practitioner, being part of ' a grouping which 
possesses a distinct set of traits and attributes' 71
The second and third situation cannot be seen apart 
from this to take ordinary care The second situation is 
where a practitioner has deviated from a general and 
approved practice In this situation he can be negligent on 
two accounts (1 ) he may be negligent if he has not acted 
with ordinary care, although the practice he professed was 
not necessarily flawed, and (1 1) he may be negligent if the 
practice he followed was flawed, and was one no other 
practitioner would have followed taking ordinary care In 
other words, a practitioner must take ordinary care 
regarding the practice he wishes to follow and he must take 
ordinary care regarding the exercise of this practice
A general and approved practice is defined as a 
practice which is accepted by a substantial number of 
respectable practitioners holding the relevant 
qualifications This is essentially a sociological 
approach, m  which two questions are relevant is the 
practice adapted by "all", "most", "some", or "no" 
practitioners, and what is the justification for departure 
from the majority view? Another question is how a practice 
becomes general and approved of Is it through custom, 
professional opinion, or theoretical knowledge? Is it the
71See Tomkin & Hanafin (1995 10)
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number of adherents or the quality of the adherence?
As to a practice that carries obvious inherent 
defects, it is argued whether a practitioner who follows it 
automatically violates his duty to take ordinary care as 
described m  the first situation Apparently not, because 
any other practitioner, taking ordinary care would have 
followed that practice In this case a practitioner takes 
ordinary care, but is doing (inadvertently) the wrong 
thing How ought he have known this? It is said that those 
defects should be so obvious to any person, who would have 
given the matter due consideration But why, when the 
defects are so obvious, can it still be a general and 
approved practice and is it still adhered to? The defects 
did not seem obvious to those who upheld the practice as 
accepted and approved
One suggestion could be that inherent defects in a 
general and approved practice should be regarded as 
"genuine faults", such as leaving instruments behind m  the 
body after an operation, or not sterilising surgical 
equipment
Another suggestion could be that the profession itself 
is aware of those aspects of the practice which may render 
the practice defective or may damage the patient However, 
the profession takes these consequences into account as 
inherent risks of proposed treatment rather than an 
inherent defect The question that follows is whether the 
courts interpret an inherent defect as unreasonable m  
order to render the practice negligent and thus, to
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compensate the victim's loss? If so, this would mean that 
the courts, as a matter of policy, do have the final word 
on the matter
4 . 3 . 6 .  It is suggested that m  DUNNE v NATIONAL 
MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1989] I R 91 the key components of the 
"professional" approach to ascertain liability are
(1) the reference to a hypothetical or actual body of 
qualified opinion, l e standards of education and 
training,
(2) the reference to the attainment of manual skill or 
dexterity and aptitude,
(3) the negotiation of procedures of diagnosis or treatment 
with a degree of skill or care which is hypothesized as 
"ordinary" or "average",
(4) following approved procedures m  such a way as to 
discriminate on the one hand between procedures with an 
inherent defect and, on the other, those which are not 
inherently defective, and only selecting the latter,
(5) departing from a responsible body of professional 
opinion only within accepted parameters
There are some questions or issues which must be 
addressed m  such an approach These are
(A) The reference to a hypothetical or actual body of 
qualified opinion begs the question how is the court to 
infer what such standards are? Is it by reference to an 
external body of knowledge? If so, where is the repository 
for that knowledge? If not, surely, the only way of
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ascertaining what such standards of training or education 
are, is by reference to practitioners This is a circular 
and self-perpetuating process, which would exclude 
innovation and development
(B) The problem with the reference to the attainment of 
manual skill or dexterity and aptitude lies with the 
distinction between such skills m  a "professional" as 
opposed to a manual labour context Perhaps, the 
distinction can be found m  the degree of esoterical and 
theoretical based knowledge, and the dependency on it
(C) The negotiation of procedures of diagnosis or treatment 
with a degree of skill or care which is hypothesized as 
"ordinary" or "average" begs the question how far is it 
possible to hypothesize what constitutes average or 
ordinary care m  the context of professional advice, 
diagnosis and treatment, except by reference to res ipsa 
loquitur and to specific catalogues?
(D) Following approved procedures m  such a way as to 
discriminate on the one hand between procedures with an 
inherent defect and, on the other, those which are not 
inherently defective and only selecting the latter, is this 
a red herring? Again, there is nothing intrinsically 
peculiar to professional persons m  the requirement that m  
order not to be negligent, one should not perform a 
procedure with inherent defects
(E) The right to depart from a responsible body of 
professional opinion only within accepted parameters 
discloses the key element of the professional person the
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liberty to form one's own view of a proposed course of 
action within proper limits, agreed or negotiated by other 
professional persons
The question which should be addressed, before one can 
apply an approved practice, is whether it is necessary to 
have professionally made one's mind up as to the route to 
follow If so, it is obvious that the process whereby all 
persons follow or institute "approved practice" must be to 
hold a "professional opinion" This, of course, disposes of 
two problems certain professional opinions may lead to 
inherently objectionable or flawed procedures which should, 
according to DUNNE, explicitly not be followed The second 
is that this encapsulates one of the idiosyncratic 
distinctions between professional opinion, on the one hand, 
and non-professional opinion, on the other, by 
demonstrating that professional opinion has a necessary 
connection with theory
This thesis draws a line between the majority judgment 
m  DANIELS v HESKIN [1954] I R 73, the dissenting 
judgment of Maguire C J m  DANIELS and the decision m  
DUNNE v NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1989] I R 91 
Possibly, the main line of opinion is that of Maguire C J 
and Finlay C J , whereby it may be asserted that where the 
courts follow Kmgsmill Moore J they are really following 
that part of it that does not differ from Maguire C J 's 
dissenting judgment m  DANIELS and tacitly ignoring the 
rest
Both Maguire C J and Finlay C J stress that some
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duties or situations are so obvious that they do not 
require a "professional-centred" approach Maguire C J 
made this clear m  his dissenting judgment m  DANIELS v 
HESKIN [1954] I R 73 He suggested that, with regard to 
the defendant's duty to disclose certain information, the 
defendant cannot be excused of negligence of something 
which is so obviously his duty only because his conduct 
coincides with medical opinion
Finlay C J agreed with him on this point In his 
view, the courts adjudicate, where a practice carried 
inherent defects, whether these defects are so obvious that 
they render the practice flawed because they should have 
been obvious to any man giving the matter consideration, 
not merely the medical profession
4 4. Conclusion
4.4.1. Two aspects need to be addressed here First, the 
thesis identified certain fixed points on the negligence 
spectrum which may be relevant to defining what 
differentiates "professional" negligence from general 
negligence Second, the thesis demands a brief discussion 
as to how the DUNNE test relates to the BOLAM test This is 
of particular relevance in the discussion on the specific 
attributes of professional negligence, subject of the 
following Chapter
223
\
4.4.2. Thus, certain fixed points are identified These
are equally applicable to both the BOLAM and the DUNNE 
test
First, particularly m  medical negligence there is a 
clear distinction between on the one hand the duty of
ordinary care and specific other duties In DANIELS v
HESKIN [1954] I R 73 these specific duties related to
treatment and information or advice This is suggested
throughout the thesis BOLAM v FRIERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT 
COMMITTEE [1957] 2 All E R 118 demonstrated that besides
the specific duties such as a duty to diagnose, a duty to 
inform etc , there is a general duty as between a doctor 
and his patient which "over-arches" all the incidences of 
the doctor-patient relationship (and includes as sub-sets 
of the main relationship the subsidiary duties such as the 
duty to diagnose and the duty to inform) Going back to 
BOLAM, it is clear that there are two different tests which 
must be applied simultaneously when it is alleged that a 
doctor is negligent m  (1) his general duty to take care 
(the over-arching duty) and (2) breaching one of the sub­
set duties, such as the duty to inform
Second, there are professional standards which embody 
twin expertise, theory, and manual or professional skill, 
dexterity (There is no question of this being relevant to 
cases not being m  the professional negligence category)
Third, there is "approved" or "recommended"
professional practice, which may include a variety of 
alternative approaches selected from within a
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professionally defined norm In non-professional negligence 
cases, the standard appealed to is that of the "ordinary 
man", the "reasonable man", the "man on the Clapham 
omnibus", as opposed to the person with education, 
training, qualifications, manual ability and dexterity At 
the very least, the points of reference are different 
There is an implied appeal, m  the case of professional 
negligence, to external and defined standards of behaviour 
imposed on those belonging to a defined group, by the group 
itself
Fourth, there is an ordinary or average standard of
behaviour Here, at first sight, there is a similarity of
approaches between professional negligence cases and the 
other sorts of negligence cases But it is necessary to 
remember that m  DUNNE v NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL 
[1989] I R 91, the qualifying factor is that it 
hypothesizes an appeal, not to a global or universal
standard of behaviour, but to a standard which is
perceptible by examination of a particular group those of 
similar qualifications, skill and expertise
Fifth, there is a requirement to expressly recognize 
and distinguish procedures by the presence or absence of 
inherent defects It is questionable whether this criterion 
applies to all cases of negligence, or only to professional 
negligence However, m  the context of DUNNE, it is not 
"definitional" That is to say, what DUNNE appears to be 
maintaining is that no professional practice which includes 
the carrying out of an inherently defective procedure is
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admissible The key may be that a higher standard will be 
expected from a professional person as to the recognition 
and avoidance of obvious inherent defects The relevant 
part of professional education and training is the 
recognition and critical appraisal of conventional 
procedures m  specific practical contexts, and the 
rejection of inappropriate procedures where this would 
result m  damage Finlay C J is referring m  DUNNE v 
NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1989] I R 91 to a critical 
part of professional education 72
What remains to be considered, is the way in which 
professional practice is codified or recognized and the way 
it allows innovation and technical or academic development 
of its procedures and education There may be several ways 
of ascertaining this The first is by professional evidence
tabout what people actually do The second is by reference 
to text-books, codes of practice, what people ought to do 
It is suggested that the former is "accepted practice", the 
latter is "optimal practice"
4,4,3. Both the BOLAM and DUNNE test depart from the 
ordinary principles of negligence At the core of both 
tests no reference is made to the "ordinary man" This, for 
stated reasons, is irrelevant or, at least, questionable 
Instead, both tests appeal to the concept of a professional 
person (the medical practitioner) of equal qualification 
and skill, acting with ordinary care
72 [1989] I R 91 at 109-110
Both tests agree that the professional person has a
\
certain professional autonomy within accepted parameters 
Consequently, a honest difference of opinion is no evidence 
of negligence if one practice is preferred over another 
practice and both deserve equal recognition
However, m  addressing of what constitutes an equally 
skilled practitioner acting with ordinary care, both tests 
differ The BOLAM test refers to a responsible body of 
opinion to determine whether the practice is an accepted 
practice It does not argue the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct The test 
merely asks what professions do If the defendant's conduct 
is unreasonable m  the eyes of the profession (non­
conformity with professional opinion), the defendant is 
negligent In other words, not the courts, but the 
profession sets the parameters within which the individual 
practitioner is free to exercise his skill and competence 
The DUNNE test makes a distinction between a general 
and approved practice on the one hand, and the conduct of 
the practitioner who deviates from a general and approved 
practice on the other Adherence to a general and approved 
practice is normally evidence of non-negligent behaviour 
Upon either test, the professional person has 
individual autonomy to deviate from an accepted practice 
However, this autonomy is limited, it is set within certain 
parameters, taking into account the interests of the 
profession and its development on the one hand, and the 
interests of the patient or client on the other
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The court may intervene if it concludes that a general 
and accepted practice carries an obvious inherent defect 
Here, the court retains, according to this researcher, the 
freedom to question the reasonableness or unreasonableness 
of the practice Emphasis is put on what is commonly done 
by the profession, not, as is the case m  BOLAM, whether 
the defendant's conduct conformed to professional opinion 
Professional opinion is only relevant where the defendant 
deviated from the common practice
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The Standard Examined
Chapter Five
5 . 1 .  Introduction
This Chapter addresses a number of specific attributes 
that can be inferred from the described and presumed 
standard of care m  professional negligence as represented 
m  BOLAM v FRIERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE [1957] 2
All E R 118 and DUNNE v NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL 
[1989] I R 91 This analysis consists of both Irish and 
English cases The following attributes are discussed (i) 
"obvious inherent defects", (n) errors of (clinical) 
judgment, (in) difference of professional opinion, ( i v ) 
scientific disputes and (v) consent and information 
disclosure
5 . 2 .  "Obvious Inherent Defects"1
5 . 2 . 1 .  In ROCHE v PEILOW [1985] I R 232 a solicitor
l
was held to have acted negligently in not executing a
xThe exception of "obvious inherent defects" is one of 
the distinguishing factors of the professional negligence 
test m  Ireland and England, see supra Subparagraph 4 4 3
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search in the Companies Office regarding the registration 
of a mortgage according to the requirements of section 99 
of the Companies Act 1963 The plaintiff had entered into, 
inter a h a , a building agreement unaware of this mortgage 
It appeared from the evidence that this omission was 
considered among all solicitors as a universal conveyancing 
practice m  Ireland
The High Court held that the defendants were not 
negligent because they had adhered to a universal 
conveyancing practice This practice was 'to make searches 
immediately prior to completion of a transaction only and 
that pre-contract searches were not known as a custom or 
practice m  ordinary conveyancing m  this country' 2 The 
defendants asserted that -
to hold them guilÊy of negligence m  failing to 
avail of a precaution which, though it would have 
avoided the particular loss the plaintiffs have 
suffered m  this case, was not one known as part 
of the conveyancing practice of solicitors, would 
be to apply a false standard of care and skill 
which the law requires from a solicitor m  the 
carrying out of his professional work 3
However, Finlay P argued that m  O'DONOVAN v CORK 
COUNTY COUNCIL [1967] I R  173 the above proposition was 
not without qualification In this case Walsh J stated 
that -
2 [1985] I R 232 at 242, per Finlay P
3Ibid , at 242
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[i]f there is a common practice which has 
inherent defects which ought to be obvious to any 
person giving the matter due consideration, the 
fact that it is shown to have been widely and 
generally adopted over a period of time does not 
make the practice any less negligent 4
But Finlay P , m  ROCHE, accepted an exception to this 
rule, claiming that the -
universality of a particular practice adopted by 
an entire profession must itself be evidence that 
it is not a practice which has inherent defects 
which ought to be obvious to any person giving 
the matter due consideration 5
To make such an exception valid, the emphasis must be 
put down on the universality of the particular practice 
This means that such a practice must have been accepted as 
universal by the whole body of professional or legal 
opinion Only then is the practice accepted as not carrying 
inherent defects 6
Finlay P initially accepted this exception In his 
view the universal application of a particular practice 
indicated that that practice did not carry any inherent 
defects which ought to be obvious to any person giving the 
matter due consideration The legal profession m  ROCHE 
regarded such a practice as obviously non-defective
4 [1967] I R 173 at 193
5 [1985] I R 232 at 244
6In England, m  DELANEY v SOUTHMEAD HEALTH AUTHORITY 
[1992] 26 B M L R 111, it was held that the evidence that 
the practice was universally adopted and acceptable, 
rebutted the application of the maxim res ipsa loquitur
231
The learned judge m  ROCHE did not define or describe 
what could be regarded as a general and accepted practice 
It can only be implied from the judgment of the President 
that a practice is not universal if it carried obvious 
inherent defects
The aspect of "universality" was reasserted by Finlay 
C J (by then Chief Justice) m  DUNNE v NATIONAL MATERNITY 
HOSPITAL [1989] I R 91 In this case it was reaffirmed 
that a practitioner is negligent if he followed a general 
and approved practice, which is proven to carry inherent 
defects that ought to be obvious to any person giving the 
matter due consideration Finlay C J , however, went on and 
stated that -
" [g]eneral and approved practice" need not to be 
universal but must be approved of and adhered to 
by a substantial number of reputable 
practitioners holding the relevant specialist or 
general qualifications 7
Without this reassertion, the courts would have used, 
m  the opinion of this researcher, different criteria with 
regard to "deviation from a general and approved practice" 
and a "practice carrying inherent defects" Considering the 
former it is enough that the practice is accepted by a 
responsible body of opinion for a professional not to be 
negligent In the latter the practice is assumed to be 
universally accepted
7 [1989] I R 91 at 109
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5.2.2. The decision by Finlay P m  ROCHE was reversed 
m  appeal The Supreme Court held that -
as the universal conveyancing practice relied 
upon by the defendants had inherent defects which 
ought to have been obvious to any person giving 
the matter due consideration, the defendants were 
negligent m  failing to execute a search m  the 
Companies Office 8
The reasons for this approach were outlined by, m  
particular, Walsh, Henchy and McCarthy JJ Walsh J argued 
that it cannot be true that a general practice is based on 
the fact that m  most of the cases nothing really goes 
wrong That proposition 'does not obviate the risk clearly
inherent m  such a practice' 9 The danger of such a risk
materializing does not decrease due to the fact that it was 
often undertaken, nor can it be said that m  this
particular case the consequences of such a risk being 
materialized were unforeseeable
The defendants, according to Walsh J , were therefore 
negligent m  failing to exercise the duty to advise the 
plaintiff The judge considered hereupon, inter alia, 
Finlay P 's decision m  TAYLOR v RYAN [1995] P N L R 47 
In this case the omission to make a direct inquiry
regarding the validity of a liquor licence led to damages 
It was held by Finlay P that 'such an inquiry, m  the 
particular circumstances of the case was a necessary
8 [1985] I R 232
9 Ibid , at 250, per Walsh J
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reasonable standard of professional skill and care on the 
part of the defendants' 10
Henchy J ' s reasoning m  ROCHE was based on the 
following arguments Apart from a duty to advise, a 
solicitor owes a general duty to his client He is obliged 
to show his client the degree of care which can be expected
from a reasonable careful solicitor m  the particular
circumstances of the case In most cases he fulfils this 
duty when he follows a practice common to his colleagues 
However, the learned judge stated that it cannot be said 
that a person acted reasonably if -
he automatically and mindlessly follows the 
practice of others when by taking thought he 
would have realised that the practice m  question 
was fraught with peril for his client and was 
readily avoidable or remediable 11
He must be held negligent if an alternative and safe 
procedure was open to him and the procedure which he did 
follow was not m  the interest of his client This means 
that a professional person is obliged to form his own 
opinion At all times he must make up his mind as to
whether a practice which is commonly used is a valid 
practice and consider whether there is an alternative
practice open to him which, m  his opinion, does not carry 
inherent defects This obligation follows from his status 
as a professional, enjoying individual autonomy m  the
10 [1995] P N L R 47 at 48
11 [1985] I R 232 at 254
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exercise of his functions within accepted parameters
It is suggested by this researcher that a professional 
person is not negligent if he can show that he has not 
without consideration followed an accepted or universal 
practice In doing so, he, consequently, formed his own 
professional opinion as to whether this practice carried 
any inherent defects, because this ought to be obvious to 
any person giving the matter due consideration
In other words, the emphasis must not be put on 
whether the practice carried any inherent defects Instead, 
the emphasis must be whether the professional person has 
discharged his duty to see whether a practice was 
inherently flawed
Finally, McCarthy J argued that the court should 
guard itself against being wise after the event, 
particularly m  a case of professional negligence This 
argument is based on the warning given m  KELLY v CROWLEY 
[1985] I R 212 Murphy J stated m  this case that -
[i]n all cases involving allegations of
negligence, but particularly negligence alleged 
to have been committed by experts, there is a 
danger of judging the conduct of the defendant 
with the benefit of knowledge emerging after the 
event or indeed by reference to a standard more 
theoretical than practical 12
However, according to McCarthy J , this can be avoided 
by adopting an approach that is based on the expectations 
of a client, instead of an approach that considers the
12 [1985] I R 212 at 229
235
evidence regarding the nature of the practice exercised at 
the time Based on the former approach, it is clear that a 
client would not have been satisfied with the practice 
which was adopted, although it was regarded as a general 
and approved practice The loss that has been suffered was 
foreseeable and, therefore, evidence to examine whether the 
adopted practice was inherently defective Consequently, 
according to McCarthy J , it -
cannot be a legal principle that a profession is, 
so to speak, entitled to "one free bite" - to 
wait until damage has occurred before taking an 
obvious means of avoiding such damage 13
McCarthy J applied here an approach which is "client- 
centred" and can be compared with the approach taken m  
America with regard to the "prudent patient" test 14 The 
standard must be set by law and the doctor must realize 
that the risk involved is material if the patient 'would be 
likely to attach significance to the risk7 15 One of the 
reasons given for this approach was the fact that medical 
custom is a façade for non-disclosure 16
One can also suggest that the "ordinary" negligence 
principles apply The solicitor must have known that 
through his conduct, his client would have been adversely
13 [1985] I R 232 at 263
14Cf CANTERBURY v SPENCE (1972) 464 F 2d 772
15Jjbid , at 778
16See Robertson (1981a 106)
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affected 17
learned judges all lead to the same conclusion A 
professional person is negligent when he follows a practice 
which, although universally accepted by his profession, 
carries inherent defects Those defects must be obvious 
when given the matter due consideration
From this case it follows that there is a conflict of 
interest between the attitude of the profession with regard 
to a specific practice and the attitude of the court On 
the one hand, there is the interest of the profession that 
has been given discretion by the courts as to determine a 
certain standard of competence, skill and care On the 
other hand, there is the interest of the public and the 
individual client Their rights must be safeguarded 
properly Where these interests clash, the court must 
decide as to which interest has to prevail The question 
here is whether the status of the tortfeasor gua 
professional is critical Or does the court impose 
liability irrespective of professional opinion?
A closer look at the judgments of the learned judges 
may give some indication that the court imposes liability 
regardless of professional opinion, at least with regard to 
inherently defective practices In ROCHE v PEILOW [1985] 
I R 232 the omission to execute a search m  the Companies 
Office prior to a contractual agreement was regarded as
5 2.3 The different approaches given by the three
17Cf DONOGHUE v STEVENSON [1932] A C 562
(part of) a universal practice Therefore, it was not 
considered m  the legal profession as a flaw m  the
exercise of the duties of a solicitor Accordingly, the 
practice was regarded as proper If not, 'a false standard 
of skill and care' would be required from a solicitor 18 
Finlay P m  the High Court agreed with this, stating that 
a universally accepted practice cannot carry inherent 
defects
The Supreme Court reversed this decision The learned 
judges did not approve of the opinion that the aspect of 
universality is proof that a practice does not carry
inherent defects
Walsh J appreciated that the practice followed m
ROCHE encapsulated an omission m  advising Accordingly, 
Judge Walsh emphasized the right of a client to be properly 
informed before he entered into a contract or any other 
agreement or relationship with another party Walsh J
stated -
The whole object of a search is to discover these 
matters and no solicitor can permit his client to 
purchase lands or to commit himself irrevocably 
financially m  the purchase or developments of 
lands unless he has first of all ascertained 
whether or not the land is free from 
encumbrances If it is not he must bring that 
fact to the notice of his client and allow the 
client, after proper advice, to decide whether or 
not he should take the risk of accepting the 
transaction with the risk posed by the existence 
of the encumbrance 19
18 [1985] I R 232 at 242
19Ibid , at 250-251
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The omission therefore resulted in negligence because 
the solicitor or defendant did not meet a reasonable
standard of professional skill 20
Henchy J argued m  ROCHE that the defendant should be 
held negligent because of his status as a professional 
person A person who held himself out as such was obliged 
to take on board the responsibilities to exercise that
particular skill with a certain degree of care In this, 
the professional person distinguished himself from other 
persons The professional person acquired the capacity to 
form his own professional opinion, and was obliged thereto 
He should not have, according to Henchy J , 'automatically
and mindlessly [followed] the practice of others', because 
after some deliberation 'he would have realised that the 
practice m  question was fraught with peril for his client 
and was readily avoidable or remediable' 21 In the process 
of forming his own professional opinion he would have given 
the matter due consideration and he would have discovered 
that the inherent defects were obvious and would have
adopted an alternative practice
According to McCarthy J , status or position had
nothing to do with it In his view it was the violation of 
the client's expectations which made the practice 
negligent This can be concluded from the judge's approach 
He did not take into account the evidence as regard to the 
general practice but he emphasized to what was done m  the
20Cf TAYLOR v RYAN [1995] P N L R 47
21 [1985] I R 232 at 254
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cross-examination of the expert witness McCarthy J stated 
that -
[t]his was not a consideration m  respect of the 
capacity of the builder, the quality of his 
workmanship, the efficiency or speed of 
completion, it was a consideration more 
fundamental and more akin to what one might 
expect from a solicitor m  the purchase of an 
existing house 22
Although a general and approved practice was followed 
m  this case, the court has restricted the profession's 
freedom and discretion to set a standard of care
A reason for this approach may be that m  ROCHE the 
defendant did not consider the practice as being defective 
After all, it was universally accepted and applied The 
professional person enjoys, however, a certain degree of 
autonomy within which he can deviate from or adhere to an 
accepted practice As a lawyer, he is allowed to maximize, 
within the accepted parameters, the interests of his 
client In not doing so, the defendant disregarded his 
client's interest and he waived his responsibility which 
he, as a professional, owed to his client He is said to 
provide a disinterested service and should not take into 
account his own interests m  ignoring his responsibilities 
to and denying the interests of his client
This is a case where the court, contrary to the whole 
of the legal profession, imposed liability to compensate 
for the loss suffered by the plaintiff The court did not
22Ibid , at 263
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take into account the nature and function of the legal 
profession and the position of the defendant as a 
professional person Here the law of tort accommodates a 
change by imposing liability in a different way
5.3. Errors of (Clinical) Judgment
5.3.1. In WHITEHOUSE v JORDAN [1981] 1 All E R 267,
the facts concerned a trial of forceps delivery which went 
wrong It was alleged by the mother, acting as next friend 
to the plaintiff, that the defendant had pulled too long 
and too hard on the plaintiff's head thereby causing brain 
damage She claimed damages for negligence
It was concluded from the evidence m  the High Court 
that ' the amount of force to be properly used m  a trial of 
forceps was a matter of clinical judgment' 23 Subsequently, 
the learned judge concluded from the evidence of the 
mother, the defendant and from the report of the consultant 
professor that the defendant had pulled too long and too 
hard In doing so, he had fallen below the standard of 
skill expected from the ordinary competent specialist and 
was held negligent
This decision was reversed m  the Court of Appeal 24 
It ruled that 'an inference of negligence should not 
necessarily be drawn from the fact that a baby is born with
23 [1981] 1 All E R 267 at 268
24WHITEHOUSE v JORDAN [1980] 1 All E R 650
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brain damage sustained m  the course of delivery' 25 The 
pulling of the forceps, if it was accepted that the pulling 
was too hard and too long, could only amount to an error of 
clinical judgment and therefore was not negligence m  law 
The question was, according to Donaldson L J
whether there had been any failure by the
defendant to exercise the standard of skill 
expected from the ordinary competent specialist 
having regard to the experience and expertise 
which that specialist holds himself out as
possessing 26
If he failed to exercise the skill he had or claimed 
he had, he was m  a breach of duty and therefore negligent 
However, 'if he exercised that skill to the full, but 
nevertheless takes what, m  hindsight, can be shown to be 
the wrong course, he is not negligent and is liable to
none' 27 To test whether an error of clinical judgment does
not amount to negligence is whether the average competent 
and careful practitioner would have made that sort of 
error
The plaintiff appealed to the House of Lords 28 This 
appeal was dismissed on the grounds that, although the 
inference made by the High Court from the evidence heard 
before it was of special value, the Court of Appeal was not
2SIbid , at 651
26Ibid , at 662
27 Ibid
28WHITEHOUSE v JORDAN [1981] 1 All E R 267
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precluded from drawing its own inference from the same 
evidence 29 It concluded that no justification could be 
found from the evidence that the defendant negligently 
pulled too long and too hard Therefore the Court of Appeal 
was entitled to reverse the judge's decision
More significantly, their Lordships stated that -
[t] he test whether a surgeon has been negligent 
is whether he has failed to measure up m  any 
respect, whether m  clinical judgment or 
otherwise, to the standard of the ordinary 
skilled surgeon exercising and professing to have 
that special skill of a surgeon 30
5 3 2. The House of Lords made reference to 'an error of 
judgment or otherwise' 31 It did not explain what should be 
understood as (i) "an error of clinical judgment" and (n) 
"otherwise"
It seems that an error of judgment should be 
interpreted as an error which cannot be foreseen or 
anticipated upon, whether or not it is negligent does not 
matter
When does a doctor fail to measure up otherwise? 
Obviously when the error is not an error of clinical 
judgment On the one hand, errors which do not necessarily
29According to Robertson (1981b), the Court of Appeal 
did not justify its reversal of facts made by the trial 
judge with any convincing reason This was not m  line with 
existing case law
30 [1981] 1 All E R 267 at 269
3 1  J j b i d
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have to be made with reference to the particular skill or 
knowledge, 1 e leaving foreign objects m  the patient's 
body, or neglecting to obtain relevant facts regarding the 
patient's medical history On the other hand, errors which 
are made with reference to the doctor's skill or knowledge, 
but are not clinical For example, not keeping m  touch 
with the mainstream medical journals, pigheadedly carrying 
on with some old and out of date practice, etc
It is, however, wrong to say that without any 
qualification an error of clinical judgment does not amount 
to negligence According to the affirmative decision of the 
House of Lords m  WHITEHOUSE such an error of judgment is 
only not negligent when it complies with the test as set m  
BOLAM v FRIERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE [1957] 2 All 
E R 118 the ordinary skilled doctor who acts according to 
a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of 
medical opinion Thus, m  the context of medical or 
professional negligence the phrase "error of clinical 
judgment" cannot be accepted m  that it exonerates a doctor 
or professional person from negligence just like that It 
still must stand the test of BOLAM In the opinion of this 
researcher it is the qualification of certain behaviour 
which amounts to negligence 32 The term "error of clinical 
judgment" is legally irrelevant
32The implications of this decision are set out by 
Robertson (1981b), see supra Subparagraph 2 3 4 The 
thesis cannot but agree with him that the House of Lords 
missed the opportunity to fully address what is wrong with 
medical negligence under the BOLAM test
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5.4.1. In MAYNARD v WEST MIDLANDS REGIONAL HEALTH 
AUTHORITY [1985] 1 All E R 635, the plaintiff suffered
injuries due to an exploratory operation This was 
necessary m  order to diagnose whether she suffered from 
tuberculosis, for which she was treated, or from Hodgkin's 
disease which could have been another possibility It was 
found out that she indeed suffered from tuberculosis As a 
result of the operation her speech was impaired due to 
damage to a nerve affecting her vocal cords It was said 
that such damage is an inherent risk of the operation
The plaintiff sued the defendants for negligence, 
claiming that the operation was not necessary at the time 
because the defendants did not wait for the results of the 
tuberculosis test In other words, it was alleged that this 
decision, to carry out an exploratory operation, was not 
well considered and therefore the defendants were 
negligent
With regard to the necessity of the operation there 
were two conflicting bodies of opinion One supporting the 
plaintiff that the decision was wrong The other supporting 
the decision as 'being reasonable m  the circumstances' 33
The question m  this case was, according to Lord 
Scarman, whether the defendants 'were guilty of an error of 
professional judgment of such a character as to constitute
5.4. Differences of Professional Opinion
33 [1985] 1 All E R 635
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a breach of their duty of care' 34 It would constitute such 
a breach if they failed to measure up 'to the standard of 
the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have 
that special skill' 35 This is the test as formulated by 
McNair J m  BOLAM v FRIERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
[1957] 2 All E R 118
This does not mean that only one practice may 
constitute negligence If there is a conflict of medical 
opinion resulting m  several practices available and 
applicable, which is the case m  MAYNARD, it does not 
necessarily mean that one practice is good and the other 
bad That is not a task for the court to decide Lord 
Scarman stated -
It is not enough to show that there is a body of 
competent professional opinion which considers 
that theirs was a wrong decision, if there also 
exists a body of professional opinion, equally 
competent, which supports the decision as 
reasonable m  the circumstances 36
It is not for the court to decide that the defendants 
were negligent if it preferred one opinion rather than the 
other It must be recognized that m  professions such as 
medicine the existence of differences of opinion and 
practice is common, and that 'there is seldom any one 
answer exclusive of all others to problems of professional
34Ibid , at 636
35Ibid , at 63 8 Lord Scarman citing Lord Edmund Davies
m  WHITEHOUSE v JORDAN [1981] 1 All E R 267 at 277
36 [1985] 1 All E R 635 at 638
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The decision m  MAYNARD was applied, m  England, m  
ADDERLEY V  NORTH MANCHESTER HEALTH AUTHORITY [ 1 9 9 5 ]  2 5
B M L R 42 38 In the ADDERLEY case the defendant 
psychiatrist diagnosed the plaintiff, concluding that he 
suffered from encapsulated schizophrenia As a result, the 
plaintiff claimed that he suffered from his health, and his 
well-being was undermined He sued the defendant The 
expert evidence concluded that the plaintiff did not suffer 
from schizophrenia but they stated that the plaintiff did 
have some mental disorder The diagnosis of schizophrenia 
at the time was, however, a reasonable diagnosis
The court held that the diagnosis, although it was 
wrong, was not 'an opinion that no reasonable doctor within 
their specialisation would have reached, based on the 
clinical picture presented to the psychiatrist m  1986' 39
5.4.2. In Ireland, this issue was subject to debate in,
inter alia, HEALY v NORTH WESTERN HEALTH BOARD,
Unreported, High Court, 31 January 1996, Flood J In this 
case it was claimed that the alleged negligence of the
Health Board resulted m  the suicide of the father of the
plaintiff, who was discharged after nine days from a 
psychiatric hospital, after he was administered there for
j udgment7 37
31 Ibid
38See also BOLITHO v CITY AND HACKNEY HEALTH
AUTHORITY [1992] 13 B M L R 111
39 [1992] B M L R 111
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In particular, it was claimed that the discharge 
procedure was not properly conducted This included, with 
regard to depressions, a consideration as to suicidal 
traits of the patient One of the expert witnesses 
concluded from the hospital notes that there appeared to 
have been no proper assessment of the risks prior to the 
discharge Apart from one note there was no indication that 
the staff had carried out a suicide risk assessment 
Another expert witness for the plaintiffs believed that it 
was not sufficient to only ask the patient ones about 
suicide, moreover because there were some pointers towards 
suicidal ideas
As to suicide risk assessment there were two schools 
of thought One view considered that such a procedure must 
be formal This procedure existed m  a formal, consistent 
and continuous inquiry into the mental state of the 
patient The discharge must be the result of an informed 
decision and accompanied with a summary of the assessment 
The other school of thought expressed a more informal 
approach This approach included a type of checklist, 
discussions with the nurses and Registrars and to look out 
for indicators or manifestations of suicide One witness 
here, took the view that where a patient does not bring it 
up, proper practice was to not follow it up with further 
questions This practice was said to be, contrary to the 
more formal one, commonly used m  Ireland
The test as to the standard of care m  medical
depression
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negligence cases has been set out by the Supreme Court m  
DUNNE v NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1989] I R 91 This 
test related to whether the defendant acted with ordinary 
care of an equally competent practitioner as to the 
administration of a general practice approved of by a 
substantial amount of reputable practitioners of like 
specialization An honest difference of opinion is no 
ground to establish liability
Applying the test on the circumstances of the case, 
Flood J came to the following conclusions
(I) As to the different schools of thought - the formal and 
informal discharge assessment procedures - it is not up to 
the judge to decide which one is to be preferred However, 
both schools accepted that suicidal risks are inherent to 
depression and therefore the patient should be monitored 
and prior to release the risk of suicide must be assessed 
(either formal or informal)
(II) Having accepted that the followed procedure was not 
incorrect - one could say that the learned judge did not 
consider whether this practice carried any obvious inherent 
defects - the learned judge considered whether this 
practice was carried out in a manner sufficient to relieve 
the defendant from liability Flood J held that it was 
not There was no indication that a pre-discharge 
assessment was carried out, contrary of what would have 
been good practice, and to report this assessment m  the 
clinical notes There was, therefore, no evidence that the 
patient was m  a 'state of "firm remission" Such evidence
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would other wise not lead to the suicide of the patient
(III) Hence, the defendant was negligent m  not having 
carried out an assessment and, if he had carried out an 
assessment, it would have been inadequate or inadequately 
considered
Thus, although a difference of opinion does not result 
m  negligence, the practice that was followed must, 
subsequently, be approved of by a substantial amount of 
reputable practitioners of like specialization
It could be suggested that the decision m  this case 
could open up litigation m  this particular category It 
could change, according to some, 40 clinical and medical 
legal practice m  Ireland
Flood J emphasised two aspects of medical care m  his 
judgment The defendant failed m  his duty of care First, 
by not keeping proper clinical records of the plaintiff's 
father This can only lead to a change for the better 
Second, the judge considered the practical application of 
the general and approved practice as not sufficient to meet 
the standard of care He came to this conclusion by stating 
that, m  his view, this standard was not met because the 
patient was not m  a "firm remission" Otherwise he would 
not have committed suicide Obviously, the judge had here 
the benefit of hindsight
This second aspect demands further consideration In 
effect, the judge ruled that only persons who are no longer 
suffering from the symptoms for which they were admitted
40See, inter alios, Webb (1996)
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may be discharged At least, if this is what he meant with 
"firm remission", the medical interpretation of the term 41 
It would have been suffice for the judge to conclude that, 
due to the absence of proper clinical records, it could not 
be established whether the defendant acted with reasonable 
care, and, knowing the result of the discharge, he could 
conclude that the defendant was negligent 42 But 
interpreting, as a laymen, medical terms, the judge may, m  
effect, have made a policy decision as to the care for 
psychiatric patients Furthermore, it could be argued 
whether the actual procedure was not flawed m  itself, 
having obvious inherent defects
5.5 Scientific Disputes
5.5.1. It has already been acknowledged by the courts, 
both m  England and Ireland, that an honest difference of 
opinion is not a ground to find a professional practitioner 
negligent However, m  some instances the courts are 
required to come to a solution as to the cause of the 
dispute m  order to reach a balanced decision The absence 
of any knowledge regarding the nature of the specific 
scientific dispute and not being able to rely on expert
41Ibid
42If this argument is accepted, it would imply that a 
doctor owes a duty directly towards his patient to keep 
proper clinical records He is negligent if he fails to 
discharge this duty
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evidence, which after all is a reflection of the dispute, 
requires the courts to take a different viewpoint and to 
seek an innovative and different solution
5 5.2. In BEST v WELLCOME FOUNDATION LTD [1992]
I L R M 609, the plaintiff suffered injuries - he became 
severely mentally retarded - as a result of vaccination 
against D T P  (diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis) The 
alleged negligence was, inter alia, based on the fact that 
the first defendant, Wellcome, released a batch of vaccine 
which was excessively potent and toxic The High Court held 
that Wellcome were negligent m  that release, but that 
there was no temporal link between the vaccination directed 
by the general practitioner and the onset of the symptoms 
of the plaintiff 43 The plaintiff could not discharge 
himself from the onus of proof which rested on him, the 
evidence given by the plaintiff was rejected, and the claim 
was dismissed The plaintiff appealed
The relevant questions which had to be answered by the 
Supreme Court were (i ) can the manufacturer of the vaccine 
be held negligent, (n) what is the role of the courts m  
solving scientific disputes and (in) did the injuries 
arise from the vaccination, l e was the inference drawn 
from the evidence correct?
With regard to the first question, the evidence showed 
that the vaccination with D T P  could cause, however 
remote or rare, a reaction resulting m  injuries as
43BEST V WELLCOME FOUNDATION LTD [1993] 3 I R 421
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described in this case On these grounds a manufacturer of 
such a product has, according to O'Flaherty J , a duty -
to exercise all reasonable care having regard to 
the importance of what they are doing to avoid 
exposing the recipient to undue danger or risk of 
harm from the use of their product Failure to 
meet this standard of reasonable care will 
subject the manufacturer to liability for any 
resulting injury 44
This means that, as opposed to the provisions of the 
E U directive on product liability, 45 a manufacturer is 
not automatically liable for negligence, merely because the 
injuries were proximately caused by the manufacturer's 
product At all times the manufacturer must exercise the 
proper standards of care m  the production and testing of 
his product He must, m  particular, consider 7 current 
scientific and medical knowledge and experience as well as 
his own experience concerning the propensities of the 
vaccine' 46 It is therefore not sufficient for a 
manufacturer to comply with 'mandatory or minimum 
requirements demanded by national health authorities m  the 
area m  which the vaccine was manufactured' , nor is it 
sufficient 'to rely on one particular point of view m  a 
debated question concerning the risks involved' 47 It was 
held that Wellcome was negligent because the tests were
44 [1992] I L R M 609 at 640
450 J No L210/29
46 [1992] I L R M 609 at 640, per 0'Flaherty J
47Ibid , at 626, per Finlay C J
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carried out inadequately
With regard to a "debated question", Finlay C J 
remarked that it is not the court that was able to or 
should resolve disputes among scientists regarding 
technical topics Instead, the court had to -
apply common sense and a careful understanding of 
the logic and likelihood of events to conflicting 
opinions and conflicting theories concerning a 
matter of this kind 48
A vaccination with D T P  can cause a reaction, called 
post-pertussis vaccine encephalopathy (P P V E ) which can 
produce symptoms similar to those of the plaintiff's This 
was inferred from expert evidence given to the trial judge 
However, this was not an issue Instead the issue was 
whether or not it can be established that the injuries the 
plaintiff suffered were a result of the particular 
vaccination A necessary link is a close temporal 
association between vaccination and the occurrence of the 
symptoms To establish this link one must rely on the 
evidence of the defendants and the plaintiffs The 
plaintiffs argued that the symptoms started hours after the 
vaccination, thus an indication that the reactions were 
caused by the vaccination The defendant argued that those 
symptoms were not recorded until weeks later
These records were found inadequate by the Supreme 
Court Finlay C J was therefore, as opposed to the High
48Ibid
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Court, driven to the conclusion 'that the inference made by 
the learned trial judge is not a sound inference and it is 
not one which I can draw from a perusal of the 
[evidence] ' 49
This decision is not without qualification The 
Supreme Court did not justify this position It is inferred 
from the produced antagonistic evidence In doing so, the 
court ignored the position of the defendants as being 
professional If the Supreme Court would not have departed 
from a professional centred approach, it could have come to 
the conclusion that the defendant's evidence ought to 
prevail because the professional practitioner is supposed 
to keep proper medical records 50 However, m  BEST v 
WELLCOME FOUNDATION LTD [1992] I L R M  609 it was not 
disputed whether or not the practitioner had acted 
negligently Had this been inferred, although not an issue, 
it could have given the court a valid reason to reject the 
general practitioners evidence on the grounds that he had 
violated his duty to keep proper medical records
5.5.3. The question is whether this case can be regarded 
as a professional negligence case The interpretation of 
the general practitioner's behaviour cleared the way for a 
claim for damages based on the negligence of a manufacturer
i9Ibid
50See, for example, ARMSTRONG v EASTERN HEALTH BOARD 
[1995] P N L R 291 The preparation of medical records 
benefit both the practitioner and the patient They are 
specifically prepared for this purpose and must be used in 
the ordinary course of the doctor's duties
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of pharmaceutical products, 1 e negligence based on 
product liability
Nevertheless, the role of the general practitioner 
remains important His behaviour was m  dispute, to the
extent that the courts addressed the issue as to whether
they could rely on his evidence
The case's importance from the point of view of this 
researcher, is, that it addressed the question as to what 
the role of the court is m  resolving issues of conflicting 
scientific (or even professional) disputes or "debated 
questions" Although both courts examined the batch of 
vaccine on its potency and toxicity thoroughly, the 
deciding factor m  attributing negligence was not the 
upholding of one, rather than another professional or 
scientific opinion, or both Instead, the courts reached 
their decision on what they regarded as grounds of common 
sense and understanding by holding (as a matter of 
evidence) that the particular batch was not produced and 
tested according the proper standards of care In a passage 
which has subsequently been criticised by Goldrem , 51 
Finlay C J stated -
I am satisfied that it is not possible either for
a judge of trial or for an appellate court to
take upon itself the role of a determining, 
scientific authority resolving disputes between 
distinguished scientists m  any particular line 
of technical expertise The function which a 
court can and must perform m  the trial of a case 
m  order to acquire a just result, is to apply 
common sense and a careful understanding of the
51 (1994 1415)
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logic and likelihood of events to conflicting 
opinions and conflicting theories concerning a 
matter of this kind 52
Goldrem53 described this approach as somehow 
conflicting with the approach described in BOLITHO v CITY 
OF HACKNEY HEALTH AUTHORITY (1993) 4 Med L R 381 which 
characterized the function of the judge, sitting as a jury, 
as m  part assessing the credibility of the expert witness 
qua witness, and by implication preferring the evidence of 
one rather than another where two conflict (However, it 
must be stressed that Finlay C J is contemplating 
situations where expert evidence is directly 
contradictory)
It is suggested that there is a possible misconception 
here A judge's function is to consider and evaluate expert 
evidence, as suggested m  BOLITHO But, where there is a 
genuine dispute among experts (and the dispute is not 
resolvable as an issue of evidence), then the function of 
the judge is to apply 'common sense and a careful 
understanding of the logic and likelihood of events' m  
assessing the evidence 54 In other words, where a conflict 
of evidence exists, the judge may prefer one expert to 
another, but where the dispute is not about which expert is 
to be preferred but about a conflict of theory, then the 
judge must use common sense
52 [1992] I L R M 609 at 626
53 (1994 1411)
54 [1992] I L R M 609 at 626, per Finlay C J
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The Finlay C J approach could be misstated It could 
be said that the Chief Justice was suggesting that a court, 
when faced with conflicting experts, must not arbitrate 
between them With respect, this is not so What it seems 
to this researcher is, that Finlay C J is suggesting that, 
on being faced with an irreconcilable conflict of 
professional evidence, a judge may be unable to prefer one 
expert to another and must accordingly apply his own 
techniques to the evaluation of evidence
Applying this to the issue of professional negligence 
generally, what the BEST case seems to be saying is that m  
certain cases (particularly those involving a dispute as to 
expert evidence, or about professional conduct) it is 
almost inevitable that experts disagree Two sorts of 
disagreements may be differentiated On the one hand, there 
is the situation where one "expert" may be less reliable or 
less convincing then another Clearly here the judge may 
actively prefer the better evidence On the other hand, 
there are situations where expert opinion is divided and 
the credibility of both witnesses is not really m  
question There, Finlay C J asserted that the job of the 
judge is to apply judicial techniques to discover a fair 
and just outcome
In the latter case, the "prof essionality" of the 
witnesses is only an issue insofar as the judge must 
tacitly acknowledge that m  complex scientific (or medical) 
matters experts can and do differ These differences are 
legitimate But legitimate differences of expert
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professional opinion must not inhibit a judge from reaching 
a decision, making a verdict or rewarding pecuniary 
damages Finlay C J , far from abjuring the requirement to 
make a decision, is defining and describing the decision 
making process at the limits of professional or medical 
knowledge and superimposing, as is perfectly proper, the 
requirements of justice which involve making a decision
This, m  one way sets the limit to the freedom of 
professional people to make decisions It suggests that if 
there is a genuine dispute at the professional margins, the 
law will take over and, however rough and ready this may 
seem, will apply logic and common sense
What this case therefore adds to our understanding of 
professional autonomy, is a boundary line or terminus ad 
quern, within which professional judgment is permitted and 
upheld
At this stage, the model of professional negligence 
that applies m  Ireland may be seen to have three important 
components The first is reference to a practice approved 
of by a responsible body of professional opinion The 
second is the inadmissibility of any procedure with 
inherent defects which ought to be obvious The third is 
the prerogative of the courts to apply "logic" and "common 
sense" to situations where experts of equal standing and 
acceptability disagree on a matter which is not capable of 
solution by reference to a decided body of expert opinion
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5.6. Consent and Information Disclosure
5.6.1. In WALSH v FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES [1992] I R 
496 the plaintiff underwent voluntarily a vasectomy 
operation He subsequently contracted orchelgia He sued
j
the defendants on three grounds (i ) negligence m  the 
treatment, (n) negligence, assault and battery m  failing 
to advise him regarding the consequences of the operation, 
and (in) because he had not given his consent to the third 
defendant, (the doctor who undertook the operation)
The first question which must be answered is whether 
an action could be brought m  assault or battery The 
Supreme Court ruled, contrary to the High Court, that -
[w]here the gist of the plaintiff's plea is lack 
of informed consent to a surgical procedure, then 
his action should be determined on ordinary 
negligence principles rather than assault and 
battery purporting to rest upon some vitiated 
consent 55
A reason for this was that -
a claim of assault should [ ] be confined to
cases where there is no consent to the particular 
procedure or where an apparent consent has been 
vitiated by fraud or deception 56
Thus, only a failure to obtain consent is subject to 
the principles of assault or battery Where consent has
55 [1992] I R 496 at 498
s6Ibid , at 513, per Finlay C J
been given, but is debated as to what or how it has been 
given, the rules of negligence apply
From the facts it is clear that an initial question of 
professionalism must have been introduced when the patient 
volunteered for counselling about the merits and objections 
to vasectomy From there on professional counselling shapes 
the basis of the doctor-patient relationship It is 
suggested that where this initial counselling takes place, 
at least two possibilities may be inferred First, there is 
the supposition that the doctor is informing the patient of 
the pros and cons of intervention, so that, if a medical 
accident occurs or the patient suffers complications, what 
was said at the initial counselling session will be 
relevant to defining the patient's willingness to undergo 
the defined risks The second hypothesis is that the 
doctor/counsellor is re-defming the entire basis of the 
doctor-patient relationship, not so much by consulting the 
patient about treatment options (a process to be taken for 
granted m  all but emergency dealings between patient and 
doctor) but going further, 1 e explaining to the patient 
what the patient's expectations may realistically be
It is suggested that, by implication, one of the 
reasons for MacKenzie J 's award of pecuniary damages for 
breach of the plaintiff's bodily integrity might be 
attributable to the fact that the patient, m  his 
counselling session, clearly understood not just that he 
would (if he acceded to the operation) be treated, but 
would be treated (a) in a specific way and (b) by a
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specific doctor The counsellor/doctor, in providing this 
pre-interventive counselling is thus raising the legitimate 
expectations of the patient, as well as merely running 
through the pros and cons of intervention
If this is accepted, then it can readily be understood 
that a differentiating factor between simple cases of 
negligence, on the one hand, and cases of "professional 
negligence", on the other, lies m  the extra counselling or 
advice provided m  some of the latter cases This would be 
consonant with the fact that m  most cases the opinion of 
the professional provider of services is more highly 
influential on the decision to purchase these services, 
than would be the case m  a non-professional context 
Hence, the award of damages for breach of bodily integrity 
might be attributable to the patient's reliance on the 
representations of the doctor as to how and by whom his 
bodily integrity would be violated
Of course, it may be objected that two members of the 
Supreme Court (Finlay C J , and McCarthy J ) appear to 
suggest that because the operation was under the control of 
the second named defendant, there was no basis to the claim 
that the plaintiff had not consented to the operation being 
performed by another doctor However, it should be noted 
that Finlay C J pointed out that, as a matter of evidence, 
it was not proven that the counselling session dealt with 
who precisely should perform the operation There was no 
suggestion that the counselling session could not have 
specifically addressed this issue, rather that m  this case
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the counselling session m  question did not do so
Speaking generally, it could be extrapolated from this 
case that where it is possible to elect whether to avail of 
professional services or not, a higher responsibility will 
be expected of a professional person who outlines the 
options and "counsels" a client or patient, than will be 
expected from a non-professional provider More weight is 
attached to the professional opinion This is consonant 
with common sense and everyday experience
That this is so, may be inferred from the emphasis 
placed by the Supreme Court on disclosure to all patients 
about shortcomings of the proposed treatment It is quite 
clear that there are two different views on the quantum of 
disclosure required
According to Finlay C J , a practitioner has a 'clear 
obligation' to warn against the consequences and risks of 
an operation or treatment 57 The extent of this obligation 
is likely to vary, depending on the elective nature of the 
operation concerned This elective nature may be 'implied', 
'apparent' or 'real' 58
In cases where the carrying out of a particular
surgical procedure is, as a matter of medical knowledge,
necessary to maintain the life or health of the patient, a 
limited discussion regarding the consequences may be
appropriate and proper In other cases where a particular 
procedure is not, as a matter of medical knowledge
57 [1992] I R 486 at 510
S8Ibid , at 517, per McCarthy J
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immediately necessary to maintain the life or health of the 
patient, this obligation may be more stringent and onerous 
The standard of care m  these situations is similar as to 
the standard of care exercised m  the giving of treatment, 
as laid down m  DUNNE v NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1989]
I R 91
A different opinion is given by McCarthy J In his 
view the practitioner had m  this particular case, an 
elective surgical procedure, a duty to supply the patient 
with all the material facts 'which are so obviously 
necessary to an informed choice [ ] that no reasonably
prudent doctor would fail to make it' 59 The question was 
now, which facts must be regarded as material? McCarthy J 
gave the impression that these were facts which were 
directly related to the patient's physical and mental 
health after the operation
Thus, the Supreme Court is divided not about the 
counselling issue, but about the principles which govern 
the doctor's duty regarding the quantum of disclosure The 
difference is purely one of degree
But the professional issue (in the context of the two 
judgments of Finlay C J and McCarthy J ), so to speak, is 
not about quantum of disclosure since these two Supreme 
Court judges do not materially differ The professional 
issue surely is related to the role and function of pre- 
mterventive counselling, and how this may shape and mould 
and modify the doctor patient relationship This theme
59Ibid , at 520
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shall be re-addressed m  the consideration of later cases 
Where it is suggested that a professional issue does 
come into play m  the context of consent to treatment and 
information about treatment options, is found m  the 
j udgment of McCarthy J In this j udgment a thorough
analysis was made of the options open to a responsible
treating doctor There may be some doubt as to how McCarthy 
J defined these options
This is because he appeared to differ from McMahon & 
Bmchy who summarised the options as threefold 60 They 
stated them as either (a) the BOLAM option (would generally 
accepted practice support disclosure), (b) the self-
determination requirement (the patient has "absolute 
rights") or (c) the mean approach generally accepted
practice would permit non-disclosure save where disclosure 
7 was so obviously necessary to an informed choice on the 
part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man 
would fail to make it7 61
The error (pace McMahon & Bmchy) m  their argument is 
that they misdescribe the BOLAM test The BOLAM test refers 
not to what would be supported by generally accepted 
practice, but what would be supported as reasonable by a 
responsible body of professional opinion 62 The
60 (19 9 0 2 6 8)
61[1992] I R 486 at 520, per McCarthy J
62Reference to the latter interpretation may mean that 
the fact that a practice may be inherently flawed renders 
the practitioner, performing that particular practice, 
negligent by reference to a reasonable body of opinion
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disadvantage of applying this test is that it will produce 
a solution which provides an imprimatur to practice, even 
if such practice is on the borderline of what is 
professionally acceptable, or is regarded as acceptable by 
only a minority of informed opinion
But this error has been compounded by another error 
This time, it is respectfully suggested, one made by 
McCarthy J It is impossible that solutions (b) and (c) 
could be the same This is because (b) suggests some 
absolute right, and (c) suggests some qualified right which 
may be expanded if it was "obviously necessary" It is 
illogical to suggest that an absolute right can ever be 
essentially the same as a qualified right What can happen 
is that the circumstances may suggest the application of a 
qualified right, rather than the application of an absolute 
right and to this, one would have to unhesitatingly agree 
The difference between the two is that if the doctor is 
wrong, or an error occurs, it must be clear beyond 
peradventure that exemplary damages must accrue where an 
absolute right has been infringed, on the mistaken 
assumption that the circumstances permitted this 
infringement of a right
Of course, here the dilemma of the professional 
provider of services is absolutely exposed If one adopts 
the position that there is an absolute right which cannot 
be taken away ( (b) m  McMahon and Bmchy, supra) , m  hard 
cases, the professional either sacrifices professional 
discretion, and fulfils the law, or breaks the law to
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safeguard the interests of the patient If one adopts the 
alternative approach, the professional will have maximum 
discretion to state that the circumstances were such that 
no reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make the 
(amount of) disclosure
Therefore, the judgment of McCarthy J does suggest 
that the judgment of the professional person is at least a 
matter for debate That is to say, McCarthy J suggested 
that the features which mark out the professional person's 
duty to make the requisite amount of disclosure involve (1 ) 
whether the operation is elective or not (1 1 ) the risk of 
unwanted sequelae, and ( m )  the "obviousness" of the 
decision, 1 e accepted professional practice
It is significant that the degree of disclosure which 
is required can, on the analysis of McCarthy J , never be 
reduced to some simple formula Yet on the absolutist 
approach ( (b) on the analysis of McMahon & Bmchy, supra) , 
the degree can be so reduced As a consequence, it is quite 
clear that disclosure to McCarthy J is a question of 
professional skill and judgment
The common feature between McMahon & Bmchy's approach 
and that of McCarthy J lies m  their implicit acceptance 
that, essentially, professional negligence, m  the context 
of failure to inform the patient, lies m  a judgment call 
It is submitted that this is quite different m  questions 
on "non-professional" negligence
0' Flaherty J divided the question regarding 
counselling into two parts First, which criteria should
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determine whether a duty of care exists to give warning m  
relation to a particular procedure? Second, how far must 
this duty of care reach?
The first question should, according to O'Flaherty J , 
'be resolved on the established principles of 
negligence' 63 It should not be answered according to the 
criteria regarding general and approved practice, set out 
m  DUNNE v NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1989] I R 91 A 
reason for this can be found m  the argument that general 
and approved practice does not always take into account the 
legitimate expectations of the patient, but leaves a wide 
discretion to the practitioner as to whether he should give 
a warning or not In addition, it can be argued that 
disclosure per se, is not a matter of medical judgment 
This can be justified with the answer O'Flaherty J gives 
to the second question -
where there is a question of elective surgery 
which is not essential to health or bodily well­
being, if there is a risk - however exceptional 
or remote - of grave consequence [ ] the
exercise of the duty of care owed by the 
[practitioner] requires that such possible 
consequences should be explained m  the clearest 
language to the [patient] 64
This reasoning seems to tie m  with the absolutist 
approach ( (b) the requirement of self-determination) A 
patient has an absolute right to be informed of all
63 [1992] I R 486 at 535
64 Ibid
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consequences of an elective operation The duty is based on 
established principles of negligence Once it is 
established, it is absolute and not depending on the 
discretion of the practitioner
It can be argued on which established principles this 
duty should be based, surely not the "ordinary skilled 
man" This would, as we have seen, involve a professional 
judgment It could be argued that we must refer to the 
"prudent patient" 0' Flaherty, however, did not give an 
answer He left this up to the trial judge to determine in 
each particular case
It can be said that m  this approach professional 
negligence does not lie m  a judgment call, but depends on 
whether or not the patient's absolute right on information 
has been infringed If this is the case, can it be 
distinguished from "non-professional" negligence?
5 6.2. In England "information disclosure" cases are, as 
well as cases concerning diagnosis and treatment, subject 
to the BOLAM test This observation can be inferred from 
the main line of reasoning m  SIDAWAY v BETHLEM ROYAL 
HOSPITAL GOVERNORS [1985] 1 All E R 643 However, m
SIDAWAY and other cases, for example, CHATTERTON v GERSON 
[1981] 1 All E R 257, the extent and contents of the duty 
to disclose were subject to debate and have given rise to 
fundamentally different interpretations These
interpretations vary from an unrestricted application of 
the BOLAM test to the absolutist approach, discussed m  the
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WALSH case [supra) Nevertheless, the end-result appears to 
be the acceptance of the BOLAM test The decision of the 
Court of Appeal m  GOLD v HARINGEY HEALTH AUTHORITY [1987] 
2 All E R 8 8 8, interpreted the decision m  SIDAWAY as an 
unrestricted application of the BOLAM test 65 It is argued 
that this does not justify the extensive debate m  both 
SIDAWAY and CHATTERTON, and totally disregards the 
dissenting judgment of Lord Scarman m  SIDAWAY In GOLD the 
Court of Appeal stated -
[W]here medical advice had been given by a doctor 
the standard of care required of the doctor did 
not depend on the context m  which the advice was 
given but on whether there was a substantial body 
of doctors who would have given the same 
advice 66
5 6 3. In CHATTERTON v GERSON [1981] 1 All E R 257,
the plaintiff suffered injury due to treatment for chronic 
and intractable pain, which was the result of a hernia 
operation This treatment consisted of two subsequent 
intrathecal injections, ("pain blockers") The injuries she 
obtained after the second operation were numbness m  the 
right leg and foot which impaired her mobility and loss of 
muscle power She claimed damages, alleging that (i ) the 
defendant had committed trespass, because she could not 
give an informed consent, (n) he had been negligent m  not
65See also HEATH v BERKSHIRE HEALTH AUTHORITY [1991]
8 B M L R 98
66 [1987] 2 All E R 888 at 889
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giving an explanation regarding the treatment and its 
implications, and (1 1 1) this explanation was part of his 
duty to take care 'to treat a patient with the degree of 
professional skill and care expected of a reasonably 
skilled medical practitioner' 67
Evidently, m  CHATTERTON, the action by the plaintiff 
is based on the doctor's duty to inform the patient about 
the proposed treatment and inherent risks This is
recognized by Bristow J The plaintiff claimed damages
alleging that ' [the doctor] had not given her an
explanation of the operations and their implications so 
that she could make an informed decision whether to risk 
them' 68 A medical practitioner ought to warn of what may 
happen by misfortune 69 However, Bristow J restricted this
duty to situations, only where 'there is a real risk of a
misfortune which is inherent m  the treatment or 
operation' 70
Consequently, the next question is what must be 
considered as a "real" risk? Judge Bristow's decision
implied that a risk is real when it is a foreseeable risk 
of the operation or treatment Thus, a doctor has a duty to 
explain the treatment or operation and its consequences, 
and if there are real risks of misfortune inherent m  the
67 [1981] 1 All E R 257
6 8  J j b i d
69See also STOBIE AND ANOTHER v CENTRAL BIRMINGHAM 
HEALTH AUTHORITY [1994] 22 B M L R 135 and LYBERT v
WARRINGTON HEALTH AUTHORITY [1995] 2 5 B M L R  91
70 [1981] 1 All E R 257 at 266
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treatment or operation, those risks too 71
The evidence of the case showed that the doctor 
disclosed some sort of information The operation 
intrathecal pain block injection - was described as very 
severe While there was a body of opinion which claimed 
that 'it is right to try it on patients suffering from pain 
other than that caused by terminal cancer ' , 72 there was 
another body of opinion which respected the above view but 
retains this treatment only to terminal cancer patients
The defendant, a specialist m  this area of medicine, 
stressed m  an article on the subject of pain management 
the fact that m  some cases treatment may carry the risk of 
complications and that -
advantages and disadvantages of any line of 
treatment should be put to the patient so that he 
may choose The vast majority of patients with 
severe pain are willing to risk considerable side 
effects if there is a hope of relief However, it 
is still necessary to be explicit about these 73
It was his regular practice to explain all about the
71In KITCHEN v MCMULLEN [1989] 5 B M L R 59 the
defendant omitted to provide the plaintiff with information 
with regard to inherent risks of the administration of a 
certain type of blood product These risks where expressly 
stated on the package of the blood product The plaintiff 
developed the risks described The general practice was 
said to be not to warn a patient of these risks because 
they were extremely minimal It was held that, as a general 
principle, only material risks must be disclosed In this 
case the risk was material because of the express warning 
on the product itself
72 [1981] 1 All E R 257 at 260
73Ibid , at 259
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process of the treatment and possible side effects 
numbness and possible muscle weakness There was no reason 
why he should have departed from this practice m  this 
case, although the plaintiff's recollection was otherwise 
Therefore Bristow J accepted, on the balance of 
possibilities, that the defendant had exercised his regular 
practice He explained the treatment, its consequences and 
he had warned of real risks inherent m  the operation This 
did not need to be repeated m  a follow-up operation of the 
same type However, after the follow-up operation the 
plaintiff obtained the injuries which lay at the basis of 
her claim numbness m  the right leg which impaired her 
mobility and loss of muscle power
Whether the claim was subject to the tort of battery 
or negligence depended on whether the consent was real The 
plaintiff claimed that she was not able to give a real 
consent to the treatment because the doctor did not explain 
to her the procedure and its implications Therefore, the 
'operation was m  law a trespass to her person, that is, a 
battery' 74 It would be if the consent was not real 
However, Bristow J argued that the consent was real -
In my judgment once the patient is informed m  
broad terms of the nature of the procedure which 
is intended, and gives her consent, that consent 
is real, and the cause of the action on which to 
base a claim for failure to go into risks and 
implications is negligence, not trespass 75
14Ibid , at 264
lsIbid , at 265
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Citing the Canadian authority on information 
disclosure (REIBL v HUGHES (1978) 21 Q R 2d 14), Bristow 
J stated that where a doctor had acted m  "good faith" and 
m  the interest of the patient, and he had been negligent 
m  doing so, the action of battery was inappropriate 76
It depended on the extent and amount of information 
given by the doctor whether he was negligent, whether he 
was m  breach of his duty 7 to explain what he intends to 
do, and its implications, m  the way a careful and 
responsible doctor m  similar circumstances would have 
done7 77 The learned judge did not apply the BOLAM test, 
although the evidence showed that none of the three expert 
witnesses could 7 really help over the adequacy of the 
explanation7, given by the defendant to the injured 
patient 78 Instead, Bristow J stated -
The fundamental assumption is that he knows his 
job and will do it properly But he ought to warn 
of what may happen by misfortune however well the 
operation is done, if there is a real risk of a
75In other words, trespass is not a valid remedy m  
this type of litigation because, m  the opinion of this 
researcher, there is always some sort of real consent, 
either implicit or explicit A patient is always aware, at 
least to some extent, that he shall be operated upon or
given treatment This is even more apparent m  elective
surgery A consequence of the difference between negligence 
or trespass (battery) is that with regard to the latter it 
is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that, if he was 
properly informed, he would not have undergone the 
treatment See, for example, COBBS v GRANT (1972) 8 Cal 
3d 229, 104 Cal Rprt 505
77 [1981] 1 All E R 257 at 265
1QIbid , at 266
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Accordingly, he must 7 take into account the 
personality of the patient, the likelihood of the 
misfortune, and what in the way of warning is for the 
particular patient's welfare' 80
The defendant m  this case was not held negligent He
did not violate his duty, and the risks that materialized - 
loss of sensation and control of the right leg and foot - 
were not foreseeable -
The condition of her leg and foot was not a 
possibility inherent m  the operation of which 
[the defendant] should have warned her 
Accordingly the claim of negligence fails 81
The BOLAM test was not applied Instead, the judge 
asked what the doctor ought to have done, by taking into 
account the interests of the patient and his welfare 
Whereas the BOLAM test reflects a "professional-centred" 
approach, Bristow J applied a "client-centred" approach
One of the reasons for this may be that the learned
judge is of the opinion that m  cases where disclosure of
information is involved, it is not a special skill or
knowledge that underlays the amount of disclosure
misfortune inherent m  the procedure 79
19 Ibid 
B0Ibid
8 1  J j b i d
5.6.4. In SIDAWAY v BETHLEM ROYAL HOSPITAL GOVERNORS 
[1985] 1 All E R 643 the plaintiff suffered injuries due
to an operation which was performed with due care and skill 
by the defendant, a neuro-surgeon However, she claimed 
that the doctor was m  breach of his duty of care m  not 
warning her prior to the operation against all the possible 
risks This had caused her to fail to give an "informed 
consent" to the operation The trial judge dismissed the 
claim The Court of Appeal upheld his decision, stating 
that under English law the doctrine of informed consent is 
not based on full disclosure of all the facts to the 
patient The plaintiff appealed to the House of Lords
The question m  this case was threefold and related to 
(i ) the right of the patient to be informed of inherent 
risks by her doctor, (n) the amount of disclosure a doctor 
ought to give to his patient prior to the treatment to 
enable his patient to come to a balanced decision (must 
there be full disclosure or does the doctor have a 
discretion?) and ( m )  what should be the criterion to 
judge whether the disclosed amount suffices the right of 
the patient
In answering the third question all their Lordships 
but one (Lord Scarman) considered that a doctor's duty to 
warn or inform the patient of inherent risks, must be 
tested along the same lines as to his duty regarding 
diagnosis and treatment is tested, BOLAM applied a doctor 
is required to 'act m  accordance with a practice accepted 
at the time as proper by a responsible body of medical
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opinion7 82
Lord Diplock could not find a reason to substitute the 
rule, as it was laid down by McNair J m  BOLAM v FRIERN 
HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE [1957] 2 All E R 118, for a 
new and different rule for that part governing a doctor's 
duty to advise and warn the patient of risks His Lordship 
concluded -
To decide what risks to existence of which a 
patient should be voluntarily warned and the 
terms m  which such warning may have, is as much 
an exercise of professional skill and judgment as 
any other part of the doctor's comprehensive duty 
of care to the individual patient, and expert 
medical evidence on this matter should be treated 
m  just the same way The Bolam [sic] test should 
be applied 83
However, Lord Scarman was of the opinion that the 
failure to warn or give advice should not be tested 
according to the BOLAM test Reference to the current state 
of responsible and competent professional opinion and 
practice should not be the exclusive reference It is a 
consideration the court may take into account Instead, 
according to Lord Scarman, the failure should be tested 
referring to -
whether a doctor m  advising his patient gave the 
consideration which the law requires him to give 
to the right of the patient to make up her own 
mind m  the light of the relevant information 
whether or not she will accept the treatment
82 [1985] 1 All E R 643
82Ibid , at 659 (Lord Diplock7s italics)
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which he proposes 84
The reason for this was that his Lordship did not 
agree with the fact that medical opinion is to judge 
whether a doctor has a duty to inform his patient of 
inherent risks and the scope of that duty The implication 
is that ' [i]t leaves the determination of a legal duty to 
the judgments of doctors' 85 He stated that -
[i]t would be a strange conclusion if the courts 
should be let to conclude that our law, which 
undoubtedly recognises a right m  the patient to 
decide whether he will accept or rej ect the 
treatment proposed, should permit the doctors to 
determine whether and m  what circumstances a 
duty arises requiring the doctor to warn his 
patient of the risks inherent m  the treatment 
which he proposes 86
A clear distinction can be made between the two 
judicial opinions The former is primarily based on a 
"professional-centred" model, qualified by some exceptions 
m  certain circumstances, which are explained later The 
latter, however, departs from this model and exercises a 
"client-centred" approach, containing the two main 
arguments that (i ) a client has the right to determine for 
herself whether or not to undergo treatment, and (n) 
medical opinion as to what is best for the patient must be
84Ibid , at 645
65Ibid , at 649
*èIbid
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limited m  favour of this right 87
This does not mean that the patient has a right to 
have all risks disclosed, or the doctor a duty to reveal 
all risks A risk should be disclosed, according to Lord 
Scarman , 'when a reasonable person, m  what the physician 
knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be 
likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of 
risks m  deciding whether or not to forego the proposed 
therapy' 88 Here, Lord Scarman relied on the so-called 
"prudent-patient" test developed m  America m  CANTERBURY 
v SPENCE (1972) 464 F 2d 772
The doctor, however, has, according to Lord Scarman, 
a 'therapeutic privilege', implying that a 'doctor should 
have the opportunity of proving that he reasonably believed 
that disclosure of the risk would be damaging to his 
patient or contrary to his best interest' 89
The majority of the House of Lords relied on the BOLAM 
test and agreed that the amount or extent of disclosure is 
one of clinical judgment However, m  certain situations 
their Lordships acknowledged that the test can be modified
87Accordmg to Kennedy (1988) , the j udgment of Lord 
Scarman m  SIDAWAY should not be regarded as a dissenting 
judgment He rather took two steps forward First, he 
emphasized the patient's right from which the doctor's duty 
to inform arises and he agrees here with Lords Bridge and 
Templeman Second, he goes further and regards this right 
as "overriding", the determination of disclosure cannot be 
left m  the hands of the medical profession but must be m  
the hands of the courts, see supra Subparagraph 2 3 7
88 [1985] 1 All E R 643 at 653 (Lord Scarman's
italics)
89Ibid , at 654
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First, their Lordships considered that where a patient asks 
specific questions regarding the risks involved m  the 
proposed treatment and he is of sound mind, a doctor must 
answer truthfully and as thoroughly the patient requires
Second, m  the absence of specific questions, Lord 
Bridge accepted that certain circumstances demand something 
else than clinical judgment First, the disclosure of a 
particular risk may 'be so obviously necessary to an 
informed choice on the part of the patient that no 
reasonably prudent doctor would fail to disclose that 
risk' 90 Second, Lord Templeman held that the duty to 
inform included the requirement to inform the patient of 
'danger which by its nature or magnitude or for some other 
reason requires to be separately taken into account by the 
patient m  order to reach a balanced judgment' 91 However, 
this duty must be used m  the best interest of the patient 
and it remains at the discretion of the doctor to decide 
what information he thinks should be disclosed and the 
terms of disclosure
The cynic would argue that the consequences of the two 
tests would not materially differ The exception of 
"therapeutic privilege" may largely nullify the 
justification that the patient has a fundamental right to 
be informed and can be regarded as a BOLAM test m  
disguise Again, an absolute right cannot be the same as a 
qualified right Many other writers conclude that the
90Ibid , at 663, per Lord Bridge
91 JJbid , at 664
280
English approach sanctions medical paternalism 92
However, on the other hand, it can be argued - by the 
realist - that the English courts slowly begin to recognize 
that clinical judgment cannot be conclusive when it comes 
to the imposition of liability The "professional-centred" 
approach can be described as 'out-moded' 93 Not only 
because medical science has become more sophisticated and 
complicated, other reasons may justify this recognition 
For example, the increasing awareness of consumer rights 
which has already been recognized m  areas such as product 
liability In this approach medical services must, 
accordingly, be regarded as a consumer product, defined and 
determined by the market, whether or not this market is 
private or publicly controlled, and may lead to a change m  
the professional-client relationship, deviating from a 
collegiate model
5.6.5. The discussion m  SIDAWAY evolved around the 
recognition of a patient's right to be informed 
Constitutionally, this can be expressed m  terms of the 
right to autonomy and self-determination This ideology is, 
m  America, reflected m  the doctrine of "informed 
consent", according to Robertson (1981a) In broad terms 
the doctrine requires a doctor to -
92See, inter alios, Teff (1985), supra Subparagraph
2 3 6
93See Harris (1992), supra Subparagraph 2 3 6
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give his patient sufficient information about 
proposed treatment so as to provide him with the 
opportunity of asking an "informed" or "rational” 
choice as to whether to undergo the treatment 94
It is a legal concept It imposes on the doctor a duty 
to inform the patient about the nature of the treatment, 
its consequences and inherent risks of the treatment The 
fundamental question is how much and who determines the 
amount which ought to be disclosed?
Two tests apply The first leaves it up to the doctor 
The disclosure remains a matter of medical judgment 
determined by the evidence of medical experts m  relation 
to normal medical practice 95 The second test was developed 
m  CANTERBURY v SPENCE (1972) 464 F 2d 772 In this case 
the amount of disclosure was determined by reference to the 
"prudent patient" The standard was set by law and the 
amount which ought to be disclosed depended on the 
materiality of the risk The risk is material or real -
when a reasonable person m  what the physician 
knows or should know to be the patient's 
position, would be likely to attach significance 
to the risk or cluster of risks m  determining 
whether or not to forego the proposed therapy 96
Three reasons were given to justify this departure
94Cf NATANSON v KLINE (1960) 186 Kan 393 at 410,
350 P 2d 1093 at 1106
95 Ibid See also SALGO v LELAND STANFORD JR 
UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES (1957) 154 Cal App 2d 560, 
317 P 2d 170
96 (1972) 464 F 2d 772 at 787
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from the medical judgment test, according to Robertson 97 
First, the acknowledgement of the patient's right to self- 
determination Second, medical custom could appear to be a 
façade for non-disclosure This could indicate a sceptical 
attitude to the value of the self-disciplined and self- 
regulatory aspects of the medical profession Third, the 
determination of what is material is possible without 
having special knowledge (when the test is taken from the 
patient's perception and expectation)
As a consequence, the concept of professional 
negligence, as being based on a special skill where damage 
occurs as a result of the insufficient disclosure of 
information, can no longer be maintained Negligence m  
these situations can now be determined on the normal 
principles of negligence proximity and foreseeability of 
damage In CANTERBURY two steps were needed
(I) Was there a duty to inform? This can be determined 
using a medical standard However, what should have been 
disclosed is answered by referring to the "prudent 
patient"
(II) What could reasonably be foreseen (a) what would 
damage the patient or (b) what would the patient be 
expected to be informed of? This is the "prudent-patient" 
test 98
97 (1981a 106)
98However, the "prudent patient" test is rendered 
invalid due to the doctor's "therapeutic privilege" 
Consequently, that what must be foreseen, remains a matter 
of medical judgment, taking into account the best interest 
of the patient, see Robertson (1981a 106)
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The CANTERBURY case was recently affirmed by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court In LARGEY v ROTHMAN (1988) 110 N J 
204, 540 A 2d 504 it held that the disclosure of
information must be based on the individual patient and 
should not be subject to 'the whim of the medical 
community' 99 In addition, it stated that medical opinion 
would have effect if only medical factors had to be 
considered However, other factors, such as the emotional 
and psychological condition of the patient must play a role 
m  the determination of the scope of disclosure Finally, 
the doctor's discretion m  establishing the scope of 
disclosure must yield for the patient's exclusive right of 
self-determination and autonomy This right does often 
challenges the medical profession's 'anachronistic 
paternalism' 100
The function of the doctrine is two-fold and derived, 
as has been shown, from the premise that the patient has a 
right to self-determination (i) to promote individual 
autonomy and (n) to encourage individual decision 
making 101
Thus, it reflects the ideal that the decision to 
undergo medical treatment is foremostly the patient's 102 
The patient should be informed or advised properly to
"(1988) 110 N J 204 at 212-213
100Jjbid , at 214
101See Robertson (1981a 108-109)
102Exceptions could be made in emergency or life-saving 
treatment
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provide him with an opportunity to come to a decision m  a 
ratlonal manner
However, realists see the function of the doctrine 
differently and argue that the doctrine's true function is 
to expand liability to victims of "medical accidents" 103 
This realistic or sceptic view may have derived from the
idea that the imposition of liability depends on risk
assessment, it being a simple abstraction the cost-benefit 
analysis 104
In doing so, the court places emphasis on the costs of 
eliminating the risks of injury The balance between risks 
and costs to avoid or decrease risks, tips to the former 
when the costs are unreasonable high to avoid a small 
risk 105 However, where the risk of injury appears to be 
substantially more, the analysis looses its value 106
Whether this is true m  England remains to be seen
Lord Denning said m  HUCKS v COLE (The Times, 9th May
196 8) that a doctor cannot be held negligent simply because 
something goes wrong Thus, under a no-fault system, as in
103See, inter alios, Meisel (1977 51)
104It is based on the idea, according to Harris (1980 
42) , that man 'is a rational maximizer of his 
satisfactions' In this analysis, economic factors form the 
basis of the assessment of negligent behaviour One is 
negligent if 'the loss caused by the accident, multiplied 
by the probability of the accident's occurring exceeds the 
burden of the precautions that the defendant might have 
taken to advert it', (according to Learned Hand m  UNITED 
STATES v CARROLL TOWING COMPANY (1947) 159 F 2d 169)
105Cf CALLAGHAN v KILLARNEY RACE CO LTD [1958] I R
106Cf MORRIS v LUTON CORPORATION [1946] 1 All E R
366
1
285
England and Ireland, a large number of patients are 
necessarily deprived of compensation
It can be said that one other purpose of the 
CANTERBURY case was to relieve the plaintiff's burden of 
establishing negligence by medical evidence alone The 
judicial emphasis prior to it lay on the doctor's duty to 
disclose information without making any reference to the 
patient's understanding of such information So much for 
self-determination and individual autonomy In other words, 
now the courts can vindicate to impose liability m  the 
event of loss occurring without actual fault or negligent 
behaviour of the doctor m  the actual administration of the 
treatment, the prudent patient is provided with a remedy to 
have his losses compensated
The question of patients' comprehension is overlooked 
It is m  America, according to Robertson, merely a 'legal 
mechanism to expand the liability of the medical profession 
m  order to compensate a greater number of victims of 
medical accidents' 107
The scope of the doctrine is m  England and Ireland 
still restricted This was recently reaffirmed m  Ireland 
m  FARRELL v VARIAN, Unreported, High Court, 19 September 
1994 In this case, Judge 0'Hanlon relied on the majority 
decision m  SIDAWAY The plaintiff m  FARRELL suffered from 
contraction m  his left hand for which he was successfully 
operated However, the symptoms returned some time later 
and had spread to his right hand as well He was operated
107 (1981a 112)
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again on his left hand This was unsuccessful and a remote 
risk developed Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy Syndrome 
(R S D Syndrome) This is a rare phenomenon which cause is 
not yet known The patient argued that he should have been 
informed about it because if he had known of it he would 
not have undergone the second operation This was rejected 
by O'Hanlon J The defendant had informed the plaintiff 
properly about the nature of the operation and ailment The 
omission not to warn a patient about the R S D Syndrome 
was accepted as a general and approved practice 0 'Hanlon 
J said that this was a matter of clinical judgment, to be 
made m  the best interest of the patient Relying on the 
decision m  SIDAWAY the judge said that this warning was 
not 'obviously necessary to make an informed choice on the 
part of the patient' 108 He concluded that 'the standard
twarning given by the [d]efendant [ ] was adequate m  all
the circumstances' 109
Thus, it is accepted that the patient has some sort of 
right to be properly informed, but the determination of 
disclosure remains, according to a majority of the cases, 
a matter of medical judgment This approach is based on a 
number of reasons 110 These are
(I) The judicial policy m  England is against expansion of
108Unreported, High Court, 19 September 1994, at page 
51 of 0'Hanlon J 's judgment
109Ibid , at 51-52
110Robertson (1981a 125-126)
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medical liability 111
(II) The fear of defensive medicine, linked with the fear 
of an increase m  medical litigation, impedes the 
introduction of the doctrine
(III) The disclosure of inherent real risks is seen as a 
part of the overall (medical) duty of care and m  that way 
restricts the development of the doctrine
(IV) The influence of expert evidence denies the 
reasonableness of disclosure
(V) A strict application of the causation rules will create 
difficulties of proof for plaintiffs m  informed consent 
litigation
The last reason has been exemplified m  the decision 
m  KITCHEN v MCMULLEN [1989] 5 B M L R 59 The test of
consent m  England is two-folded It is important to first 
establish whether a risk needs to be disclosed, before it 
could be considered whether a reasonable person would have 
consented to the treatment if he was properly informed In 
the circumstances of the case, the risk should have been 
disclosed However, the plaintiff's action failed because 
he could not prove that, if the risk was disclosed, he 
would not have undergone the treatment
li:LThis has been made clear in decisions like WHITEHOUSE 
v JORDAN [1980] 1 All E R  650 and SIDAWAY v BETHLEM
ROYAL HOSPITAL GOVERNORS [1985] 1 All E R 643
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Specific Attributes of the Standard of 
Care of Solicitors
6.1. Introduction
The standard of care of solicitors m  Ireland demands 
special consideration One of the reasons for this, is that 
unlike the position with regard to medical law judges are 
scarcely to be considered as lay persons when it comes to 
the assessment of lawyerly conduct This is particularly 
clear, at least m  Ireland, with regard to the exception of 
"obvious inherent defects" Although specialist areas 
exist, the judges are regarded as well capable to form an 
opinion with regard to the standard of care and to consider 
the reasonableness of the solicitor's conduct
In Ireland the standard of care for solicitors is m  
most cases similar to the standard of care expected from 
medical practitioners This has been made clear m  HANAFIN 
v GAYNOR [1995] P N L R 278 In this case the defendant 
solicitor acted for the plaintiff with respect to a 
property transaction The plaintiff claimed that his 
solicitor did not properly investigate the title to the 
property with regard to planning permission and had advised
Chapter Six
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him inadequately, resulting m  loss for the plaintiff
Egan J dismissed the claim He held that the 
principles laid out m  DUNNE v NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL 
[1989] I R 91 also applied to the alleged negligence of a 
solicitor The question was whether the solicitor followed 
a general and approved practice, without any obvious 
inherent defects On the evidence, he concluded that the 
solicitor was not guilty of such a failure as no equally 
competent solicitor would have been guilty of, if acting 
with ordinary care Proper requisitions on title were 
carried out and searches were undertaken 1
The specific attributes this Chapter examines are (i ) 
advice, (n) representation and instructions to counsel and 
(in) information and enquiries
6 2. Advice
6 2 1. This section illustrates that a solicitor has a 
duty to advise his client with regard to the subject matter 
for which he represents his client Some have debated 
whether it would be feasible to draw a comparison with the
1In England, Oliver J , m  MIDLAND BANK TRUST CO LTD 
v HETT STUBB & KEMP [1972] Ch 384 at 403-403, pointed out 
that the standard of care of solicitors was 7what the 
reasonably competent practitioner would do having regard to 
the standards normally adopted m  his profession' This 
standard is determined by reference to the other members of 
the relevant profession, see Jackson & Powell (1992 39)
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solicitor's duty to advise and the doctor's duty to 
inform 2 After all, as Kennedy points out, advice and 
information is to a solicitor what treatment and diagnosis 
is to a medical practitioner 3 It remains to be seen 
whether this is practical
In this context it may be debated what exactly is the 
nature of the duty to advise and its extent, m  the context 
of the discretionary powers of the solicitor and the 
autonomous nature of his position
6.2.2. In PARK HALL SCHOOL LTD v OVEREND AND OTHERS 
[1987] I L R M 345 the plaintiff offered certain lands for 
sale When a buyer was found, the negotiations commenced 
and a contract was drawn up but not signed by the purchaser 
m  the specified time The plaintiff therefore withdrew the 
offer and put the lands on the market again
The original purchaser anticipated this by bringing an 
action for specific performance of an oral agreement to 
sell him the lands This resulted m  a finding by the High 
Court (and upheld by the Supreme Court m  KELLY v PARK 
HALL SCHOOL LTD [1979] I R 340) that a valid contract was 
made A letter, confirming the terms for the sale to the 
first purchaser and written by the plaintiff's auctioneer 
to one of the plaintiff's advisers, constituted a 
sufficient note or memorandum of the agreement to sell for
2See, inter alios, Munneke & Loscalzo (1989), supra
Subparagraph 2 4 2
3 (1988)
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the purpose of the Statute of Frauds (Ireland) Act, 1695, 
despite the letter stating that the terms had been agreed 
"subject to contract" This was held to postpone 
contractual liability
The plaintiff, however, accepted during this process - 
believing that the purchaser's action would fail - the 
highest tender for the lands Unable to show good title to 
the new purchaser, this new purchaser brought an action for 
damages against the plaintiff
The plaintiff argued that its solicitors (the 
defendants) were negligent on two accounts First, they had 
failed to advise the plaintiff that a valid contract 
existed with the first purchaser Second, that its 
solicitors had allowed the plaintiff to enter into a 
contract with another purchaser before the determination of 
the action for specific performance of the first contract 
It was held m  the High Court that -
(1) The defendants were under no obligation to 
bring to the notice of the plaintiff the mere 
possibility that the purchaser might assert the 
existence of contractual rights, until some hint 
emerged that he intended to do so
(2) Once the action for specific performance had 
been initiated, the defendants had acted as 
prudent solicitors should do m  such a situation, 
by seeking the advice of counsel, and acting upon 
it at every successive stage of the proceedings 4
According to McMahon & Binchy a solicitor may be held
4 [1987] I L R M 345 at 346, per O'Hanlon J
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negligent m  failing to give advice 5 This depends mainly 
on the relevance and urgency of the neglected advice 6 In 
PARK HALL SCHOOL, however, O'Hanlon J decided, taking into 
account the difficult state of the law as to offer and 
acceptance, especially with regard to the phrase "subject 
to contract", that the defendants had not failed to give 
advice Instead, there was no obligation to inform the 
plaintiff The defendants had taken the right course of 
action, they followed the proper procedure
An important matter is the manner m  which the 
defendants applied the law as it was at the time when the 
contractual arrangements were made Did the defendants 
apply the correct procedure or did they make a signal 
omission?
It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the validity of 
the above contract as it stood at the time of the judgment 
(1983) On the basis of this discussion it may implicitly 
be concluded whether or not the defendants, m  not 
informing the plaintiff that a doubtful situation existed, 
followed a general and approved practice, and if so, 
whether or not the defendants properly formed their own 
opinion as to whether or not this practice carried inherent 
defects
First, one must ask the following question did the 
defendants realize that, when they came across the letter, 
sent by the plaintiff's auctioneer to the plaintiff's
5 (1990 277-278)
6Cf LAKE V BUSHBY [1949] 2 All E R 964
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adviser, their client was contractually bound to the first 
purchaser before the execution of the contract? In this 
letter the auctioneer confirmed that he had agreed the 
terms, subnect to contract, for the sale of the lands
The state of the law at that time m  England showed, 
according to Clark, that -
if a document contains the hallowed phrase, 
"subject to contract" that document cannot
constitute a memorandum because the memorandum
must acknowledge that an oral contract exists 7
Or, according to Lord Denning m  TIVERTON ESTATES LTD 
v WEARWELL [1975] Ch 146 -
The effect of the words "subject to contract" is 
that the matter remains m  negotiation until a 
formal contract is executed
The cases m  Ireland, however, indicate a different
approach to the "subject to contract" formula In
0'FLAHERTY v ARVAN PROPERTY, Unreported, High Court, 3 
March 1976, McWilliam J , it was decided that the vendor 
can introduce parol evidence to show that an oral agreement 
was reached The letter containing the phrase "subject to 
contract" will not be allowed to operate because it was 
added after the oral agreement had been struck
A second distinction is found m  another Irish 
authority, according to Clark, expressing the view that
7 (1982 45)
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' the phrase "sub]ect to contract" may be ignored if it, 
within the context of the contract m  question, is a 
meaningless phrase' 8 9
This clearly shows that the phrase "sub]ect to 
contract" might have been interpreted m  two antithetical 
ways It may be inferred that whatever else the solicitors 
could have assumed, they should have been aware that 
uncertainty existed m  this area
6 2,3 A surprising omission m  the judgment m  PARK
HALL SCHOOL LTD v OVEREND AND OTHERS [1987] I L R M  345 
was any clear indication as to the degree of information 
and participation that should be accorded to the client as 
soon as a potential difficulty arose
Did the defendants apply the correct procedure, 
anticipating English and Irish law, to assume that no 
binding contract had yet been concluded and proceed to send 
on a draft contract to the first purchaser? According to 
O'Hanlon J they did and when the unsigned contract was 
subsequently sent back the defendants owed a duty to their 
client (the plaintiff) to ask themselves was it or was it
8 (1992 33)
9 In KELLY v PARK HALL SCHOOL (1979] I R 340, the 
case where the first purchaser put an action against the 
plaintiff m  this case for specific performance, the 
Supreme Court were 'prepared to scrutinise the negotiations 
to see if all the terms have been settled and, if so, 
"subject to contract" added m  any letter will be treated 
as if it were an ambiguous or meaningless phrase', (Clark, 
1992 33) According to Clark (supra) the decision m  this
case is controversial and may stand on its own particular 
facts
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not safe to proceed (to put the lands back on the market 
again)9 In doing so, the defendants had the opportunity to 
form their own professional opinion They came to the
conclusion that, m  their view, it was safe to proceed 
This was based on the fact that there was no indication 
that the first purchaser had the intention to pursue the 
matter any further The defendants did not have an 
obligation at this stage to notify their client of the mere 
possibility of such a claim Therefore, O'Hanlon J was 
prepared to hold that -
the defendants had conducted the plaintiff's 
affairs as a prudent solicitor would have done, 
had he been equipped with that knowledge of the 
law which I consider an experienced conveyancing 
solicitor should have had at the time 10
The property was put back for sale again and a tender 
was accepted by the plaintiff During this process the 
solicitors of the first purchaser had contacted the 
defendants without referring to a possibility of a claim 
The defendants were lulled into a false sense of security, 
until the possibility of a claim became reality with the 
issue of a plenary summons
According to O'Hanlon J , the only possibility open to 
the defendants was 'to consult counsel as to the steps 
which should be taken as a matter of urgency to protect 
their client's interest' 11 This they did and for this
10 [1987] I L R M 345 at 355
lxIbid , at 356
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reason it was asserted that they took the course of a 
prudent solicitor, acting m  similar circumstances
6.2.4. Having reviewed this case step by step and having
discussed the difficult state of the law, can it now be
concluded that the defendants took at both stages a proper
course of action9
On the one hand, at each stage they considered their 
client's interest and, more importantly, they formed their 
own opinion as professionals with regard to what steps they 
should undertake Having acted as prudent solicitors, they 
followed a general and approved practice
On the other hand, is it possible to argue that the 
solicitors were perhaps cavalier m  failing to inform their 
client that the state of the law was difficult and that it 
might have been unsafe to offer the lands for re-sale, 
until assurances were received from the initial purchaser 
Surely, it behoved the solicitors to explain to their 
clients the potential liability at a stage prior to the 
issuing of proceedings
This has general implications If a procedure is 
potentially inherently flawed (whether by uncertainty m  
the law or something more) it surely should not be adopted 
without at least some consultation with the client, without 
transgressing the requirements set out m  ROCHE v PEILOW 
[1985] I R 232 For the court to find that a sale to A, 
and a re-sale to B did not pose any questions to the mind 
of experienced conveyancing solicitors until after
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proceedings were initiated, is surely rather hard to 
credit
Hence, where the law is uncertain, a solicitor may 
safely assume that current practice may be followed, even 
if at a later stage the presumptions inherent m  current 
practice are incorrect 12 What is surprising is, that m  
medical law it may be assumed that practice does change and 
any indiciae that a current practice is unsatisfactory 
should, all things being equal, be communicated to the 
patient so that he may, within his intellectual and 
emotional limits, make up his own mind
O'Hanlon J does not go into this, but at all stages 
the learned judge took into consideration the professional 
status of the defendants and expressed the opinion that the 
defendants acted as prudent solicitors From this it 
follows that the defendants exercised their duties 
according to a general and approved practice, not by 
mindlessly following a certain practice, but considering 
their client's interests and forming their own professional 
opinion
In the opinion of this researcher, two alternative
12However, a solicitor is obliged to anticipate on a 
clear change m  the law, for example, the enactment of a 
new Statute See MCMULLEN v FARRELL & PARTNERS AND OTHERS 
[1992] I L R M 776
In this case the plaintiff claimed that the defendants 
were negligent m  failing to advise him that he had a 
statutory right (to compel a change of user of lands) under 
the enactment of a new and relevant act It was held by 
Barron J that as to advice on pending legislation, a 
solicitor must, inter alia, consider the relevance of the 
new legislation and the likely date of enactment If prior 
to it, the solicitor had advised his client differently, he 
must correct this as soon as possible
298
conclusions result By strictly following the O'Hanlon J 
decision, one could state that the practice adopted by A 
& L Goodbody was held not to have carried any inherent 
defects, obvious to any person giving the matter due 
consideration This conclusion is supported by following 
the line of thought of McMahon & Binchy the defendants 
were not negligent m  the failure to give advice, because 
this advice was not urgent or relevant 13 In support of 
this, it is only necessary to refer to O'Hanlon J 's 
assertion that 'up to the stage the matter had reached as 
of March 1978, [he was] prepared to hold that the 
defendants had conducted the plaintiff's affairs as a 
prudent solicitor would have done' 14
But, considering the decision m  the context of 
medical law cases, it must be argued that (i) the
consultation with counsel took place at a late stage, (n) 
the plaintiff was not informed about the possible choices 
open to him prior to the commencement of litigation and 
(in) therefore, whilst the solicitors might not have been 
stncto sensu negligent, they surely, to adopt McCarthy
J 's language m  a later case,15 contravened one of the 
expectations of the plaintiff that m  any routine
conveyancing procedure, where a possible ambiguity of
interpretation or an accepted conveyancing technique throws
13 (1990 277-278)
14 [1987] I L R M 345 at 355
15See WALSH v NATIONAL MATERNITY HOSPITAL [1992] 1
I R 486
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up a possibility of financial loss, at least the client 
must be apprised of the difficulty and some input requested 
from him
This case highlights another difference between Irish 
medical negligence cases and legal and other negligence 
cases In the former, consent is critical and m  turn, 
information and instruction is vital to the existence of 
consent But, m  the PARK HALL SCHOOL case there is 
virtually no mention of the requirement that a professional 
person should inform the client of the nature of the 
transaction and any inherent flaws therein This is 
virtually inexplicable It suggests that one of the 
ingredients of professionalism is absent m  the solicitor- 
client relationship the necessity to keep the client 
informed of possible ambiguities m  the practice of 
conveyancing, even where such ambiguities are the result of 
disharmony m  the case-law
In case it might be suggested that the researcher is 
being wise after the event, it should be stressed that the 
judgment itself provided ample evidence of the fluctuating 
state of the law O'Hanlon J described the process as 
'fraught with uncertainty7 16
The proposition to be derived from this case, then, 
must run as follows a solicitor will not be held negligent 
for adopting a particular course where this course proves 
harmful to his client, even where the position is fraught 
with uncertainty and his client has not been afforded the
16 [1987] I L R M 345 at 353
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opportunity to consider the uncertainties and determine 
with his solicitor what course should be adopted This is 
truly astonishing and surely should not be accepted as good 
law m  the professional (or indeed m  any other) context
6.2.5. In other cases, a parallel can be drawn with 
medical negligence cases also The solicitor is under a 
duty to provide information, as well as advise his client, 
so that she can come to a correct decision
In WARD v LANE [1995] P N L R 11 the plaintiff 
sought to secure a premises with living accommodation to 
run it as an antique shop To this, she agreed with an 
occupying tenant to purchase his interest However, the 
defendant solicitor omitted to furnish any requisitions on 
title prior to the sale of the interest He had not 
obtained consent of the landlord, who objected to the 
change of lease also, restricting it solely to a grocery 
business Subsequently, the landlord got an order for 
possession which was affirmed on appeal It also ordered 
the plaintiff to pay the costs of the appeal The plaintiff 
sought damages for negligence
The solicitor m  this case failed to provide 
information He failed to furnish requisitions on title and 
failed to inform the plaintiff that, until permission was 
obtained, she could not conduct any business other than 
grocery In doing so, the solicitor concealed from the 
plaintiff that she was m  breach of the conditions attached 
to the purchase agreement and, subsequently, left her open
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to any action by the landlord without having any defence 
Hence, the plaintiff was unable to come to a correct 
decision
Murneghan J was satisfied that the defendant 
solicitor failed to act as a reasonable solicitor m  
similar circumstances should and would have acted No 
information, which was vital for the plaintiff's aim, was 
given to her This rendered her m  breach of the tenancy 
requirements and open, without defence, to a subsequent 
action by the landlord This would have been avoided if the 
defendant solicitor had taken it upon himself to inform his 
client as to her position with regard to the former 
tenant's interest In not doing so, he was clearly 
negligent, knowing or ought to have known the 
consequences 17
The obstacle m  these cases is that, contrary to 
medical negligence cases, consent is not an explicit 
requirement for a solicitor It may, among other things, be 
justified that the personal or bodily integrity is not an 
issue here The thesis agrees with Munneke & Loscalzo 
(1989) that the solicitor-client relationship is one of
17See also HARTE v SHEEHY AND OTHERS (THIRD PARTIES) 
[1995] P N L R 132 In this case the solicitor was 
negligent m  failing to advise his client as to the 
consequences of the omission to meet the repayment 
requirements of a bridging loan, i e that this could 
result m  a breach of contract with the plaintiff In KEHOE 
v LOUTH Sc SON [1992] I L R M 282 the solicitor was held 
negligent m  failing to advise the plaintiff that, m  order 
to purchase a particular premises, there was a necessity to 
revalue the property which would lead to financial 
implications
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agency 18 Therefore, the solicitor must be left with a 
degree of discretion to act and he shall do this, m  normal 
cases, m  the interest of the client If he fails, his 
conduct is, subsequently, tested against general and 
approved practice, not on the basis that the client did not 
give a valid consent to whatever the solicitor was doing m  
the interest of his client
6.3. Representation and Instructions
to Counsel
6.3.1. In DESMOND AND OTHERS v BROPHY AND OTHERS [1985] 
I R 449 the first defendant (a solicitor) was alleged to 
have been negligent m  failing to take care of his clients' 
interests The plaintiffs asked for the services of the 
first defendant (Brophy) to act on their behalf m  the 
purchase of two apartments They paid a deposit on the 
apartments, assuming that their solicitor would arrange 
matters so that the deposit was held by the second 
defendants (the solicitors of the vendor, a building 
company) as stakeholders and not as agents However, this 
was not made clear by Brophy to the vendor's solicitors 
Instead, on receipt of the deposits the vendor's 
solicitors, m  accordance with instructions and normal 
policy, endorsed them in favour of the vendor Before 
completion of the contracts the building company went into
18See supra Subparagraph 2 4 2
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receivership and the plaintiffs lost their deposit
The question was whether the first defendant looked 
after his clients' interests with reasonable professional 
care and skill Barrington J held he did not The 
plaintiffs could recover their losses against the first 
defendant The learned judge gave the following reasons for 
this decision
The defendant was aware of the practice of builders 
demanding and receiving booking deposits Consequently, he 
knew the risks which purchasers were running He explained 
these risks to the plaintiffs and took, m  his opinion, 
proper steps to protect his clients' interests He sent the 
deposits to the vendor's solicitors, who were acting as 
agents for the vendor and accompanied the deposits with a 
letter However, from this letter it could not be concluded 
that the defendant, acting on behalf of the purchasers, 
wished to send the deposits to the vendor's solicitors as 
stakeholders It could not be concluded that they were sent 
'in accordance with what they [the vendor's solicitors] 
knew to be their instructions from their client and their 
client's general course of business' 19
The vendor's solicitors endorsed the cheques sans 
recours on behalf of the first defendant's firm and sent 
them to their client This seems to be m  accordance with 
the state of the law at the time
According to Barrington J , the letter did not show 
sufficient evidence that the first defendant took proper
19 [1985] I R 449 at 457, per Barrington J
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steps to safeguard his clients' interests Therefore, the 
first defendant, although there was not any lack of 
concern, did not show 'reasonable professional skill m  
defending those interests and the clients, as a result, are 
at a loss' 20
This case makes clear that a solicitor acts (as an 
agent) on instructions of his client This means that he 
has a certain discretion as to how he shall fulfil his 
instructions This freedom to zealously pursue his clients' 
interests has been recognized by many 21 Of course, it 
derives from his autonomous professional position However, 
if a solicitor fails to act or conduct his duties according 
to his instructions, his discretionary powers cannot be a 
defence against liability
6.3.2. In FALLON v GANNON [1988] I L R M 193 the
plaintiff sued his solicitor for negligence and breach of 
contract The solicitor conveyed a licensed premises but 
the sale was repudiated by the purchasers The plaintiff
(the vendor) claimed that the solicitor mishandled the
defence of the action brought by the purchasers for 
rescission of the contract The reason for the purchasers' 
rescission lay m  the false representations made by the 
plaintiff with regard to the turnover of the licensed 
premises (m reality it was a third of what had been
20Ibid
21See, inter alios, Wilkins (1990), supra Subparagraph 
2 6 11
represented) The plaintiff's claim was dismissed m  the 
High Court The plaintiff appealed
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High 
Court Finlay C J concluded that the defendants were not 
negligent with regard to the sale of the licensed premises 
up to the time it was repudiated, and that the defendants 
were not negligent m  their defence of the action brought 
by the purchasers for the rescission of the contract
One of the plaintiff's submissions was that the 
defendant solicitor was negligent m  not attending the 
auction The plaintiff claimed that, if his solicitor would 
have been present, he would have prevented his client from 
making a false representation or 'that he had been 
subsequently available as a witness to deny the making of 
any representation by the plaintiff' 22
The case showed on this point that the relationship 
between a professional person and his client is essentially 
based on trust It is more than a contract One must accept 
that m  such a relationship there is something more than 
just the negotiations of pure commercial regulation of 
overt mutually agreed terms and one may regard the 
relationship as a "covenant"
This element of trust reflects the idea that m  a 
solicitor-client or doctor-patient relationship, the seeker 
of the professional service, as well as the service 
provider, is under a fiduciary duty m  addition to his 
explicit contractual duty It cannot be true that a person
22 [1988] I L R M 193 at 196
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who seeks professional help is freed from the burden of 
responsibility whenever he enters into a relationship for 
which he needs professional assistance That this burden 
(to prevent mistakes, make inquiries, provide information, 
etc ) is entirely placed on the shoulders of the
professional person does not equate with socio-economic 
reality
In the opinion of this researcher this has never been 
the idea of a profession It aims, instead, to resolve or 
avoid conflicts Perhaps the most important skill is clear 
and proper communication between the adviser and the
client Therefore, a solicitor, as was the case m  FALLON, 
is right m  withdrawing his services when this element of 
communication fails The relationship is vitiated
6 3 . 3 .  Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in FALLON v
GANNON [1988] I L R M 193 that -
[t] he duty of a solicitor with regard to the 
conduct of a case m  court where counsel has been 
briefed is first to brief appropriate and 
competent counsel and secondly, to instruct them 
properly m  regard to the facts of the case which 
he has obtained from his client, and to make 
provision for the attendance of appropriate 
witnesses and other proofs A solicitor has not 
got any vicarious responsibility for the 
individual conduct of counsel 23
This has been recognized m  previous decisions and was 
recently affirmed m  MCMULLEN v CARTY AND OTHERS [1995]
23 [1988] I L R M 193 at 195-196
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P N L R  408 In MILLARD & KINSELLA v MCMAHON [1995] 
P N L R 1 - an older case - the plaintiffs sued their
solicitor for negligence on the grounds that he had not 
initiated proceedings m  time, m  accordance with the 
Statute of Limitations, 1957 The proceedings entailed the 
recovery of debts of a moribund company by winding up the 
company and to follow the monies paid over to the receiver 
The defendant claimed that he merely had to compel the 
receiver to vouch his accounts and that he had instructed 
counsel only one day after he himself was instructed 
Counsel advised the clients that the claim appeared to be 
statute barred unless it was revived by part payment 
However, one of the plaintiffs had a letter from the 
auditor of the moribund company acknowledging the debt If 
so, it would take the claim out of the Statute of 
Limitations This failed because the letter was written by 
the auditor after he had ceased to work for the company
The claim was dismissed by Henchy J He held that 
where a solicitor lays his client's claim fully before 
competent counsel and, accordingly, acts on the counsel7s 
advice, the solicitor is not negligent
With regard to a claim which may be statute barred, a 
solicitor is under a number of duties First, he is to be 
aware of the Statute Second, to inform his client on his 
position Henchy J quoted Scruton L J who stated m  
FLETCHER & SON v JUBB BOOTH AND HELLIWELL [1920] 1 K B  
275 that 7 the period of limitation [is] one of those 
matters which [solicitors] as [ ] legal advisors ought to
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have borne m  mind' 24
Although the solicitor did not regard the limitation 
for contracts, he cannot be liable, according to his 
counsel m  this case because the claim was already statute 
barred (the plaintiffs instructed him after it became 
statute barred) This was not upheld Instead, the 
solicitor escaped liability because he had instructed 
counsel, who, subsequently, advised the plaintiffs properly 
as to the limitation period Henchy J stated that ' [1]f 
the plaintiffs had to rely solely on the personal exertions 
of their solicitor on their behalf, I would find him guilty 
of negligence' 25
6.4. Information and Enquiries
6.4.1. In the following case the solicitor was alleged 
to have been negligent with regard to the gathering of
3
information and the making of inquiries
In KELLY v CROWLEY [1985] I R 212 the plaintiff 
instructed his solicitor to acquire, on his behalf, a 
licensed premises which he wanted to operate as a public 
house The solicitor, aware of his client's intentions, 
negotiated the sale In the requisitions on title raised by 
the solicitor, the vendor was asked to specify the exact 
type of licensing attached to the premises The vendor, m
24 [1920] 1 K B  275 at 281
25 [1995] P N L R 1 at 10
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return, handed over the licence The solicitor failed to 
inspect the Register of Licences Had he inspected the 
Register, he would have found out that the premises had a 
hotel license only
The plaintiff took possession of the premises and 
operated it as a public house When he sought to renew the 
licence it was refused on the grounds that the premises was 
not operated as a hotel within the meaning of the licensing 
laws 26 As a result the plaintiff suffered substantial loss 
and sued his solicitor for negligence and breach of 
contract
It was alleged by the plaintiff that his solicitor 
(the defendant) had failed to carry out any or any adequate 
search m  the Register of Licences and had failed to 
exercise 'any or any reasonable skill or diligence m  
raising Rejoinders to the Replies furnished by the vendor's 
solicitors as to the nature of the licence attaching to the 
said premises' 27 v
It is clear that m  a case like this the existence of 
a general practice may be critical to the imposition of 
liability If it is shown that a solicitor deviated from 
such a practice, professional liability is imposed 
However, if it can be shown that the solicitor adhered to 
a general accepted practice, despite the financial loss 
suffered by his client, this would provide him with a
26See subsection 2(2) of the Licensing (Ireland) Act,
1902
27 [1985] I R 212 at 220
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defence to a professional negligence claim, unless this 
practice carried any obvious inherent defects
However, each case stands on its own and according to 
Murphy J , 7 there are cases m  which professional practices 
and procedures themselves may be so deficient that reliance 
upon them would not provide a defence to a claim for 
negligence7 28 He continued that -
there must always be room for the application of 
the professional expertise of the individual 
lawyer to the particular circumstances of the 
individual case and the needs of his own 
client 29
In other words, it is an obligation of a solicitor or 
any other professional person to form their own profes­
sional opinion and not mindlessly follow the practice of 
others A solicitor who exercises a general accepted 
practice which carries inherent defects is negligent when 
these defects are obvious to any person giving the matter 
due consideration These observations have already been 
made by this researcher m  07DONOVAN v CORK COUNTY COUNCIL 
[1967] I R 173, ROCHE v PEILOW [1985] I R 232, PARK HALL 
SCHOOL v OVEREND AND OTHERS [1987] I L R M  345 and other 
cases
One of the particular facts of this case is the 
licensing The legislation with regard to the licensing of 
premises is not transparent In certain cases it is
28Jbid , at 221
29 Ibid
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difficult to distinguish premises for which a licence was 
granted, either by inspection of the licence or the 
premises itself, between hotels and other premises (a 
public house) 30 The difficulty is especially great where a 
solicitor is unfamiliar with the licensing laws 
However, according to Murphy J
a person familiar with the relevant legislation 
and the proper interpretation thereof would 
appreciate the importance of distinguishing 
between a licence granted to a public house and 
a licence granted to a hotel 31
Accordingly, the judge considered whether -
the defendant m  the present case failed m  his 
contractual obligation to the plaintiffs by 
neglecting to ensure that the licence attaching 
to the licensed premises m  question was granted 
m  respect of a public house rather than a 
hotel 32
The judge affirmed that a solicitor has a duty to 
exercise care, he is assumed to possess and properly apply 
that degree of skill and knowledge m  the conduct of his 
client's affairs However, this does not mean that a 
solicitor should give a guarantee that a particular result 
will be achieved Or, m  the words of Lord Fullerton, as
30The form of a publican's licence is identical to
certain hotel licences Whether the licence is granted for 
a public house or a hotel is pointed out on the back of the
licence
31Ibid , at 224
32 Ibid
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quoted by Hodson L J in SIMMONS v PENNINGTON & SON [1955] 
1 W L R 183 -
A professional man does not warrant that what he 
does will certainly have the effect which is 
expected from him He warrants only that he 
should bestow on the matter committed to him the 
skill generally possessed by his brethren m  the 
profession 33
This is a characteristic element of the professional 
relationship between a solicitor and his client
After this consideration Murphy J came to the 
conclusion that 'a solicitor acting on behalf of a lay 
client m  the purchase of a licensed premises is bound to 
make appropriate enquiries as to the nature of the licence 
attached thereto' 34 The mam reason for this conclusion 
was inspired by the reality that the licence and its nature 
were a substantial part of the consideration for the sale 
of the premises
The learned judge stated that -
the defendant had a duty not only to make the 
necessary enquiries so as to advise his client 
adequately with regard to the licence attaching 
to the [ ] premises but also to make those
enquiries at a time when his advice based on the 
replies to the enquiries would be of maximum 
value to his client 35
33 [1955] 1 W L R 183 at 189
34 [1985] I R 212 at 226
35Jbid , at 228
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\m  the absence of any evidence of some proper 
established professional practice to the 
contrary, [ ] the defendant/solicitor should
have enquired from the vendor's solicitor prior 
to the auction, or indeed enquired from the 
auctioneer at the auction itself, as to whether 
the licence referred to m  the brochure 
advertising the premises was a licence granted m  
respect of an hotel premises or some other type 
of premises 36
6.4.2. The defendant m  KELLY deviated from an 
established general and approved practice He breached two 
principal duties he ought to have exercised m  this case
His first duty was to make relevant and necessary 
enquiries, and to advise his client accordingly, so that 
the latter could make an informed decision A violation of 
this duty meant that the solicitor did not meet the
reasonable standard of professional skill and care This
can be inferred from Finlay P 's decision m  TAYLOR v 
RYAN ' [s]uch an enquiry, m  the particular circumstances 
of the case was a necessary reasonable standard of 
professional skill and care on the part of the
defendant' 37
The violation of the second duty which the defendant 
ought to have exercised was a consequence of the first 
Having omitted to make the necessary enquiries, the
He concluded that -
36 Ibid
37 [1995] P N L R 47 at 48
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defendant could not have advised his client on a time where 
this advice would have been of "maximum value" to his 
client 38
A defence that the time to make those enquiries was 
limited cannot be accepted This defence is invalid for 
someone who holds himself out as possessing professional 
expertise and knowledge about the law In a situation where 
a professional man did not have the time to gain important 
information, he should advise his client accordingly and 
warn him of possible risks Basically, a professional 
person is obliged to exercise his duties m  such a way that 
his client can make an informed decision and instruct his 
solicitor accordingly The value and contents of that 
information depends on (1) the time available, (1 1) the 
complexity of the case and (1 1 1) the intricacy of the law
38See also LAKE v BUSBY AND ANOTHER [1949] 2 All E R 
964 The plaintiff, after contracting for the purchase of 
a property with the first defendant, suffered damages 
because his solicitors failed to communicate relevant 
information regarding the planning permission of his 
property In failing to do so they were found negligent It 
was not enough to see that the plaintiff had obtained good 
title
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Recent Developments
7.1. The Standard of Care Reference Points
7.1.1. The thesis asserted m  the previous Chapters that 
a general duty of care "over-arches" a sub-set of specific 
duties These specific duties arise from the specific 
attributes of the particular relationship between a 
professional person and his client or patient They 
correspond, m  most cases, with the presence of a special 
skill or competence, inherent to the profession, upon which 
the client relied and depended These duties relate to the 
specific phases of the professional person's service This 
is clearly illustrated with regard to the provision of 
medical services The doctor's duties relate to diagnosis, 
treatment and advice or information (risk disclosure) As 
well as these specific duties, it is obvious that there is 
an "over-arching" duty to take care 1
It has been demonstrated previously how the courts
xIt is suggested here that this duty is given its 
content also through the professions' internal regulations, 
such as the professional and ethical codes of conduct and 
other disciplinary regulations See also Wilkins (1994), 
supra Subparagraph 2 6 11
Chapter 7
The Standard of Care Conclusion.
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assessed negligence m  those cases where duties were 
violated The justification for the existence of an over­
arching duty of care is found, both m  England and Ireland, 
m  the fact that the standard of care refers, first of all, 
to the concept of the professional practitioner of equal 
specialization and skill, acting with ordinary care This 
reference to ordinary care is nothing new It is consonant 
with the general idea of the tort of negligence This was 
abundantly made clear by McNair J m  BOLAM v FRIERN 
HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE [1957] 2 All E R 118 and has 
been applied throughout the development of the tort of 
negligence 2
The question whether the courts look at the presumed 
responsibilities of a particular socio-economic grouping m  
Ireland, or whether they merely seek to accommodate 
technical and other changes by imposing liability m  
different ways can now be answered, at least, m  relation 
to the standard of care The thesis suggests that the 
courts look at the responsibilities of professional 
groupings This is justified by the presence of a special 
skill For this reason, the standard must differ
Here, the relevance of the existence of a sub-set of 
duties comes to light and explains the reference by McNair 
J to the professional practitioner with egual 
gualification and skill This also underlines the 
importance of the professional practitioner's conduct,
2Cf BLYTH V BIRMINGHAM WATERWORKS CO [1856] 11
Exch 781
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rather than assessing the practitioner qua professional
Thus, reference is made to "ordinary" care, this is 
consonant with negligence itself Second, reference is made 
to a special skill or aptitude The professional person 
possesses some knowledge which is desired and relied upon 
Here, the professional man distinguishes himself from the 
ordinary man Third, reference is made to his peers 
(equally competent men) He must possess an average or 
ordinary degree of skill and competence, inherent to his 
expertise He is not required to hold any higher degree of 
skill The question then runs as follows would the 
ordinary skilled man have adopted the conduct or practice 
which has been exercised by the defendant professional 
person9 This question is resolved by the courts, relying on 
expert evidence
In England, under the BOLAM test, this is achieved by 
reference to a responsible body of expert opinion It 
suggests a connection between theory and practice The 
courts rely on this theoretical foundation, although it 
refers to an optimum, as the exclusive determinant of 
average or ordinary practice In doing so, the courts throw 
the ball into the profession's corner The courts merely 
ask what the profession does If it is similar to the 
defendant's conduct, the defendant is not negligent The 
duty is imposed by law, the standard is matter of 
professional judgment
The Irish courts resolve the question by reference to 
a general and approved practice It emphasizes the
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practical application of theoretical knowledge It must be 
distinguished from, on the one hand, optimum practice and, 
on the other hand, custom As a result, the defendant 
practitioner is not negligent if he has acted in accordance 
with a practice accepted as general by the profession This 
does not mean that a deviation from it renders the 
practitioner automatically negligent Deviation is accepted 
within established parameters What is done and what is the 
justification for departure from the majority view9 Here 
lies the reflection of the individual autonomy of a 
professional person It is the liberty to form one's own 
view of a proposed course of action within proper limits
Essentially, the Irish test does not differ, to this 
point, from its English counterpart However, the Irish 
courts have reserved themselves the right to disregard 
expert evidence m  favour to common sense and logic On two 
fronts it may impose liability whatever the profession's 
view may be First, the courts may hold a practitioner 
liable if they establish that the course he adopted was, 
although general and accepted, flawed In the courts' view 
it consisted of inherent defects that ought to have been 
obvious, not only to the profession or the defendant, but 
to 'any person given the matter due consideration' 3
Second, the courts have the prerogative to apply logic 
and common sense m  situations where experts of equal 
standing and acceptability disagree on a matter which is
3Cf 0'DONOVAN v CORK COUNTY COUNCIL AND OTHERS 
[1967] I R 173 at 193, per Walsh J
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not capable of solution by reference to a decided body of 
expert opinion 4
7.1.2. Characteristic of both tests is that they are 
"professional-centred" It is confined to the conduct of 
professional people and, m  most cases, the exercise of a 
special skill At the basis, it is disposed of all 
subjective elements, including the personality of the judge 
and the interests and expectations of the injured party
McMahon & Bmchy (1990) argue that this test refers to 
customary practice The authors, reviewing the decision m
O'DONOVAN v CORK COUNTY COUNCIL [1967] I R 173, state -
[I] f a member of a profession can show that he or 
she adhered to the customary practice of his or 
her profession, this should normally relief him 
or her of the accusation if negligence 5
Custom could be defined as a 'practice accepted as
normal and general by other members of the community m  
similar circumstances' 6 It consists of ' [clommon 
practices, sanctioned by general usage' 7 Paramount here is 
whether there is a 'level of routine repetition that custom
4Cf BEST v WELLCOME FOUNDATION LTD [1993] I R 421 
An honest difference of opinion is, however, allowed and a 
defendant is not negligent m  following one practice m  
preference to another and both practices earn equal 
recognition
5 (1990 259)
Fleming (1992 119)
7Epstem (1992 6)
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presupposes' 8 Thus, there is a degree of conformity with 
regard to a certain practice which has been exercised This 
degree is subsequently proof that the defendant acted with 
due care, thus escaping liability
Epstein (1992) argues that, in cases where negligence 
is consequent to an already existing relationship, the 
proper standard of liability is custom, especially where 
both parties had knowledge about the custom But, m  an 
underlying relationship where only one party, for example, 
the professional service provider, is familiar to a custom, 
a preliminary question arises did the alleged tortfeasor 
take a risk of mis-communication under the circumstances9 
In other words, was the plaintiff properly informed 
regarding the custom prior to the alleged negligent conduct 
if he was ignorant to the custom9 If so, is adherence to 
custom sufficient evidence to escape liability9
However, it must be argued that there is a difference 
between custom and standard practice The latter is a 
measure to assess the practice or conduct of the defendant, 
it must be demonstrated that his conduct was accepted as 
proper by comparing him to the ordinary skilled man With 
regard to custom, the defendant has acted either m  
accordance or contrary to custom, and is not compared with 
the conduct of an ordinary skilled man It can be 
suggested, therefore, that the defendant's conduct must be 
recognized within definite principles His conduct must be 
more or less similar to a line of thought of at least a
QIbid , at 7
Customary practice does not equate to approved or 
accepted practice The latter refers to the connection with 
theory which inherently strives at an optimum Custom does 
not really answer what is demanded as a standard of care 
Certainly, it may give an indication to what is demanded or 
expected by the professional grouping but it is not 
conclusive as to whether it is the correct practice The 
case review has shown that practices may be inherently 
flawed, rendering the defendant's conduct negligent It 
also showed that practitioners were allowed to deviate 
within accepted parameters
The point is that m  terming a practice "customary" 
one is really reserving one's position on whether such a 
practice is (1 ) accepted but flawed or (1 1) accepted and 
optimal or (1 1 1) accepted as an adequate compromise m  the 
face of alternative and conflicting demands The term 
"customary" is no more than an insufficiently precise 
epithet for describing what is often done, whether by those 
who are expert, inexpert, careful or careless It is 
therefore a term better to be avoided
7 1.3. The previous Chapters showed that the assessment 
of the standard of care is, de facto, m  the hands of the 
professions This was recognized by Lord Scarman m  SIDAWAY 
v BETHLEM ROYAL HOSPITAL GOVERNORS [1985] 1 All E R 643 
He stated that ' the law imposes a duty of care, but the
respectable minority of the profession
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standard of care is a matter of [professional] judgment' 9 
He found the view of the law disturbing and criticized it 
m  relation to the doctor's duty to disclose risks -
It would be a strange conclusion if the courts 
should be led to conclude that our law [ ]
should permit the doctors to determine whether 
and m  what circumstances a duty arises requiring 
the doctor to warn his patient of the risks 
inherent m  the treatment which he proposes 10
In England and Ireland, nevertheless, the standard of 
care is conditioned by general accepted practice or 
professional opinion This attitude may be explained by the 
belief that it is the professional person's duty which is 
at stake (professional negligence aims at the conduct of 
the defendant) and not the client's right to, for example, 
self-determination or reasonable expectations Therefore, 
the judgment of what is demanded m  the interest of the 
client or patient, calls for professional expertise 
However, and one has to agree with Fleming, that one must 
always warn against 'passing too cavalierly upon the 
conduct and decisions of experts' 11
9 [1985] 1 All E R 643 at 649
10 Ibid»
11 (1992 120)
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ROGERS v WHITAKER
7.2.1. An indication for a different approach m  
assessing professional negligent conduct has been expressed 
by Lord Scarman m  SIDAWAY v BETHLEM ROYAL HOSPITAL 
GOVERNORS [1985] 1 All E R 643 and, m  Ireland, by Maguire 
C J m  DANIELS v HESKIN [1954] I R 73 and Finlay C J m  
WALSH v FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES LTD [1992] 1 I R 486 
Some situations or duties are so obvious that they do not 
require a "professional-centred" approach It can be argued 
that m  these situations the judges refer to what ought to 
have been done by reference to the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of the defendants' conduct
This line of thought has been subjected to examination 
m  Australia In ROGERS v WHITAKER [1992] 16 B M L R 148, 
the Australian High Court demoted the BOLAM test to a "rule 
of thumb" The decision m  this case underlies an approach 
similar to that m  "ordinary" negligence cases The 
question that can, subsequently, be inferred is does the 
presence of a body of esoteric knowledge justify the need 
for professional judgment m  the assessment of the standard 
care m  professional negligence cases9
7.2.2. In ROGERS v WHITAKER [1992] 16 B M L R 148, a
medical negligence case, an ophthalmic surgeon (the 
appellant) was sued by his patient (the respondent) for 
negligence This was based on the allegation that the
7.2. Recent Developments
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surgeon had failed to warn her against an inherent risk of 
the operation (the development of sympathetic ophthalmia m  
her left eye as a result of surgery on the patient's right 
eye) despite "incessant" questioning by the patient about 
the inherent risks The operation was performed with due 
care and skill However, the patient developed the risk as 
described above
The question m  this case was twofold First, did the 
failure to warn against the inherent risks result m  
negligence, a breach of duty of care of the surgeon9 
Second, should, to provide an answer to this question, the 
BOLAM test be applied m  this case9
The trial judge concluded that the surgeon was 
negligent, because 'a warning was necessary m  the light of 
her [the patient's] desire for such relevant 
information' 12 The judge was not satisfied with the proper 
medical practice not to warn a patient if she had not 
expressed a desire for such information In other words, a 
doctor is only negligent if he fails to disclose 
information when he is asked for such information
The defendant appealed The Australian High Court 
rejected the appeal, but on different grounds These are 
set out below
A doctor must exercise reasonable care and skill This 
duty is imposed upon the doctor by law The standard which 
is required is that of an ordinary skilled person 
exercising and professing to have that special skill This
12 [1992] 16 B M L R 148 at 151
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is said to be a matter of medical judgment This follows 
from BOLAM v FRIERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE [1957]
2 All E R 118 and SIDAWAY v BETHLEM ROYAL HOSPITAL 
GOVERNORS [1985] All E R 643 In these cases it was 
considered that the BOLAM test should be applied m  cases 
of negligent information and advice
However, m  SIDAWAY Lord Scarman dissented He refused 
to apply the BOLAM test m  cases where the alleged 
negligent conduct lay m  the non-disclosure of such 
information and advice He expressed the opinion that m  
these cases it is up to the court to decide whether or not 
an omission to warn a patient resulted m  a breach of a 
doctor's duty of care
The Australian High Court followed the dissenting 
judgment m  SIDAWAY and stated that 'the question of 
whether a patient has been given sufficient information to 
consent to treatment does not generally depend on medical 
practice' 13 The essence is whether the conduct of the 
doctor followed the standard of care which is demanded by 
law, not by the medical profession
One reason for this departure from BOLAM lies m  the 
insignificance of direct questions and inquiries by a 
patient m  the BOLAM test In applying the test, medical 
opinion determines whether or not information should be 
disclosed to a patient This opinion does not logically 
alter by an express desire of a patient, asking a doctor 
about the proposed treatment
12Ibid , at 148
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The majonty of the Law Lords m  SIDAWAY shared the 
opinion that direct inquiries from a patient should be 
answered truthfully, but 'subject to therapeutic 
privilege' 14 This indicated, according to the Australian 
High Court, a shortcoming m  the application of the BOLAM 
test The recognition m  SIDAWAY that answers should be 
answered truthfully, without reference to a particular 
medical standard but subjected to the idea of therapeutic 
privilege, does not attach sufficient significance to the 
interests or expectations of the patient When a patient 
asks a question regarding the nature of, or a particular 
inherent risk m  the treatment, it should be clear to his 
doctor that it is of concern to that patient that her 
question is answered truthfully, whatever the reason may 
be
Unlike m  England (and Ireland) , the principles set 
out m  BOLAM do not find much acceptance m  the Australian
courts, especially not m  cases relating to the disclosure
of information Instead, the Australian courts have adopted 
a different principle This principle was applied in F v 
R (1983) S A S R 189 In this case, King C J stated -
The ultimate question is not whether the 
defendant's conduct accords with the practice of 
his profession or some part of it, but whether it 
conforms to the standard of reasonable care 
demanded by law That is a question for the court
and the duty of deciding it cannot be delegated
to any profession or group m  the community 15
14 [1985] 1 All E R 643
15 [1983] S A S R 189 at 194
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This implied, according to the court m  ROGERS v WHITAKER 
that -
it is for the courts to adjudicate on what is the 
appropriate standard of care after giving weigh 
to the paramount consideration that a person is 
entitled to make his own decisions about his
life 16
The evidence of acceptable medical practice should 
only be used as a guideline for the courts For this reason 
the BOLAM test must fail
Following this, the next question concerns the amount 
of information which must be disclosed to a patient The 
answer must take into account, according to the High Court 
m  ROGERS, 'the nature of the treatment, the patient's
state of health and temperament and all the general 
circumstances' 17 Above all, a doctor has the duty to
inform a patient of material risks inherent m  the 
treatment This information is only m  special 
circumstances subject to therapeutic privilege A risk is 
material, according to the Australian High Court if -
m  the circumstances of the particular case, a 
reasonable person in the patient's position, if 
warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it or if the medical practitioner 
is or should reasonably be aware that the
particular patient, if warned of the risk, would 
be likely to attach significance to it 18
16 [1992] 16 B M L R 148 at 154
17Ibid , at 148-149
18Ibid , at 156
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Gaudron J added that a doctor should inform his 
patient of 'real and foreseeable risks', and, 'if the 
patient does not ask specific questions about the treatment 
the doctor has a duty to provide information which would 
reasonably be required by a person m  the position of the 
plaintiff' 19
7.2.3. The case clearly demonstrated that, at least m  
Australia, the BOLAM test is regarded as insufficient m  
the context of information and advice This insufficiency 
was demonstrated by the court, having reviewed the evidence 
m  ROGERS The medical opinion given m  expert evidence was 
that the patient should have been told of the inherent risk 
of sympathetic ophthalmia, but only if the patient would 
have asked for it This seems at odds with the interests 
and desires of the patient She might not have asked the 
specific question - it is needless to say that most 
patients are laymen - but from her anxiety that nothing 
would happen to her "good" eye, the doctor must have 
understood that she would have attached significance to the 
risk if she was informed accordingly
According to Gaudron J , there was, even m  cases 
concerning diagnosis and treatment -
no legal basis for limiting liability m  terms of 
the rule known as "the Bolam [sic] test"', m  
which a doctor is negligent, only if he does not 
act m  accordance with a practice accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of doctors skilled
19Ibid , at 149
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Such a test is only useful as 'a "rule of thumb" m  
some jury cases', although expert evidence remains 
important 21 The reason for this observation was that m  
Gaudron J 's view 'the nature of particular risks and their 
foreseeability are not matters exclusively within the 
province of medical knowledge or expertise [T]hey are 
often matters of common sense' 22
The relevance of this case lies m  the fact that no 
reference is made to a special skill In this jurisdiction 
and m  England, this element is the distinguishing factor 
m  the concept of professional negligence The reason for 
a different approach is the fact that the court m  ROGERS 
took into account, as the courts have done m  American 
cases dealing specifically with the notion of "informed 
consent",23 the position of the patient within the 
professional or medical relationship
It can be asserted that the imposition of liability m  
ROGERS was based on the idea of proximity (the doctor- 
patient relationship) and foreseeability (not of the risks 
inherent to medical treatment, but the idea whether the 
doctor should have been aware that the patient ought to 
have been informed)
20Ibid , at 158
21 Ibid
22Ibid
m  the relevant field of practice 20
23Cf CANTERBURY v SPENCE (1972) 464 F 2d 772
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This may indicate a shift or change with regard to the 
presumed responsibilities of professional men and the 
manner m  which society deals with the allocation of 
compensation for losses of an injured party as a result of 
professional behaviour or the behaviour of professional 
men 24
It is suggested by this researcher that the rejection 
of the BOLAM test m  Australia may have been based on some 
policy consideration to be able to compensate more victims 
of medical accidents However, the negligence test, as used 
by the Australian High Court, reflects the application of 
pure tort principles proximity and foreseeability
24This latter distinction is important, m  that it 
suggests that the involvement of a special skill appears 
not always to be essential to the imposition of liability
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PART C:
8.1. Introduction
This Chapter seeks to identify the particular aspects 
of the professional relationship between, on the one hand,
t
the professional service provider and his client or patient 
and, on the other hand, the professional person and those 
who, for whatever reason, rely on his skill and expertise 
but are not stricto sensu part of the professional 
relationship
In order to describe the legal structure of a 
professional relationship, this Chapter takes three 
professions as examples 1 The aim is to identify the 
particular characteristics of each relationship
The contractual relationship regarding a general 
practitioner under the G M S , and other health care 
contracts, demands an examination of the legal status of 
the patient and doctor m  the professional medical
Chapter 8
The Professional Relationship
•^The thesis has outlined m  Chapter Three that, m  
order to understand what is meant m  this thesis with a 
"profession", it takes three professions at its point of 
departure to describe the concept of professional 
negligence These are the medical and legal professions and 
accountancy
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relationship Whether the rights and obligations are 
confined to what is agreed m  the contract is also 
examined
A solicitor's express duties derive normally from the 
contract of retainer However, it is said that the 
relationship is of a fiduciary nature, implying other 
duties and obligations 2 3
The auditor appears to be m  a legal limbo with regard 
to whom he owes his contractual and fiduciary duties He is 
there to exercise his functions for the company members but 
m  an independent manner
It must, however, be remembered here that the 
contracting parties may differ from the parties involved m  
the actual professional relationship between client or 
patient and the professional service provider In some 
instances there is an intervening third party as, for 
example, the Health Boards m  relation to health care 
services under the G M S , or the Board of Directors 
contracting as agents with an auditor for services provided 
primarily to the members m  general meeting of a company
2Cf NOCTON v LORD ASHBURTON [1914-15] All E R 45 
and BROWN v I R C  [1964] 3 All E R 119
3As for a barrister, he cannot contract with a client, 
but this does not mean that he is exonerated from certain 
duties and obligations, which derive predominantly from 
public policy
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8.2. The Intellectual Basis
8.2.1. The thesis asserts that the "profession" enjoys 
a high degree of independency and professional autonomy, it 
being a particular socio-economic grouping m  society 4 
This has also been identified by a number of writers, 
including Dahrendorf (1984) Such characterization may be 
consequential to the idea that the profession is a 
collective organisation, whereby its independency is set 
within accepted parameters which are sometimes subject to 
State regulation 5 The reason for this independency is the 
interpretation given to the "professional status" of the 
professional service provider This status implies, 
according to Dahrendorf, a contract between society and the 
professions 6 This contract is based on (1 ) responsibility 
and (n) confidence or reliance
By means of accepting the responsibilities inherent to 
professional performance, professions can maintain their 
independency Within an organisational structure they are 
private bodies with public functions Their services, to
4See supra Chapter Three In addition, the
professional person enjoys individual autonomy It has been 
demonstrated m  Chapter Four that a professional person may 
deviate from an accepted or standard practice as long as 
this deviation is within accepted parameters
Professions m  England (and Ireland) differ from the 
professions on the Continent which are directly subject to 
statutory regulation and State supervision with regard to, 
for example, education, examination, admission and
sanctioning of the violation of professional or ethical 
conduct, (Dahrendorf, 1984 182)
6(1984 179)
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meet the demands m  society, exceed the immediate 
relationship with their clients These demands are said to 
be served by -
rules and standards which are defined and upheld 
by the professions themselves At the same time, 
their protection and privileges are provided if 
not as a matter of course then through voluntary 
agreement 7
An example of such privilege is the tenure of the 
academic professional person It permits him to exercise 
his functions m  an autonomous and impartial fashion 
without an obligation to, or under control by, the State 8 
Indeed, Dahrendorf asserts that those privileges must be 
earned and should not be used m  order to protect 
professional monopoly m  an abusive manner Privileges 
cannot be unlimited, and the 'other side of the protection 
is responsibility' 9 The privilege of tenure and protection 
must be earned Only then can one vindicate these 
privileges
The second foundation on which the implied contract is 
based is confidence or reliance The reliance on 
professional expertise by individual clients is the 
reflection of the confidence m  the professions by society
7Ibid , at 179
\
8However, it has been argued by some (Veblen, 1957)
that this supervision has shifted to serve commercial 
goals Academic research is directed through sponsoring and 
other financial incentives
9Dahrendorf (1984 180)
335
in general The value of the implied contract will be 
curtailed if this wider confidence is frustrated
This confidence is settled within the professions 
themselves, for example, m  their codes of conduct More 
importantly, it is judged as to how the professional person 
is engaged m  society m  matters where his professional 
skill is not directly a concern In other words, 
professionals may have opinions on matters that concern 
society These opinions are developed from their respective 
professional backgrounds The question, however, is do or 
should they have an opinion as a professional person9 If 
so, this will undermine their independence because, 
according to Dahrendorf, questions of a topical political 
nature are not questions 'to which professionals have a 
privileged answer Indeed they abuse their privileges and 
protection if they pretend to have such an answer' 10 They 
should express their opinion as a citizen, not as a 
professional This distinction may be artificial, 'but 
crucial' 11
Thus, the professional relationship between the 
service provider and the public is based on some sort of 
implied (social) contract The obligations on the part of 
the professional person encapsulate, on the one hand, the 
responsibility of performance and, on the other hand, the 
reliance or confidence by the public or society at large m  
the nature of the profession
10Ibid , at 183
lxIbid
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8 . 2 . 2 .  But, how can the professional relationship be 
described between the service provider and the individual 
client or patient9 Is this characterized as purely 
contractual, governed by the law of contract or is there 
something more to it The assertion that there is something 
as an implied contract with society, suggests that the 
duties of a professional person go beyond that of the 
particular obligations he is asked to perform by his client 
or patient If so, the relationship is fiduciary, implying 
obligations which are not or cannot necessarily be 
incorporated within a contractual arrangement
This is asserted throughout the thesis and can be 
illustrated with the duty question Apart from redefined, 
specific duties based on the performance of specific tasks, 
the professional practitioner is subjected to an "over­
arching" duty of care This duty is based on the altruistic 
nature of the profession, as well as the practical 
implication that most professions, unlike a shopkeeper,12 
cannot guarantee their product The professional person 
cannot warrant a particular result The law does not demand 
this either 13
The duties arising from contract consist of executing 
specific and pre-determined services and the payment of a 
specific and reasonable fee These obligations are agreed
12See, for example, sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Sale 
of Goods Act, 1979 (England)
13Cf GREAVES & CO v BAYNHAM MEIKLE & PARTNERS 
[1975] 1 W L R 1095 at 1100, per Lord Denning
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solely between the two parties and may be negotiated 
upon 14 But the nature of a profession brings along two 
overarching duties which are not necessarily implied m  a 
contract between a professional person and his client 15
The first of these duties is that the service shall be 
exercised with reasonable care and skill 16 In GREAVES & 
CO v BAYNHAM MEIKLE & PARTNERS [1975] 1 W L R 1095 Lord 
Denning stated that ' [t]he law does not usually imply a 
warranty that [a professional person] will achieve the 
desired result, but only a term that he will use reasonable 
care and skill' 17 This general duty can be interpreted m  
two ways First, it regards the dimension of the duty (its 
contents) and second, it regards the range or scope of the 
duty - to whom is it owed7
Subsequently, professional persons are required to 
possess a certain minimum of competence This follows from, 
on the one hand, the requirement to use reasonable skill 
and, on the other hand, the characteristics of a 
profession, notably a body of esoteric knowledge, 
restricted entry, education and examination Hence, it is
14However, contractual arrangements for medical 
services provided under the G M S contract or V H I 
Scheme are made between the health care provider and the 
relevant Health Board or the V H I Board respectively, not 
with the addressee of the services
15The two duties are not exhaustive, other terms may be 
implied but depend on the nature of the supplied service
16See section 39(b) of the Supply of Goods and
Services Act, 1982 (England) 'he will supply the service 
with due skill, care and diligence'
17 [1975] 1 W L R 1095 at 1100
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the professional person's duty to keep up to date with 
relevant developments m  his field of expertise, for 
example, reading the mainstream literature, attend seminars 
and visit study groups 18 19
The two overarching duties form the basis for more 
specific duties inherent m  each profession These 
distinctive duties are normally not specifically 
circumscribed m  the contractual agreement but flow from, 
or are inherent to, the facts of each individual case
The duty to exercise reasonable care and skill is an 
implied term within the (contractual) relationship between 
a professional person and client and does not necessarily 
derive from the professional status of the service 
provider It is imposed on him through, for example, 
statutes,20 codes of conduct or other external factors
One of these factors is public policy This derives 
from the fact that professional persons not only owe a duty 
to the individual client but also to the society at large 
In some cases, the courts are privileged to overrule 
professional discretion and impose rules, irrespective of
18Cf CRAWFORD v BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF CHARING CROSS 
HOSPITAL, The Times, 8 December 1953 See also MAYNARD v 
WEST MIDLANDS REGIONAL HEALTH AUTHORITY [1985] 1 All E R
635 and ROE v MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND OTHERS [1954] 2 All
E R 131
19According to Jackson & Powell (1992 6), this degree
of care and competence depends on the type of professions 
and the reasonable expectations of the client
20See, for example, the Medical Practitioners Act, 1978 
and the Supply of Goods and Services Act, 1980
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professional opinion 21 Other factors which may be 
mentioned here are elements of legal, moral and ethical 
principles which have an overriding application and cannot 
be exonerated
Thus, the doctor's specific duties relate to 
diagnosis, treatment and advice A number of cases show 
that the duty to take reasonable care "over-arches" all the 
incidences of the doctor-patient relationship and includes, 
as sub-sets of the main relationship, the subsidiary duties 
such as the duty to diagnose, the duty to treat and the 
duty to inform This position was exemplified m  the 
examination of the decision m  DANIELS v HESKIN [1954] 
I R 73 The facts of this case have been set out m  detail 
m  Chapter Four and are here summarized The plaintiff m  
DANIELS sued her doctor for damages for negligence It was
♦ 'Z valleged by the plaintiff's counsel that the doctor was 
negligent and unskilful m  three ways
(I) He was negligent m  permitting and causing a needle to 
break at the time he was stitching the perineum of the 
plaintiff
(II) He was negligent m  permitting the broken needle to be 
left m  the body for a considerable time and failing to 
remove it
(III) He was negligent in failing to inform the plaintiff 
of the existence of the broken needle
The above three submissions relate both to the over­
21See, for example, the decisions m  BEST v WELLCOME 
FOUNDATION LTD [1992] I L R M  609 and RE A WARD OF COURT 
[1995] 2 I L R M 401
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arching and sub-duties of a medical practitioner 
Submission (1 1) clearly reflects an overall duty to take 
care and a specific duty of medical opinion and judgment, 
submission (1 ) reflects a specific duty towards treatment, 
while submission (1 1 1) reflects a specific duty towards 
information
8.2.3. In other professions, many specific duties exist 
as sub-sets of a general duty of skill and care For 
example, an architect and other building professionals have 
the duty that their designs reasonably fit the purpose and 
if not, they have a duty to correct the design 22 In 
addition, they are required to exercise the service within 
a reasonable time,23 to supervise work, to inform a client 
on his degree of knowledge,24 etc
With regard to accountants and auditors Jackson & 
Powell (1992) identify that many negligence disputes 
involve the precise scope and nature of the agreed task 
between accountant or auditor and client 25 In any event, 
one of his specific duties involves the verification of the
22Cf BRICKFIELD PROPERTIES LTD v NEWTON (1983) 25
Build L R 99
23See subsection 14(1) of the Supply of Goods and
Services Act, 1982 (England)
24Cf RICHARD ROBERTS HOLDINGS LTD v DOUGLAS SMITH
STIMSON PARTNERSHIP AND OTHERS [(1988) 46 Build L R 50
25 (19 9 2 6 1 0) See also TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY OF
APFEL (A BANKRUPT) v ANNAN DEXTER & CO (1926) 70 Acct
L R 57 and SMITH v SHEARD (1906) 34 Acct L R 65
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'substantial accuracy' of the accounts 26 In addition, an 
auditor has a number of statutory duties, under which the 
duty to carry out his task with professional integrity (s 
193(6) Companies Act 1990) Other, more specific duties are 
found m  s 202 Companies Act 1990 An example of a 
fiduciary duty of an auditor or accountant is a duty not to 
disclose confidences 27
Solicitors owe specific duties which relate, inter 
aha, to the provision of urgent and relevant 
information,28 to carry out adequately relevant searches 
m, for example, the Companies Registration Office,29 or to 
make direct inquiries regarding the validity of a liquor 
licence 30 These duties have already been addressed m  
Chapter Six of the thesis
8.3. The Medical Practitioner
8.3.1. By way of introduction it is necessary to examine 
the way m  which the explicit terms of the contract between 
a doctor and patient are laid down In doing so certain 
distinctions ought to be made First, there is a
25Cf LEEDS ESTATE, BUILDING AND INVESTMENT CO v
SHEPHERD (1887) 36 Ch D 787 at 802, per Stirling J
27Cf FOGG v GAULTER AND BLANE (1960) 110 L J 718
28Cf LAKE v BUSBY AND ANOTHER [1949] 2 All E R 964
29Cf ROCHE v PE I LOW [1985] I R 232
30Cf TAYLOR v RYAN (1995) P N L R 47
distinction between (1 ) general practitioner care and (1 1) 
hospital care Second, one must realize that a medical 
practitioner may deal with either the public or the private 
sector The former is eligible under the schemes provided 
by the Health Board, 1 e the G M S (General Medical 
Service) The private sector generally obtains medical care 
under the Voluntary Health Insurance Scheme (V H I 
Scheme) However, the relationship between a private 
patient and a general practitioner is often not insured, 
and eligibility to payment lies upon the patient himself 
In these instances the contracting parties are similar to 
the parties involved m  the provision and reception of 
medical services
The primary relationship between the health care 
provider and patient may be taken to be that made under the 
contract between the general practitioner and the G M S 
(general health care for the public sector) It is by 
virtue of this contract that patients are taken on by the 
doctor A similar contractual arrangement, outlining the 
inter-relational structure between doctors, patients and 
hospitals is the "Consultant's Contract" It replaced the 
salary and fee's scheme which existed prior to 1980 The 
contract was first initiated on proposals made by the 
Health Boards, the Voluntary Hospitals and the professional 
medical organisations 31 Further inter-relational 
structures are subject to private contracts between doctors
31See "Working Party on a Common Contract and Common 
Selection Procedure for Consultants", Interim Report 
(1978), Dublin Department of Health
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and (private) hospitals and to the rules laid down under 
the Voluntary Health Insurance Scheme In addition, the 
Patient's Charter sets out certain rights of the patient 
relying on hospital services Finally, the Medical 
Practitioners Act, 1978 provides a procedure as to the 
practitioner's fitness to practice
The General Practitioner
8 . 3 . 2 .  In Ireland, the terms of the contract between the 
G M S and the general practitioner is not to be found m  
one document However, Section 58 of the Health Act, 1970 
provides that the Health Boards are obliged to make 
available general medical services, free of charge, to 
eligible persons
The contractual terms are set out m  the Schedule to 
the "Form of Agreement with Registered Medical Practitioner 
for Provision of Services" 32 The Agreement itself consists 
of an undertaking to provide services m  accordance with 
section 58 for a particular Health Board area It specifies 
the places at which the doctor will attend and the hours of 
attendance It provides that such attendance will not be 
varied It permits the deduction of 5% of the capitation 
payments from gross receipts which are paid into a 
superannuation fund This superannuation fund is
32 (19 9 5), Dublin Department of Health (hereafter the 
Agreement) The Agreement followed the agreement which 
exists between the Minister and the Irish Medical 
Organisation under section 26 of the Health Act, 1970
(subparagraph 41(1) of the Schedule to the Agreement)
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The terms of the contract are subject to alteration 
every three years, according to the outcome of the review 
between the existing agreement between the Minister and the 
Irish Medical Organisation 33
It was recently asserted m  ASSOCIATION OF GENERAL 
PRACTITIONERS LTD AND OTHERS v MINISTER OF HEALTH [1995] 
2 I L R M 481 that the Minister acted illegally and ultra 
virus by entering into an agreement with the Irish Medical 
Organisation It was also claimed that the refusal to 
consult the Association of General Practitioners, as part 
of the review procedure, was unfair and contrary to 
practitioners' legitimate expectations However, these 
assertions were not upheld The Minister had a discretion 
m  how to exercise his function and, according to 0'Hanlon
t
J , as an employer he 'has freedom of choice as to whether 
he will negotiate or consult with any organisation on such 
matters' 34
In the Schedule to the Agreement certain terms and 
conditions are explicitly set out m  41 paragraphs and a 
schedule for payment rates is provided Though it is not 
intended to provide an exhaustive description of this 
contract, this section discusses the main paragraphs of the 
Agreement
The main paragraphs can be divided into at least three
constituted by Deed of Trust
33See subparagraph 41(2) of the Schedule to the
Agreement
34 [1995] 2 I L R M 481 at 482
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distinctive groups The first group of paragraphs relate to 
the eligibility of patients and their acceptance or 
assignment - who may avail of general public health 
services735 The second group consists of the duties of the
medical practitioner and his remuneration 36 The third
group deals with complaints and identifies the paragraphs 
which provide conflict resolution procedures 37
8 3.3. The first group of paragraphs of the Schedule 
deals with whom the medical practitioner may or must
provide medical services to Services are provided to 
people who are eligible and accepted by the medical 
practitioner or people who are assigned to him by the 
relevant Health Board 38
The assessment of eligibility is set out in sections 
45 and 46 of the Health Act, 1970 There are two 
categories First, adult persons and their dependants who 
cannot avail of medical services without undue hardship 
enjoy full eligibility Second, people with limited 
eligibility
An eligible person is accepted by the practitioner if 
that person lives within seven miles from the principal 
centre of practice This condition does not apply if a 
person lives more than seven miles from the practice and no
35See paragraphs 1-10 of the Agreement
36Ibid , paragraphs 11-27
37Ibid , paragraphs 16, 28, 30-41
2QIbid , paragraph 1
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doctor practices within seven miles of his residence or 
alternative arrangements have been made with the relevant 
Health Board 39
A medical practitioner ordinarily accepts patients on 
his panel In the event he does not wish to accept a 
particular patient he must, if so requested, give a reason 
m  confidence for this decision 40
In two circumstances the Health Board has the power to 
assign people on a practitioner's panel 41 These 
assignments are open for review on request by the medical 
practitioner after six months of the assignment taking 
effect The Health Board shall assign persons if (l) it is 
satisfied that the eligible person has not been accepted by 
at least three medical practitioners m  the area the person 
resides, unless there were good reasons to the contrary or
(1 1) the Agreement with a medical practitioner is 
terminated or suspended In this event, the Health Board 
assigns the persons who were on the practitioner's panel to 
another, with these persons' consent, until the suspension 
is lifted or another practitioner has succeeded the 
practitioner whose Agreement has been terminated
In addition, three other categories of people may 
avail of the practitioner's medical services (i) temporary 
residents with established eligibility,42 (n) children of
39Ibid , paragraph 3
40Jjbid , paragraph 2
41Ibid , paragraph 4
A2Ibid , paragraph 5
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eligible people, not being children under section 63 of the 
Health Act, 1970,43 and (in) eligible people who require 
emergency treatment 44
At any time the medical practitioner may ask the 
Health Board to remove a person from his panel, unless that 
person is assigned to him The petition must be given m  
confidence and provided with a reason if so requested 45
Under the Agreement a medical practitioner must be 
available for services for a total of 40 hours each week 
for at least five days These times must be known to his 
panel and suitable arrangements must be made m  events of 
urgency
8.3.4. The second group of paragraphs entails the duties
and rights of the medical practitioner under the Agreement
He is contractually bound to the relevant Health Board to 
fulfil these terms, but the terms are designed to take into 
account the interests of his panel However, whether a 
breach of these duties constitutes a cause of action for an 
individual patient on his panel remains to be seen The 
duties or obligations relate to, inter alia, the 
practitioner's competence, responsibilities, impartiality 
to treatment and clinical records
First and foremost, the Schedule expects the medical
42Ibid , subparagraph 1(d)
44Jjbid , paragraph 6
ASIbid , paragraph 9
46Xjbid , paragraph 10
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practitioner 7 on behalf of the relevant Health Board/, to 
provide 'proper and necessary treatment of a kind usually 
undertaken by a general practitioner' 47 He is not required 
to provide treatment involving the degree of skill or
experience normally expected from a specialist
Does this imply that if a medical practitioner fails 
to provide treatment usually undertaken by him, the
relevant Health Board is answerable for this failure to a
patient, having regard to the exact meaning of 'on behalf
of', or is the medical practitioner responsible for this 
failure to the patient on his own account9
According to McMahon & Binchy, it is now well
established that, since the decision m  0'DONOVAN v CORK 
COUNTY COUNCIL AND OTHERS [1967] I R 173, full time
medical staff of hospitals are servants for the purpose of 
vicarious liability 48 The question is whether general 
practitioners who have entered into the Agreement with the 
relevant Health Board can also be regarded as servants of 
the Health Boards
It appears that the requirements under the Agreement
and the Schedule are similar to those under the contract
between medical staff and the hospitals
In other instances, a hospital can owe a direct duty 
of care towards patients In KELLY v THE BOARD OF 
GOVERNORS OF ST LAURENCE'S HOSPITAL [1988] I R 402 the 
plaintiff - suffering from epilepsy - was off medication m
47Ibid , paragraph 11 (top)
48 (1990 754-755)
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order to undergo tests During his stay m  the hospital he 
fell out of a toilet window and suffered severe injuries 
The question was whether the hospital was negligent m  
leaving the patient unattended while going to the toilet 
It was held to be so m  the High Court The defendants 
appealed
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that 
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find for the 
plaintiff Henchy J (in a dissenting judgment) outlined 
the duty a hospital owes to its patients He stated that -
the duty the defendants owed to the plaintiff was 
to take reasonable care to avoid permitting him 
to be exposed to injury which a reasonable person 
ought to foresee, m  this case the duty of a 
reasonable hospital administration to provide a 
reasonable nursing service 49
Thus, the test is the reasonable careful person m  the 
position of the defendants, 1 e the hospital
Finlay C J refused to treat the case as one of 
medical negligence The issue was one of ' care and 
attention which a reasonable careful hospital would have 
afforded to the plaintiff' 50 The foreseeability of risk 
from a medical point of view is important but not vital to 
come to a decision
Thus, there is a distinction between the liability for 
duties owed by a hospital and a practitioner The former
49 [1988] I R 403
50 [1988] I R 402 at 406, per Henchy J
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may be liable if it fails to provide a safe system of 
hospital services, to provide staff with a proper system in 
which they can exercise their duties Where the doctor 
fails to discharge his duties, such as diagnosis, treatment 
and advice, the hospital may be vicarious liable
The Schedule points out that the medical practitioner 
is required to take full clinical responsibility for the 
people on his panel who require treatment and all other 
people who may legitimately avail of his services 51 Thus, 
the practitioner is subject to the clinical well-being of 
his patients, whereby "clinical" means the direct treatment 
of the ill-health of his patients
The practitioner must guard against or must take 
reasonable steps to avoid discrimination or differentiation 
regarding treatment of public (listed) and private 
patients 52 This includes the arrangement of surgery 
provisions It implies that the practitioner is obliged to 
employ a similar standard of care and treatment to public 
and private patients 53
The medical practitioner is required to administer 
treatment and provide care in a sufficient and economic
51See paragraph 11 of the Agreement It cannot be said 
that for all other persons the practitioner does not carry 
any responsibility The question is whether he is 
personally responsible or "on behalf of the relevant Health 
Board"
52See paragraph 11 of the Agreement
“According to Tormey (1992 379), it is on ethical
grounds important that 'the present financial incentives 
for doctors to preferentially treat private patients should 
be removed7
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manner having regard to the needs of the patient 54 This 
duty indicates that the practitioner has a responsibility 
to the Health Board with regard to the management of health 
care expenditure, whereby the interests of the patient must 
be taken into account
He must keep abreast with developments m  clinical 
care relevant to the general practice 55
He shall reside m  his area of practice or within 
reasonable access to it 56
In accordance with article 5 of the Health Services 
Regulations, 197157 the Health Board and its officers are 
required to keep and maintain a confidential register of 
clinical records of eligible persons These records cannot 
be disclosed so as to identify the name of the patient 
without the written consent of the relevant patient In 
order to satisfy the requirements of the Act the medical 
practitioner is obliged under paragraphs 22 and 23 of the 
Schedule to the Agreement to keep a register of clinical 
records of his panel 58
54See paragraph 11 of the Agreement With regard to 
the prescribing and dispensing of drugs, medicines or 
appliances, the practitioner must also take into account 
the need for economy, but his primary concern is the 
interest of the patient In doing so he shall have regard 
to the recommendations made jointly by the Minister and the 
Irish Medical Organisation, see paragraph 18 of the 
Agreement
55See paragraph 11 of the Agreement
56 Ibid
57S I 105/1971
58See also ARMSTRONG v EASTERN HEALTH BOARD [1995] 
P N L R 291
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In addition, the practitioner is advised to keep his 
own records, including, at least, a simple list of names of 
patients seen each day 59
Subject to a written consent from the patient, the 
practitioner provides, on transfer of the patient to 
another practitioner, the latter with a summary of the 
patient's medical history and condition 60 The Health Board 
must notify the patient, on retirement or resignation of a 
practitioner, the name of the new practitioner The patient 
must also be notified that if he does not want his clinical 
records to be transferred to the new practitioner, he 
should indicate so On the death of the practitioner 
however, the records are transferred without giving notice 
of the possibility to oppose against this transferral 61
The clinical records may be taken into custody by the 
Director of Community Care and the Medical Officer of 
Health Records deposited with him may be destroyed by him 
after a reasonable time 62 It is, however, not clarified 
what a reasonable time constitutes, does it refer to the 
records itself or the duration after a patient has ceased 
to be a member of the practitioner's panel or the duration 
after the practitioner has ceased to provide medical 
services under the Agreement9
With respect to these clinical records other questions
59See paragraph 24 of the Agreement
60Ibid , paragraph 23
61 J jb id
62 Ibid
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arise regarding the ownership of and access to these 
records It seems that the Health Services Regulations, 
1971,63 by imposing the obligation on the Health Boards to 
keep clinical records, imply that the records are held by 
the relevant Health Boards on behalf of the Minister of 
Health and are prepared or kept by the medical practitioner 
under the Agreement However, no reference is made as to 
whom the records may be examined by other then an
authorised person under regulation 5(4) of the Health
Services Regulations, 1971 Authorized persons are a
registered medical practitioner, the Chief Executive 
Officer or the Minister In addition, no reference is made 
to the possibility of access to clinical records by the 
patients Is it possible for a patient to give consent to 
the disclosure of his clinical records, without having
knowledge of its contents’64
The remuneration of the general practitioner is dealt 
with m  paragraphs 2 6 and 27 Payments to him are made in 
accordance with the scale of fees, allowances and other 
payments approved or directed by the Minister m  accordance 
with the contract The rate and frequency of the payments 
are set out m  Appendix A of the Schedule to the Agreement 
Under the contract the medical practitioner (or his deputy) 
is not allowed to demand or accept any other payments 65
63S I 105/1971
64Under the Patient's Charter the patient has a right
to access to his clinical records, subject to "therapeutic 
privilege" of the doctor
65See paragraph 27 of the Agreement
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The payment system  under th e  G e n e ra l M e d ic a l S e rv ic e s  
c o n tra c t  was s u b je c t to  deb ate  m  O'CONNOR v G IB L IN  AND 
OTHERS [1989] I  R 583 Under th e  c o n t r a c t ,  th e  g e n e ra l  
p r a c t i t io n e r  must keep a r e g is t e r  o f  a tte n d a n c e  m  o rd e r  to  
r e c e iv e  th e  r e q u ir e d  re m u n e ra tio n  I t  was a l le g e d  m  t h is  
case th a t  th e  p l a i n t i f f  had an e x c e s s iv e  r a te  o f  
a tte n d a n c e  The m a tte r  was in v e s t ig a te d  and i t  was d e c id e d  
th a t  th e r e  was in d e ed  an e x c e s s iv e  r a te  o f  a tte n d a n c e  The 
p l a i n t i f f ' s  re m u n e ra tio n  was reduced  a c c o rd in g ly  The 
H e a lth  Board came to  t h is  c o n c lu s io n  by means o f a 
s t a t i s t i c a l  com parison w ith  th e  averag e  r a te  o f  a tte n d a n c e  
o f o th e r  p r a c t i t io n e r s  The p l a i n t i f f  c la im e d  a d e c la r a t io n  
th a t  th e  d e c is io n  was u l t r a  vires
I t  was h e ld  th a t  th e  s t a t i s t i c a l  com parison as a 
s in g le  t e s t  was n o t an a p p ro p r ia te  s ta n d a rd  o f  judgm ent An 
e x c e s s iv e  r a te  o f  a tte n d a n c e  must be d e f in e d  as 7 a r a te  o f  
a tte n d a n c e  f o r  c o n s u lta t io n  o r  tre a tm e n t w hich exceeds what 
is  re a s o n a b ly  n e c e ss a ry  f o r  th e  p ro p e r d is c h a rg e  o f [th e  
p r a c t i t io n e r 's ]  c o n tr a c tu a l o b l ig a t io n s 7 66 In  d e c id in g  on 
w h eth er th e  a tte n d a n c e  r a te  was e x c e s s iv e  th e  H e a lth  Board  
was r e q u ire d  to  in v e s t ig a te  th e  m e d ic a l and o th e r  
c irc u m sta n c e s  o f  th e  p a t ie n ts  on th e  p r a c t i t i o n e r 7s p a n e l 
In  n o t d o in g  so th e  d e fe n d a n t had f a i l e d  to  address  th e  
q u e s tio n  and th e  d e c is io n  was a r b i t r a r y ,  u n re a s o n a b le  and 
ultra virus  i t s  powers
A t a l l  tim e s  th e  g e n e ra l p r a c t i t io n e r  is  a llo w e d  to  
te rm in a te  th e  c o n t r a c t ,  g iv in g  a t  le a s t  th r e e  months
66 [1989] I R 583 at 589, per Lardner J
355
n o t ic e  67 The H e a lth  Board may te rm in a te  th e  c o n tra c t  on 
fo u r  in s ta n c e s  ( 1 ) where th e  p r a c t i t i o n e r 's  name is  e ras e d  
from  th e  r e g is t e r  un der th e  M e d ic a l P r a c t i t io n e r s  A c t,  
19 7 8 , 68 ( n )  where th e  H e a lth  B oard is  s a t i s f i e d  th a t  th e
m e d ic a l p r a c t i t io n e r  is  s u f fe r in g  from  a perm anent 
i n f i r m i t y  o f  mind o r  body (a g a in s t  w h ich  an a p p e a l l i e s  to  
th e  M in is t e r  o f  H e a l t h ) , 69 ( m )  th e  m e d ic a l p r a c t i t io n e r  
has reach ed  th e  age o f 65 , (o r  70 y e a rs  m  th e  case o f  
those  e n te r in g  in to  c o n tra c ts  on th e  commencement d a te  o f  
th e  Agreem ent under s e c t io n  58 o f  th e  H e a lth  A c t , 1 9 7 0 ) ,70 
and (iv) i f  th e r e  is  a s e r io u s  b reach  o f  th e  Agreem ent 71 
The t h i r d  in s ta n c e  was d is p u te d  m  GREHAN v NORTH­
EASTERN HEALTH BOARD AND OTHERS [1989] I  R 422 The 
p l a i n t i f f  o b je c te d  a g a in s t  th e  new c o n d it io n s  o f th e
Schedule r e g u la t in g  th e  te r m in a t io n  o f th e  s e rv ic e  c o n tra c t  
betw een a g e n e ra l p r a c t i t io n e r  and th e  r e le v a n t  H e a lth  
Board w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  new a g e - l im i t  (65) These
c o n d it io n s  were a r e s u l t  o f  n e g o t ia t io n s  betw een th e  I r i s h  
M e d ic a l O rg a n is a t io n  ( I  M O ) and th e  f i r s t  d e fe n d a n t The
p l a i n t i f f  s a id  th a t  she was n o t a member o f  th e  I  M 0 and
th e r e fo r e  c la im e d  th a t  h e r  agreem ent w ith  th e  f i r s t  
d e fe n d a n t c o u ld  n o t be te rm in a te d  o r  a l t e r e d  w ith o u t h e r  
consent The d e fe n d a n t c la im e d  th a t  i t  c o u ld  te rm in a te  th e
67See  p a ra g ra p h  34 o f  th e  Agreem ent
68Ibid  , p a ra g rap h  35
69Ibid  , p a ra g ra p h  3 7
70Ibid  , p a ra g ra p h  3 8
71 Ibid , subparagraph 30(3)
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agreem ent a f t e r  g iv in g  h e r  re a s o n a b le  n o t ic e  Thus, th e  
q u e s tio n  was w h eth er th e  c o u rt  c o u ld  im p ly  a te rm  in t o  th e  
c o n tra c t  th a t  e n t i t l e d  th e  H e a lth  B oard to  te rm in a te  th e  
c o n tra c t  a f t e r  g iv in g  re a s o n a b le  n o t ic e  C o s te l lo  J h e ld  
m  th e  H igh  C o u rt th a t  th e  exp ress  term s o f  th e  Agreem ent 
were so c le a r  and unambiguous th a t  th e  c o u r t  c o u ld  no t 
j u s t i f y  an im p lie d  te rm  th a t  m o d if ie d  th e s e  exp ress  te rm s , 
m  p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  exp ress  term  th a t  th e  c o n tr a c t  w i l l  be 
te rm in a te d  on th e  p r a c t i t io n e r  re a c h in g  th e  age o f s e v e n ty  
The im p lie d  te rm  d id  n o t g iv e  e f f ic a c y  to  th e  c o n t r a c t ,  no r  
was th e r e  any in t e n t io n  to  do so, upon c o n s tru c t io n  o f th e  
c o n tra c t
The H e a lth  Board may suspend th e  c o n tra c t  under 
p a ra g ra p h  31 , o r  where an o rd e r  is  made by th e  H igh  C ourt 
under p a ra g ra p h  3 5
8 . 3 . 5 .  The t h i r d  group o f  p a rag rap h s  d e a ls  w ith  ( i ) 
c o m p la in ts  re g a rd in g  th e  n o n -co m p lian ce  o f any o f  th e  term s  
under th e  Agreem ent and ( n )  c o n f l i c t  r e s o lu t io n  p ro c ed u re s  
w ith  re g a rd  to  d is p u te s  a r is in g  o u t o f  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  th e  
Agreem ent betw een th e  two p a r t ie s  to  th e  c o n tra c t
Under p a ra g ra p h  28 b o th  p a r t ie s  to  th e  Agreem ent must 
c o -o p e ra te  w ith  each o th e r  to  see th a t  th e  term s o f  th e  
c o n tra c t  a re  r e a l iz e d  In  th e  e ven t o f  a c o n f l i c t  th e  
p a r t ie s  ag ree  to  th e  c o n f l i c t  r e s o lu t io n  p ro c e d u re  s e t ou t 
m  subp aragraph  4 1 (5 )  I t  p ro v id e s  th a t  th e  p a r t ie s  o f  th e  
Agreem ent ag ree  to  a r b i t r a t i o n  in  th e  e v en t o f  a d is p u te  
c o n c e rn in g  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  th e  Agreem ent In  such an
357
e v e n t, r e fe r e n c e  is  made to  a t h i r d  p a r ty  to  w h ich  b o th  
p a r t ie s  a g re e , o r  a t h i r d  p a r ty  is  no m inated  by th e  
Chairm an o f th e  Labour C o u rt m  th e  e v e n t o f  th e  p a r t ie s  
n o t b e in g  m  agreem ent An exam ple o f  a c o n f l i c t  w h ich  is  
s u b je c t  to  t h is  p ro c e d u re  concerns m a tte rs  re g a rd in g  th e  
use o f H e a lth  B oard p rem ises  72
The p ro ced u re s  w hich a re  to  be fo llo w e d  a re  s e t o u t by  
th e  a r b i t r a t o r  and h is  d e c is io n  is  ac ce p te d  u n le s s  b o th  
p a r t ie s  a g ree  th a t  th e  d e c is io n  goes o u ts id e  th e  term s o f  
th e  Agreem ent On re q u e s t o f  one o f th e  p a r t ie s  th e
Chairm an o f th e  Labour C ourt may d e c id e  w h eth er th e  
d e c is io n  is  o u ts id e  th e  term s T h is  d e c is io n  is  b in d in g  to  
th e  p a r t ie s  However, t h is  does n o t w a ive  th e  r ig h t  o f  b o th  
p a r t ie s  to  have th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  th e  c o n tr a c t  j u d i c i a l l y  
re v ie w e d  C o n se q u e n tly , th e  d e c is io n , a lth o u g h  assumed to  
be a c ce p te d  by b o th  p a r t ie s ,  c a r r ie s  th e  n a tu re  o f  a
recom m endation 73
The C h ie f  M e d ic a l O f f i c e r  addresses  a c o m p la in t i f  he
has reaso n  to  b e l ie v e  th a t  th e  m e d ic a l p r a c t i t io n e r  does
n o t com ply w ith  th e  term s s e t o u t m  th e  A greem ent, o r  when 
an in d iv id u a l  ( l i v i n g )  p a t ie n t  com pla ins  w ith  re s p e c t to  
h is  p r a c t i t io n e r  w i th in  s ix  weeks o f th e  a l le g e d  e v e n t 74 
The Agreem ent does n o t make c le a r  w h eth er a c o m p la in t o f  an
12Ibid  , p a ra g rap h  16 (bottom )
73 Jjbid
74Ibid  , p a ra g ra p h  3 0 The C h ie f  E x e c u tiv e  O f f ic e r  
cannot c o n s id e r  a c o m p la in t th a t  r e la t e s  to  an in d iv id u a l  
p a t ie n t ,  w ith o u t th a t  p a t ie n t  i n i t i a t i n g  th e  c o m p la in t  
p ro c ed u re
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in d iv id u a l  p a t ie n t  must r e la t e  to  th e  term s s e t ou t 
t h e r e in
The C h ie f  E x e c u tiv e  O f f i c e r  may fo l lo w  th r e e  courses  
o f a c t io n  ( 1 ) he may r e q u ir e  th e  m e d ic a l p r a c t i t io n e r  to  
m a in ta in  any a d d i t io n a l  re c o rd s , ( 1 1 ) he may r e f e r  th e  
m a tte r  to  th e  C o m p la in ts  O f f i c e r  (who may, a f t e r  
in v e s t ig a t io n ,  (a) d e c id e  th a t  th e  c o m p la in t is  o f  no 
su b s tan ce , (b) is s u e  a w arn in g  a n d /o r  impose a d e d u c tio n  o f  
paym ents o r  (c) he may r e f e r  th e  is s u e  back to  th e  C h ie f  
E x e c u tiv e  O f f i c e r  because o f th e  s e r io u s  n a tu re  o f  th e  
m a tte r  co m pla ined  o f)  and ( 1 1 1 ) th e  C h ie f  E x e c u tiv e  O f f i c e r  
may, m  any o th e r  case o f s e r io u s  b reach es  o f  th e  c o n tr a c t  
o r  by r e fe r e n c e  o f th e  C o m p la in t O f f i c e r ,  te rm in a te  th e  
c o n tra c t  o r  ta k e  o th e r  d is c ip l in a r y  a c t io n  75
P r io r  to  t h i s ,  th e  C h ie f  E x e c u tiv e  O f f i c e r  
com m unicates th e  reasons o f th e  c o m p la in t to  th e  
p r a c t i t io n e r  and n o t i f i e s  him th a t  he s h a l l  c o n s id e r  any  
r e p re s e n ta t io n s  made by th e  p r a c t i t io n e r  w i th in  one month 
o f th e  is s u e  o f th e  n o t i f i c a t i o n
D is c ip l in a r y  a c t io n  c o n s is ts  o f  e i t h e r  te r m in a t in g  th e  
c o n tra c t  o r  suspending th e  Agreem ent p en d in g  th e  
in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  th e  c o m p la in t, and th e  c a re  o f  th e  p a t ie n t  
o r  p a t ie n ts  in v o lv e d  is  m  je o p a rd y  The d e c is io n  may be 
ap p e a le d  by th e  m e d ic a l p r a c t i t io n e r  to  th e  G M S 
t r ib u n a l  76
75See subparagraphs 3 0 ( 1 ) ,  (2) and (3) o f  th e
Agreem ent
16Ibid , paragraph 33
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The Consultant's Contract
8 .3 .6  S in ce  1991 th e  C o n s u lta n t 's  C o n tra c t77 is  r e v is e d
and i t s  c o n te n t is  based on th e  term s o f th e  common 
c o n tra c t  (m  e x is te n c e  p r io r  to  1991) and th e  c o n te n ts  o f  
th e  In te r im  R ep o rt o f  th e  W orking P a r ty  on a Common 
C o n tra c t , 1978 70 T h is  re p o r te d  in c lu d e d  th e  
recom m endations o f th e  R eview  Body on H ig h e r  R em uneration  
m  th e  P u b lic  S e c to r  as w e l l  as th e  outcome o f th e  
n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  th e  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e  b o d ie s  o f  th e  m e d ic a l 
p ro fe s s io n  The G u id e lin e s  o f  Comhairle na nOspideal  a re  
now p a r t  o f  th e  C o n tra c t Documents m  accordance w ith  
s u b s e c tio n  4 1 ( 1 ) ( b ) ( l )  o f  th e  H e a lth  A c t , 1970
8 . 3 . 7 .  The C o n tra c t Documents c o n s is t  o f  ( 1 ) th e  
C o n tra c t f o r  A ppointm ent (th e  a c tu a l c o n t r a c t ) , ( n )  th e
Memorandum o f Agreem ent w hich e x p la in s  th e  term s and 
c o n d it io n s  o f th e  c o n t r a c t ,  such as , i n t e r  a l i a ,  th e  n a tu re  
and s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  a p p o in tm e n t, th e  re m u n e ra tio n  and th e  
c o n d it io n s  o f  em ploym ent, and ( i n )  A ppendices
The ap p o in tm en t is  perm anent (w ith  an i n i t i a l  
p ro b a t io n  p e r io d  o f  tw e lv e  months f o r  c o n s u lta n ts  n o t under 
an e x is t in g  c o n tr a c t )  and th e  p e n s io n a b le  age is  s e t  a t  65 
A s u p e ra n n u a tio n  fund  is  p ro v id e d  f o r ,  by e i t h e r  th e  L o ca l 
Government Scheme o r  th e  V o lu n ta ry  H o s p ita l  S u p era n n u a tio n
77" C o n s u lta n t7 s C o n tra c t Documents" (1 9 9 1 ) , D u b lin  
D epartm ent o f  H e a lth
78D u b lm  D epartm ent o f  H e a lth
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Scheme Where th e  ap p o in tm en t is  under a H e a lth  B oard , P a r t  
I I  o f  th e  H e a lth  A ct w i l l  a p p ly  to  th e  ap p o in tm en t 79
The c o n tr a c t  p ro v id e s  f o r  th r e e  c a te g o r ie s  o f  p o sts  
g e o g ra p h ic a l w h o le tim e , e x is t in g  w h o le tim e  and p a r t - t im e  
Under a w h o le tim e  p o s i t io n  th e  c o n s u lta n t  has a commitment 
o f 1 0 -1 1  f ix e d  and f l e x i b l e  s ess io n s  p lu s  2 n o n -s c h e d u la b le  
sess io n s  p e r  week C o n s u lta n ts  a re  a llo w e d  to  engage m  a 
p r iv a t e  p r a c t ic e ,  ta k in g  in t o  account th e  c o n d it io n s  s e t  
o u t m  th e  Memorandum o f  Agreem ent (sub p arag rap h  5 16) 80 
P a r t - t im e  c o n s u lta n ts  have sch ed u led  s e ss io n s  w hich a re  
p r o p o r t io n a te  to  t h e i r  commitment
A c o n s u lta n t  is  d e f in e d  m  c la u s e  5 1 o f  th e  C o n tra c t  
f o r  A ppoin tm ent as -
a r e g is te r e d  m e d ic a l p r a c t i t io n e r  m  h o s p ita l  
p r a c t ic e  who, by reason  o f h is  t r a in in g ,  s k i l l  
and e x p e rie n c e  m  a d e s ig n a te d  s p e c ia l i t y ,  is  
c o n s u lte d  by o th e r  r e g is te r e d  m e d ic a l 
p r a c t i t io n e r s  and u n d e rta k e s  f u l l  c l i n i c a l  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  p a t ie n ts  m  h is  c a re , o r  th a t  
a s p e c t on w hich he has been c o n s u lte d , w ith o u t  
s u p e rv is io n  in  p r o fe s s io n a l m a tte rs  by any o th e r  
p erson  He w i l l  be a p erson  o f  c o n s id e ra b le  
p r o fe s s io n a l c a p a c ity  and p e rs o n a l i n t e g r i t y
The essence o f h is  work in v o lv e s  th e  d ia g n o s is , 
a n a ly s is ,  t re a tm e n t o r  d e s c r ip t io n  o f t re a tm e n t f o r  h is  
p a t ie n ts  He c a r r ie s  ongoing r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  them as 
lo n g  as th e y  rem ain  m  h is  c a re  In  d o in g  so, he en jo ys
79See c la u s e  4 o f  th e  C o n tra c t f o r  A ppo in tm ent
B0Ibid  , c la u s e  8 2
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' c l i n i c a l  in d ep en d en ce ' 81 T h is  independence is  e x e rc is e d  
w ith in  presumed l i m i t s  and i t  d e r iv e s  from  th e  concept o f  
th e  s p e c i f ic  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een d o c to r  and p a t ie n t ,  
whereby th e  l a t t e r  t r u s t s  th e  d o c to r  m  ta k in g  th e  
d e c is io n s  m  th e  p a t ie n t 's  b e s t in t e r e s t s  and c o n tin u e s  to  
have f u l l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  t h e i r  consequences
R e g a rd le s s  o f  th e  manner o f  r e f e r r a l ,  th e  d o c to r -  
p a t ie n t  r e la t io n s h ip  is  a p e rs o n a l one once a p a t ie n t  and 
d o c to r  come in to  c o n ta c t 82 The l i m i t s  a re  s a id  to  be s e t  
by th e  p a t ie n t 's  co n se n t, th e  law  and p r o fe s s io n a l and 
e t h ic a l  s ta n d a rd s  83
O th e r r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  in c lu d e  th e  management o f  th e  
c o n s u lta n t 's  own p r a c t ic e  and p r a c t ic e  p la n  as w e l l  as th e  
c o -o p e r a t io n  and p a r t ic ip a t io n  m  th e  ru n n in g  o f  th e  
d ep artm en t o r  u n i t  m  w hich th e  c o n s u lta n t  p r a c t ic e s  84
The c o n s u lta n t  has a d u ty  to  keep a b re a s t w ith  new 
developm ents m  h is  a re a  o f  e x p e r t is e  He m ust, t h e r e fo r e ,  
ta k e  th e  i n i t i a t i v e  w ith  re g a rd  to  'a  programme o f
81See subp aragraph  6 3 2 o f  th e  Memorandum o f
Agreem ent
82In  an A m erican case , th e  p l a i n t i f f  a rgued  th a t  a
p r o fe s s io n a l r e la t io n s h ip  had been e s ta b lis h e d  betw een h e r  
and th e  d o c to r  who was c o n s u lte d  f o r  a d v ic e  by th e  d o c to r  
who was a c t u a l ly  t r e a t in g  h e r , based on th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  
a t h i r d - p a r t y - b e n e f lc ia r y  c o n tra c t  T h is  was r e je c te d  by 
th e  c o u rt  s t a t in g  th a t  to  see w h eth er a d o c to r -p a t ie n t
r e la t io n s h ip  had been e s ta b lis h e d  sh o u ld , among o th e r  
th in g s , be based on th e  c o n s id e ra t io n  ' to  what e x te n t  th e  
c o n s u lta t iv e  p h y s ic ia n  had e x e rc is e d  p r o fe s s io n a l  
ju d g m e n t', (GILINSKY v INDELICATO, The N a t io n a l Law 
J o u rn a l, 18 A ugust 1995)
83See subp aragraph  6 3 4 o f  th e  Memorandum o f
Agreem ent
84See c la u s e  6 o f  th e  C o n tra c t f o r  A ppo in tm ent
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c o n t in u a l m e d ic a l e d u c a tio n  r e le v a n t  to  h is  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  b o th  as p r a c t is in g  c o n s u lta n t  and as a 
manager o f  re s o u rc e s ' 85
C o m p la in ts  o r  d is p u te s  a r is in g  o u t o f  th e  c o n tr a c t  a re
d e a l t  w ith  w i th in  th e  'n o rm a l s t ru c tu r e s  o f  th e  em ploy ing
1
a u t h o r i t y '  86 I f  r e s o lu t io n  p ro ves  im p o s s ib le , th e  prob lem  
s h a l l  be r e fe r r e d  to  a m u tu a lly  ag reed  upon t h i r d  p a r ty
The P a t ie n t 's  C h a r te r 87
8 . 3 . 8 .  The C h a r te r  is  d es ig n ed  to  p u t th e  p a t ie n t  f i r s t  
I t  em phasizes t h a t ,  on th e  one hand, th e  p a t ie n t  is  aware  
o f h is  r ig h t s  and, on th e  o th e r  hand, th e  h e a lth  s e rv ic e s  
become more aware o f  p a t ie n t s '  needs and d e s ire s  These 
r ig h t s  a re  n o t new b u t have a lr e a d y  been re c o g n iz e d  and 
in c lu d e  to p ic s  such as access to  h o s p ita l  and o u t - p a t ie n t  
s e rv ic e s , in fo r m a t io n  and c o n s e n t, c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  and 
c o m p la in ts
G e n e r a lly  th e  p a t ie n t  has access to  h o s p ita l  s e rv ic e s  
But i t  is  a t  th e  d is c r e t io n  o f  th e  h o s p ita l  to  d e te rm in e  
where and when T h is  d is c r e t io n  is  used m  th e  e v en t o f  
u n a v a i l a b i l i t y  o r  th e  c a n c e l la t io n  o f  th e  recommended
85See subp aragraph  4 15 o f  th e  Memorandum o f  
Agreem ent
86See c la u s e  8 8 o f  th e  C o n tra c t f o r  A ppo in tm ent o f  
C o n s u lta n t and subp aragraph  8 1 o f  th e  Memorandum o f  
Agreem ent
87"A C h a r te r  o f  R ig h ts  f o r  H o s p ita l  P a t ie n ts "  (1 9 9 5 ) ,  
D u b lin  D ep artm ent o f  H e a lth , p 1 ( h e r e a f te r  th e
C h a rte r )
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m e d ic a l p ro ced u re
The p a t ie n t  has th e  r ig h t  to  be in fo rm e d  about th e  
n a tu re  o f  th e  i l l n e s s , m e d ic a l p ro c ed u res  and r i s k s , and 
th e  name o f  h is  c o n s u lta n t  He a ls o  has th e  r ig h t  to  
consent  to  th e  t r e a tm e n t , th e  d o c to r  must o b ta in  consent 
p r io r  to  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  t re a tm e n t In  d o in g  so, he 
must have in fo rm e d  th e  p a t ie n t  about th e  n a tu re  and 
consequences o f  th e  proposed tr e a tm e n t ,  m  a form  o f  
language u n d e rs ta n d a b le  to  th e  p a t ie n t  88
In  th e  v ie w  o f t h is  re s e a rc h e r , i t  must be em phasized  
th a t  th e  r ig h t  to  consent must be u n d ers to o d  as a r ig h t  to  
be in fo rm e d  about th e  n a tu re  and consequences o f  th e  
t re a tm e n t The consent i t s e l f  i s ,  a t  le a s t  m  I r e la n d ,  a 
p r e c o n d it io n  f o r  tre a tm e n t In  o th e r  w ords, i t  i s  th e  
d o c to r 's  d u ty  to  o b ta in  co n s e n t, i t  i s  th e  p a t ie n t 's  r ig h t  
to  be in fo rm e d
The p a t ie n t  has th e  r ig h t  to  have access to  d e t a i l s  o f  
r e le v a n t  c o n f id e n t ia l  m e d ic a l re c o rd s , e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  o r  
by com m unication th ro u g h  th e  fa m i ly  d o c to r , b u t s u b je c t  to  
th e  d o c to r 's  d is c r e t io n  89 T h is  seems c u r io u s , i t  is  a t  th e  
d is c r e t io n  o f th e  d o c to r  w h eth er o r  n o t th e  in fo rm a t io n  
b e in g  d is c lo s e d  would harm th e  p a t ie n t 's  p h y s ic a l o r  m en ta l 
w e ll -b e in g  However, c o u ld , as a consequence, th e  p a t i e n t 's  
a n x ie ty  have been r a is e d  even f u r t h e r 7 O r, is  th e  p a t ie n t  
l e f t  m  doubt o r  ig n o ra n c e  as to  w h eth er in fo r m a t io n  is  
d is c lo s e d , e i t h e r  f u l l y  o r  p a r t i a l l y 7
88See a r t i c l e s  7 and 8 o f  th e  C h a r te r
Q9Ibid  , a r t i c l e  9
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In  E ng land t h is  prob lem  was ad d ressed  m  R v MID 
GLAMORGAN FAMILY HEALTH SERVICES AUTHORITY AND ANOTHER, EX 
PARTE MARTIN [1994] 21 B M L R 1 The C o u rt o f  A ppeal h e ld  
th a t  th e  p a t ie n t  has a r ig h t  o f  access to  h is  m e d ic a l 
re c o rd s , b o th  under common law  and s ta tu t e  (s u b s e c tio n s  
5 (1 )  and (2) o f  th e  Access to  M e d ic a l Records A c t , 1990 
However, t h is  r ig h t  is  q u a l i f i e d  The r e le v a n t  a u t h o r i t y  my 
deny access i f  i t  i s  m  th e  b e s t in t e r e s t  o f  th e  p a t ie n t  to  
do so
P r o fe s s io n a l M isconduct
8 . 3 . 9 .  The M e d ic a l P r a c t i t io n e r s  A c t , 1978 p ro v id e s  a 
p ro ced u re  w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  f i t n e s s  to  p r a c t ic e  The 
conduct o f  a m e d ic a l p r a c t i t io n e r  may un der s e c t io n  4 5 o f  
th e  A ct be s u b je c te d  to  an in q u ir y  w ith  re g a rd  to
p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct o r  f i t n e s s  to  engage m  p r a c t ic e  by  
reaso n  o f  m e n ta l o r  p h y s ic a l d i s a b i l i t y
I f  th e  p r a c t i t io n e r  is  a c c o rd in g ly  g u i l t y  o f
p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct o r  i t  is  p roven  th a t  he is  u n f i t  to  
p r a c t ic e  he may be suspended o r  s tru c k  o f f  from  th e  G e n e ra l
R e g is te r  o f  M e d ic a l P r a c t i t io n e r s  o r  from  th e  R e g is te r  o f
M e d ic a l S p e c ia l is ts  90 The p r a c t i t io n e r  concerned  may a p p ly  
to  th e  H ig h  C ourt f o r  c a n c e l la t io n  o f  th e  d e c is io n  91 In  
any e v e n t, th e  C o u n c il must i t s e l f  a p p ly  to  th e  H igh  C ourt
90The R e g is te r  o f  M e d ic a l S p e c ia l is ts  is  as o f  y e t  no t 
e s ta b lis h e d
91See s u b s e c tio n  4 6 (3 )  o f  th e  M e d ic a l P r a c t i t io n e r s  
A c t, 1978
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to  have i t s  d e c is io n  c o n firm e d  92 On th e  h e a r in g  o f an 
a p p l ic a t io n  b e fo re  th e  H igh  C o u rt, i t  may re g a rd  'e v id e n c e  
o f any p erson  o f  s ta n d in g  m  th e  m e d ic a l p ro fe s s io n  as to  
what is  p r o fe s s io n a l m isco n d u ct' 93
The G u id e lin e s  o f  th e  M e d ic a l C o u n c il d e s c r ib e  
p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct as 'c o n d u c t w h ich  d o c to rs  o f  
e x p e r ie n c e , com petence and good re p u te  c o n s id e r  d is g r a c e fu l  
o r d is h o n o u ra b le ' 94 The d o c to r 's  f i t n e s s  to  p r a c t ic e  must 
be exam ined, ta k in g  in t o  account th e  'm e r i ts  o f  th e  
case ' 95
In  E ng land th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct 
was r e c e n t ly  addressed  m  MCCANDLESS v  GENERAL MEDICAL 
COUNCIL [1996] 1 W L R 167 In  t h is  case , a d o c to r  was
found g u i l t y  o f  s e r io u s  p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct by th e  
P ro fe s s io n a l Conduct Com m ittee o f  th e  E n g lis h  G e n e ra l 
M e d ic a l C o u n c il The Com m ittee d i r e c te d  to  e ra s e  th e  d o c to r  
from  th e  r e g is t e r ,  ta k in g  in t o  account th e  po or s ta n d a rd  o f  
m e d ic a l c a re  p ro v id e d  by th e  d o c to r  to  th e  th r e e  p a t ie n t s ,  
who i n i t i a l l y  com pla ined
The d o c to r  a p p e a le d , a l le g in g  th a t  th e  Com m ittee  
a p p lie d  a wrong t e s t  to  d e te rm in e  s e r io u s  p r o fe s s io n a l  
m isco n d u ct, i t  shou ld  mean conduct th a t  is  m o ra lly  
b lam ew o rth y , m  l i n e  w ith  th e  p re -M e d ic a l A c t , 1969
92Ibid  , s u b s e c tio n  4 6 (4 )
93X b id  , s u b s e c tio n  4 6 (9 )
94A Guide to  E t h ic a l  Conduct and B e h a v io u r and to
F itn e s s  to  P r a c t ic e "  (1994) 4 th  E d i t io n ,  D u b lin  The 
M e d ic a l C o u n c il, subparagraph  12 07
9SIbid , subparagraph 12 08
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in t e r p r e t a t io n
T h is  was r e je c te d  T h e ir  L o rd sh ip s  f i r s t  found th a t  
th e  o ld  a u t h o r i t ie s  d id  n o t a p p ly  a s im i la r  approach They  
r e fe r r e d  to ,  f o r  exam ple, th e  d e c is io n  m  REX v GENERAL 
COUNCIL OF MEDICAL EDUCATION AND REGISTRATION OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM [1930] 1 K B  562 In  t h is  case an o b je c t iv e  
s ta n d a rd  was used The conduct was ju dged  'a c c o rd in g  to  th e  
r u le s  w r i t t e n  o r  u n w r it te n  g o v e rn in g  th e  p r o fe s s io n ' 96 In  
FELIX v  GENERAL DENTAL COUNCIL [1960] A C 704 r e fe re n c e  
was made w h eth er conduct was based on an h o n e s t ly  h e ld  
o p in io n
Second, t h e i r  L o rd sh ip s  h e ld  th a t  th e  v a r i a t i o n  o f  
m easurers , whereby e ra s u re  is  th e  most s e r io u s  one, 
in d ic a te d  to  in c lu d e  s e r io u s  cases o f n e g lig e n c e
T h ir d ,  th e  p u b lic  e x p e c ta t io n  o f p r o fe s s io n a l ,  
in c lu d in g  m e d ic a l, s e rv ic e s  is  h ig h e r  m  r e la t io n  to  th o se  
p ro fe s s io n s  w hich a re  g iv e n  a s e l f - r e g u la t o r y  mandate
F o u rth , th e  a u t h o r i t a t iv e  s ta te m e n t is  a t  p re s e n t  
o b je c t iv e  S e rio u s  p r o fe s s io n a l m isco n d u ct, ju dged  by  
p ro p e r p r o fe s s io n a l s ta n d a rd s  and th e  c irc u m sta n c e s  o f th e  
case (th e  o b je c t iv e  fa c ts  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l  p a t i e n t ) , is  
conduct th a t  no d o c to r  o f  re a s o n a b le  s k i l l  e x e r c is in g  
re a s o n a b le  c a re  w ould c a r r y  o u t and may in c lu d e  s e r io u s  
n e g l ig e n t  conduct T h is  t e s t  d e r iv e d  from  th e  d e c is io n  m  
DOUGHTY v  GENERAL DENTAL COUNCIL [1987] A C  164 The 
m eaning o f  th e  w o rd in g  " s e r io u s  p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct"  
was a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y  s ta te d  as b e in g  o b je c t iv e  The conduct
96 [1930] 1 K B  562 a t  569 , per  S c ru tto n  L J
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of the practitioner must be -
ju dged  by p ro p e r  p r o fe s s io n a l s ta n d a rd s  m  th e  
l i g h t  o f  th e  o b je c t iv e  fa c ts  about th e  in d iv id u a l  
p a t ie n ts  [ ] th e  d e n ta l tre a tm e n ts  c r i t i c i s e d
as un n essecary  [were] tre a tm e n ts  th a t  no dentist 
of reasonable skill exercising care would carry 
out  97
8 .3 .1 0 .  T h ere  is  a t h in  l i n e  betw een p r a c t i t io n e r s  who 
a re  g u i l t y  o f  p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct and p r a c t i t io n e r s  who 
were n e g l ig e n t  m  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  t h e i r  p r a c t ic e  However, 
th e  two must be d is t in g u is h e d  I t  cannot be s a id  th a t  
p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct a u to m a t ic a l ly  le a d s  to  n e g lig e n c e  
and n e g l ig e n t  conduct does n o t a u to m a t ic a l ly  e n t a i l  
p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct
The d i s t i n c t io n  l i e s  m  th e  f a c t  th a t  p r o fe s s io n a l
m isconduct may in v o lv e  a much w id e r  s c a le  o f  e v e n ts  In  
n e g lig e n c e  th e  d o c to r 's  conduct is  c o n fin e d  to  th e  b reach  
o f a d u ty  o f  c a re  th a t  was owed to  th e  p a t ie n t  The f a i l u r e
to  a c t m  accordance w ith  e t h ic a l  r u le s  o r  g u id e lin e s  may
in v o lv e  some k in d  o f m ora l b lam ew o rth in e ss  and d is c r e d i t  
th e  p r o fe s s io n a l s ta n d a rd , and f o r  th a t  reaso n  th e
p r a c t i t io n e r  may be g u i l t y  o f  p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct
The I r i s h  M e d ic a l P r a c t i t io n e r s  A c t, 1978 is  u n c le a r  
what is  meant by p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct on th e  one hand,
97 [1987] A C 164 a t  173 ( i t a l i c s  added) In  GEE v  
GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL [1987] 2 B M L R 100 a t  101 i t  was 
h e ld  th a t  a course o f  conduct c o u ld  amount to  s e r io u s  
p r o fe s s io n a l m isco n d u ct, 7 even though th e  p a r t i c u la r  
in s ta n c e s  m aking up th a t  course d id  n o t '
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and e t h ic a l  conduct on th e  o th e r  Tomkin (1995) a s s e r ts  
th a t  th e  M e d ic a l C o u n c il cannot impose s a n c tio n s  f o r  
a lle g e d  e t h ic a l  m isconduct N e ith e r  can i t  is s u e  codes o f  
p r o fe s s io n a l conduct d e a lin g  w ith  ' e t h i c a l  conduct and 
b e h a v io u r ' 98 The w r i t e r  suggests  th a t  t h is  is  beyond th e  
powers o f  th e  M e d ic a l C o u n c il 99 I f  so, th e  d e c is io n  m  RE 
A WARD OF COURT [1995] 2 I L R M  401 may have two
im p l ic a t io n s  F i r s t ,  m  fo l lo w in g  th e  c o u rt  o rd e r  th e  
p r a c t i t io n e r  is  n o t m  b re ach  w ith  th e  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  
r ig h t s  o f  th e  p a t ie n t ,  b u t i t  may re n d e r  him l i a b l e  f o r  
p r o fe s s io n a l m isconduct Second, a d h e r in g  to  th e  
G u id e lin e s , is s u e d  by th e  M e d ic a l C o u n c il, th e  p r a c t i t io n e r  
breach es  th e  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  r ig h t s  o f  th e  p a t ie n t  100
8 .4 .  The S o l i c i t o r
8 . 4 . 1 .  The p r o fe s s io n a l r e la t io n s h ip  as i t  e x is ts  
betw een a s o l i c i t o r  and h is  c l i e n t  is  re c o g n iz e d  m  e q u ity  
as a f id u c ia r y  r e la t io n s h ip  I t  imposes on th e  s o l i c i t o r  a 
g e n e ra l d u ty  to  ta k e  c a re  as w e l l  as s p e c ia l  o b l ig a t io n s  
T h is  was re c o g n iz e d  in ,  inter alia, NOCTON v LORD 
ASHBURTON [1 9 1 4 -1 5 ] A l l  E R 45 and BROWN v I R C  [1964]
98See s e c t io n  69 o f  th e  M e d ic a l P r a c t i t io n e r s  A c t,
1978
"S ee a ls o  Tomkin & Me A u le y  (1995a) , supra 
S ubparagraph 2 6 7
100The d e c is io n  m  RE A WARD OF COURT [1995] 2 I  L R M 
401 is  exam ined m  d e t a i l  m  C h a p te r 10
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G e n e r a lly  th e  s o l i c i t o r  must a c t  m  good f a i t h ,  must 
d is c lo s e  f u l l y  and h o n e s t ly  a l l  f a c ts  w i th in  h is  knowledge  
to  h is  c l i e n t  and m a in ta in  h is  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  to  t h i r d  
p a r t ie s  A c o n f l i c t  o f  d u t ie s  is  no excuse to  d is c h a rg e  
h im s e lf  from  th a t  d u ty  101 F i n a l l y ,  i t  is  s a id  th a t  th e  
s o l i c i t o r  p ro v id e s  a d is in t e r e s t e d  s e rv ic e  102
3 All E R 119
8 4 .2 .  The p r a c t is in g  s o l i c i t o r  is  m  I r e la n d  governed  
by th e  s t a tu t o r y  r e g u la t io n s  o f  th e  S o l ic i t o r s  A c t,  
19 9 4 103 He is  a ls o  s u b je c te d  to  th e  e t h ic a l  and 
p r o fe s s io n a l g u id e lin e s  is s u e d  by th e  Law S o c ie ty  o f  
I r e la n d ,  104 105 and o th e r  European and in t e r n a t io n a l
a s s o c ia t io n s  106
The o b l ig a t io n s  under w hich a s o l i c i t o r  p e rfo rm s  h is  
fu n c t io n s  a re  based on c o n tr a c t  - th e  r e t a in e r ,  and a re
101Cf GOODY v BARING [1956] 2 A l l  E R 11 , a p p ro v in g  
MOODY v COX Sc HATT [1917] 2 Ch 71
102See Horne (1988 10)
103The S o l ic i t o r s  A c t, 1994 re p la c e s  to  a la r g e  e x te n t  
th e  p re v io u s  S o l ic i t o r s  A cts  o f  1954 and 196 0 However, 
c e r t a in  s e c tio n s  o f th e  p re v io u s  A cts  rem a in  r e le v a n t ,  fo r  
exam ple s e c t io n  7 o f  th e  S o l ic i t o r s  A c t , 1954
104See "A Guide to  P ro fe s s io n a l Conduct o f  S o l ic i t o r s  
m  Ir e la n d  " (1 9 8 8 ) ,  D u b lin  The In c o rp o ra te d  Law S o c ie ty  o f  
I r e la n d  (h e r e a f te r  th e  G uide)
105S m ce  1994 th e  Law S o c ie ty  has a l t e r e d  i t s  name under 
s e c t io n  4 o f  th e  S o l ic i t o r s  A ct 1994 from  th e  " In c o rp o ra te d  
Law S o c ie ty  o f  I r e la n d "  in t o  th e  "Law S o c ie ty  o f  Ir e la n d "
106See, f o r  exam ple, th e  " In t e r n a t io n a l  Code o f  Conduct" 
(1 9 8 6 ) , W ashington In t e r n a t io n a l  B ar A s s o c ia t io n  and th e  
"Code o f Conduct f o r  Lawyers m  th e  European Community" 
(1988) , S tra s b o u rg  European B ar A s s o c ia t io n
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e i t h e r  exp ress  o r  im p lie d  o b l ig a t io n s  I t  is  a c o n tr a c t  
w hereby, ' m  r e tu r n  f o r  th e  o f f e r  o f  a c l i e n t  to  em ploy  
him , a s o l i c i t o r ,  e x p re s s ly  o r  by im p l ic a t io n ,  u n d e rta k e s  
to  f u l f i l  c e r t a in  o b l ig a t io n s ' 107 The exp ress  o b l ig a t io n s  
a re  s e t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  m  th e  r e t a in e r  and must be c o n s id e re d  
m  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e  a c tu a l  c o n tra c t
As m  E ng land , i t  can be argued th a t  m  Ir e la n d  th e  
s o l i c i t o r  is  s u b je c t  to  th e  term s s e t o u t m  P a r t  IV  o f  th e  
S a le  o f  Goods and S up ply  o f  S e rv ic e s  A c t , 1980 The im p lie d  
term s d e a l w i th ,  inter a h a ,  th e  use and p o sse ss io n  o f  
re a s o n a b le  s k i l l  m  th e  p erfo rm an ce  o f  th e  s e rv ic e  
p r o v id e r 's  d u t ie s  (s e c t io n  3 9 (a ) and (b) o f  th e  1980 A c t)  
The purpose o f th e  S o l ic i t o r s  A c t, 1994 is  to  p ro v id e  
a b e t t e r  p r o te c t io n  to  c l ie n t s  o f  s o l i c i t o r s  I t  in c lu d e s
( l )  a new c o m p la in ts  p ro c e d u re ,108 ( 1 1 ) powers by th e  Law
S o c ie ty  to  in te rv e n e  m  th e  s o l i c i t o r ' s  p r a c t ic e ,  ( i n )  new 
s u p e rv is o ry  fu n c t io n s  o f th e  H igh  C o u rt (P a r t  I I I  o f  th e  
1994 A c t) , (iv) f in a n c ia l  p r o te c t io n  o f c l ie n t s  (P a r t  IV  o f  
th e  1994 A c t) and (v) r e g u la t io n s  f o r  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  and 
ad m iss io n  (P a r t  V o f  th e  1994 A c t) and r e g is t r a t i o n  (P a r t  
V I o f  th e  1994 A c t)
There  a re  th r e e  ty p es  o f  c o m p la in ts  p ro c e d u re s , each  
in v o lv in g  a number o f  s tag es
F i r s t , under s e c t io n  8 o f  th e  S o l ic i t o r s  A c t , 1994,
107See p a ra g rap h  1 8 o f  th e  G uide
108 A t p re s e n t , th e  c o m p la in ts  p ro c e d u re  is  b e in g  
re v ie w e d  by th e  Law S o c ie ty  I t  has p led g e d  to  a c t  on a 
recom m endation to  p r o te c t  fu tu r e  c l ie n t s  o f  s o l i c i t o r s  who 
have had a number o f  c o m p la in ts  made about them , see Anon 
(1996)
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th e  Law S o c ie ty  has th e  power to  in v e s t ig a te  a c o m p la in t  
from  a s o l i c i t o r ' s  c l i e n t  a l le g in g  th a t  th e  s o l i c i t o r ' s  
s e rv ic e s  were in a d e q u a te  and were n o t o f  a q u a l i t y  th a t  
c o u ld  re a s o n a b ly  be ex p e c te d  o f a s o l i c i t o r  The aim  is  to  
s o lv e  th e  m a tte r  by agreem ent The Law S o c ie ty  has m  
s e c t io n  9 o f  th e  S o l ic i t o r s  A c t, 1994 th e  power to  s a n c tio n  
th o se  s o l i c i t o r s  who charge e x c e s s iv e  fe e s  A g a in , th e  
m a tte r  is  a tte m p te d  to  be s o lv e d  by agreem ent betw een th e  
p a r t ie s  in v o lv e d  On b o th  occas io n s  th e  s o l i c i t o r  can be 
summoned by th e  S o c ie ty  to  produce documents w h ich  a re  
r e le v a n t  f o r  th e  c o m p la in t 109
Second, th e  Law S o c ie ty  is  r e q u ir e d  to  m a in ta in  and 
fund  a scheme f o r  th e  e x a m in a tio n  and in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  
w r i t t e n  c o m p la in ts  by an in d ep en d en t a d ju d ic a to r  110
T h ir d ,  th e  P re s id e n t o f  th e  H igh  C ourt may un der  
s e c t io n  16 o f  th e  1994 A ct a p p o in t from  tim e  to  tim e  (th e  
members o f )  th e  D is c ip l in a r y  T r ib u n a l T h is  T r ib u n a l is  
empowered to  i n i t i a t e  an in q u ir y  in t o  th e  conduct o f  a 
s o l i c i t o r  on th e  grounds o f a l le g e d  m isconduct as d e s c rib e d  
under s e c t io n  7 o f  th e  S o l ic i t o r s  A c t , 1960 On c o n c lu s io n  
o f th e  in q u ir y  two courses o f  a c t io n  a re  open The f i r s t  
course o f  a c t io n  empowers th e  T r ib u n a l to  r e p o r t  to  th e  
H igh  C o u rt, w hich on i t s  tu r n  may, inter alia , s t r i k e  th e  
s o l i c i t o r  o f f  th e  r o l l  o r  suspend him 111 The second course  
o f  a c t io n  empowers th e  T r ib u n a l to  ( i )  a d v is e  and admonish
109See s e c t io n  10 o f  th e  S o l ic i t o r s  A c t , 1994
110Ibid  , s e c t io n  15
111Jjbid , subsection (18) (1) (a)
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o r  censure  th e  s o l i c i t o r ,  o r  ( 1 1 ) d i r e c t  th e  s o l i c i t o r  to  
(a) pay a sum to  th e  Com pensation Fund, (b) pay (p a r t  o f)  
th e  c o s ts  o f  th e  S o c ie ty  o r  any p erson  a p p e a rin g  b e fo re  
them o r  (c) pay a sum as r e s t i t u t i o n  to  any a g g r ie v e d  
p a r ty  112
The s o l i c i t o r  as w e l l  as th e  S o c ie ty  has a r ig h t  to  
a p p e a l th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e  T r ib u n a l to  th e  H ig h  C o u rt
The f in a n c ia l  p r o te c t io n  o f  th e  s o l i c i t o r s '  c l i e n t s  is  
g u a ra n te e d  un der P a r t  IV  o f  th e  S o l ic i t o r s  A c t , 1994 The 
S o c ie ty  is  empowered to  make such r e g u la t io n s  w ith  re g a rd  
to  th e  p r o v is io n  o f in d e m n ity  a g a in s t  lo s s e s  a r is in g  from  
c i v i l  l i a b i l i t y  c la im s  a g a in s t  a s o l i c i t o r
8 . 4 . 3 .  The Guide to  P ro fe s s io n a l Conduct o f  S o l ic i t o r s  
m  Ir e la n d  p ro v id e s  a d e s c r ip t io n  o f g u id e lin e s  w ith  re g a rd  
to  p r o fe s s io n a l and e t h ic a l  conduct o f  th e  s o l i c i t o r  m  h is  
p r a c t ic e  A lth o u g h  i t  is  n o t as s p e c i f ic  as i t s  E n g lis h  
e q u iv a le n t ,113 i t  governs th e  fu n d am en ta l a s p e c ts  o f  th e  
s o l i c i t o r ' s  p r a c t ic e ,  such as h is  p r o fe s s io n a l r e la t io n s h ip  
w ith  h is  c l i e n t s ,  th e  c o u r ts , t h i r d  p a r t ie s ,  c o lle a g u e s  and 
c o u n s e l, re m u n e ra tio n  and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y
The fo re w o rd  to  th e  Guide e x p la in s  th a t  i t  must be 
used as a re fe re n c e  as to  what is  p ro p e r  m  th e  p a r t i c u la r  
s i t u a t io n  I t  is  a p r a c t ic a l  s e t o f  r u le s  and c o n d it io n s ,  
based on common sense I t  is  a g u id e  to  enhance
112Ibid  , s u b s e c tio n  1 7 (9 )
113See "Guide to  P r o fe s s io n a l Conduct o f  S o l ic i t o r s "
(1993) 3 rd  E d i t io n ,  London The Law S o c ie ty  o f  E ng land and 
W ales
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p r o fe s s io n a l conduct w hich ' is  la r g e ly  a m a tte r  o f  s e l f -  
d i s c i p lm e '  114
I t  is  beyond th e  scope o f t h is  s e c t io n  to  exam ine th e  
Guide on i t s  m e r i ts ,  b u t some b a s ic  assum ptions can be pu t 
fo rw a rd  115
The s o l i c i t o r  is  s a id  to  s ta n d  m  a f id u c ia r y  
r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  h is  c l i e n t  I t  is  based on th e  r e t a in e r  
o f c o n tr a c t  and th e  s o l i c i t o r  is  r e q u ir e d  to  use 'h is  
utm ost s k i l l  and c a re ' 116 The s ta n d a rd  is  th a t  o f  a 
re a s o n a b le  com petent s o l i c i t o r  The r e la t io n s h ip  is  
governed by b o th  law  and p r in c ip le s  o f  p r a c t ic e  Where a 
c o n f l i c t  o f  in t e r e s t  a r is e s  betw een two c l ie n t s  f o r  w hich  
th e  s o l i c i t o r  a c ts , he must cease to  a c t f o r  b o th  o f  
them 117
C o n tra ry  to  most o th e r  p ro fe s s io n s  he owes c e r t a in  
o th e r  d u t ie s  to  o th e r  p a r t ie s  As an o f f i c e r  o f  th e  c o u r t  
he owes c e r t a in  d u t ie s  to  th e  c o u r t  These d u t ie s  a re  
e n c a p s u la te d  m  th e  id e a  o f  a due a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  
ju s t ic e  Most im p o r ta n t ly ,  he must n o t keep back r e le v a n t  
in fo rm a t io n  w i th in  h is  know ledge and must n o t m is le a d  th e
114See p v  o f  th e  G uide
115The l i t e r a t u r e  has s e t o u t th e  chang ing  r o le  o f  codes 
o f e th ic s  m  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  By some com m entators i t  is  
suggested  th a t  p ro o f o f  e t h ic a l  m isconduct may be 
a d m is s ib le  m  a n e g lig e n c e  a c t io n ,  see supra  Subparagraph  
2 6 12
116See subp aragraph  1 9  o f  th e  G uide
117The s o l i c i t o r  has a d u ty  to  in fo rm  h is  c l i e n t  i f  
th e r e  is  a c o n f l i c t  o f  in t e r e s t  betw een him and h is  c l i e n t ,  
see, f o r  exam ple , th e  d e c is io n  m  HALIFAX MORTGAGE SERVICE 
LTD v STRYSKY [1995] 3 W L R 701
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c o u rt  by s t a t in g  u n tru e  fa c ts  118
In  h is  r e la t io n s h ip  to  coun se l i t  is  th e  s o l i c i t o r ' s  
d u ty  to  p r o p e r ly  in s t r u c t  coun se l and p ro v id e  him w ith  a l l  
th e  n e c e s s a ry  in fo rm a t io n  r e le v a n t  to  th e  case The reason  
f o r  a c o r r e c t  com m unication is  th a t  'c o u n s e l can o n ly  be as 
e f f e c t i v e  as th e  in s t r u c t io n s  he re c e iv e s  a l lo w  ' 119
F i n a l l y ,  w ith  re g a rd  to  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  and th e  
d is c lo s u r e  o f  in fo rm a t io n  th e  s o l i c i t o r  cannot be co m p elled  
to  d is c lo s e  in fo r m a t io n  passed betw een him and h is  
( p o t e n t ia l )  c l i e n t  T h is  p r iv i l e g e  e x is ts  o n ly  where th e re  
is  a p r o fe s s io n a l b a s is  f o r  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  th e  s o l i c i t o r ' s  
fu n c t io n s  120
8 4 .4 .  One q u e s tio n  w hich rem ained  unanswered th u s  f a r  
re g a rd s  th e  la c k  o f  w i l l in g n e s s  o f s o l i c i t o r s  and t h e i r  
c l ie n t s  to  c o n tra c t  on a l l  m a tte rs , i  e th e  r ig h t s  and 
d u t ie s  w h ich  a re  o v e r -a rc h in g  o r  r e la t e  to  th e  s p e c i f ic  
s e rv ic e s  p ro v id e d  by th e  s o l i c i t o r  Is  t h is  n o t io n  due to  
th e  d e s ir e  to  sue, m  th e  e v en t o f  damages, m  t o r t  r a th e r  
th a n  f o r  b reach  o f c o n tr a c t  o r  is  i t  s im p ly  im p o s s ib le  to  
c o n tra c t  on a l l  te rm s ’
The d e s ir e  to  sue in  t o r t  is  c o n tr a r y  to  a le g a l  
d o c tr in e  th a t  a s s e r te d  th a t  th e  s o l i c i t o r - c l i e n t  
r e la t io n s h ip  re s te d  e n t i r e l y  on th e  c o n t r a c tu a l  agreem ent
118See subp aragraph  4 1 o f  th e  G uide
ll9Ibid  , p a ra g ra p h  8 2 I t  has a lr e a d y  been e x p la in e d
m  th e  th e s is  th a t  a s o l i c i t o r  is  n o t v ic a r io u s ly  l i a b l e  
f o r  h is  c o u n s e l, see supra , P arag rap h  6 3
120See subparagraphs 3 1 and 3 2 of the Guide
375
betw een th e  two p a r t ie s  121 In  DEIGNAN v GREENE, Supreme 
C o u rt, U n re p o rte d , 21 O cto b er 1954, O 'D á la ig h  J s ta te d  -
I t  may in d e ed  be th a t  th e  c a te g o r ie s  o f  
n e g lig e n c e  a re  n e v e r c lo s e d , b u t i t  does n o t 
n e c e s s a r i ly  fo l lo w  th a t  a l l  th e  r e je c te d  c la im s  
o f o th e r  b ranches o f th e  law  can th e r e  f in d  
s a n c tu a ry  [ ] I  much doubt i f  re fu g e  can be
found f o r  c la im s  w hich must f l e e  th e  
in c o n v e n ie n c e  o f  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f
c o n s id e ra t io n  122
However, m  FINLAY v MURTAGH [1979] I  R 249 t h is
to p ic  was re a d d res s e d  In  t h is  case th e  Supreme C ourt
g ra n te d  a r ig h t  to  sue a s o l i c i t o r  m  t o r t  The im p o rtan ce  
o f t h is  case la y  m  th e  fo l lo w in g  two q u e s tio n s
( I )  In  what c irc u m sta n c e s  can a t o r t io u s  r ig h t  o f  an a c t io n  
m  n e g lig e n c e  be r e a l i z e d 7
( I I )  Is  t h i s  r ig h t  r e s t r i c t e d  to  th e  p a r ty  who e n te re d  in to  
a c o n tra c t  w ith  th e  s o l i c i t o r  o r  can t h is  be ex ten d ed  to  
n o n -c o n tr a c tu a l p a r t i e s 7
In  FINLAY v MURTAGH th e  p l a i n t i f f  c la im e d  damages f o r  
th e  a l le g e d  n e g lig e n c e  o f th e  d e fe n d a n t A c t in g  as th e
p l a i n t i f f ' s  s o l i c i t o r  th e  d e fe n d a n t f a i l e d  to  i n s t i t u t e  an 
a c t io n  on b e h a lf  o f  h is  c l i e n t  a g a in s t  a t h i r d  p a r ty  w i th in  
th e  p e r m it te d  p e r io d , as s ta te d  m  th e  S ta tu te  o f  
L im i ta t io n s ,  1957 The p l a i n t i f f  se rv e d  n o t ic e  o f  th e  t r i a l  
o f th e  a c t io n  by a ju dge  and ju r y  to  th e  d e fe n d a n t The
d e fe n d a n t contended th a t  th e  a c t io n  sh o u ld  be t r i e d  by a
121See McMahon & B inchy (1990 2 7 5 -2 7 6 )
122Supreme C o u rt, U n re p o rte d , 21 O c to b er 1954 , per
O 'D á la ig h  J , a t  p 6 o f  h is  judgm ent
376
ju d g e  a lo n e  However, th e  H igh  C o u rt d ism is s e d  an 
a p p l ic a t io n  by th e  d e fe n d a n t f o r  an o rd e r , s e t t in g  a s id e  
th e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  n o t ic e  o f  t r i a l  The d e fe n d a n ts  ap p e a le d  
The d e fe n d a n t 's  co u n se l h e ld  th a t  -
where lo s s  is  s u s ta in e d  w hich is  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  
th e  n e g l ig e n t  p erfo rm an ce  o f a c o n t r a c tu a l  
o b l ig a t io n ,  an a c t io n  m  t o r t  does n o t l i e  m  
re s p e c t o f  th a t  lo s s  [ ] The r e la t io n s h ip  o f
s o l i c i t o r  and c l i e n t  is  a c o n tr a c tu a l  one 123
F u rth e rm o re , th e y  argued th a t  th e  d e c is io n  m  HEDLEY 
BYRNE Sc CO LTD V  HELLER Sc PARTNERS LTD [1964] A C  465 
w ould n o t a p p ly  to  th e  n e g l ig e n t  perfo rm an ce  o f a 
c o n tr a c tu a l  o b l ig a t io n  In  HEDLEY BYRNE i t  was d e c id e d  th a t  
where a p erso n  r e l i e d  on th e  s k i l l  and judgm ent o f  a 
p r o fe s s io n a l p e rs o n , a t o r t io u s  d u ty  o f  c a re  must be 
im p lie d  i f  th a t  p a r ty  re p re s e n te d  h im s e lf  as h a v in g  th a t  
s p e c ia l s k i l l  o r  judgm ent In  FINLAY v MURTAGH, how ever, 
th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  co u n se l a rgued  th a t  th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  f a i l u r e  
d id  n o t embody a f a i l u r e  to  e x e rc is e  a s p e c ia l  s k i l l ,  bu t 
a f a i l u r e  to  a c t  ( to  i n s t i t u t e  an a c t io n  w i t h in  th e  l im i t e d  
p e r io d )  T h is  f a i l u r e  c o n s t itu te d  a b reach  o f a c o n tr a c tu a l  
o b l ig a t io n  124 The p l a i n t i f f ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, 
sought to  w iden th e  "ne ig h b o u r" p r in c ip le ,  so as to  b lu r  
th e  d i s t i n c t io n  betw een l i a b i l i t y  m  t o r t  and b re a ch  o f  
c o n tra c t
123 [1979] I  R 249 a t  252
124I t  can be suggested  t h a t ,  m  t h is  s i t u a t io n ,  th e  
s o l i c i t o r  l im i t e d  h is  l i a b i l i t y  in  c o n tr a c t  a lo n e
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Henchy J held m  the Supreme Court that -
th e  c o n c lu s io n  th a t  an a c t io n  by a c l i e n t  a g a in s t  
a s o l i c i t o r  f o r  damages f o r  b re ach  o f h is  
p r o fe s s io n a l d u ty  o f  c a re  is  n e c e s s a r i ly  and 
e x c lu s iv e ly  one m  c o n tr a c t  is  in c o m p a tib le  w ith  
modern developm ents m  th e  law  o f t o r t s  and 
sh o u ld  be o v e r ru le d  125
On c o n s id e ra t io n  o f th e  a u t h o r i t ie s  m ention ed  m  a 
number o f  E n g lis h  and I r i s h  cases126, Henchy J came to  
th re e  c o n c lu s io n s , and answered th e  above two q u e s tio n s  127 
F i r s t ,  th e  le a rn e d  ju dge  was s a t i s f i e d  th a t  -
th e  g e n e ra l d u ty  o f  c a re  c re a te d  by th e  
r e la t io n s h ip  o f  s o l i c i t o r  and c l i e n t  e n t i t l e s  th e  
c l i e n t  to  sue m  n e g lig e n c e  i f  he has s u f fe r e d  
damage because o f  th e  s o l i c i t o r ' s  f a i l u r e  to  show 
due p r o fe s s io n a l c a re  and s k i l l
Second, he added th a t  -
th e  c l i e n t  [n o tw ith s ta n d in g ] c o u ld  sue 
a l t e r n a t i v e l y  m  c o n tr a c t  f o r  b reach  o f th e  
im p lie d  te rm  m  th e  c o n tra c t  o f  r e t a in e r  th a t  th e  
s o l i c i t o r  w i l l  a c t  w ith  th e  m a tte r  m  hand w ith  
due p r o fe s s io n a l c a re  and s k i l l
He conclu ded  th a t  -
12SIbid, a t  255
126HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & PARTNERS LTD 
[1964] A C 4 65 , SOMERS v ERSKINE [1943] I  R 348 , MIDLAND 
BANK v  HETT STUBBS & KEMP [1979] Ch 384 , BATTY v
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY REALISATIONS LTD [1978] Q B 554, 
PHOTO PRODUCTION LTD v SECURICOR LTD [1978] 1 W L R
856
127 [1979] I R 249 at 257
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[ t ]h e  s o l i c i t o r ' s  l i a b i l i t y  m  t o r t  un der th e  
g e n e ra l d u ty  o f  c a re  ex ten d s  n o t o n ly  to  a c la im  
f o r  re w a rd , b u t to  any p erson  f o r  whom th e  
s o l i c i t o r  u n d e rta k e s  to  a c t  o c c a s io n a lly  w ith o u t  
re w a rd , and a ls o  to  th o se  [ ] w ith  whom he has
made no arrang em ent to  a c t b u t who, as he knows 
o r  ought to  know, w i l l  be r e ly in g  on h is  
p r o fe s s io n a l c a re  and s k i l l  128
However, th e re  is  one e x c e p tio n  to  t h is  r u le  Henchy 
J s ta te d  th a t  a c l i e n t  does n o t have a t o r t io u s  r ig h t  to  
sue when th e  s o l i c i t o r ' s  d e f a u l t  a r is e s  'f ro m  a b re a ch  o f  
a p a r t i c u la r  and s p e c ia l te rm  o f  th e  c o n tr a c t  m  re s p e c t o f  
w hich th e  s o l i c i t o r  w ould n o t be l i a b l e  i f  th e  c o n tr a c t  had 
n o t c o n ta in e d  such te rm ' 129
Exam ples o f  th o se  term s a re  to  is s u e  p ro c e e d in g s  
w ith in  a s p e c i f ie d  tim e  n o t re g u la te d  by s t a t u t e ,  to  c lo s e  
a s a le  on a p a r t i c u la r  d a te  and so on and so f o r t h  T h is  
e x c e p tio n  may be j u s t i f i e d  w ith  th e  argum ent, d e r iv e d  from  
HEDLEY BYRNE and argued  by th e  d e fe n d a n ts , th a t  when a 
s o l i c i t o r  is  m  b reach  o f such a p a r t i c u la r  and s p e c ia l  
te rm , h is  c l i e n t  d id  n o t r e l y  on th e  s k i l l  and judgm ent o f  
th e  s o l i c i t o r
I t  can be a rg u ed , a c c o rd in g  to  t h is  r e s e a rc h e r , th a t  
such a b reach  m  i t s e l f  c o n s t i tu te s  a b re a ch  o f th e  g e n e ra l  
d u ty  to  ta k e  c a re  Hence, a reason  f o r  an a c t io n  to  sue m  
t o r t  o f  n e g lig e n c e  c o u ld  be e s ta b lis h e d  T h is  l i n e  o f  
th o u g h t may be j u s t i f i e d  w ith  th e  argum ent p u t fo rw a rd  by 
Kenny J  m  FINLAY th a t  -
128Fo r a d is c u s s io n  re g a rd in g  th e  l i a b i l i t y  tow ards  
t h i r d  p a r t ie s ,  see infra  C h ap te r N in e
129 [1979] I R 249 at 257
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[ t ]h e  p r o fe s s io n a l p e rs o n , how ever, owes th e  
c l i e n t  a g e n e ra l d u ty , w hich does n o t a r is e  from  
c o n tra c t  b u t from  th e  " p r o x im ity ” p r in c ip le  to  
e x e rc is e  re a s o n a b le  c a re  and s k i l l  m  th e  
perfo rm an ce  o f  th e  work e n tru s te d  to  him T h is  
d u ty  a r is e s  from  th e  o b l ig a t io n  w hich s p r in g s  
from  th e  s i t u a t io n  th a t  he knew o r  ought to  have  
known th a t  h is  f a i l u r e  to  e x e rc is e  c a re  and s k i l l  
w ould p ro b a b ly  cause lo s s  and damage T h is  
f a i l u r e  to  have o r  to  e x e rc is e  re a s o n a b le  s k i l l  
and c a re  is  t o r t io u s  o r  d e l i c t u a l  m  o r ig in  130
In  o th e r  w ords, a b rea ch  o f a s p e c i f ic  te rm  o f  th e  
c o n tra c t  c o u ld  be re g a rd e d  as a b reach  o f a g e n e ra l d u ty  to  
e x e rc is e  re a s o n a b le  c a re  and s k i l l  because th a t  b reach  
c o u ld  cause lo s s  o r  damage, w hich a s o l i c i t o r  knew o r  ought 
to  have fo re s e e n
The case showed th a t  th e re  was a t o r t io u s  r ig h t  to  sue 
a p r o fe s s io n a l p e rso n , o v e r and above th e  r ig h t  to  sue ex 
contractu  A p r o fe s s io n a l person  can be h e ld  n e g l ig e n t  by  
h is  c l i e n t  who s u f fe r e d  damage o r  lo s s  and r e l i e d  on th e  
p r o fe s s io n a l p e rs o n 's  s k i l l  and judgm ent T h is  d e r iv e d  from  
th e  g e n e ra l d u ty  to  ta k e  re a s o n a b le  c a re
8 . 4 . 5 .  I t  is  s ig n i f ic a n t  th a t  where an I r i s h  c o u r t  is  
fa c e d , m  a c o n te x t such as t h i s , w ith  th e  c h o ic e  o f  
d e c id in g  an a c t io n  m  e i t h e r  c o n tr a c t  o r  t o r t ,  th a t  i t  
p la c e s  such r e l ia n c e  on th e  t o r t  remedy
R e a l is t  ju r is p ru d e n c e  m igh t seek to  in t e r p r e t  such  
r e l ia n c e  as a d e c is io n  to  eschew th e  l i m i t i n g  fe a tu re s  o f  
th e  award o f  c o n tr a c t  damages as opposed to  c a lc u la t in g  
damages on th e  more generous s c a le  awarded m  t o r t  O th ers
12DIbid, at 264
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m igh t p o in t  to  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  p o in t  th a t  a l l  t o r t  cases  
were h e a rd  w ith  a ju r y ,  u n t i l  1988 , 131 and th a t  c o n tra c t  
cases were d e te rm in e d  by a ju dge  a lo n e
But i t  is  a t  le a s t  w o rth  c o n s id e r in g  a d eep er p o in t  
P u b lic  p o l ic y  e lem en ts  a re  a ls o  p re s e n t The way m  w hich  
t o r t  has e v o lv e d  as a body o f rem edies  a p p ro p r ia te s  to  an 
e v o lv in g  s o c ie ty ,  m  w hich p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l  change and 
an a l t e r e d  s o c io lo g y  r e -d e f in e s  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  s o c ie ty  
m  w hich l i t i g a t i o n  ta k e s  p la c e  T h is  is  th e  p a r t i c u la r  
f a c i l i t y  o f  t o r t  la w , to  a c t as a " m irro r"  o f  s o c ie t a l  
change I t  has been n o te d  b o th  by H euston & B u c k ley  (1992) 
and McMahon & B m chy (1990) and by hundreds o f  o th e r  
com m entators a ls o
The q u e s tio n  rem ains why p r o fe s s io n a l persons do no t 
seek to  c o n tra c t  on a l l  th e  im p lie d  term s and d u t ie s  w ith  
t h e i r  c l i e n t s ’  T h is  seems n o t f e a s ib le  Most im p lie d  d u t ie s  
depend on and a re  consequences ex post  th e  p a r t i c u la r  f a c ts  
o f th e  case and can , m  most cases , o n ly  be a n t ic ip a te d  
a f t e r  th e  e v en t In  a d d i t io n ,  th e r e  is  more to  i t  th a n  a 
c o n tra c t  pur sang  To speak o f  a c o n tr a c t  betw een , f o r  
exam ple, a d o c to r  and p a t ie n t  o r  s o l i c i t o r  and c l i e n t  is  
p e r f e c t ly  c o r r e c t  - l e g a l l y  sp eak in g  But th e  in c id e n c e  o f
th e  d o c to r -p a t ie n t  r e la t io n s h ip  o r  th e  s o l i c i t o r - c l i e n t
)
r e la t io n s h ip  b o th  e x te n d  beyond what is  n o rm a lly  th o u g h t o f  
as a c o n tr a c t  ( in  some cases , is  th e r e  a c o n tr a c t  a t  a l l ’ ) 
The word "co venan t" is  sometimes used T h is  te rm  seems to
131See C o u rts  A c t, 1988 (The r ig h t  to  a ju r y  t r i a l  m  
th e  lo w e r c o u rts  was a b o lis h e d  m  th e  C o u rts  A c t , 1971, 
under s e c t io n  6)
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r e f l e c t  th e  o n -g o in g , f id u c ia r y  and e x t r a - f in a n c i a l  
r e la t io n s h ip  more a c c u r a te ly
I t  is  f o r  t h is  reaso n  th a t  i t  can be argued  th a t  th e  
c o u rts  a re  w i l l i n g  to  a p p ly  th e  more generous measures o f  
damages a v a i la b le  m  t o r t  to  s i tu a t io n s  in v o lv in g  th e  
d e f a u l t  o f  p r o fe s s io n a l p e o p le  I t  may even r e f l e c t  th e  
j u d i c i a l  a t t i t u d e s  about th e  more com plex r e la t io n s h ip  
w hich s u b s is ts  betw een a c l i e n t  and h is  p r o fe s s io n a l  
a d v is e r  However, th e  n a tu re  o f  t h is  r e la t io n s h ip  is  no t 
" s t a t ic "  In  some cases th e  norm al in c id e n c e  o f c o n tra c t  
may p r e v a i l  Henchy J was p re p a re d  to  a l lo w  a p r o fe s s io n a l  
p erson  to  l i m i t  h is  l i a b i l i t y  m  t o r t  where t h is  seemed 
a p p r o p r ia te
Thus, i t  is  a s s e r te d  th a t  where a p r o fe s s io n a l person  
can o n ly  be h e ld  l i a b l e  f o r  s p e c i f ic  c o n tr a c tu a l  te rm s , and 
no t o r t io u s  r ig h t  is  a d m itte d , h is  p r o fe s s io n a l s ta tu s  is  
in s ig n i f ic a n t  to  th e  im p o s it io n  o f  l i a b i l i t y  T h is , o f  
c o u rs e , means th a t  i t  is  n e c ess ary  to  lo o k  a g a in  a t  th e  
concept o f  th e  " r e la t io n s h ip "  betw een a p r o fe s s io n a l person  
and h is  c l i e n t  o r  p a t ie n t  C e r t a in ly ,  e lem en ts  o f  c o n tra c t  
a re  c o n ta in e d  w i th in  th e  g e n e ra l r e la t io n s h ip ,  and may 
(th ro u g h  l i m i t in g  o r  e x c lu d in g  l i a b i l i t y  by means o f  
e x o n e ra tio n  c la u s e s ) m o d ify  th e  r u le s  o f  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  
But where one r e f e r s  to  th e  d e f in in g  f a c t o r  as a "covenant"  
o r  " r e la t io n s h ip " , one must a c cep t t h a t , as betw een a 
d o c to r  and p a t ie n t  o r  a s o l i c i t o r  and c l i e n t ,  th e r e  is  
som ething o th e r  th a n  th e  n e g o t ia t io n  o f  p u re  com m ercia l 
r e la t io n s  o f o v e r t  m u tu a lly  ag reed  te rm s , w h ich  is  endem ic
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to  th e  p r o fe s s io n a l e le m e n t, p ro v id e d  by th e  s o l i c i t o r  o r  
d o c to r  o r  any o th e r  person  c o n s id e re d  a p r o fe s s io n a l
8 .5 .  The A cco u n tan t A c tin g  as A u d ito r
8 . 5 . 1 .  The a u d i t o r 's  d u t ie s  d e r iv e  from  e i t h e r  s ta tu te  
(th e  Companies A ct 1963-1990) o r  th e  common law  He has a 
p r o fe s s io n a l r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  two p a r t ie s  ( l )  th e  Board  
o f D ir e c to r s ,  from  whom he o b ta in s  in s t r u c t io n s  and upon 
whom he r e l i e s  w ith  re s p e c t to  th e  acco unts  and ( n )  th e  
company m  g e n e ra l m e e tin g , i t  b e in g  h is  c o n tr a c t in g  p a r ty  
m  lu r e ,  i t s  members r e l y  on h is  e x p e r t is e  In  d o in g  so, 
th e  members a re  a b le  to  e x e rc is e  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  
com pany's m ainstream  ( f in a n c ia l )  p o l ic y  Under c e r t a in  
c irc u m s ta n c e s , th e  a u d i to r  may owe a d u ty  m  t o r t  to
o u ts id e rs  who he b e lie v e d  r e l i e d  on h is  e x p e r t is e  m
r e la t io n  to  th e  com pany's accounts  However, under CAPARO 
INDUSTRIES PLC v DICKMAN [1990] 1 A l l  E R 568, h is
l i a b i l i t y  was, a t  le a s t  m  E ngland and un der th e  c r i t e r i a  
o f th e  case , r e s t r ic t e d  to  th e  members m  g e n e ra l  
m eetin g  132
The a u d i t o r 's  fu n c t io n  is  tw o - fo ld  He is  ( 1 ) to  see
th a t  p ro p e r  books a re  k e p t and ( 1 1 ) to  exam ine w h eth er
those  books g iv e  a t r u e  and f a i r  v ie w  o f th e  s ta te  o f  
a f f a i r s  o f  th e  company C o n seq u en tly , th e  a u d i to r  owes th e
132Fo r a f u l l  re v ie w  on t h i r d - p a r t y  l i a b i l i t y ,  see 
infra, C h a p te r N in e
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g r e a te s t  d u ty  to  th e  members o f  th e  company, who have th e  
power to  a p p o in t133 o r  remove134 him and to  f i x  h is  
re m u n e ra tio n  135
However, th e  a u d ito r  is  o b lig e d  to  be in d ep en d en t m  
th e  e x e rc is e  o f  h is  d u t ie s  T h is  re q u ire s  f u r t h e r  a n a ly s is
8 . 5 . 2 .  The company e n te r s , th ro u g h  i t s  ag en ts  (th e  
d i r e c t o r s ) , in t o  a c o n tr a c t  w ith  th e  a u d i to r  I t  governs  
th e  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een them , and th e  r ig h t s  and 
o b lig a t io n s  a r is in g  from  i t  a re  r e s t r i c t e d  to  th e s e  two 
p a r t ie s  I t  in c lu d e s  d e t a i ls  such as h is  a p p o in tm e n t, 
re m u n e ra tio n , d u ra t io n  o f o f f i c e ,  and th e  d u t ie s  and r ig h t s  
o f th e  a u d ito r  as s t a t u t o r i l y  p ro v id e d  m  th e  Companies 
A cts  1963 - 1990
The a u d i to r  is  n o rm a lly  re g a rd e d  as an o f f i c e r  o f  th e  
company 136 C o n seq u en tly  he may be h e ld  l i a b l e  un der any 
s t a tu t o r y  p r o v is io n  o f  th e  Companies A c ts  1963 - 1990 ,
d ir e c te d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  to  " o f f ic e r s "  137 B u t, m  r e la t io n  to  
th e  e x e rc is e  o f  h is  d u t ie s  he may be re g a rd e d  as an ag en t 
o f th e  company 138 As a consequence, i t  can be a s s e r te d
133See s u b s e c tio n  1 6 0 (1 ) o f  th e  Companies A c t, 1963
134Jjbid , s u b s e c tio n  1 6 0 (5 ) ,  as amended by s e c t io n  183
o f th e  Companies A c t, 1990
135See s u b s e c tio n  1 6 0 (8 ) o f  th e  Companies A c t , 1963
136Cf RE SHACTER [1960] 1 A l l  E R 61
137See C o u rtn ey  (1995 560)
138Cf RE TRANSPLANTERS (HOLDING CO ) LTD [1958] 2 A l l  
E R 711 See a ls o  Keane (1991 361)
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th a t  h is  d u t ie s  a re  o f  a f id u c ia r y  n a tu re  139
He may be c o n t r a c tu a l ly  l i a b l e  to  th e  company f o r  
b re a ch  o f  h is  s t a tu t o r y  d u t ie s  o r  o th e r  c o n tr a c tu a l  
arran g em en ts , r e s u l t in g  m  lo s s  to  th e  company In  t o r t  he 
may be h e ld  l i a b l e  f o r  b reach  o f h is  d u ty  o f  c a re  X40
H is  r ig h t s  a re  e x p la in e d  m  s e c t io n  193 o f  th e  
Companies A c t , 1990 F i r s t  and fo rem o st th e  a u d i to r  has th e  
r ig h t  to  access o f a l l  th e  r e le v a n t  in fo r m a t io n  He is  
empowered to  r e q u ir e  from  a l l  o f f ic e r s  and em ployees o f th e  
company to  g iv e  such in fo r m a t io n  and e x p la n a t io n  w ith  
re g a rd  to  what th e  a u d ito r  th in k s  p ro p e r  f o r  th e  e x e rc is e  
o f h is  fu n c t io n  He is  e n t i t l e d  to  a t te n d  th e  g e n e ra l  
m eetin g s  and to  be q u e s tio n e d  re g a rd in g  a l l  a sp e c ts  o f  th e  
com pany's b u s in ess  w hich a re  o f  h is  concern
H is  s t a tu t o r y  d u t ie s  a re  f o u r - f o ld  F i r s t ,  he has a 
d u ty  to  e x e rc is e  h is  fu n c t io n s  w ith  'p r o fe s s io n a l  
i n t e g r i t y '  141 The 1990 A ct does n o t c o n te m p la te  any  
f u r t h e r  on what t h is  p r o v is io n  n e c e s s ita te s  I t  is  
suggested  h e re  th a t  th e re  is  a l i n k  w ith  p r o fe s s io n a l and 
e t h ic a l  m isco n d u ct, w hereby g u id e l in e s  o r  r e g u la t io n s ,  such 
as p ro v id e d  by th e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  C h a rte re d  A c c o u n ta n ts , 
p ro v id e  th e  a u d ito r  w ith  an in d ic a t io n  o f  how to  e x e rc is e  
h is  fu n c t io n s  m  a p r o fe s s io n a l manner He must e x e rc is e
139A n o th e r q u e s tio n  i s ,  w h eth er s ta te m e n ts  o r  a c ts  made 
by th e  a u d i to r  m  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  h is  d u t ie s  and r e l i e d  
upon by o u ts id e rs  a re  b in d in g  to  th e  company
140Cf CANDLER v CRANE CHRISTMAS & CO [1951] A l l  E R  
426 and CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v DICKMAN [1990] 1 A l l  E R
568
141See subsection 193(6) of the Companies Act, 1990
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t h is  d u ty  w ith  due re g a rd  to  a l l  o th e r  s t a tu t o r y  and common 
law  d u t ie s
F u r th e r  m ore, he is  r e q u ire d  to  n o t i f y  th e  R e g is t r a r  
and th e  company i f  th e  company f a i l s  to  keep p ro p e r  books 
m  accordance w ith  s e c t io n  202 o f  th e  Companies A ct 
19 9 0 ,142 to  make a r e p o r t  to  th e  m em bers,143 and to  
d is c lo s e  d i r e c t o r s '  emoluments where th e y  do n o t ap p ear m  
th e  acco unts  144 These s t a tu t o r y  d u t ie s  a re  s p e c i f ic  d u t ie s  
f o r  w hich th e  a u d ito r  may be h e ld  l i a b l e  under th e  s ta tu te s  
as an o f f i c e r  o f  th e  company 145
Under common law  h is  d u t ie s  can be syn o p s ized  as a 
d u ty  to  e x e rc is e  re a s o n a b le  c a re  and s k i l l  m  th e  
p erfo rm an ce  o f h is  fu n c t io n , he has a d u ty  n o t to  b re ach  
h is  s t a tu t o r y  d u t ie s ,  f o r  w hich he can be h e ld  l i a b l e  m  
t o r t  146 A g a in , i t  i s  shown h ere  th a t  th e  a u d i t o r 's  
s p e c i f ic  d u t ie s  a re  s u b -s e ts  to  th e  " o v e r -a rc h in g "  d u ty  to  
ta k e  re a s o n a b le  c a re
The s ta n d a rd  o f c a re  is  th a t  m  com parison to  h is  
p ee rs  Hanna J , m  LEECH v STOKES [1937] I  R 787, s ta te d  
th a t  an a u d i to r  is  ' t o  e x e rc is e  such s k i l l  and c a re  as a 
d i l i g e n t ,  s k i l l e d  and c a u tio u s  a u d ito r  w ould e x e rc is e
1A2Ibid  , s e c t io n  194
143Jjbid , s u b s e c tio n  1 9 3 (1 )
144Jjbid , s u b s e c tio n  1 9 1 (8 )
145Cf RE SHACTER [1960] 1 A l l  E R 61
146See C o u rtn ey  (1995 562)
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a c c o rd in g  to  th e  p r a c t ic e  o f  h is  p ro fe s s io n ' 147
An in d ic a t io n  as to  what in v o lv e s  an a c ce p te d  o r
approved p r a c t ic e ,  m  th e  m eaning o f th e  d isc u s s e d  model o f  
p r o fe s s io n a l n e g l ig e n c e ,148 can be found m  th e  d e c is io n  m  
LLOYD CHEYHAM & CO LTD v LITTLEJOHN & CO [1987]
B C L C 303 In  t h is  case i t  was s a id  th a t  co m p lian ce  w ith  
th e  s o -c a l le d  "a c c o u n tin g  p r in c ip le s " 149 is  s tro n g  ev id en ce  
th a t  th e  books o f  accounts  g iv e ,  m  accordance w ith  s e c t io n  
202 o f th e  Companies A c t, 1990, a t r u e  and f a i r  v ie w  
C o n seq u en tly , t h is  may mean th a t  adherence to  t h is  accep ted  
and s ta n d a rd  p r a c t ic e  shows th a t  an a u d ito r  has conform ed  
to  th e  r e q u ir e d  s ta n d a rd  o f c a re  However, adherence is  n o t 
'c o n c lu s iv e ' e v id en c e  150 There  is  room f o r  d e p a r tu re
w ith in  a c ce p te d  p a ra m e te rs , a lth o u g h  th e  members o f  th e  
acco u n tan cy  b o d ie s  a re  r e q u ir e d  to  fo l lo w  th e  p re s c r ib e d  
p r a c t ic e  151
In  FOMENTO (STERLING AREA) LTD v SELSDON FOUNDATION 
CO [1958] 1 A l l  E R 1 Lord  D enning conclu ded  th a t  an
a u d ito r  is  n o t r e q u ir e d  to  search  f o r  i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  152
147 [1937] I  R 787 a t  789 See a ls o  IR IS H  WOOLLEN CO 
LTD v TYSON (1900) 26 A cct L R 13
148See supra, C h ap ter Four
149These p r in c ip le s  a re  l a i d  down by th e  A cc o u n tin g  
S tan d ard s  Com m ittee o f  th e  C o n s u lta t iv e  Com m ittee o f
A cco u n tin g  B odies o f  th e  U K and I r e la n d ,  m  th e
S ta te m e n ts  o f  S ta n d a rd  A cco u n tin g  P r a c t ic e  (S S A P 's )  and
by th e  in d ep en d en t A cco u n tin g  S tan d ard s  Board m  th e
F in a n c ia l  R e p o rtin g  S tan d ard s  (F R S 's )
150 [1987] B C L C 303 a t  313, per  W oo lf J
151See C o u rtn ey  (1995 497)
152 [1958] 1 All E R 1 at 11
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A l l  th a t  is  r e q u ir e d  is  t h a t ,  when he comes acro ss  
i r r e g u l a r i t i e s ,  he d e a ls  w ith  them He is  'a  w atchdog, no t 
a b loodhound' 153
8 . 5 . 3 .  Persons who a re  q u a l i f i e d  to  be a p p o in te d  as an 
a u d ito r  a r e , among o th e rs , th o se  who a re  members o f  th e  
M in i s t e r i a l  re c o g n iz e d  b o d ie s , such as m  Ir e la n d  th e  
I n s t i t u t e  o f  C h a rte re d  A cco u n tan ts  m  Ir e la n d  and th e  
I n s t i t u t e  o f  C e r t i f i e d  P u b lic  A cco u n tan ts  m  Ir e la n d  154
The M in is t e r  m ust, m  o rd e r  to  be a b le  to  re c o g n iz e  
th e s e  b o d ie s , be s a t is f i e d  th a t  c e r t a in  s ta n d a rd s  have been  
met 155 The M in is t e r  may r e q u ir e  from  th e s e  b o d ie s  a code 
o f p r o fe s s io n a l and e t h ic a l  co n d u ct, w h ich  may be s u b je c te d  
to  r e g u la t io n s  p r o v id in g  f o r  th e  m o n ito r in g  o f  com pliance  
w ith  th e  code 156 The R e g is t r a r  o f  Companies is  r e q u ir e d  to  
keep a r e g is t e r  o f  persons who a re  q u a l i f i e d  to  be 
a p p o in te d  as an a u d ito r  157
The e t h ic a l  code o f conduct p ro v id e d  by th e  I n s t i t u t e  
o f  C h a rte re d  A cco u n tan ts  m  I r e la n d 158 c o n ta in s  a d e t a i le d  
d e s c r ip t io n  o f g u id e lin e s  m  re s p e c t to  th e  v a r io u s  a sp ec ts  
o f th e  a u d i t o r 's  fu n c t io n  I t  is  n o t e x h a u s tiv e  and i t  is
153Ibid  , p e r  Lord  Denning
I
154See s e c tio n s  191 and 192 o f  th e  Companies A c t , 1990
155Ibid  , s e c t io n  191
156Ibid  , s u b s e c tio n  1 9 2 (4 )
1B1Ibid  , s e c t io n  198
158" E th ic a l  Guide f o r  Members" (1995) , D u b lin  The 
I n s t i t u t e  o f  C h a rte re d  A cco u n tan ts  m  Ir e la n d  ( h e r e a f te r  
th e  E t h ic a l  G uide)
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recommended th a t  th e  a u d ito r  sh o u ld  a ls o  be g u id e d  by th e  
s p i r i t  o f  th e  Guide 159 I t  is  beyond th e  scope o f t h is  
s e c t io n  to  d isc u s s  i t s  c o n te n ts  m  f u l l  The d is c u s s io n  is  
r e s t r i c t e d  to  some fu n d am en ta l p r in c ip le s  and o th e r  a sp e c ts  
r e le v a n t  m  th e  c o n te x t o f  t h is  C h ap te r
The a u d ito r  is  r e q u ir e d  to  behave w ith  i n t e g r i t y ,  
w hich in c lu d e s  n o t o n ly  h o n es ty  b u t a ls o  f a i r  d e a lin g  and 
t r u th fu ln e s s  160 He is  re g a rd e d  to  s t r i v e  f o r  o b j e c t i v i t y ,  
w hich is  s a id  to  be a 's t a t e  o f  m ind ' 161 T h is  o b j e c t i v i t y  
is  p r o te c te d  and d em o n stra ted  by m a in ta in in g  h is  
independency from  o u ts id e  in f lu e n c e s  w h ich  c o u ld  underm ine  
h is  o b je c t iv e  judgm ent w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  acco unts  o f  th e  
company
The a u d ito r  must be com petent to  do th e  work he is  
asked to  do I f  n o t, he must r e je c t  th e  work o r  must o b ta in  
such a d v ic e  and a s s is ta n c e  n e c e ss a ry  to  p e rfo rm  th e  work 
c o m p e te n tly  162
The a u d i to r  must e x e rc is e  h is  work w ith  7 due s k i l l , 
c a re , d i l ig e n c e  and e x p e d it io n ' 163 He i s  e x p e c te d  to  have  
re g a rd  to  th e  p r o fe s s io n a l and te c h n ic a l  s ta n d a rd s  o f  th e  
p ro fe s s io n  T h is  im p lie s  th a t  he must keep up to  d a te  w ith  
developm ents and adhere  to  th e  p r a c t ic e  l a i d  down by th e  
p r o fe s s io n a l body o f acco untancy
l5SIbid  , a t  1
160Ibid  , a t  4
161 I b i d
162 Ibid
163 Ibid
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An a u d i to r  has th e  d u ty  to  d is c lo s e  a r e la t io n s h ip  to  
any r e le v a n t  p a r ty  i f  th a t  r e la t io n s h ip  th r e a te n s  h is  
o b j e c t i v i t y  m  r e la t io n  to  th e  r e le v a n t  p a r ty  164
The a u d i to r  has to  re g a rd  th e  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  o f  
in fo r m a t io n  w h ich  he o b ta in e d  in  th e  course  o f  th e  e x e rc is e  
o f h is  fu n c t io n s  165 T h is  in fo r m a t io n  can o n ly  be d is c lo s e d
where consent has been o b ta in e d  o r  i f  d is c lo s u r e  d e r iv e s
\
from  a le g a l  r ig h t  o r  d u ty  He must gu ard  a g a in s t  u s in g  
in fo r m a t io n  f o r  h is  advantage o r  f o r  th e  advantage  o f  t h i r d  
p a r t ie s
8 . 5 . 4 .  As o f  y e t  th e  acco untancy  p ro fe s s io n  has n o t been  
s u b je c t  to  s t a tu t o r y  in t e r v e n t io n ,  a p a r t  from  th e
p ro v is io n s  m  th e  Companies A cts  m  r e la t io n  to  a u d ito r s  
A t th e  same t im e , th e  r e g u la to r y  b o d ie s  m  I r e la n d  do no t 
have a c o n t r o l l in g  mechanism w ith  s a n c t io n in g  powers such 
as th e  R eview  P an e l m  E ng land T h is  P an e l is  presumed to  
form  a c o u n te rb a la n c e  a g a in s t  th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  th e
d ir e c to r s  m  re s p e c t to  th e  a u d ite d  accounts  In  d o in g  so 
th e  R eview  P an e l aims a t  th e  p r e s e r v a t io n  o f  th e
independency o f th e  a u d ito r  w ith  re s p e c t to  h is
r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  th e  Board o f D ir e c to r s
T h is  independency is  subj e c t  to  c e r t a in  p r e ­
c o n d it io n s  166 Among them a re  th e  c o n d it io n s  th a t  th e  
a u d ito r  sh o u ld  a v o id  undue dependence on th e  c l i e n t ,
164Jjbid , at 5
165Ibid , at 45
166Ibid , at 5 ff
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p re s s u re  from  t h i r d  p a r t ie s ,  b e n e f ic ia l  in t e r e s t s  m  th e  
c l i e n t  company, lo an s  from  o r  to  th e  c l i e n t  company and 
accep tan ce  o f  goods, h o s p i t a l i t y  o r  s e rv ic e s  from  th e  
c l i e n t  company The Companies A c t, 1990 d e f in e s  m  
s u b s e c tio n  1 8 7 (2 ) persons who a re  d is q u a l i f i e d  from  b e in g  
a p p o in te d  as a company a u d ito r
The r e la t io n s h ip  betw een th e  a u d ito r  and th e  d i r e c to r s  
is  ambiguous m  th e  sense th a t  th e  term s o f th e  
r e la t io n s h ip  a re  n o t c le a r  w ith  re s p e c t to  th e  a u d i t o r 's  
fu n c t io n  o f  in d ep en d en t v e r i f i c a t i o n  B e in g  an a u d i to r ,  h is  
ta s k  is  to  check w h eth er th e  books a re  k e p t p r o p e r ly  and 
w h eth er th e y  g iv e  a f a i r  and t r u e  v ie w  o f  th e  s ta te  o f  
a f f a i r s  o f  th e  company In  d o in g  so, th e  a u d i to r  must r e ly  
on in fo r m a t io n  p ro v id e d  by o r  re q u e s te d  from  th e  o f f ic e r s  
o f th e  company, n o ta b ly  th e  members o f  th e  B oard o f  
D ir e c to r s  T h is  reaso n  makes i t  e s s e n t ia l  th a t  th e  
r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  d i r e c to r s  is  p r o p e r ly  d r a f te d ,  c o n s is t in g  
o f c o l la b o r a t io n  and shared  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  167
I t  has been re c o g n iz e d  th a t  com ple te  independency  
cannot be p o s s ib le  168 The in d ep en d en t p o s i t io n  o f  a u d ito r s  
is  o f te n  je o p a rd iz e d , due to  th e  in s u r m o u n ta b il i ty  th a t  
c e r t a in  p re c o n d it io n s  cannot be p r o p e r ly  s a feg u ard ed  
a g a in s t  On th e  one hand, th e  a u d ito r  depends on th e  
d ir e c to r s  and o f f ic e r s  o f  a company On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  
a u d i t o r 's  o p in io n  is  d e v a lu e d  i f  i t  was n o t reach ed  on an
167See a ls o  "Guide to  Boardroom P r a c t ic e  No 2 , The
B oard and th e  A u d ito rs "  (1 9 8 3 ) , London The I n s t i t u t e  o f  
D ir e c to r s
168See Auditing Practices Board (1995 122)
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o b je c t iv e  b a s is  S u b se q u e n tly , a c c o rd in g  to  th e  A u d it in g  
P ra c t ic e s  B o a rd ,159 m  th e  e v en t o f  a com pany's f a i l u r e  to  
produce p ro p e r  books, th e  p u b lic  o u tc ry  is  d i r e c te d  to  th e  
a u d ito r s ,  w ere th e y  t r u l y  o b je c t iv e  o r  n o t ’ 170
One o f  th e  reasons th a t  c re a te d  t h is  s i t u a t io n  is  th e  
f a c t  th a t  a u d ito rs  ' f i n d  th em selves  on a " h a l f - b u i l t  
b r id g e "  betw een d i r e c to r s  and s h a re h o ld e rs ' 171 In  o th e r  
w ords, th e  a u d i to r  is  m  some s o r t  o f  le g a l  lim b o  He owes 
h is  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  tow ards th e  members m  g e n e ra l m e e tin g , 
b u t he cannot d is c h a rg e  t h is  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
w ith o u t th e  c o -o p e r a t io n  o f and sh ared  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  w ith  
th e  B oard o f  D ir e c to r s  and o th e r  o f f i c e r s  One s te p  fo rw a rd  
to  enhance th e  p u b lic  p e rc e p t io n  o f o b j e c t i v i t y  and 
independency o f a u d ito r s  i s ,  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  same B oard , 
a c r i t i c a l  e x a m in a tio n  o f ' th e  p ro cess  o f  a c c e p tin g  an 
ap p o in tm en t o r  r e s ig n in g ' 172
In  th e  e v en t o f  a f a i l u r e ,  th e  a u d i to r ,  as w e l l  as th e  
d i r e c t o r s , can be h e ld  l i a b l e  m  n e g lig e n c e  A p e c u l ia r  
asp ect o f  t h is  is  th a t  th e  assessm ent o f  th e  a l le g e d  
n e g lig e n t  conduct f o r  th e  same lo s s e s  depends on th e  n a tu re  
and fu n c t io n  o f  th e  t o r t f e a s o r  The a u d i to r ,  as a 
p r o fe s s io n a l in d iv id u a l ,  must have d e v ia te d  from  some s o r t  
o f a c ce p te d  p r a c t ic e  The d i r e c t o r ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, is
169 Jjbid
170See a ls o  P e r c iv a l  (1991) , supra  Subparagraph  2 6 13 
and Savage (1 9 8 3 ) , supra  Subparagraph 2 6 14
171 Ibid
112 Ibid
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l i a b l e  i f  he had f a i l e d  to  't a k e  re a s o n a b le  c a re  m  
c irc u m s ta n c e s  where th e  d i r e c t o r  was un der a d u ty  to  ta k e  
c a re ' 173 He is  r e q u ire d  to  show s k i l l  and d i l ig e n c e  bu t 
t h is  d u ty  is  assessed w ith o u t p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e f e r r in g  to  
d ir e c to r s  as a d i s t i n c t iv e  group m  s o c ie ty  (h is  p e e rs ) o r  
th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  com pany's a c t i v i t i e s ,  b u t to  a person  o f  
h is  know ledge and e x p e rie n c e  174 In  t h is  sense th e  d u ty  may 
in v o lv e  a h ig h e r  s ta n d a rd  where th e  d i r e c t o r  is  an 
ac co u n ta n t 175
A n o th e r, even more p e c u l ia r  a s p e c t, is  th a t  a d i r e c t o r  
can d is c h a rg e  h is  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  and escape l i a b i l i t y  i f  
he can j u s t i f y  th a t  he c o u ld  le a v e  th e  p e rfo rm an ce  o f  
c e r t a in  d u t ie s  up to  o th e r  o f f ic e r s  o f  th e  company, 'w h ere  
such d u t ie s  may p r o p e r ly  be l e f t  to  such an o f f i c i a l  h a v in g  
re g a rd  to  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f th e  a r t i c l e s  and th e  e x ig e n c ie s  
o f th e  b u s in e s s ' 176 Thus, where a d i r e c t o r  has d e le g a te d  
c e r t a in  d u t ie s  o r  ta s k s , i t  seems th a t  he has d e le g a te d  h is  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  p ro p e r  perfo rm an ce  o f  
such d u t ie s  o r  ta s k s  as w e l l  I t  rem ains to  be seen w h eth er
173See Keane (1991 312)
174Cf RE C ITY EQUITABLE FIRE INSURANCE CO LTD [1925] 
1 Ch 4 0 7 , p e r  Romer J
175In  a re c e n t  case m  A u s t r a l ia ,  DANIELS v ANDERSON 
(1995) 16 A C L R 607, th e  New South W ales C ourt o f  A ppeal 
ad d ressed , among o th e r  th in g s , th e  s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re  o f  
d ir e c to r s  I t  r a is e d  th e  s ta n d a rd  to  a le v e l  much c lo s e r  to  
th e  s ta n d a rd  th a t  is  p o p u la r ly  ex p e c te d  from  d ir e c to r s  
D ir e c to r s  and n o n -e x e c u tiv e  d i r e c to r s  a re  n o t a c c e s s o r ie s  
The a re  e x p e c te d  to  have a c e r t a in  d eg ree  o f  s k i l l  and 
com petence in d ep en d en t o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  a b i l i t i e s  See 
a ls o  N o lan  (1996 91) and Passmore (1995 1 3 1 -1 3 2 )
176Keane (1991 312) See a ls o  RE C ITY EQUITABLE FIRE
INSURANCE CO LTD [1925] Ch 407
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th e  words o f  Lo rd  H a ls b u ry  L C m  DOVEY v CORY [1901]
A C 477 a re  s t i l l  a p p l ic a b le  He s ta te d  th a t  7 [ t ]h e
b u s in ess  o f l i f e  c o u ld  n o t go on i f  p eo p le  c o u ld  n o t t r u s t  
th o se  who a re  p u t in t o  a p o s i t io n  o f  t r u s t  f o r  th e  exp ress  
purpose o f  a t te n d in g  to  d e t a i ls  o f  management' 177
8 .6 .  C o n e lu s io n
The d o c to r -p a t ie n t  r e la t io n s h ip  may be re g a rd e d  as th e  
c o rn e rs to n e  exam ple o f  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  p r o fe s s io n a l  
r e la t io n s h ip  I t  is  f i d u c i a n l y  c h a r a c te r iz e d  and in c lu d e s  
a d eg ree  o f  e x p e r t is e ,  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  and r e l ia n c e ,  w ith o u t  
any p re -a r ra n g e d  r e s u l t  b u t to  e x e rc is e  th e  powers m  th e  
b e s t in t e r e s t  o f  th e  p a t ie n t  T h is  a f fo r d s  to  th e  m e d ic a l 
p r a c t i t io n e r  a g re a t  degree  o f  d is c r e t io n  w ith  re g a rd  to  
th e  e x c is e  o f  h is  d u t ie s  The p a t ie n t  has o n ly  a few  r ig h t s  
to  p r o te c t  h is  p o s i t io n  as b o th  s u b je c t  and o b je c t  o f  th e
r e la t io n s h ip  G e n e r a lly  he has no in p u t in t o  th e  shape and
outcome o f th e  r e la t io n s h ip
Th at a d o c to r  e n jo ys  in d iv id u a l  autonomy and 
independence w i th in  th e  d o c to r -p a t ie n t  r e la t io n s h ip  was 
r e c e n t ly  em phasized by th e  C o u rt o f  A ppeal m  E ng land  m  RE 
R (A MINOR) [1991] 4 A l l  E R 177 Lord  Donaldson M R 
s ta te d  th a t  th e  d e c is io n  to  t r e a t  is  dependent upon th e  
d o c to r 's  own p r o fe s s io n a l judgm ent and he cannot be 
r e q u ir e d  by th e  c o u r t  o r  anyone e ls e  to  t r e a t  o th e rs
177 [1901] A C 477 at 486
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The fu n d am en ta l a sp e c ts  o f  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  ap p ear to  
be d ir e c te d  to  th e  p r a c t i t io n e r ,  e i t h e r  as a s p e c ia l is t  o r  
a g e n e ra l p r a c t i t io n e r  The p a t ie n t  has n o t much in p u t m  
th e  r e la t io n s h ip  H is  o n ly  p red o m in an t r ig h t  is  th a t  he is  
e n t i t l e d  to  tre a tm e n t In  a d d i t io n ,  he has some a n c i l l a r y  
q u a l i f i e d  r ig h t s ,  such has th e  r ig h t  to  be in fo rm e d  and th e  
r ig h t  to  have access to  h is  m e d ic a l re c o rd s  178
Thus, a lth o u g h  th e  p a t ie n t  has a r ig h t  to  t r e a tm e n t ,  
i t  is  a t  th e  d is c r e t io n  o f th e  d o c to r  to  a d m in is te r  
t re a tm e n t to  h im , o r  to  ta k e  him , under th e  G M S , on 
board  h is  p a n e l Once a r e la t io n s h ip  is  c o n s t i tu te d ,  th e  
p r a c t i t io n e r  is  s u b je c t to  c e r t a in  d u t ie s  and o b l ig a t io n s  
He is  r e q u ir e d  to  possess a c e r t a in  degree  o f  com petence  
and s k i l l ,  to  keep up to  d a te  w ith  r e le v a n t  developm ents m  
h is  a re a  o f  e x p e r t is e  and he has to  keep c o n f id e n t ia l  and 
p ro p e r m e d ic a l re c o rd s  A t a l l  tim e s  he ta k e s  f u l l  c l i n i c a l  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  h is  p a t ie n ts  T h is  must be u n d ers to o d  m  
th e  l i g h t  o f  in d iv id u a l  p r o fe s s io n a l autonom y, w hereby th e  
d o c to r  is  e n t i t l e d  to  d e v ia te  from  a norm al p r a c t ic e  w i th in  
accep ted  p a ra m e te rs
The r e la t io n s h ip  betw een th e  s o l i c i t o r  and h is  c l i e n t  
is  n o t as c le a r - c u t  as th e  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een a m e d ic a l
178However, th e r e  a re  in d ic a to r s  th a t  suggests  a g r e a te r  
aw areness o f p a t ie n t s '  r ig h t s  In  o th e r  a re a s  consumer 
o rg a n is a t io n s  p r o te c t  consumer in t e r e s t s  The n ew ly  s e t up 
I r i s h  P a t ie n ts  O rg a n is a t io n  proposes to  p r o te c t  and enhance 
th e  r ig h t s  o f  h o s p ita l  p a t ie n ts  I t  em phasizes th e  problem s  
th a t  e x is t  m  m e d ic a l h e a lth  c a re  m  Ir e la n d ,  f o r  exam ple, 
com m unication problem s betw een d o c to r  and p a t ie n t ,  and aims 
a t  c o -o p e r a t io n  w ith  m ed ic a l h e a lth  c a re  o rg a n is a t io n s  to  
im prove th e  q u a l i t y  and s a fe ty  o f  th e  s e rv ic e s  p ro v id e d ,  
see Dempsey (1996)
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p r a c t i t io n e r  and h is  p a t ie n t  T h is  can be a t t r i b u t e d  to  th e  
f a c t  th a t  a s o l i c i t o r  e x e rc is e s  h is  fu n c t io n s  autonom ously  
and in d e p e n d e n tly  from  c e r t a in  g o v e rn in g  b o d ie s , such as m  
m e d ic in e  th e  H e a lth  Boards o r  P u b lic  and V o lu n ta ry
H o s p ita ls  T h is  means th a t  a w e l l - d e f in e d  and o m n ip resen t 
s t r u c tu r e  is  ab sen t
In  each case th e  c o n tr a c tu a l and u n iq u e  d u t ie s  a re  
s p e c if ie d  m  th e  c o n tr a c t  o f  r e t a in e r  In  a d d i t io n ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  under common law  and e q u ity ,  th e  s o l i c i t o r  has 
d u tie s  th a t  a p p ly  to  h is  p r o fe s s io n a l conduct and o v e r -a rc h  
h is  c o n tr a c tu a l  o b l ig a t io n s
The p o s i t io n  o f  an a c co u n ta n t as an a u d ito r  is
p re d o m in a n tly  d e te rm in e d  by h is  a s s e r te d  r o le  as an 
in d ep en d en t c o n t r o l  mechanism w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  f in a n c ia l  
a f f a i r s  o f  th e  company T h is  means th a t  h is  p r o fe s s io n a l  
r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  h is  c l i e n t  - th e  company - does n o t e x is t  
by v i r t u e  o f  th e  need o f p r o fe s s io n a l s e rv ic e s  by th e  
company, as i t  e x is ts  in ,  f o r  exam ple, th e  r e la t io n s h ip  o f  
a s o l i c i t o r  and h is  c l i e n t  o r  th e  m e d ic a l p r a c t i t io n e r  and 
h is  p a t ie n t  179 The r e la t io n s h ip  is  r e q u ir e d  by v i r t u e  o f  
s t a tu t o r y  r e g u la t io n s ,  1  e s u b s e c tio n  1 6 0 (1 ) o f  th e
Companies A c t, 1963 Those r e g u la t io n s  a re  e n a c te d  f o r  th e
b e n e f i t  o f  th e  company However, a c c o rd in g  to  t h is  
re s e a rc h e r , th e  r e g u la t io n s  a ls o  b e n e f i t  th e  p u b lic  as a 
means to  e x e rc is e  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r an a r t i f i c i a l  and 
law-m ade e n t i t y  The purpose o f  acco u n tan cy  has been
179A company can a v a i l  o f  th e  norm al s e rv ic e s  o f  an 
a c c o u n ta n t o r  em ploy an ac co u n ta n t to  keep th e  books o f  
accounts
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s h i f t e d  from  a p re d o m in a n tly  in t e r n a l  a f f a i r  to  an e x te r n a l  
and p u b lic  concern  to  a v o id  d is a p p o in tm e n t and to  p r o te c t  
a g a in s t  u n b r id le d  b u s in ess  a d v e n tu re s  th o se  who have ta k e n  
th e  f in a n c ia l  r is k s ,  f o r  exam ple, s h a re h o ld e rs , in v e s to rs  
o r  c r e d ito r s
397
9 .1 . Introduction
Lord  R e id  s ta te d  m  HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER 
& PARTNERS [1963] 2 A l l  E R 575 th a t  7 [h] ow w ide th e
sphere o f  th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  m  n e g lig e n c e  is  to  be l a i d  
depends u l t im a t e ly  on th e  c o u r t 's  assessm ent o f  th e  demands 
o f s o c ie ty  f o r  th e  p r o te c t io n  from  th e  c a re le s s n e s s  o f  
o th e r s ' 1
T h is  is  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e le v a n t  m  p r o fe s s io n a l  
n e g lig e n c e , a t  le a s t  m  th e  absence o f an u n d e r ly in g
r e la t io n s h ip ,  hence, th e  t i t l e  o f  t h is  C h a p te r I t  
im m e d ia te ly  becomes a p p a re n t th a t  th e  C h a p te r d e a ls  w ith  
th e  g e n e ra l n e g lig e n c e  is s u e s  p r o x im ity ,  f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  
and p o l ic y  as a b a s is  f o r  th e  im p o s it io n  o f  a d u ty  o f  c a re  
B u t, to  say th a t  t h i r d - p a r t y  l i a b i l i t y  is  c o n fin e d  to  th e  
c o n te x t o f  p r o fe s s io n a l n e g lig e n c e  is  an a s s e r t io n  th a t  
must be r e je c te d  N e g lig e n c e , as an in d ep en d en t t o r t ,  is  
about t h i r d  p a r t ie s  T h is  i s ,  o f  c o u rse , i l l u s t r a t e d  w ith
th e  " m ile -s to n e "  d e c is io n  m  DONOGHUE v STEVENSON [1932]
Chapter 9
Tort Development Third-Party
Liability and Immunity
1 [1963] 2 A l l  E R 575 a t  615
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{
A l l  E R 1 Where i t  d i f f e r s ,  m  th e  c o n te x t o f  
p r o fe s s io n a l n e g lig e n c e , is  th a t  th e  t h i r d  p a r ty  has 
s u f fe re d  lo s s  as a consequences o f an a lr e a d y  e x is t in g  
r e la t io n s h ip  betw een th e  p r o fe s s io n a l p erson  and a n o th e r ,
\ f o r  exam ple, a company, a t e s t a t o r ,  e tc  T h is  as p e c t  
c re a te d  th e  need f o r  a d i f f e r e n t  assessm ent o f  th e  
p r o fe s s io n a l p e rs o n 's  d u t ie s  A t th e  same t im e , how ever, 
th e  case law  on th e  t o r t  o f  n e g lig e n c e  d eve lo p ed  g e n e ra l  
p r in c ip le s  '
T h is  C h ap te r lo o ks  a t  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  developm ent o f  
th e  t o r t  o f  n e g lig e n c e  and d isc u s s e s  i t s  u n d e r ly in g  
asp e c ts  The q u e s tio n  r e fe r s  to  what th e  reason s a re  to  
a s s e r t  th e  e x is te n c e  o f a d u ty  o f  c a re  and to  impose 
l i a b i l i t y  T h is  demands a d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  im p o rta n t cases  
m  t h is  a re a , s t a r t in g  w ith  th e  d e c is io n  m  DONOGHUE v  
STEVENSON [1932] A l l  E R 1 However, th e  developm ent th a t  
le a d  to  th e  d e c is io n  m  DONOGHUE is  a ls o  r e le v a n t  and 
i l lu m in a te s  th e  p h i lo s o p h ic a l ,  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  and 
eco n o m ica l changes m  W estern  s o c ie ty
In  DONOGHUE, Lo rd  M a c m illa n  re c o g n iz e d  th a t  th e  
c a te g o r ie s  o f  l i a b i l i t y  a re  n e v e r c lo s e d  2 However, th e  law  
o f t o r t  o f  n e g lig e n c e  o p e ra te s  as a le g a l  mechanism to  
l i m i t  l i a b i l i t y  The c o u rts  s e t th e  l i m i t s  w ith  re g a rd  to  
th e  e x is te n c e  o f a d u ty  o f  c a re  and i t s  e x te n t  The l i m i t s  
a re  n o t s t a t i c  They change from  tim e  to  tim e  as l i f e  
i t s e l f  changes, and i t  can be argued  th a t  th e y  r e f l e c t  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  c l im a te  o r  th e  so c io -e co n o m ic  r e a l i t y  we l i v e  m
?
2 [1932] A C 562 at 619
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I t  appears  th a t  a t  each s tag e  th e  c o u r ts  a re  lo o k in g  
f o r  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  to  impose l i a b i l i t y  o r  to  r e l ie v e  th e  
t o r t f e a s o r  from  h is  com pensation o b l ig a t io n s  T h is  is  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i l l u s t r a t e d  w ith  re g a rd  to  some s p e c i f ic  
d u t ie s  o f ,  on th e  one hand, a u d ito r s  and, on th e  o th e r  
hand, s o l i c i t o r s  The a s s e r t io n  o f  a d u ty  o f  c a re  appears  
to  depend on th e  c o n s tr u c t io n  o f  th e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  
e x p e c ta t io n  and th e  purpose o f th e  s p e c i f ic  d u ty  th a t  has 
been v io la t e d  L i a b i l i t y  is  imposed as a m a tte r  o f  p o l ic y  
I t  seems t h a t ,  a t  le a s t  m  E ng land , a s o l i c i t o r  who f a i l s  
to  p e rfo rm  a d e q u a te ly  must pay up, w h ile  an a u d ito r  who 
n e g l ig e n t ly  p re p a re s  th e  accounts  o f  a company g e ts  away 
w ith  h is  n e g l ig e n t  co n d u ct, why’
T h is  C h a p te r d e a ls  w ith  th e  fo l lo w in g  is s u e s  
F i r s t ,  i t  lo o ks  a t  th e  developm ent o f  n e g lig e n c e  as an 
in d ep en d en t t o r t  and th e  emergence o f th e  d u ty  concept 
T h is  in v o lv e s  an e x a m in a tio n  o f th e  e x is t in g  l i t e r a t u r e  
re p re s e n te d  by s c h o la rs  such as P o llo c k  (1916) , W in f ie ld  
(1 9 2 6 ) , H o ld sw o rth  (1 9 5 7 ) , B aker (1990) and K re tzm e r
(1994)
Second, i t  re v ie w s  th e  modern n e g lig e n c e  cases T h is  
re v ie w  is  d iv id e d  in t o  th r e e  s ta g e s , s t a r t in g  w ith  th e  
d e c is io n  m  DONOGHUE v STEVENSON [1932] A l l  E R 1, 
fo llo w e d  by th e  d e c is io n  in  ANNS v MERTON LONDON BOROUGH 
COUNCIL [1978] A C 728 and ends w ith  th e  d e c is io n  m  
CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v DICKMAN [1990] 1 A l l  E R 568
T h ir d , i t  i l l u s t r a t e s  th e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  to  impose o r  
a s s e r t  a d u ty  o f  c a re , o r  to  deny th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a d u ty
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o f c a re  o f  an a u d ito r  and a s o l i c i t o r  3
F i n a l l y ,  th e  C h ap te r b r i e f l y  d isc u s s e s  th e  p o l ic y  
argum ent o f  a b a r r i s t e r 's  im m unity  f o r  c o u r t  work T h is  
p r iv i l e g e  has r e c e n t ly  been s u b je c te d  to  c r i t i c is m
9 .2 .  The O r ig in s  o f  th e  T o r t  o f  N e g lig e n c e
and th e  D uty  o f  Care
9 . 2 . 1 .  In  any t o r t ,  i t  is  a l le g e d  th a t  a "w rong” has 
been com m itted  a g a in s t  th e  p l a i n t i f f  T h e re fo re  t h is  
"wrong" appears  to  form  th e  param ount e lem en t in  th e  law  o f  
t o r t  4 T h is  wrong p reced es  some form  o f  damage and r e s u lts  
m  a c o n f l i c t  betw een th e  p l a i n t i f f  and t o r t f e a s o r ,  and, 
s u b s e q u e n tly , asks f o r  a r e s o lu t io n  m  c o u rt  A cause o f  
a c t io n  is  based on, inter alia , th e  in fr in g e m e n t o f  th ef
p l a i n t i f f ' s  r ig h t s ,  p e rs o n a l m en ta l o r  p h y s ic a l i n t e g r i t y ,  
o r th e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  p ro p e r ty
A p a rt from  t o r t io u s  wrongs th e r e  a re  o th e r  wrongs 
w hich  a d e fe n d a n t may be an sw erab le  f o r  m  law  c r im in a l ,  
c o n tr a c tu a l o r  r e s t i t u t i o n a l  wrongs T o r t ,  how ever, 
d is t in g u is h e s  i t s e l f  from  th o se  ty p e s  o f wrongs by
3A rg u a b ly , th e  m e d ic a l p r a c t i t io n e r  can owe d u t ie s  to  
t h i r d  p a r t ie s  as w e l l  T h is  is  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e le v a n t  w ith  
re g a rd  to ,  f o r  exam ple, a d u ty  to  warn t h i r d  p a r t ie s  about 
dangerous p s y c h ia t r ic  p a t ie n ts  T h is  a re a  o f  t h i r d - p a r t y  
l i a b i l i t y  was d eve lo p ed  m  A m erica I t  is  b r i e f l y  d iscu sse d  
m  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  re v ie w  where i t  t i e s  in  w ith  r e q u is i t e  
s ta n d a rd  o f  c a re , see supra  Subparagraph 2 2 12
4In  f a c t ,  " t o r t "  is  a Norman word (W h ite , 1980 x i )  I t  
was commonly used in  th e  E n g lis h  lan g u ag e , m eaning  
l i t e r a l l y  " tw is te d "  o r  "wrong" (K eeton , e t  al , 1984 1)
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em p h as iz in g  th e  need f o r  com pensation 5 When th e r e  is  an 
a l le g a t io n  o f a t o r t io u s  wrong, th e  d e fe n d a n t is  l i a b l e  
because h is  conduct r e s u lte d  in  lo s s  to  a n o th e r  f o r  w hich  
th e  law  s h a l l  re d re s s  w ith  damages Thus, t o r t  is  a wrong 
due to  a b re a ch  o f a le g a l  d u ty  w hich th e  d e fe n d a n t owed to  
th e  p l a i n t i f f  and t h is  wrong demands p e c u n ia ry  
com pensation
T h is  is  p re e m in e n t m  t o r t  l i a b i l i t y  and re q u ire s  
c lo s e r  e x a m in a tio n  The law  o f t o r t  (o r  t o r t s ) 6 is  
concerned w ith  th e  a l lo c a t io n  o f lo s s e s  a r is in g  from  ou r  
a c t i v i t i e s  m  d a i l y  l i f e  I t  a r is e s  when th e r e  is  a
c o n f l i c t  betw een , on th e  one hand, th e  in t e r e s t  m
p r o te c t io n  o r  s a fe ty  and, on th e  o th e r  hand, th e  in t e r e s t
m  freedom  o f a c t io n  (o r  m  some cases in a c t io n )  The law
o f t o r t ,  by im posing  le g a l  d u t ie s ,  imposes l i a b i l i t y  m  
th o se  cases where th e  need to  com pensate supersedes th e  
freedom  o f  a c t io n  o f  th e  t o r t f e a s o r  I t s  ta s k  is  to  do t h is  
exem p lary  and j u s t i f i a b l y  I t  has ' t o  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  betw een  
th e  v a r io u s  k in d s  o f  in t e r e s t s  f o r  w hich in d iv id u a ls  may
5C n m in a l law  c a r r ie s  an im p o rta n t e lem en t o f  
pun ishm ent, a form  o f com pensation to  s o c ie ty  as a whole  
In  c o n tr a c t  law , d u t ie s  and o b l ig a t io n s  o f  e i t h e r  p a r t ie s  
a re  p r im a r i ly  made betw een th e  p a r t ie s  th em selves  and a 
d u ty  imposed by c o n tra c t  does n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  have to  be 
imposed by law  R e s t i tu t io n  d e a ls  w ith  th e  re im bursem ent o f  
u n in te n t io n a l  and u n ju s t i f i e d  b e n e f i ts
6The answers m  each case - w h eth er th e r e  is  a law  o f  
t o r t  o r  law s o f t o r t s  - do n o t e x c lu d e  each o th e r ,  
a c c o rd in g  to  G la n v i l l e  W illia m s  (1939) In  h is  v ie w , t o r t  
is  ' e i t h e r  (1) a c o n c re te  w ro n g fu l a c t  o r  (2) a s p e c ie s  o f  
wrong coming w i t h in  th e  g e n e r ic  c o n c e p tio n  o f t o r t ' , 
(supra, a t  115)
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c la im  p r o te c t io n  a g a in s t  in ju r y  by o th e r s ' 7
How does th e  t o r t  law  impose le g a l  d u t ie s ’  Two v iew s  
a re  p r e v a le n t  The f i r s t  v ie w , exp ressed  b y , inter a h a ,  
Salmond sees th e  law  o f t o r t s  as c o n s is t in g  o f 'a  number o f  
s p e c i f ic  r u le s  p r o h ib i t in g  c e r t a in  k in d s  o f  h a rm fu l 
a c t i v i t y ,  and le a v in g  a l l  th e  re s id u e  o u ts id e  th e  sphere  o f  
le g a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y '  8 O th e rs , l i k e  W i n f ie ld ,9 su p p o rt th e  
v ie w  th a t  th e  law  o f  t o r t  c o n s is ts  o f  a g e n e ra l p r in c ip le  
th a t  ca u s in g  harm is  w ro n g fu l, u n le s s  th e r e  is  some ground  
f o r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o r  excuse T h is  v ie w  a cce p ts  new t o r t s  m  
th e  'v i r t u e  o f  th e  p r in c ip le  th a t  u n ju s t i f i a b le  harm is  
t o r t io u s '  10 The fo rm e r d e n ie s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  th e  
emergence o f  a new t o r t
However, a c c o rd in g  to  G la n v i l l e  W i l l ia m s ,11 th e  two 
v iew s d e a l w ith  th e  same prob lem  can t o r t s  be expanded and 
i f  so, how’  The two v iew s m e re ly  d is c lo s e  th a t  th e r e  a re  
some g e n e ra l r u le s  f o r  c r e a t in g  l i a b i l i t y  { p r o te c t io n  and 
s a fe ty )  as th e re  a re  f o r  exem pting  l i a b i l i t y  {freedom  o f  
a c t io n )  In  o th e r  w ords, m  what c irc u m sta n c e s  does th e  law  
o f t o r t  impose le g a l  d u t ie s  upon th e  a l le g e d  t o r t f e a s o r ’
9 .2  2 N e g lig e n c e  is  lo n g  s in c e  c o n s id e re d  an
in d ep en d en t t o r t  and is  nowadays th e  dom inant cause o f
’ F lem in g  (1992 4)
8H euston & B u ck ley  (1992 1 7 -1 8 )
9Rogers (1989 4)
10Ibid , at 14
11 (1939 131)
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As an in d ep en d en t t o r t  i t  can be p la c e d  betw een  
in t e n t io n a l  t o r t s ,  f o r  exam ple, t re s p a s s , and th o se  t o r t s  
upon w h ich  s t r i c t  l i a b i l i t y  is  im posed, 1  e p ro d u c ts  
l i a b i l i t y  and th e  r u le  m  RYLANDS v FLETCHER 13 I t  has 
been d e s c r ib e d  by many, in c lu d in g  th e  w e ll-k n o w n  and o f te n  
c i t e d  d e s c r ip t io n  by A ld e rs o n  B In  BLYTH v BIRMINGHAM 
WATERWORKS CO [1856] 11 Exch 781 he s ta te d  th a t  -
action for accidental injury 12
[n ]e g lig e n c e  is  th e  om iss io n  to  do som ething  
w hich  a re a s o n a b le  man, g u id ed  upon th o se  
c o n s id e ra t io n s  w h ich  o r d i n a r i l y  r e g u la te  th e  
conduct o f  human a f f a i r s ,  w ould do, o r  d o ing  
som eth ing  w hich a p ru d en t and re a s o n a b le  man 
w ould n o t do 14
T h is  approach d e te rm in e s  l i a b i l i t y  by a s s e s s in g  th e  
conduct o f  th e  d e fe n d a n t, r a th e r  th a n  fo c u s in g  on th e  k in d  
o f harm done to  th e  p l a i n t i f f ,  and re c o g n iz e s  n e g lig e n c e  as 
an in d ep en d en t t o r t  15 A t t h is  p o in t  i t  can be a s s e r te d  
th a t  l i a b i l i t y  m  n e g lig e n c e  d e a ls  w ith  th e  le g a l  d u t ie s  
w hich a re  imposed on th e  t o r t f e a s o r  and he is  l i a b l e  i f  h is  
conduct is  o f  such n a tu re  th a t  he v io la t e s  th e s e  d u t ie s
12K eeton , e t  a l  (1984 160)
13 (1868) L R 3 H L 330
14 [1856] 11 Exch 781 a t  784
15In  a d d i t io n ,  n e g lig e n c e  is  u n d ers to o d  as a method o f  
com m ission to  commit o th e r  t o r t s ,  l  e n u isan ce  o r  tre s p a s s  
( i f ,  f o r  exam ple , n e g lig e n t  conduct causes d i r e c t  p h y s ic a l  
harm) In  t h is  sense, n e g lig e n c e  means c a re le s s n e s s  and 
must be d is t in g u is h e d  from  o th e r  d eg rees  o f w ro n g fu l 
conduct such as in a d v e r te n c e , re c k le s s n e s s  o r  in t e n t  
(H euston & B u c k le y , 1992 1 9 9 -2 0 0 )
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T h is  was n o t a lw ays th e  case , a c c o rd in g  to  H o ld sw o rth  
(1957) In  m e d ie v a l tim e s  i t  was b e lie v e d  th a t  a man a c te d  
a t  h is  own p e r i l  L i a b i l i t y  was founded on a p r im i t iv e  
b a s is  The th e o ry  c o n ta in e d  th a t  -
[a] man is  l i a b l e  f o r  a l l  th e  harm w h ich  he has 
i n f l i c t e d  upon a n o th e r by h is  a c ts , i f  what he 
has done comes w i th in  some one o f  th e  form s o f  
a c t io n  p ro v id e d  by law , w h eth er th a t  harm has 
been i n f l i c t e d  in t e n t io n a l l y ,  n e g l ig e n t ly  o r  
a c c id e n t a l ly  16
The m ain argum ent was th e  c a u s a tio n  betw een lo s s  and 
th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  conduct The l a t t e r  had o n ly  a few  
d efen ces  H o ld sw o rth  m entions 17 ( i )  th e  conduct was
p e rm it te d  by law  - i t  se rv ed  th e  p u b lic  in t e r e s t  o r  th e  
d e fe n d a n t 's  conduct was a n e c e ssary  d e fen ce  o f  h is  own
p e rs o n a l r ig h t s  o r  p ro p e r ty , ( n )  th e  conduct was th e
p l a i n t i f f ' s  and ( i n )  th e  conduct was u n a v o id a b le  by reason  
o f an " a c t o f  God"
I t  fo l lo w s  from  t h is  th e o ry  th a t  m  a l l  o th e r  cases  
th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  l i a b i l i t y  depended on a c a u s a l c o n n e c tio n  
betw een h is  conduct and th e  lo s s  s u f fe r e d  by th e  p l a i n t i f f  
T h is  n o tio n  o f c a u s a tio n  r e f le c t e d  ' t h e  p r im i t i v e  concepts  
o f r e s p o n s ib i l i t y 7 18 The id e a  th a t  th e  d e fe n d a n t had a 
le g a l  o b l ig a t io n  to  ta k e  c a re  w ith  re g a rd  to  h is  conduct
and th a t  a b rea ch  o f t h is  o b l ig a t io n  c o u ld  le a d  to
16H o ld sw o rth  (1957 446)
11 Ibid
18Kretzmer (1994 46)
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l i a b i l i t y  was n o t y e t  p ro c la im e d  The th e o ry  e x c lu d e d  
im m ediate  re fe re n c e s  to  n e g lig e n c e  as a cause f o r  
l i a b i l i t y
T h is  th e o ry  s u rv iv e d  f o r  a lo n g  p e r io d  However, a t  
th e  c lo s e  o f  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  i t  was re p la c e d  by what 
is  now known as th e  in d iv id u a l  t o r t  o f  n e g lig e n c e  Three  
developm ents p re c lu d e d  t h is  F i r s t , th e  emergence o f  new 
t o r t s  based on some s o r t  o f  w ro n g fu l in t e n t  Second, th e  
developm ent o f  th e  (modern) d o c tr in e  o f  e m p lo yers ' 
l i a b i l i t y  T h ir d ,  and fo rem o st m  th e  c o n te x t o f  t h is  
C h a p te r, th e  c o u rts  began to  base an a c t io n  f o r  l i a b i l i t y ,  
no t on th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  conduct per  se , b u t on h is  n e g lig e n t  
conduct One o f  th e  reasons f o r  t h is  new approach was th a t  
th e  o ld  c a u s a tio n  th e o ry  s t i f l e d  e n te r p r is e  19 The new 
p r in c ip le  fa v o u re d  th e  in t e r e s t  o f  freedom  o f  a c t io n  and 
' r e l i e v e d  e n te r p r is e s  o f  some o f  th e  c o s ts  o f  t h e i r  
a c t i v i t i e s '  20 T h is  became p a r t i c u l a r l y  a p p a re n t w ith  
re g a rd  to  damage caused by in d u s t r ia l  m ach in e ry , f o r  
exam ple, a c c id e n ts  in v o lv in g  r a i lw a y  t r a in s  21 22
A cco rd in g  to  H o ld sw o rth , n e g lig e n c e  was l a t e n t l y  
p re s e n t m  th e  m e d ie v a l th e o ry  because i t  ap p eared  th a t  'a  
man was o n ly  l i a b l e  f o r  th e  damage w h ich  [was] th e
19See a ls o  supra  Subparagraph 2 7 2
20K re tzm e r (1994 47)
21W m f le ld  (1926 195)
22I t  can a ls o  be arg u ed , a c c o rd in g  to  t h is  re s e a rc h e r ,  
th a t  s o c ie ty  became aware o f  th e  r e c o g n it io n  o f  in d iv id u a l  
r ig h t s  and th e  p ro c la m a tio n  o f th e  d e m o c ra tic  p r in c ip le s
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p ro x im a te  consequence o f h is  a c t '  23 T h is  appeared  to  be o f  
s p e c ia l im p o rtan ce  m  cases where th e  c o n n e c tio n  betw een  
th e  a c t and th e  lo s s  was n o t so o b vio u s  I t  g r a d u a lly  
f a m i l ia r i z e d  th e  c o u rts  w ith  th e  g e n e s is  o f  and em pathy f o r  
th e  concept o f  n e g lig e n c e  They became accustom ed to  
c o n te m p la te  upon th e  concept o f  p ro x im a te  cause m  cases  
where th e  c ru x  o f  th e  a c t io n  on th e  case was damage 24 
C o n s eq u en tly , th e  c o u rts  began to  a p p ly  an ob j e c t iv e  
s ta n d a rd  and n e g lig e n c e  became analogous to  th e  e x is te n c e  
o f a d u ty  n o t to  harm th e  p l a i n t i f f  T h is  s ta n d a rd  was 
adopted  to  f in d  o u t w h eth er th e r e  was a s u f f i c i e n t  
p ro x im a te  consequence o f th e  d e fe n d a n t 's  a c ts , h av in g  
re g a rd  to  what ' an o r d in a ry  p ru d e n t man w ould have 
fo re s e e n ' 25
The u n d e r ly in g  d u ty  - as c o r r e la t iv e  to  n e g lig e n c e  - 
was f i r s t  re c o g n iz e d  m  cases where i t  a ro se  o u t o f  some 
p r o p r ie t a r y  r e la t io n s h ip ,  c o n tr a c t  o r  q u a s i-c o n t r a c t  In  
most cases t h is  in v o lv e d  p eo p le  who p ro fe s s e d  a ' common 
c a l l i n g ' , such as m n -k e e p e rs , c a r r ie r s ,  a r t i f i c e r s ,  
surgeons and a t to rn e y s  26 I t  was h e ld , a c c o rd in g  to  B aker, 
th a t  -
a p erso n  who embarked upon a re q u e s te d  s e rv ic e
w hich b ro u g h t him in t o  c o n ta c t w ith  th e  p erso n  o r
23 (1957 449)
24The concept o f  f o r e s e e a b i l i t y ,  as we use now, is  
r e l a t i v e l y  modern (H o ld sw o rth , 1957 449)
25H o ld sw o rth  (1957 450)
26Baker (1990 460)
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p ro p e r ty  o f  a n o th e r was l i a b l e  i f  he p e rfo rm ed
th e  s e rv ic e  w ith  want o f  c a re  o r  s k i l l  and damage
r e s u lte d  27
Thus, th e  u n d e r ly in g  a s p e c t o f  n e g lig e n c e  was th e  
p resen ce  o f  an u n d e rta k in g  Th ere  a lr e a d y  had to  be some 
s o r t  o f  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een th e  d e fe n d a n t and th e
p l a i n t i f f  b e fo re  damage o c c u rre d
But why n o t an a c t io n  m  b rea ch  o f c o n t r a c t ’  B aker 
argued th a t  th e  o b l ig a t io n  w h ich  aro se  o u t o f  th e
u n d e rta k in g  was o n ly  to  do th e  work th e  d e fe n d a n t was asked  
to  do 28 And, a c c o rd in g  to  P o llo c k , th e  d u ty  to  ta k e  c a re  
reach ed  f u r t h e r  th a n  a c o n tr a c t ,  w hereby m  t o r t  ' th e  
p r im a ry  q u e s tio n  o f  l i a b i l i t y  may i t s e l f  depend [ ] on
th e  n earn ess  o r  rem oteness o f th e  harm co m pla ined  o f '  29 
The harm r e s u lte d  from  want o f  c a re  and t h is  c a re  was 
imposed by law  30
Thus, m  th e  c o n te x t o f  an a lr e a d y  e x is t in g  
r e la t io n s h ip  betw een d e fe n d a n t and p l a i n t i f f ,  based on a 
common c a l l i n g ,  n e g lig e n c e  became th e  cause o f a c t io n  In  
t h is  sense th e  d e p a r tu re  o f  th e  c a u s a tio n  p r in c ip le  l im i t e d  
th e  l i a b i l i t y  o f  th o se  p e rso n s , l i a b i l i t y  was based on a 
b rea ch  o f an o v e r -a r c h in g  d u ty  o f  c a re  w hich was owed by
27 Ibid
28 Jjbid
29 (1916 30)
30The o v e r la p  betw een t o r t  and c o n tr a c t  s t i l l  e x is ts  
to d a y  w ith  re g a rd  to  men 'whose d u t ie s  to  be c a r e f u l  a r is e  
b o th  by reaso n  o f  t h e i r  p h y s ic a l nexus w ith  th e  p l a i n t i f f  
o r  h is  p ro p e r ty  and by reaso n  o f  t h e i r  d e a lin g s  w ith  th e m ', 
(B aker, 1990 461)
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th e  d e fe n d a n t to  th e  p l a i n t i f f  Fo r some d e fe n d a n ts  t h is  
l i m i t a t i o n  was based, a c c o rd in g  to  H o ld sw o rth , 'o n  m a tte rs  
o f p u b lic  p o l i c y 7 31
In  th e  absence o f an u n d e r ly in g  r e la t io n s h ip ,  
l i a b i l i t y  was s t i l l  r u le d  by th e  m e d ie v a l c a u s a tio n  
p r in c ip le  N o rm a lly  an a c t io n  was b ro u g h t in ,  f o r  exam ple, 
tre s p a s s  vi et armis  H ere th e  conduct was e i t h e r  n e g l ig e n t  
o r  o th e rw is e  and caused damage to  th e  p l a i n t i f f  The a c t  o r  
conduct m  tre s p a s s  was deemed u n la w fu l and l i a b i l i t y  was 
imposed, even i f  th e  damage was a c c id e n t a l ly  b ro u g h t about 
In  LAMBERT v BESSEY (1681) Th Raym 421 i t  was h e ld  th a t  
7 m  a l l  c i v i l  a c ts  th e  law  d o th  n o t so much re g a rd  th e  
in t e n t  o f  th e  a c to r ,  as th e  lo s s  and damage o f  th e  p a r ty  
s u f f e r in g '  32 T h is  re s ta te m e n t o f  th e  m e d ie v a l p r in c ip le  
was a g a in  approved m  RYLANDS v FLETCHER (186 8) L R 3 
H L 341
However, a number o f  o th e r  cases were seen as more 
le n ie n t  and r e s t r ic t e d  th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f th e  m e d ie v a l 
p r in c ip le  m  a number o f  ways The reaso n  f o r  t h i s  le n ie n c e  
was th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  damage d id  n o t f lo w  d i r e c t l y  from  a 
v io le n t  a c t  (n o rm a lly  tre s p a s s ) T h e re fo re , th e  a c t  was no t 
n e c e s s a r i ly  u n la w fu l,  b u t th e  need f o r  com pensation  
rem ained
In  MITCHELL v ALLESTREE (1676) B & M 572 (a ru n n in g  
down case) th e  a c t  was n o t u n la w fu l b u t l i a b i l i t y  needed to  
be imposed T h e re fo re , a d u ty  to  ta k e  c a re  was imposed upon
31 (1957 452) }
32 (1681) Th Raym 421 a t  422 -4 2 3
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th e  d e fe n d a n t The ho rse  had no a b n o rm a lly  v ic io u s
c h a r a c t e r is t ic s  and th e  m aste r and s e rv a n t (th e  d e fe n d a n ts )  
had t r i e d  e v e r y th in g  th e y  re a s o n a b ly  c o u ld  do to  a v o id  an 
a c c id e n t The essence o f th e  a c t io n ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  la y  m  th e  
wrong o f b r in g in g  a ho rse  in t o  a square ' im p r o v id e n t ly ,  
r a s h ly ,  and w ith o u t due c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  th e  u n s u i t a b i l i t y  
o f th e  p la c e ' 33 The id e a  was a p p lie d  th a t  -
common law  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  n e g lig e n c e  was so
ex ten d e d  as to  make one l i a b l e ,  m  a c t io n  on th e  
case , f o r  damage f lo w in g  from  th e  n e g l ig e n t  
perfo rm an ce  o f h is  own p r o je c ts  and u n d e rta k in g s ,  
unconnected  w ith  th e  d u ty  a r is in g  from  s t a tu t e ,  
p u b lic  c a l l i n g ,  b a ilm e n t, o r  p r e s c r ip t io n  34
In  MASON v KEELING (1700) 1 Ld Raym 606 th e
p r in c ip le  was s ta te d  th a t  a man was 'a n s w e ra b le  f o r  a l l
m is c h ie f  p ro c e e d in g  from  h is  n e g le c t  o r  h is  a c t io n s , u n le s s  
th e y  w ere o f  u n a v o id a b le  n e c e s s ity ' 35 A cc o rd in g  to  B aker, 
t h is  opened up a new c a te g o ry  w hich c o u ld  a ls o  in c lu d e  ' th e  
k in d s  o f n e g lig e n c e  cases w hich had fo r m e r ly  been  
a c t io n a b le  as t re s p a s s ' 36 T h is  became even more a p p a re n t  
m  WILLIAMS v HOLLAND (1833) 10 B ing  112 I t  d e a l t  w ith
th e  d ire c tn e s s  o f  th e  wrong m  tre s p a s s  I t  was now h e ld  
th a t  th e  p l a i n t i f f  c o u ld  have an e le c t io n  A p a rt from  
tre s p a s s , he c o u ld  a ls o  sue m  case w henever th e  in ju r y  he
33 (16 7 6) B & M 572
34H o ld sw o rth  (1957 453)
35 ( 1700) 1 Ld Raym 606 a t  607
36 (1990 466)
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s u f fe r e d  was n o t d i r e c t  and w i l f u l  As a r e s u l t ,  tre s p a s s  
became more and more a s s o c ia te d  w ith  w i l f u l  i n j u r i e s ,  such 
as b a t t e r y  and a s s a u lt
F i n a l l y ,  m  STANLEY v POWELL [1891] 1 Q B 86 , i t  was 
e v e n tu a l ly  d is m is s e d  th a t  a man c o u ld  be l i a b l e  f o r  p u re ly  
a c c id e n ta l  tre s p a s s
9 2 3 . T h is  s h o rt h i s t o r i c a l  o v e rv ie w  shows a 
m o d if ic a t io n  o f  th e  c i v i l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  o f  persons  
tow ards  t h e i r  n e ig h b o u rs  F i r s t ,  c a u s a tio n  imposed  
l i a b i l i t y ,  l a t e r  t h is  p r in c ip le  was re p la c e d  by th e  
im p o s it io n  o f  a d u ty  o f  c a re  upon th e  d e fe n d a n t C a u s a tio n  
became one o f  th e  e lem en ts  m  th e  t o r t  o f  n e g lig e n c e , to  be 
p roved  by th e  p l a i n t i f f  T h is  m o d if ic a t io n  f i r s t  became 
param ount where th e  damage flo w e d  from  want o f  c a re  m  an 
a lr e a d y  e x is t in g  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een p l a i n t i f f  and 
d e fe n d a n t E v e n tu a lly  a d u ty  a ro se  m  s i t u a t io n s  where  
damage o c c u rre d  m  r e la t io n  to  th e  in d iv id u a l  conduct o f  
th e  t o r t f e a s o r  and th e  damage became th e  cause o f th e  
r e la t io n s h ip  betw een p l a i n t i f f  and d e fe n d a n t
But when does - m  those  s i t u a t io n s  - th e  d e fe n d a n t  
owe a d u ty  to  th e  p l a i n t i f f ’  T h is  has been s u b je c t o f  
d e b a te , e v e r  s in c e  th e  d e c is io n  m  DONOGHUE v STEVENSON 
[1932] A C 562 T h is  case form s th e  b a s ic  assum ption  fo r  
th e  e x is te n c e  o f a d u ty  o f  c a re  m  th e  t o r t  o f  n e g lig e n c e  
I t  d e a l t  w ith  th e  exp an s io n  o r  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  l i a b i l i t y ,  
based on f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  and p r o x im ity ,  n o t ju s t  c a u s a tio n  
The case i t s e l f  was an exp an s io n  o f th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  a
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m a n u fa c tu re r  was h e ld  l i a b l e  m  n e g lig e n c e  f o r  in ju r y  to  
th e  u l t im a te  consumer
9 .3 .  Modern T o r t  Developm ent F o r e s e e a b i l i t y ,
P ro x im ity  and P u b lic  P o l ic y
9 . 3 . 1 .  Thus, th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  a c ts  as a l i m i t a t i o n  
d e v ic e  T h is  has been re c o g n iz e d  by many 37 N e g lig e n c e , as 
an in d ep en d en t t o r t ,  is  a ty p e  o f  conduct A cause o f  
a c t io n , how ever, depends on more th a n  ju s t  n e g lig e n t  
conduct Th ere  must be a d u ty  th a t  is  owed by th e  d e fe n d a n t  
to  th e  p l a i n t i f f  T h is  d u ty  must conform  to  a re q u ire d  
s ta n d a rd  In  a d d i t io n ,  th e re  must be a le g a l  o r  p ro x im a te  
cause and a c tu a l  lo s s  o r  damage to  th e  in t e r e s t  o f  th e  
p l a i n t i f f  to  whom t h is  d u ty  is  owed
A cco rd in g  to  Rogers (1989) , th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a d u ty  
serves  two fu n c t io n s  F i r s t ,  th e  d u ty  must a c t u a l ly  e x is t  
and i t  must be owed to  a s p e c i f ic  p erso n  m  s p e c i f ic  
c irc u m sta n c es  Second, i t  must have been breach ed  Thus, 
n e g lig e n c e  i s ,  a c c o rd in g  to  R ogers, ' t h e  b re a ch  o f a le g a l  
d u ty  to  ta k e  c a re  w hich r e s u l t s  m  damage, u n d e s ire d  by th e  
d e fe n d a n t ,38 to  th e  p l a i n t i f f '  39
37See F lem in g  (1992) In  a d d i t io n  to  th e  d u ty  o f  c a re ,  
th e r e  a re  th r e e  o th e r  l i m i t a t i o n  d e v ic e s  rem oteness o f  
damage, c o n t r ib u to r y  n e g lig e n c e  and a v o lu n ta r y  assum ption  
o f r i s k  (s u p ra , a t  102) See a ls o  Rogers (1989)
38And, o f  c o u rs e , g e n e r a l ly  u n d e s ire d  by th e  p l a i n t i f f
39 (1989 72) However, one must u n d e rs ta n d  th a t  th e
d e fe n d a n t w i l l  f in d  h is  conduct u n d e s ira b le  ex post  In
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The d u ty  o f  c a re  is  used by th e  c o u r ts  to  l i m i t  ' t h e  
range o f l i a b i l i t y  w i th in  what th e y  c o n s id e r  re a s o n a b le  
bounds' 40 A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  th e  c o u rts  can expand t h is  range  
A d u ty  m  t h is  sense is  d e f in e d  as 'a n  o b l ig a t io n  
re c o g n iz e d  by la w , to  a v o id  conduct f r a u g h t  w ith  
u n rea s o n a b le  r is k  o f  dang er to  o th e r s ' 41
The d is c u s s io n  on th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  can 
be d iv id e d  m  th re e  s ta g e s , each r e la t e d  to  th e  le g a l  
developm ent o f  th e  t o r t  o f  n e g lig e n c e  The b a s is  f o r  i t  was 
l a i d  down m  th e  e a r ly  decades o f t h is  c e n tu ry  by Lord  
A tk in  m  DONOGHUE v  STEVENSON [1932] A C 562
9 . 3 . 2 .  The p r in c ip le  o f  law , l a i d  down by Lord  A tk in ,  
d e a lt  w ith  th e  exp an s io n  and l i m i t a t i o n  o f  l i a b i l i t y  based  
on ( l )  f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  and ( n )  p r o x im ity  The le a rn e d  ju dge  
g e n e r a l iz e d  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  as fo llo w s  -
The r u le  th a t  you lo v e  y o u r n e ig h b o u r becomes m  
law  you must n o t in ju r e  yo u r n e ig h b o u r, and th e  
la w y e r 's  q u e s t io n , who is  my n e ig h b o u r7 re c e iv e s  
a r e s t r ic t e d  r e p ly  You must ta k e  re a s o n a b le  c a re  
to  a v o id  a c ts  o r  om iss io ns  w hich you can
most cases th e  d e fe n d a n t m igh t n o t be aware th a t  h is  
co n d u ct, w h ich  he th o u g h t as re a s o n a b le , c o u ld  cause damage 
m  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e  c irc u m sta n c e s  o f th e  case I t  can be 
a s s e r te d  th a t  th e  d e fe n d a n t r e a l iz e d  a f t e r  th e  e v e n t th a t  
he has b reach ed  a s p e c i f ic  d u ty  w hich is  o f  such a n a tu re  
th a t  he b reach ed  h is  " o v e ra rc h in g "  d u ty  to  ta k e  re a s o n a b le  
c a re
40McMahon & B m chy (1990 88)
41 (F le m in g , 1992 125) A n o th e r d e f i n i t i o n  p e rc e iv e s  a
d u ty  as ' t h e  e x is te n c e  o f  a l e g a l l y  re c o g n iz e d  o b l ig a t io n  
r e q u ir in g  th e  d e fe n d a n t to  conform  to  a c e r t a in  s ta n d a rd  o f  
b e h a v io u r  f o r  th e  p r o te c t io n  o f o th e rs  a g a in s t  u n re a s o n a b le  
r i s k s ' ,  (McMahon & B m c h y , 1990 85)
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re a s o n a b ly  fo re s e e  would be l i a b l e  to  in ju r e  y o u r  
n e ig h b o u r Who th e n , m  law , is  my n e ig h b o u r9 The 
answer seems to  be - persons who a re  so c lo s e ly  
and d i r e c t l y  a f f e c te d  by my a c t  th a t  I  ought 
re a s o n a b ly  to  have them in  c o n te m p la tio n  as b e in g  
so a f fe c te d  when I  am d i r e c t in g  my mind to  th e  
a c ts  o r  om iss io ns  w h ich  a re  c a l le d  m  q u e s tio n  42
T h is  g e n e ra l p r in c ip le  - th e  "n e ig h b o u r"  p r in c ip le  - 
c o n s is ts  o f  two param ount e lem en ts  o r  c o n d it io n s  f o r  th e  
e x is te n c e  and e x te n t  o f  th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  F i r s t ,  th e  
re a s o n a b le  f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  o f  damage from  a c ts  o r  o m iss io ns  
Second, th e  c lo se n ess  and d ire c tn e s s  betw een d e fe n d a n t and 
p l a i n t i f f  p r o x im ity  Thus, a d u ty  is  imposed i f  th e  
d e fe n d a n t c o u ld  re a s o n a b ly  fo re s e e  th a t  h is  a c ts  o r  
o m iss io ns  c o u ld  cause in ju r y  and i f  he c o u ld  re a s o n a b ly  
fo re s e e  th a t  th e  s p e c i f ic  p l a i n t i f f  c o u ld  be a f fe c te d  by  
h is  a c ts  o r  om iss io ns  because o f  th e  d eg ree  o f  p r o x im ity ,  
c re a te d  by th e  a c t  o r  o m iss io n  o f th e  d e fe n d a n t
The p r in c ip le  combines two e lem en ts  ( 1 ) th e  c o n d it io n  
f o r  th e  e x is te n c e  o f a d u ty  and ( 1 1 ) to  whom i t  is  owed 
(th e  e x te n t  o f  th e  d u ty ) The c o n d it io n  o f  re a s o n a b le  
f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  is  th e  d e te rm in a n t f o r  th e  im p o s it io n  o f  th e  
d u ty
In  a d d i t io n  to  f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  and p r o x im ity ,  p u b lic  
p o l ic y  to o  became a d e te rm in a n t and a b a s is  to  r e je c t  th e  
im p o s it io n  o f  a d u ty  o f  c a re  b u t o n ly  m  e x c e p t io n a l cases  
T h is  opened up en d le s s  c a te g o r ie s  o f  n e g lig e n c e  u n le s s  
' th e re  was some o th e r  and seco ndary  p o l ic y  dem anding a
42 [1932] A C 562 at 580
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t o t a l  o r  p a r t i a l  im m unity  from  s u i t '  43
In  HOME OFFICE v DORSET YACHT CO LTD [1970] A C 
1004 , Lo rd  R e id  suggested  th a t  th e  tim e  had come to  re g a rd  
th e  n e ig h b o u r p r in c ip le  as a p p l ic a b le  in  a l l  cases where 
th e r e  was no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o r  v a l id  e x p la n a t io n  f o r  i t s  
e x c lu s io n  T h is  l i n e  o f  th o u g h t was fo llo w e d  and c le a r l y  
d em o n stra ted  in  ANNS v MERTON LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL 
[1978] A C 728 In  t h is  case Lord  W ilb e r fo r c e  d e ve lo p ed  
h is  tw o -s te p  fo rm u la , g iv in g  way to  a r a d ic a l  a p p l ic a t io n  
o f th e  p r in c ip le  and th e  fu n c t io n  o f  p u b lic  p o l ic y  I t  was 
aim ed a t  th e  te n s io n  betw een p r in c ip le  and p o l ic y  He 
s ta te d  -
F i r s t  one has to  ask w h e th er, as betw een th e  
a lle g e d  w rongdoer and th e  p erson  who has s u f fe r e d  
damage, th e r e  is  a s u f f i c ie n t  r e la t io n s h ip  o f  
p r o x im ity  o r  ne ighbourhood such t h a t ,  m  th e  
re a s o n a b le  c o n te m p la tio n  o f  th e  fo rm e r, 
c a re le s s n e s s  on h is  p a r t  may be l i k e l y  to  cause  
damage to  th e  l a t t e r ,  m  w hich case a p n m a  f a c ie  
d u ty  a r is e s  S eco n d ly , i f  th e  f i r s t  q u e s tio n  is  
answered a f f i r m a t i v e ly ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  to  
c o n s id e r  w h eth er th e re  a re  c o n s id e ra t io n s  w hich  
ought to  n e g a t iv e , o r  to  reduce o r  l i m i t  th e  
scope o f ,  th e  d u ty  o r  th e  c la s s  o f  p erson  to  whom 
i t  is  owed o r  th e  damages to  w h ich  a b reach  o f  i t  
may r is e  44
T h is  tw o -s te p  fo rm u la  g a in e d  r e c o g n it io n  f o r  some tim e  
and gave r is e  to  an enormous e x te n s io n  o f th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  
T h is  c u lm in a te d  m  th e  d e c is io n  m  JUNIOR BOOKS LTD v 
VEITCHI CO LTD [1983] 1 A C 520 In  t h is  case l i a b i l i t y
43H euston & B u ck ley  (1992 205)
44 [1978] A C 728 at 751
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was imposed f o r  p u re  economic lo s s  as a r e s u l t  o f  non- 
dangerous d e fe c ts  The d e c is io n  in  JUNIOR BOOKS was 
re g a rd e d  as more th a n  a mere l i n g u i s t i c  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  
th e  n e ig h b o u r p r in c ip le  I t  was even suggested  th a t  th e  
f i r s t  s te p  eq u ated  th e  d u ty  o f  c a re  w ith  th e  f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  
o f damage 45 I t  was seen as a m andate f o r  an e x te n s iv e  
a p p l ic a t io n  o f  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a l l  fo re s e e a b le  harm, u n le s s  
opposed by 'a  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e f in e d , p ree m p to ry  le g a l  
p o l ic y '  46
Many opposed th e  e x te n s iv e  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  ANNS 
They re fu s e d  to  a ccep t th e  prima facie  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f a 
d u ty  o f  c a re  w ith  f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  The n e ig h b o u r p r in c ip le  
c o u ld  n o t be re p re s e n te d  by f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  o f  harm a lo n e  
w hich 'w o u ld  o n ly  e x c e p t io n a l ly  y ie ld  to  a s p e c i f ic  
opposing  " p o l ic y " ' 47
As tim e  passed , th e  c o u rts  narrow ed down th e  
u n r e s t r ic t e d  a p p l ic a t io n  o f th e  ANNS t e s t  In  YUEN KUN YEU 
v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF HONG KONG [1988] A C 175, i t  was 
h e ld  th a t  ' f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  o f  harm is  a n e c e ss a ry  in g r e d ie n t  
o f a [p ro x im a te ] r e la t io n s h ip ,  b u t i t  is  n o t th e  o n ly  
one' 48 The p re s e n t law  in c lu d e s  o th e r  f a c to r s ,  o th e rw is e ,  
a c c o rd in g  to  R ogers, 7 th e r e  w ould be l i a b i l i t y  m  
n e g lig e n c e  on th e  p a r t  o f  one who sues a n o th e r  about to
45McMahon & B m chy (1990 92)
46F lem m g  (1992 137)
47Jjbid , a t  138
48 [1988] A C 175 a t  192 See a ls o  GOVERNORS OF THE 
PEABODY DONATION FUND v S IR  LINDSAY PARKINSON & CO LTD 
[1985] A C 210
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walk over a cliff with his head m  the air, and forbears to 
shout a warning' 49 What was wrong with ANNS was its 
application It involved the danger that if the first stage 
was easily passed, the limiting device of the second step 
was insufficiently working, thus risking the unreasonable 
extension of the boundaries of liability As a result, 'the 
creation of a duty [was] likely to involve a much more 
gradual, step by step process with greater emphasis on 
analogy with previous decisions' 50
This was recognized m  CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v 
DICKMAN [1990] 1 All E R  568 and MURPHY v BRENTWOOD
DISTRICT COUNCIL [1990] 2 All E R 908 Both cases rejected 
the ANNS test m  favour of an incremental approach Lord 
Bridge stated, relying and quoting the words of Brennan J 
m  SUTHERLAND SHIRE COUNCIL v HEYMAN [1985] 60 A L R 1 -
It is preferable m  my view, that the law should 
develop novel categories of negligence 
incrementally and by analogy with established 
categories, rather than by a massive extension of 
a p nma facie duty of care restrained only by 
indefinable "considerations which ought to 
negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the 
duty or the class of person to whom it is 
owed" 51
Thus, the English courts are guided by existing 
situations that imposed, restricted or limited (the scope 
of) a duty of care The three criteria to impose a duty of
49 (1989 79)
50JJbid , at 80
51 [1990] 1 All E R 568 at 574
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negligence are, subsequently, the foreseeability of damage, 
the proximity of the relationship and the 'reasonableness 
or otherwise of imposing a duty7 52
It is true that m  many cases the proximity element 
appears to equate foreseeability 53 However, the two 
elements are not similar There is more to proximity than 
just foreseeability The former contains the elements that 
binds the two parties, and induces certain 
responsibilities Proximity limits the category of people 
to whom a tortfeasor would owe a duty if he solely had to 
depend on foreseeability It could therefore be argued that 
a tortfeasor is not liable towards the "unforeseeable 
plaintiff", not because the conduct of the defendant could 
not be foreseen to cause the loss to the plaintiff but 
rather the absence of a sufficient proximate relationship 
per se 54 Negligence does not embrace one definable
concept It is merely, according to Lord Oliver m  CAPARO,
7 a description of circumstances from which, pragmatically, 
the courts conclude that a duty of care exists7 55
The idea of "just and reasonable" is more often used 
to deny the imposition of liability m  the tort of 
negligence, because, for example, another defendant or the
52Xbid , at 568
53See, for example, the decision m  ALCOCK v CHIEF
CONSTABLE OF SOUTH YORKSHIRE POLICE [1991] 3 W L R 1057
540r, liability cannot be imposed because of the
impossibility to assess the amount of damages m  absence of 
a reference point An example of this can be found m  the 
so-called "wrongful life" actions, see Stolker (1994)
t
55 [1990] 2 A C 605 at 633
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plaintiff is pictured as the person more suitable to bare 
the loss, or an alternative remedy exists with which the 
tort of negligence may conflict It is, of course, a policy 
argument butr is portrayed as principled by means of its 
application
9 . 3  3 .  In Ireland, the "neighbour" principle has been 
endorsed m  cases such as PURTILL v ATHLONE U D C [1968] 
I R 55 and MACNAMARA v E B S [1975] I R 1 In both 
cases the proximity element was strongly emphasized as 'the 
lynchpm of the duty of care' 56 However, McCarthy J , m  
WARD v MCMASTER AND OTHERS [1988] I R 33 7, did not 
attenuate the words of Lord Wilberforce m  ANNS v MERTON 
LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL [1978] A C 728
In the WARD case the plaintiffs had bought from the 
first defendant a bungalow for £24,000, built by him Both 
before and after the conclusion of the purchase agreement 
the premises was inspected by the second defendants 
However, no professional survey was carried out The 
plaintiffs had applied to the second defendants - the 
Housing Authority - for a loan under subsection 39(1) of 
the Housing Act, 1966 In granting such a loan the 
Authority's Council was required, under article 12(b) of 
the Housing (Loans for Acquisition or Construction of 
Houses) Regulations, to value the house It engaged the 
third defendant - a valuer - to carry out this valuation 
He reported that the house was m  good repair and its value
56See McMahon & Binchy (1990 95)
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was approximately £25,000 However, the valuer did not have 
any qualifications as to building constructions The 
plaintiffs moved m  to find out that the house was damp and 
had a smoking chimney Having surveyed the house at their 
own costs it was found that the house was structurally 
unsound and hazardous to the health of the occupants
The plaintiffs proceeded an action for damages The 
question was whether each of the defendants owed, under 
common law, a duty of care to the plaintiffs It was held 
that the first two defendants did 57
Costello J , m  the High Court, dealt first with the 
alleged breach of duty of the first defendant as the 
builder/vendor of the house The judge reviewed the 
relevant case law and concluded that the builder/vendor 
owed a duty of care 58
Having established that the first defendant was under 
a duty of care, Costello J considered its scope and
57The plaintiffs could not establish that the third 
defendant did not conform to the standard of an ordinary 
skilled auctioneer, the test as it was laid down m  BOLAM 
V  FRIERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE [1957] 2 All E R
118 He was there m  a capacity of an auctioneer placing a 
market value on the property On the basis of an 
examination of the evidence, Costello J concluded that the 
defects were defects which would have been discovered by 'a 
reasonable careful inspection carried out by a person with 
ordinary professional qualifications in house construction 
such as those that an architect or engineer would have
obtained' ( [1985] I R 29 at 36)
58Formerly, it was held that if a builder was also the
owner of the house he enjoyed immunity against liability 
However, this was abolished m  DUTTON v BOGNOR REGIS URBAN 
DISTRICT COUNCIL [1972] 1 Q B 373 In Ireland a duty arose 
m  SINEY v CORPORATION OF DUBLIN [1980] I R 400 and
COLGAN V  CONNOLLY CONSTRUCTION CO (IRELAND) LTD , 
Unreported, High Court, 2 9 February 1980, McMahon J
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extent He considered whether, since the decision m  JUNIOR 
BOOKS v VEITCHI [1982] 3 W L R 477, the scope was limited 
to avoid causing foreseeable harm to persons or property, 
or that it could be extended to a duty to avoid pure 
economic loss Costello J applied the ANNS test and held 
the first defendant liable for defective workmanship In 
other words, reasonable foresight not only established the 
existence of a duty but also its scope Thus, m  WARD v 
MCMASTER [1985] I R 29 the defendant's duty related to 
hidden defects that could not be discovered 'by the kind of 
examination which he could reasonably expect his purchaser 
to make before occupying the house' 59 This duty extended 
to avoid causing the plaintiffs consequential financial 
loss arising from the hidden effects of the house itself 
There were no compelling policy reasons to decide 
otherwise
Second, Costello J considered the liability of the 
second defendants - the Housing Authority The plaintiffs, 
alternatively, alleged that the Council owed them a common 
law duty to carry out its statutory functions under the 
Housing Act, 1966 and the Housing Authority (Loans for 
Acquisition or Construction of Houses) Regulations, 1972 60 
This common law duty consisted, m  the WARD case, of a duty 
to act with care as to the inspection and valuation of the 
house
59 [1985] I R 29 at 44
60Smce the action against the third defendant failed 
(he was not negligent), the second defendant (the Housing 
Authority) could not be held vicarious liable
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Costello J held that the existence of a duty cannot 
be based on proximity or the "neighbour" principle alone 
All the circumstances of the case must be taken into 
account to determine the scope of the duty, for example, 
the purpose of the statutory powers Thus, first one must 
establish the required degree of proximity Second, one 
must take into account the circumstances of the case, 1 e 
the purpose of the statutory powers Third, was it just and 
reasonable that a duty should exist’
The Housing Act and Regulations imposed upon the 
Housing Authority statutory powers The purpose of the 
particular powers, relevant m  this case, was to value the 
house m  order to determine whether the house would be re­
saleable m  the event of default of payment by the loan 
applicant The plaintiffs considered this inspection as to 
the state of the house m  order to approve of the loan For 
this reason they did not employ a person to examine the 
house individually Costello J held that the Housing 
Authority should have been aware of this aspect It should 
have contemplated that the plaintiffs would not go to extra 
expenses to examine the house individually and that they 
would rely on the Authority's inspection Costello J 
concluded, therefore, that there was a sufficient degree of 
proximity, 'such that m  the reasonable contemplation of 
the Council carelessness on their part m  the carrying out 
of the valuation of the bungalow the plaintiffs were going 
to purchase might be likely to cause him damage' 61 They
61 [1985] I R 29 at 52
should have been aware that it would have been unlikely 
that the plaintiffs employed a engineer personally to 
inspect the (construction of the) house Taking into
account all the circumstances, for example, the Council's 
statutory powers, it became clear that the purpose of the 
powers should be accompanied with a common law duty of 
care It was, therefore, just and reasonable to impose a 
duty The plaintiffs relied on the valuation and the 
Council should have been aware that they did so
The Council appealed 62 It claimed that (1 ) no duty
existed (the plaintiffs had to safeguard their own
interests) , (1 1 ) if there was a duty, there was no
reasonable foreseeable risk of damage and (1 1 1 ) the manner 
of valuation was a policy decision, m  which the Council 
had absolute discretion
The appeal failed The Supreme Court held, inter alia, 
that the private duty was not created from the Housing Act, 
1966 but, instead, from the relationship between the
parties The Council could have reasonably foreseen that 
the plaintiffs would lack the means for a personal 
inspection and would rely on its valuation (although 
statutorily it served a different purpose) In addition, 
McCarthy J stated that a duty arose from 7 the proximity of 
the parties, the foreseeability of damage, and the absence 
of any compelling exemption based upon public policy' 63 
It is clear from the judgment that, where Costello J
62WARD v MCMASTER [1988] I R 337
63 [1988] I R 337 at 349
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m  the High Court relied on the just and reasonable test, 
the Supreme Court (per McCarthy J ) expressed the desire to 
base the imposition of a duty on the proximity between the 
parties and the foreseeability of damages m  the absence of 
any compelling reasons to decide otherwise In other words, 
the Supreme Court relied on the two-stage approach m  ANNS 
v MERTON LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL [1978] A C  728
In DOHERTY TIMBER LIMITED v DROGHEDA HARBOUR 
COMMISSIONERS [1993] I R 315, the High Court relied on the 
decisions m  both ANNS and MCMASTER In this case the 
plaintiff - a timber merchant - was the consignee of a 
cargo of timber The timber remained on the quayside, which 
was open to the public, and was set alight by children The 
plaintiff sued the defendants for negligence and breach of 
their statutory duty to take proper measures for, inter 
a h a , the control of their harbour The plaintiff failed 
Although it was obvious that it could be reasonably 
foreseen that loss was suffered, this fact was manifest to 
both the defendant and plaintiff The reality of the 
relationship between the two parties did not go any further 
for the simple reason that any additional care would have 
been virtually impossible
9.4. The Imposition of a Duty of Care
Auditors and Solicitors
9.4.1. This section addresses the situation where a
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party
The law has created, it is suggested, general
principles for negligent statements However, it appears 
that these principles are employed incrementally and, to a 
certain extent, pragmatically, taking into account 
considerations of policy This can be explained, looking at 
the function and nature of, m  particular, auditors and 
solicitors They are information providers This
information is communicated to others They can either be 
the direct addressee - the party m  the underlying 
relationship, or a third party who relied on the
representation of the professional person
The existence of a duty of care towards third parties 
m  professional negligence is since long recognized 64 In 
FINLAY v MURTAGH [1979] I R 249 Henchy J remarked that 
a solicitor can be held liable m  tort 7 to those [ ] with
whom he has made no arrangement to act, but who, as he 
knows or ought to know, will be relying on his professional 
care and skill7 65
This "reliance" is believed to form the justification 
to impose liability on, for example, auditors and 
solicitors The case law suggests that this liability is 
imposed as a matter of policy to put the loss on the
professional person is sued for negligence by a third
64Cf HEDLEY BYRNE AND CO LTD v HELLER Sc PARTNERS 
[1963] 2 All E R 575
65 [1979] I R 249 at 257 This remark must, arguably, 
be regarded as obi ter, m  FINLAY a client sued his 
solicitor for negligence
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shoulders of those who are assumed to be capable to carry 
it This involves, of course, an assessment of the amount 
of damages suffered, the position of the defendants, 
insurance safety-nets and other issues It does not depend 
whether the conduct of the solicitor or auditor was 
negligent In most cases they were
The reliance as a pre-condition for the existence of 
a duty of care is an interpretation of the proximity 
element, laid down m  DONOGHUE v STEVENSON [1932] All E R 
1 The thesis asserts that reliance can take two forms to 
justify the existence of a duty of care
First, third parties rely on the representation of a 
professional person, expecting it to be made with due care 
and skill and, consequently, act on this representation and 
suffer loss as a result
Second, the third party remains inactive Here, he 
relies, as an outsider, on the skill and care of the 
professional person that some future result or expectation 
shall be materialized In other words, the third party 
expects, as a member of the general public, that a 
professional person exercises his duties with due care and 
skill Through the professional person's negligence the 
third party suffers loss The appearance or condition of a 
physical degree of proximity is normally absent and may be 
irrelevant
This distinction is consonant with recent case law, 
both m  England and Ireland The first situation is a 
reflection of third-party liability m  cases like HEDLEY
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BYRNE Sc CO LTD v HELLER Sc PARTNERS LTD [1963] 2 All
E R 575 and CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v DICKMAN AND OTHERS 
[1990] 1 All E R 568, and m  Ireland in POTTERTON LTD v 
NORTHERN BANK LTD [1993] I L R M 225 The second 
situation has found its roots in case like ROSS v CAUNTERS
[1979] 3 All E R 580 and recently in WHITE AND ANOTHER v 
JONES AND ANOTHER [1995] 3 All E R 691 In Ireland, WALL
v HEGARTY [1980] I L R M  124 governs this area of 
professional liability
In these cases, the courts recognize the existence of 
a duty of care differently than m  cases of "ordinary" 
negligence It can, therefore, be argued, that, contrary to 
the standard of care, the imposition or recognition of a 
duty of care is, politically and socially, responsive to 
the economic structure of society Does the law of tort 
accommodates technical and other changes by imposing 
liability m  different ways’
Reliance and Action
9 . 4 . 2 .  In HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & PARTNERS 
LTD [1963] 2 All E R 575 the appellant's bank questioned 
the respondents regarding the financial position of one of 
the respondent's customers, Easipower Ltd They replied 
that their customer was financially trustworthy but 
expressly disclaimed responsibility for this information 
The bankers report was channelled to the appellant's 
customer - an advertising agent, who subsequently placed
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orders for advertising time on behalf of Easipower Ltd The 
advertising agent was personally responsible for these 
contracts Easipower Ltd went into liquidation and the 
agent lost £17,000 on contracts They sued the respondents, 
alleging the negligent misstatement of information
It was held by the House of Lords that the respondents 
might have owed a duty of care to the appellants, but their 
disclaimer of responsibility regarding their replies was 
adequate to exclude this assumption The importance of the 
decision, however, lies m  the criteria under which a maker 
of a statement must assume a duty of care
First of all, it was made clear that m  the HEDLEY
BYRNE case negligent misstatements differ from negligent 
acts The former cannot give rise to a cause of action if 
it is innocently given on, for example, 'social or informal 
occasions' 66 There must be something more A reasonable 
man must know that he was relied upon or trusted on his 
skill and judgment to reply to inquiries This suggests 
that the injured person is aware that the alleged 
tortfeasor had a certain expertise Accordingly, the 
professional man has three options if asked for advice He 
declines to reply, disclaims any responsibility or replies 
without such a disclaimer In the event of the latter he
must realize, according to Lord Reid, to -
have accepted some responsibility for his answer 
being given carefully, or to have accepted a 
relationship with the inquirer which requires him
66 [1963] 2 All E R 575 at 580, per Lord Reid
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to exercise such care as the circumstances
require 67
In other words, someone who is asked to provide 
certain information or to give a professional opinion and 
is not contractually bound to it must at some stage assume 
responsibility This could be regarded as a red herring It 
is, m  the view of this researcher, inherent to the nature 
of a profession that the professional practitioner assumes 
responsibility at all times he is asked or voluntarily 
provides expert information, either m  or outside a
contractual capacity However, Lord Reid continued and 
stated, more importantly, that the professional
practitioner must also have, or ought to have, realized
that the person seeking the information relied on this 
information or opinion for a particular future 
transaction 68 Lord Reid goes a step further here Apart 
from assuming responsibility, the professional person must 
also anticipate the consequences of his information or 
advice for the person who relies or may rely on it, and who 
acts accordingly It follows, that he must give this 
information honestly and with reasonable care 69
61 Ibid, at 583
68Lord Reid ([1963] 1 All E R 575 at 583-584) relied
here on, inter alia, a judgment by Cardozo C J m  GLANZER 
v SHEPARD (1922) 233 N Y 236
69See also BEWLEY RYAN & CO v CRUESS- CALLAGHAN
[1995] P N L R 21 In this case it was held that a 
stockbroker was under a same duty of care as any other 
professional person If he is asked for advice or brings it 
upon himself to give advice he must do this honestly and to 
the best of his ability
429
Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest stated that there was 
authority which showed that 'irrespective of any 
contractual or fiduciary relationship and irrespective of 
any direct dealing, a duty may be owed by one person to 
another' 70 Logically he could not see a difference between 
injuries caused by negligent words or the reliance on the 
safety of the contents of a bottle of ginger ale or other 
negligent acts So did Lord Hodson, who stated that 'it is 
difficult to see why liability as such should depend on the 
nature of the damage' 71
This can even be extended, according to Lord Morris, 
to situations where a 7 service is voluntarily 
undertaken' 72 Here, the initiative lay on the alleged 
tortfeasor instead of anticipating on a request to provide
certain information or advice His Lordship gave the
example of a doctor who came across an unconscious man, a
complete stranger and m  need of medical attention If the 
doctor decided to intervene, his duty required him to 
exercise reasonable care and skill 73 The same applies to 
a person who issues a document, crafted with the
requirements of his profession, knowing that others will
Where advice is given carefully there is no 
negligence, even where the advice did not generate the 
anticipated effect, see MCSWEENEY AND LYNCH v BOURKE 
[1995] P N L R 35
70 [1963] 2 All E R 575 at 589-590
71Ibid, at 598
72Ibid, at 589
73See also BANBURY v BANK OF MONTREAL [1918-19] All 
E R 1
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rely on it who are not m  direct dealings with him
In both these situations the person takes it upon 
himself to give information or advice, knowing that others 
will rely and act on it In these situations a duty of care 
arises This is particularly true where the person who 
relied on the statement can be named or identified
Lord Devlin added that the law would be defective if 
' it would leave a man without a remedy where he ought to 
have one and where it is well within the scope of the law 
to give him one' 74 For this reason, it would be illogical 
not to extend the tort of negligence to words, just as it 
would be illogical to confine a cause of action for words 
to a contractual or fiduciary relationship between 
defendant and plaintiff
Prior to HEDLEY BYRNE it was held that, m  the absence 
of an underlying relationship, no such duty was imposed by 
law to exercise care m  the giving of information 75 There 
was only a duty to do this honestly A prime example of 
this was the decision m  CANDLER v CRANE CHRISTMAS & CO 
[1951] 1 All E R 426 However, the significance of this
case lay m  the dissenting judgment of Denning L J which, 
m  fact, formed the basis for the House of Lord's decision 
m  HEDLEY BYRNE Denning L J held that the defendant (an 
accountancy firm) owed a duty to his client and -
74 [1963] 2 All E R 575 at 602
75However, information given fraudulently may give rise 
to a cause of action See LE LIEVRE AND DENNES v GOULD 
[1893] 1 Q B 491 at 498, per Lord Esher 'in the absence
of contract, an action for negligence cannot be maintained 
when there is no fraud'
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to any third person to whom they themselves show 
the accounts, or to whom they know their employer 
is going to show the accounts so as to induce him 
to invest money or take some other action on 
them 76
'The same reasoning', according to Denning L J , 'applies 
to others7 77
The criteria for negligent misstatements can be 
summarized as follows
(I) The tortfeasor possesses a special skill or expertise 
or holds himself out to possess such expertise or skill
(II) He knows or ought to know that people rely on that 
skill or expertise for the purpose of a particular 
transaction known to the maker of the statement It cannot 
be upheld that the defendant owed a duty to anyone relying 
on him This would mean he would be ' liable m  an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class' 78 It is irrelevant that he is m  
direct dealings with those persons, whether m  a 
contractual or fiduciary relationship, or otherwise
(III) He is asked or took it upon himself to provide 
information or to give advice (voluntary assumption of 
responsibility), whereby it is immaterial whether the
76 [1951] 1 All E R 426 at 434
77 Ibid
78Cf ULTRAMARES CORPORATION v TOUCHE (1931) 174 N E 
441 at 444, per Cardozo C J (quoted by Denning L J m  
CANDLER V  CRANE CHRISTMAS & CO [1951] 1 All E R 426 at 
435)
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service was given gratuitously or not 79
If these three criteria are fulfilled the tortfeasor 
is considered to owe a duty to those who rely on him, and 
he is liable if his advice or information is negligent The 
relationship which then exists can either be general (for 
example between solicitor and client or doctor and patient) 
or particular, similar to the circumstances m  HEDLEY 
BYRNE With regard to the former it is merely necessary to 
prove its existence and the duty follows With regard to 
the latter it is necessary 'to examine the particular facts 
to see whether there is an express or implied undertaking 
of responsibility' 80
In a number of other cases the decision m  HEDLEY
BYRNE was upheld See, for example, SMITH v ERIC S BUSH
(A FIRM) and HARRIS v WYRE FOREST D C [1989] 2 All E R
514 (the House of Lords heard the two appeals together) A 
conspicuous feature m  these two cases was that the 
defendants were fully aware of the nature of the 
transaction and that their subsequent statements or
representations would be directly or indirectly
communicated to, or relied upon by, the plaintiffs 81 In
79Cf COGGS v BERNARD (1703) 2 Ld Raym 90 9 and
SKELTON V  LONDON & NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY CO (1867) L R 
2 C P 631
80HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & PARTNERS LTD 
[1963] 2 All E R 575 at 611, per Lord Devlin
81In the SMITH case, the respondent was furnished with 
a valuation report of a house, stating, negligently, that 
no repairs were necessary In the HARRIS case, the 
plaintiffs also relied on a valuation report, made by the 
defendant, to purchase a house
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addition, m  the SMITH case, Lord Griffiths rejected that 
an assumption of responsibility was conclusive to impose 
liability It can only have real meaning if this assumption 
was 'understood as referring to the circumstances m  which 
the law will deem the maker of the statement to have 
assumed responsibility to the person who acts on the 
advice' 82
9.4.3 In CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v DICKMAN AND OTHERS
[1990] 1 All E R 568 the criteria were modified In this
case the respondents invested m  a public limited company, 
relying on the audited accounts Following the investments 
(resulting m  a take-over of the company) the respondents 
sued the auditors for negligent misrepresentation (the 
accounts showed a substantial profit rather then the actual 
position of the company) They claimed that the auditors 
owed them a duty of care because they knew or ought to have 
known that the figures would make the company vulnerable to 
a take-over bid and/or would make individual and existing 
shareholders interested m  buying more shares m  the 
company
The question which needed to be answered was two-fold 
(i) did the auditors owe a duty to potential investors and 
(n) did the auditors owe a duty to existing (individual) 
shareholders’
Generally, it was held by the House of Lords that a
82SMITH v ERIC S BUSH [1989] 2 All E R 514 at 534, 
per Lord Griffiths
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duty of care did not exist where there was no relation or 
proximity between the maker of a statement and any person 
relying on it There is no such relation where the maker of 
such statement had no precise reason to foresee that the 
statement, put into more or less general circulation, might 
foreseeably be relied on by strangers for a purpose the 
statement was made for
Thus, foreseeability is not sufficient 83 There must 
be something more m  order for the court to infer that the 
maker of a statement owed a duty to those who relied on the 
statement It must also be shown that -
the maker knew that his statement would be 
communicated to the person relying on it, either 
as an individual or as member of an identifiable 
class, specifically m  connection with a 
particular transaction or a transaction of a 
particular kind and that that person would be 
very likely to rely on it for the purpose of 
deciding whether to enter into that 
transaction 84
Thus, it is not sufficient that a maker of a statement 
ought to have known, he had to be actually aware that a 
particular person or a member of a particular class of 
persons relied on his statement, particularly m  connection 
with a transaction In the words of Denning L J m  CANDLER 
v CRANE CHRISTMAS & CO [1951] 3 All E R 426 'Did the
accountants know that the accounts were required for
83See also DANNS AND ANOTHER V DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
[1995] 25 B M L R 121
84 [1990] 1 All E R 568 at 568-569
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submission to the plaintiff and use by him' 985 This is the 
degree of proximity that is required
Finally, the House of Lords held that, apart from 
foreseeability of damage and a sufficient degree of 
proximity, it must be just and reasonable, m  the 
circumstances of the case, to impose a duty of care on the 
maker of the statement
Thus, the HEDLEY BYRNE criteria may be modified as 
follows Generally, a maker of a statement is not liable 
towards persons other than those to whom the statement is 
directly addressed, except when
(I) The maker of the statement possessed a special skill or 
expertise or held himself out to possess such expertise or 
skill
(II) He knew that his statement or information would be 
communicated to those who relied on it (foreseeability)
(III) The person or persons who relied on it were no 
strangers but individuals or members of an identifiable 
class (proximity)
(IV) It was very likely that they relied on his statement 
m  deciding to enter into a particular transaction known or 
ought to be known by the maker of the statement 
(foreseeability of damage)
(V) It was just and reasonable to recognize the existence 
of a duty of care In CAPARO, the purpose of the statement 
must have been to entice the plaintiffs to invest
As a consequence, the group of people to whom a duty
85 [1951] 3 All E R 426 at 434
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is owed and the group of people owing such a duty has been 
limited, whereby the central issue involves the existence 
of a "special relationship" 86 In the circumstances of the 
case m  CAPARO, such a relationship was absent An auditor, 
auditing the accounts of a public company, was not 
considered by the Law Lords to owe a duty to a potential 
investor, it being a member of the public at large To 
deduce a relation of proximity between them would lead to 
an unlimited liability on the part of the auditor An 
individual shareholder, relying on those reports, was held 
to be m  no better position than a member of the public at 
large 87
Thus, there was not a sufficient degree of proximity 
to establish a duty of care The House of Lords also held 
that, as a matter of policy,88 the auditor's duty was 
solely owed to the shareholders m  general meeting This 
policy argument was justified by the Law Lords with 
reference to the purpose of the auditor's statutory duty to 
audit the accounts of the company 89 This duty or task 
enabled the general meeting to exercise an informed control 
regarding the state of affairs of the company The purpose
86See also SCOTT GROUP LTD v MCFARLANE [1978] 1
N Z L R 553 at 566, per Richmond P
870n the same grounds it was held m  AL SAUDI BANQUE v 
CLARK PIXLEY (A FIRM) [1989] 3 All E R 361 that an auditor 
was not considered to owe a duty towards creditors of a 
company which accounts were audited by him
88The third c n t e n u m  m  CAPARO the "just and 
reasonablenessH test
89See section 384 of the Companies Act, 1985 
(England)
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was not to 'enable individual shareholders to buy shares 
with a view of profit' 90
The extent of the auditor's duty was limited solely to 
the purpose of the audited accounts informed control by 
the shareholders m  general meeting Thus, m  addition to 
the foreseeability and proximity elements, the scope of the 
duty of care must extend to the damages incurred to the 
plaintiff In other words, whether it was, as a matter of 
policy, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the 
maker of statement Whether this was so, depended m  CAPARO 
on the purpose of the statement or duty
9 4 . 4 .  In Ireland, the courts take the decision m  
HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD V ,  HELLER & PARTNERS LTD [1963] 2 
All E R 575 as the point of departure 91 This can be 
concluded from a number of cases, most recently m  the 
decisions m  COUGHLAN v WHELTON AND ANOTHER [1995] 
P N L R 4 56 and POTTERTON LTD v NORTHERN BANK LTD
[1993] I L R M 225
In TULSK CO-OPERATIVE LIVESTOCK MART v ULSTER BANK 
LTD [1995] P N L R 55 the plaintiff - an operator of mart 
facilities - became concerned about the credit worthiness 
of one of his business partners He was concerned about the
90 [1990] 1 All E R 569
91However, according to McGrath (1981), there is an 
Irish authority at hand that predates the decision m  
HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & PARTNERS LTD [1963] 2 
All E R 575 The Circuit Court decision m  MACKEN v 
MUNSTER AND LEINSTER BANK LTD (1961) I L T R  17 set out 
similar criteria for negligent misrepresentation
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delay of payments and, subsequently, loss of interest on 
the overdrawn account This could indicate that his 
business partner might not be able to meet his liabilities 
The plaintiff contacted his bank manager who assured him 
that, although payments were slow, they were sure The 
delay of payments was caused by the bank itself, it was 
said (Although the partner banked with the same bank, the 
payments by the partner were made via a bank m  England) 
However, the partner was m  actual fact, according to the 
evidence, m  financial difficulties Eventually, he went 
into liquidation and, as a consequence, the mart closed 
The plaintiff sued the bank for negligence, alleging, inter 
alia, the misrepresentation of the partner's financial 
position
It was held by Gannon J , m  the High Court, that the 
plaintiff relied on the information provided by the bank 
It must have been aware of the importance of that 
information for the plaintiff and his dependence upon it 
for the purpose of continuing to give credit facilities and 
to run his business The bank must have been alerted by the 
delay m  payments, the unsatisfactory explanation by the 
branch manager of the bank and the anxiety of the 
plaintiff j
The bank's duty of care m  this situation reached 
further than that between a simple banker and customer 
relationship This duty consisted, inter alia, of active 
investigation, to make an honest and skilful assessment of 
the partner's financial situation and to provide discreet
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disclosure of information to the plaintiff, so that he 
could him to come to his own business decision as to the 
relationship between him and his business partner
Thus, it was clear that the bank, m  this situation,
owed a duty to the plaintiff to provide him with sufficient
and honest information to enable him to come to a proper 
decision In failing to do so, the bank was held negligent 
The nature of the duties depended, according to Gannon
J 'upon the circumstances of the relationships between the
parties and the harm, loss or detriment to either party 
which would reasonably be foreseeable from such 
circumstances and relationships' 92 Liability m  negligence 
did not depend solely on 'identifiable classifications of 
relationships', but depended on the existing circumstances 
deriving from the relationships that 'may import with the 
duty of care they demand' 93
The judge relied m  his decision on the decisions m  
PURTILL v ATHLONE U D C  [1968] I R  205 and HEDLEY BYRNE 
& PARTNERS LTD v HELLER & CO LTD [1964] A C  465 In 
other words, liability depended on the proximity of the 
relationship, rather than on the specific relationship 
itself Consequently, the duty was not an implied term of 
the specific relationship, but was based on the idea that 
one has to take reasonable care to those parties within 
one's proximity Thus, the party is within one's proximity 
if one knows or ought to know that these parties rely and
92 [1995] P N L R 55 at 60
92Ibid , at 71
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In the TULSK CO-OPERATIVE case the delay of the 
clearance of a cheque could not be justified on the grounds 
of the bank's practice or the inconvenience that it had 
caused for the bank's staff Instead, it had to be 
'measured by the nature and requirements of the business m  
which the cheque is used to effect payment as known or made 
known to the banker' 94 In other words, m  these 
circumstances a higher duty of care is necessary, higher 
than the normal or customary banking procedures as to 
clearance of cheques
It is suggested here that, as m  the HEDLEY BYRNE 
case, the proximity, although not expressed m  these words, 
derived from the fact that the plaintiff relied upon 
statements made by the defendant, who knew or ought to have 
known that these statements were important for him The 
banker m  the TULSK CO-OPERATIVE case must be assessed 
accordingly, as to the information provision of the credit 
worthiness of one of the co-operative's business partners 
In GOLDEN VALE v BARRETT [1995] P N L R 157 the 
plaintiff commissioned the defendants to investigate the 
financial position of another company that needed a cash 
injection to avoid liquidation The plaintiff was anxious 
to know whether a rival company had expressed an interest 
m  acquiring that company as well The urgency forced the 
auditors to produce a limited audit report They were aware 
that the plaintiff needed as much information as possible
act on the information provided
94 [1995] P N L R 55 at 76
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to come to the right decision, which included a substantial 
financial commitment Money was invested on the basis of 
the report However, it became clear that the company 
needed more investments after the full audit report was 
produced A new scheme was developed m  which the plaintiff 
participated by buying shares But, the company 
nevertheless went into liquidation and the plaintiff's 
money was irretrievably lost
The plaintiff claimed damages against the defendants 
for negligence It stated that it was induced to invest on 
the basis of the defendant's advice and the information 
laid down m  the first report It further stated that the 
defendants had not properly investigated the company, 
hereby relying on the difference between the first report 
and the audited accounts
0'Hanlon J allowed the claim and stated that the 
defendants were m  some degree negligent m  failing to 
protect their client from falling into error The report 
was encouraging rather than objective, knowing that the 
plaintiff was more than willing to go ahead The
encouragement was more than warranted by the state of the 
company Although this is not a case of third-party
liability per se, it showed that the makers of the
statements must do this objectively They did not so but,
instead, enticed the plaintiffs into investing m  the 
company It showed that the purpose of the advice
contrary to the purpose m  CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v
DICKMAN [1990] 1 All E R 568 - was for the plaintiffs to
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anticipate on it
In MCANARNEY AND ANOTHER v HANRAHAN AND OTHERS [1994]
1 I L R M 210 the first named defendant - an auctioneer -
was held liable because he took it upon himself to provide 
information He knew that the plaintiffs would rely on it 
This information was negligent He misrepresented to the 
plaintiffs the value at which a premises would be withdrawn 
from the auction and he misrepresented the value of the 
freehold attached to it The plaintiffs bought the premises 
with the intention to buy the freehold some time later,
only to discover the real value of it
The auctioneer was negligent because, m  voluntarily 
providing that information, he created an express 
assumption of responsibility that established a special 
relationship, imposing on him a duty of care 95
With regard to negligent misrepresentation of auditors 
two cases deserve attention First, the decision m  SISK & 
SON LTD v FLINN [1995] P N L R 80 was subjected to the 
principles laid down m  HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER 
& PARTNERS LTD [1963] 2 All E R 575 However, the auditor 
was not negligent because he had qualified the report, the 
accounts were qualified as work-m-progress figures
The plaintiff, nevertheless, relied on this qualified
95See also POTTERTON LTD v NORTHERN BANK LTD [1993] 
I L R M 225 In this case the bank voluntarily provided 
information that was, subsequently, negligent The 
plaintiff relied on this information The bank should have 
known this, as well as the financial consequences for the 
plaintiff The bank's action constituted a sufficient 
degree of proximity to justify a special relationship and 
the imposition of a duty of care, m  the absence of a 
contract between the two parties
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report to buy more shares m  the company Although the 
work-m-progress figures were overstated and the defendant 
knew that the plaintiff would rely on the report, he was 
free to qualify the report Furthermore, the evidence 
showed that the entire accounts, including the 
qualifications, were sent to the plaintiff's solicitor 
weeks before the deal was struck
In KELLY AND OTHERS v BOLAND T/A HAUGHEY BOLAND & CO 
[1989] I L R M 373 the plaintiffs were directors of a 
company wishing to purchase Tara China Ltd Before the 
conclusion of the transaction, the directors were furnished 
with the audited accounts and discussed it with the 
defendants, m  particular with regard to the stock figures 
After the purchase the plaintiffs became aware that these 
figures were understated and resulted m  a exaggerated view 
of the company's trading position They sued the defendants 
m  negligence, claiming that the duty they owed to them was 
breached Lardner J relied on the HEDLEY BYRNE principles 
and stated -
The defendants owed a duty of care to the 
plaintiffs m  respect of those accounts prepared 
at a time when they knew or ought reasonably to 
have known that they would be used by a third 
party who would rely on the accounts m  taking a 
decision as whether to invest m  Royal Tara 96
9.4.5. The case law shows that the Irish courts employ
96 [1989] I L R M 373 at 373
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a less restricted test for liability for negligent 
misstatements A duty is imposed if it is shown that, as a 
matter of proximity, the information provider knew or ought 
to have known that a third party would rely and act on it 
This is also true m  England but to the extent that policy 
determines that it was not just and reasonable to recognize 
such a duty The justification for this policy-decision is 
found m  the purpose of the statement or advice Thus, 
although a professional person provided information 
negligently, the plaintiff has his only remedy taken away 
That this is a pragmatic approach, arguably based on a 
cost-benefit analysis, is demonstrated by comparing this 
approach with the approach undertaken by the English courts 
m  the second set of cases Here, the plaintiff did not act 
on the basis of provided information but, merely, relied on 
the professional person's skill and care m  order to have 
a future expectation materialized
Reliance and Expectation
9 . 4  6 This aspect of third-party liability is 
particularly exemplified with regard to the solicitor who 
has negligently drawn up a will 97 As a result the 
beneficiary is disappointed and seeks redress via the 
solicitor This position was first addressed m  England m  
ROSS v CAUNTERS [1979] 3 All E R 580
97It can be argued, as did Jones (1994), whether this 
type of negligent representation should be confined to 
wills only, see supra 2 7 8
445
Certain activities of solicitors give rise to specific 
problems, whereby the absence of an undertaking based on 
the representation of a solicitor and the nature of the 
loss are domineering factors This justified the reason for 
a departure of the principles laid down m  HEDLEY BYRNE & 
CO LTD v HELLER & PARTNERS LTD [1963] 2 All E R 575
and CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v DICKMAN AND OTHERS [1990] 1
All E R 569 It has been argued whether the decision m
ROSS v CAUNTERS was good case law This is addressed 
later
GRAN GELATO LTD v RICHCLIFF (GROUP) LTD AND OTHERS 
[1992] 1 All E R 865 was decided upon the rules laid down 
m  CAPARO In this case the plaintiff claimed damages for 
negligence against, inter alia, the second defendants who 
were the solicitors of the first defendants It was alleged 
that the second defendants breached their duty They 
incorrectly answered preliminary inquiries, made by the 
plaintiff, regarding the underlease of a premises granted 
to the plaintiff The premises held two head leases which 
included a "redevelopment-break-clause", unknown to the
plaintiff
The question was whether the second defendants did owe 
a duty towards the plaintiff This depended, according to 
Sir Donald Nichols V-C , 'upon the solicitors themselves 
owing directly to [the plaintiff] a duty to take reasonable 
care when answering the preliminary inquiries on behalf of 
their client' 98 Whether such duty existed, did depend on
98 [1992] 1 All E R 865 at 871
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the principles set out m  CAPARO INDUSTRIES LTD v DICKMAN 
AND OTHERS [1990] 1 All E R 568 There must be
foreseeability, proximity and it must be considered, 
according to Sir Donald m  GRAN GELATO, to be ' "fair, just 
and reasonable" that the law should impose a duty of a 
given scope upon the one party for the benefit of the 
other' 99
In ROSS v CAUNTERS [1979] 3 All E R 580 the
defendant - a solicitor - negligently failed to warn the 
testator, for whom he had drawn up a will, that the 
execution by the testator could not be witnessed by the 
spouse of a beneficiary 100 As a result the plaintiff (a 
beneficiary), whose husband witnessed the execution, waived 
her benefit under the will
A principal difference with GRAN GELATO, CAPARO and 
HEDLEY BYRNE is the absence of any kind of express reliance 
upon which the plaintiff had come to a certain decision, as 
was the argument m  those cases 101 The plaintiff can 
merely be described as someone who relies or expects that 
a solicitor generally exercises his duties with due care 
and skill Sir Robert Megarry V-C , m  ROSS v CAUNTERS, 
could not see a valid reason not to impose a duty of care 
on the basis of this distinction -
99Ibid , at 872
100See section 15 of the Wills Act, 1837 (England)
101See, inter alia, HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER 
Sc PARTNERS [1963] 2 All E R 575 and CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC 
v DICKMAN AND OTHERS [1990] 1 All E R 568
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If a solicitor negligently fails to secure the 
due execution of a will, I can see no rational 
ground for distinguishing between those who knew 
that a will m  their favour was being made and 
passively relied on the solicitor's skill or his 
implicit representation of the due execution of 
the will, and those who knew nothing of the 
making of the will and relied on nothing 102
It was not argued that the defendant was negligent m
(1 ) failing to warn the testator about section 15 of the 
Wills Act, 1837, (n) failing to check whether the testator
duly executed the will, (in) failing to observe the 
plaintiff's husband as attesting witness and ( i v )  failing 
to draw this to the attention of the testator It was
evident that the defendant owed these duties to the
testator, but he was not to suffer any loss Hence, the 
person to whom the duty is owed has a remedy but does not 
need it and the person who suffered loss is deprived of a 
remedy The plaintiff, as a beneficiary, did not have a 
remedy but suffered the loss However, it was argued by 
counsel for the defendant that he did not owe a duty of 
care towards the plaintiff Council relied here on the 
decision m  ROBERTSON v FLEMING (1861) 4 Macq 167 103
This could not be upheld The reasons which Sir Robert 
provided to justify the imposition of a duty of care
appeared to derive from the principles set out m  both
HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & PARTNERS [1963] 2 All
102 [1979] 3 All E R 580 at 591
103In this case it was decided that a duty could be 
established 'only by showing privity of contract between 
the parties', ((1861) 4 Macq 167 at 177, per Lord Cambell 
L C )
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E R 5 75 and DONOGHUE v STEVENSON [1932] A C 562 
These reasons were three-fold
(I) There was a sufficiently close degree of proximity 
between the plaintiff and the defendant (the plaintiff was 
known to the defendant, she was named and identified m  the 
will) Accordingly, the defendant ought to have known that 
she could be affected by his conduct
(II) This proximity followed the duty of care which the 
defendant owed to the testator
(III) The defendant could not be held to be exposed to an 
unlimited class of liability, the liability was to one 
person only the plaintiff
Thus, the absence of any reliance was irrelevant m  
ROSS v CAUNTERS Megarry V-C stated -
If the duty of care is imposed on what I may call 
pure [DONOGHUE v STEVENSON] principles, and the 
loss occurs without being dependent on any 
reliance by the plaintiff, then I cannot see how 
the presence or absence of reliance by the 
plaintiff can affect liability 104
In other cases, express reliance is an essential pre­
condition for the imposition of liability, the loss 
occurred solely because the plaintiff relied on a
particular statement and acted upon it This is the crucial 
difference between ROSS v CAUNTERS [1979] 3 All E R 580
and cases like HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & PARTNERS
LTD [1963] 2 All E R 575 Thus, m  HEDLEY BYRNE the pure
104 [1979] 3 All E R 580 at 591
449
DONOGHUE principles are interpreted m  favour of the 
argument that the plaintiff trusted 'the defendant to 
exercise due care m  giving information on a matter m  
which the defendant [ ] knew or ought to have known of
the plaintiff's reliance on his skill and judgment' 105 
Proximity is expounded m  the sense that the defendant 
should have realized that the plaintiff relied on his
istatements and acted accordingly 106
The question remains whether the decision m  ROSS v 
CAUNTERS [1979] 3 All E R  580 is an extension of the
principle laid down m  HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & 
PARTNERS LTD [1963] 2 All E R 575 or a direct application 
of the principles laid down m  DONOGHUE v STEVENSON [1932] 
A C 562 The decision indicated the latter, emphasizing 
that reliance was not a pre-condition m  this particular 
case, but rather the degree of proximity It has been 
argued,107 whether this case extends liability to all cases 
where there is a contract between two persons for the 
benefit of a third party However, m  the view of this 
researcher, it must be understood that the defendant party 
m  those cases possessed a special skill which he 
subsequently exercised m  an unsatisfactory manner This 
special skill forces the professional person to contemplate 
that his act may effect others Again, this exemplifies the
105Ibid , at 592
106In addition, m  CAPARO, the statement must have been
made for a particular purpose
107See Jackson & Powell (1992 321)
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assertion that a professional person has an "over-arching" 
duty to take care, irrespective of possible and 
identifiable plaintiffs
9 . 4 . 7 .  The decision m  ROSS v CAUNTERS [1979] 3 All
E R 58 0 was affirmed m  England m  WHITE AND ANOTHER v 
JONES AND OTHERS [1995] 3 All E R 691 In this case a
testator instructed the defendants to change his will 
cutting both plaintiffs out of his estate The will was 
executed accordingly However, after the testator had 
reconciled himself with the plaintiffs, the former sent 
instructions to the defendants to prepare a new will These 
instructions included substantial gifts to the two 
plaintiffs They were not dealt with for a month The 
testator died m  that period - before the new dispositions 
were put into effect As a result, the new will was not 
executed and the plaintiffs were left with nothing They 
sued the defendants for damages for negligence, based on 
loss of expectation It was held, m  the court of first 
instance, that the plaintiffs were not owed a duty of care 
by the defendants The plaintiffs appealed
The Court of Appeal, applying the rule laid down m  
ROSS v CAUNTERS (A FIRM) [1979] 3 All E R 580, reversed
the decision of the judge -
A solicitor who was instructed to prepare a will 
for a client and, m  breach of his professional 
duty, failed to do so was liable m  damages to a 
disappointed prospective beneficiary if the 
client died before the will had been prepared or
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executed 108
This decision was based on the grounds that (1 ) 
financial loss was foreseeable, (1 1 ) the degree of 
proximity was foreseeable, and (1 1 1 ) the imposition of 
liability was fair, just and reasonable, because there was 
no remedy m  contract and the client's estate 'had no 
effective remedy for the client's purpose being thwarted by 
the solicitor's failure to carry out the instructions 
properly' 109 It can also be suggested that the purpose of 
the representation was, implicitly, to benefit the third 
parties, being the addressees of the will
The decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed by 
the House of Lords 110 Lord Goff and Lord Nolan 
particularly emphasized the assumption of responsibility of 
a solicitor They agreed that this responsibility should be 
extended to intended beneficiaries In this case the 
solicitor could reasonably foresee that they would be 
deprived of the legacy through his negligence In doing so 
the Law Lords m  WHITE were able to fill the gap that was 
created m  this case They were able to overcome the 
injustice m  this particular case that the person who
suffered a loss was deprived of a remedy
This approach appears to restrict the solicitor's
liability to the facts of this particular case, the
108 [1993] 3 All E R 481
109 Ibid
110WHITE v JONES [1995] 1 All E R 691
452
negligent drafting of wills However, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
and Lord Nolan added that a special relationship existed 
between the solicitor and the plaintiffs by analogy with 
established categories of relationships which gave rise to 
a duty of care The Law Lords relied here on, inter alia, 
CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v DICKMAN [1990] 1 All E R 568
This may imply, according to this researcher, that the 
restrictive nature of cases like CAPARO INDUSTRIES PLC v 
DICKMAN [1990] A C 728 and MURPHY v BRENTWOOD DISTRICT 
COUNCIL [1990] 2 All E R 908 have not created the desired 
effect to generally restrict the imposition of a duty of 
care CAPARO intended to offer a narrow interpretation of 
a "special relationship"
The WHITE case has broadened the interpretation The 
effect of the decision m  WHITE may indeed be catapulted 
into claims where a person has suffered loss due to the 
consequences of a relationship between others It is at 
least arguable that, contrary to the position of the 
auditor, the solicitor must guard himself against third 
parties who would ordinarily benefit from his actions
This decision may support the argument m  this section 
of the thesis It appears that people who expect a 
professional person to exercise his functions with due care 
and skill but do not expressly rely and act on a particular 
statement are afforded a remedy This can be justified with 
the assertion that those people are normally not m  a 
position to exercise some form of control (the plaintiffs 
might not have known that they were beneficiaries) A
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professional investor or entrepreneur, on the other hand, 
has the possibility to protect himself against possible 
risks He is aware of the functions of an auditor, he 
relies on the accounts and contemplates to act on them He 
is, however, able to examine the situation or the accounts 
independently, he is able to make a decision
It is interesting to note that the decision m  WHITE 
formed the basis for a claim m  medical negligence In 
GOODWILL v BRITISH PREGNANCY ADVISORY SERVICE (1996) 146
New L J 173, the plaintiff sued her partner's doctor She 
became pregnant from her partner (Mr M) although he had 
told her that he, before they met, had undergone a 
vasectomy His doctor had assured him that the operation 
had been successful and that he did not need to use 
contraceptives The plaintiff herself was told by her 
doctor that the chances of becoming pregnant were minute
The plaintiff asserted that she was m  the same 
position as the beneficiary m  the WHITE case She asserted 
that the doctor was employed to confer a benefit (not 
getting pregnant) on a particular class of people 
(potential future partners of Mr M, who was sterilized by 
the doctor) She suffered loss as a result of the doctor's 
negligence to advise Mr M correctly
Gibson L J was not persuaded The WHITE case belonged 
to a specific set of cases The facts m  GOODWILL could not 
be compared with it The decision m  WHITE was to overcome 
the injustice that a person who suffered the loss did not 
have a remedy, while the person who had the remedy did not
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suffer the loss In any event, the judge held that there 
was not a sufficient degree of proximity, for the doctor, 
the plaintiff was 'a member of an indeterminately large 
class of females who might have sexual relationships with 
[Mr M] during his lifetime' 111 It would not be fair, just 
or reasonable to impose on the doctor a duty of care
The decision m  GOODWILL indicates that the courts do 
not favour extending the decision m  WHITE to other areas 
of professional negligence Gibson L J expressly stated 
that WHITE belongs to a specific set of cases 112
In HEMMENS v WILSON BROWNE (A FIRM) [1993] 4 All E R 
826 the court did not impose a duty of care because an 
alternative remedy was available The defendant was asked 
to draft a document for P, giving the plaintiff the right 
to call on P for a substantial amount of money for the 
purchase of a house However, the document did not grant 
the plaintiff enforceable rights m  the event that P was 
asked to fulfil his promise The plaintiff sued the 
defendant for negligence alleging that the fact that the 
defendant owed her a duty of care to carry out P's 
instructions with reasonable care and skill Subsequently, 
by breaching this duty she had lost the benefit of a 
substantial amount of money and she had suffered damage by 
relying on misrepresentations of the defendant regarding 
the nature of the document
The court decided that, although the document was
111 (1996) 146 New L J 173, per Gibson J
112Ibid
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carelessly and unskilfully drafted, damages were reasonably 
foreseeable and that there was a sufficient degree of 
proximity -
it would not be fair, just or reasonable for a 
duty of care to be imposed on the defendants 
because [P] was still alive and therefore able to 
rectify the situation [ ] and had a remedy for
breach of contract against [the defendant], who 
accordingly would not go unpunished 113
9 4 8 In Ireland the court decided m  WALL v HEGARTY
[1980] I L R M 124, to impose a duty of care, applying the 
broad principles laid down m  DONOGHUE v STEVENSON [1932] 
A C 562 as discussed m  ROSS v CAUNTERS [1979] 3 All E R 
580
In the WALL case the defendant solicitor did not see 
to the fact that a will was duly attested as required by 
section 78 of the Succession Act, 1965 As a result, the 
plaintiff - a beneficiary m  the will - suffered a loss of 
the legacy worth £15,000 It was held that a solicitor owed 
a duty of care to a legatee named m  a draft will which 
appeared to be invalid The plaintiff could also recover 
the legal expenses m  attempting to prove the will invalid 
because 'the solicitor must know that if he fails m  his 
professional duty properly to draft the will, there is 
considerable risk the legatee will suffer damage' 114 There
113 [1993] 4 All E R 826
114 [1980] I L R M 124 at 129, per Barrington J
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was a sufficient degree of proximity, the defendant's 
'contemplation of the plaintiff [was] "actual nominate and 
direct"',115 and the legatee was named
9.5. Immunity
9.5.1. Some professional persons, notably barristers 
and, to a lesser extent, solicitors, enjoy a degree of 
immunity m  the exercise of their functions This privilege 
has of yet not been debated m  the Irish courts However, 
m  England their position is discussed m  a number of 
cases Two issues must be addressed
(I) Whether a plaintiff may succeed m  an action against a 
barrister acting as counsel, and whether he may succeed m  
an action against a solicitor with regard to litigation 
which would normally be m  the province of counsel, if 
counsel had been engaged These issues are discussed m  
RONDEL v WORSLEY [1967] 3 All E R 993
(II) Whether this immunity is absolute or qualified, i e 
should there be lines drawn within which this immunity is 
granted This was debated m  SAIF ALI v SYDNEY AND
MITCHELL & CO AND OTHERS [1978] 3 All E R 1033
9 5.2. In RONDEL v WORSLEY [1967] 3 All E R 993, the
plaintiff sued his counsel for negligence He claimed that
counsel did not properly question witnesses m  the
115Ibid
plaintiff's criminal case and that this led to his 
conviction
It has been law for over two hundred years that 
barristers cannot be sued An argument to the contrary 
could be that today all other professional men, including 
solicitors, can be made answerable m  tort for alleged 
negligent conduct, 'so why should not barristers be under 
the same liability' 9116
This rhetorical question was rejected Barristers 
enjoy immunity and this rule is based on considerations of 
public policy However, public policy is not inert but 
variable and the question is whether this rule 'is 
justifiable m  the present day conditions' 117
This question must be answered m  relation to the 
duties of a barrister and his position m  so far as his 
work relates to litigation At least three different duties 
are imposed, each relating to different classes
First, a barrister owes a duty towards his profession 
This derives from the rules of his profession He is 
obliged to accept any client, at least if it is m  his 
field of expertise He cannot refuse Lord Diplock m  SAIF 
ALI v SYDNEY AND MITCHELL & CO AND OTHERS [1978] 3 All
E R 1033 stated -
[1 ] f he is disengaged and a proper fee is 
tendered to him, he is bound to accept 
instructions to act on behalf of any client
116 [1967] 3 All E R 993 at 998, per Lord Reid 
111 Ibid
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desirous of his service m  a field of law in 
which he holds himself out as practising 118
In Ireland it can be argued that this position is 
strengthened with the constitutional guarantee of access to 
court 119 It appears that the right to access to court is 
implied under Article 40 3 of the Irish Constitution This 
can be inferred from a number of cases In MACAULEY v 
MINISTER FOR POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS [1966] I R 345 the 
Attorney General refused the plaintiff access to sue the 
Minister who had failed to provide him with an adequate 
telephone service This refusal was within the powers of 
the Attorney General under section 2 of the Ministers and 
Secretaries Act, 1924 The plaintiff argued that this 
section was invalid because it impeded free recourse to the 
courts This argument was upheld by Kenny J m  the High 
Court 120
Second, a barrister owes a duty to his client This 
duty implies that he shall do everything which the law 
permits him m  helping his client's case This is common to 
all professional men and is emphasized by Lord Upjohn m  
the RONDEL case He stated that -
if someone possessed of special skill undertakes, 
irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for
118 [1978] 3 All E R 1033 at 1043
119See McMahon & Binchy (1990 273)
120See Kelly (1994 386) See also THE STATE (QUINN)
v RYAN [1965] I R 70 and O'BRIEN v KEOGH [1972] I R 
144
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the assistance of another person who relies on 
such skill, a duty of care arises 121
Finally, a barrister owes a duty to the courts He 
owes this duty as an officer of the courts, concerned with 
the administration of justice This duty is regarded as a 
public duty
The latter two duties often coincide In acting in the 
interest of his client, he is regarded as a watchdog of the 
system of justice and must safeguard the public interest 
against unjust administration However, the duties may also 
conflict If so, there is nevertheless a strong belief that 
'where there is any doubt the vast majority of counsel put 
their public duty before the apparent interests of their 
client' 122
It shows that the position of a barrister engaged m  
litigation is unique among the professions He owes his 
duties to at least three parties his client, the courts 
(and the public) and his profession But, one can argue 
that most professions owe these duties to these parties 
This follows from, inter alia, the altruistic and 
disinterested characteristics inherent to the profession 
Thus, why immunity for barristers’ It appears that m  the 
advocacy the public duty is paramount and should not be 
jeopardized for a number of reasons
121 [1967] 3 All E R 993 at 1032 (citing Lord Morris of 
Borth-y-Gest m  HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & 
PARTNERS LTD [1963] 2 All E R 575 at 594)
122 [1967] 3 All E R 993 at 999, per Lord Reid
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First, immunity avoids the 'hampering and weakening of 
the judicial process' 123 In any other case it would burden 
the process of justice because a barrister would not be 
able to do his work properly if he is constantly watched m  
relation to the possibility of a cause of action m  tort 
It would create "defensive practice" which is already not 
uncommon among medical practitioners They, however, can be 
sued While this may lead to defensive practice it may also 
affect hospital management, if not the development of 
modern medicine Nevertheless, an argument against it is 
that m  medicine the primary duty is owed to the patient, 
rather than to society or the public at large
Second, liability would prolong litigation It is not 
desirable that, once the initial litigation is over, the
work of the barrister and, indeed, the court is open for 
any review m  the form of an action m  negligence '[T]he 
attainment of finality must be an aim of any legal system' , 
according to Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest 124
However, the review will probably focus on a detail of 
the initial litigation To suggest, therefore, that the 
initial case lies open for analysis is exaggerated and 
premature 125
Third, the independent position of a barrister 
contributes greatly to the course of justice and is of 
noble value to 'the integrity, the efficiency [and] the
123Ibid , at 1026, per Lord Pearce
124 Ibid , at 1015
125See also Osborne (1986) , supra 2 7 12
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elucidation of truth' 126 This independent position is 
partly guaranteed m  Ireland with the prohibition to form 
partnerships or other business corporatists among 
barristers 127 This, as a result, means that a barrister 
would be exposed to all losses and costs of litigation if 
he could be sued In addition, it was held by Finlay J m  
FALLON v GANNON [1988] I L R M 193 that '[a] solicitor 
has not got any vicarious responsibility for the individual 
conduct of counsel' 128
Finally, public policy necessitates immunity for two 
reasons (l) a barrister may not readily refuse litigation 
and (n) counsel performs a vital part m  the true 
administration of justice
The position of solicitors engaged m  advocacy does 
not dramatically differ from the position of a barrister 
However, the scope of immunity is more restricted A 
solicitor enjoys immunity, 'only while acting as advocate 
on behalf of his client or when settling pleadings' 129
This distinction may be explained that a solicitor, 
unlike a barrister, enters into a contract with his client 
and that, historically, his function was not advocacy, he 
did not stand 'between the client and the judge' 130
126 [1967] 3 All E R 993 at 1030, per Lord Pearce
127The Bar Council m  Ireland specifically prohibits the 
formation of partnerships
128 [1988] I L R M 193 at 197
129 [1967] 3 All E R 993
120Ibid , at 1023, per Lord Pearce
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9.5.3. The decision m  the RONDEL case was reaffirmed m  
SAIF ALI v SYDNEY MITCHELL & CO (A FIRM) AND OTHERS, P 
(THIRD PARTY) [1978] 3 All E R 1033 The important
question m  this case was where the lines of immunity 
should be drawn
The plaintiff m  this case (a solicitor) sued a 
barrister for negligence m  failing to advise him within 
the limitation period regarding an action against certain 
defendants m  a running down case The Court of Appeal 
reversed the decision m  first instance and held that a 
barrister was immune from litigation The plaintiff 
appealed, questioning the scope of the immunity does 
immunity cover pre-trial acts or omissions’
It was held by the House of Lords that immunity was an 
exception on the general rule that professional persons can 
be held liable m  the tort of negligence But, it should 
not be 'given any wider application than was absolutely 
necessary m  the interest of the administration of 
justice' 131 For this reason, immunity is granted to a 
barrister who acts only as counsel involved m  litigation 
This is based primarily on the grounds of public policy and 
to facilitate a smooth administration of justice However, 
it may be extended to -
those matters of pre-trial work which were so 
intimately connected with the conduct of the 
cause m  court that they could fairly be said to 
be preliminary decisions affecting the way that
131 [1978] 3 All E R 1033 at 1034
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cause was conducted when it came to a 
hearing 132
In Ireland this topic has not yet been addressed by 
the courts It is unlikely that the Irish courts would not 
follow the line of thought expressed m  both RONDEL v 
WORSLEY [1967] 3 All E R 993 and SAIF ALI v SYDNEY
MITCHELL (A FIRM) AND OTHERS, P (THIRD PARTY) [1978] 3 All 
E R 1033 133 However, at present the English courts are 
faced with two actions against barristers for 
negligence 134 The outcome of these cases is, as of yet, 
unknown Is the tide turning7 Should barristers be under 
the same liability7
9.6. Conclusion
9 . 6 . 1 .  Third-party liability evolves around the 
existence of a "special relationship", "expectation 
losses", "reliance" and "assumption of responsibility"
The interpretation of these terms depends on whether 
third parties relied and acted on negligent statements In 
these circumstances the courts rely on the principles 
initially set out m  HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER 
^PARTNERS LTD [1964] A C 465 In this set of cases the
132Ibid , at 1034
133See McMahon & Bmchy (1990 97)
134See Slapper (1996)
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"special relationship" depends on the different 
interpretation of foreseeability and proximity, and, at 
least m  England, liability is imposed if it is just and 
reasonable to recognize a duty of care
The proximity element m  England differs, however, 
from Ireland In England the third party must be a member 
of an identifiable class and the maker of the statement 
must be aware that the third party relies on his statement 
and, possibly, acts accordingly There is even a further 
restriction m  England Policy demands that the duty or 
statement must have been made for the specific conduct of 
the third party For any other purpose it would not be just 
and reasonable to impose a duty of care
In Ireland, the imposition of a duty of care is less
restricted and depends on the unqualified criteria laid
down m  HEDLEY BYRNE & CO LTD v HELLER & PARTNERS LTD
[1963] 2 All E R 575 The proximity element is,
accordingly, interpreted as follows the maker of the 
statement should have assumed that the third party relied 
and acted on the basis of his statements If this statement 
is negligent he is liable
If third parties were either oblivious or aware that 
a statement or representation was made m  their favour but 
had merely a general expectation that a professional person 
acts with due care and skill, the courts tend to rely on 
the general principles of negligence set out m  DONOGHUE v 
STEVENSON [1932] A C 562 Here, the tortfeasor should have 
had the third party m  contemplation He must or ought to
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foresee that his conduct could affect the particular 
plaintiff This plaintiff is identified by name, for 
example, a possible beneficiary, or as a member of a 
particular class
The thesis suggests, as a concluding argument m  this 
Chapter, that the fundamental criteria are
(I) proximity, 1 e the third party is either identifiable 
as a person or a class of persons, or is directly and 
reasonably affected by the conduct of the professional 
person
(II) the purpose of the statement, 1 e the contents of the 
statement is ultimately beneficial to the third party or 
the statement itself is directed towards the third party
9.6,2. As to the tort of negligence generally, two 
remarks are justified
First, under CAPARO, the imposition of a duty of care 
depends on proximity, foreseeability and whether it is just 
and reasonable to do so The third element is a policy 
element Although it is said to be principled, it cannot 
escape this description It is a safety net for the courts 
to avoid implications of liability that are not desired, 
not only for the specific defendant but also for society 
generally In Ireland, the courts refer to the second stage 
m  the Wilberforce test,135 and are, accordingly, more 
inclined to award damages without being subjected to a
135ANNS v MERTON LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL [1978] A C 728 
at 751
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Second, the proximity element causes interpretation 
difficulties At present it is described as a label and 
causes uncertainty The interpretation depends on the type 
of care owed by the tortfeasor by analogy to existing case 
law This has been illustrated previously Under CAPARO 
proximity refers to the ability to identify people who rely 
on statements and act accordingly
The decision in, for example, WHITE AND ANOTHER v 
JONES AND OTHERS [1995] 1 All E R 691 refers to the
defendant's knowledge that his conduct may affect others 
who do not necessarily rely on that conduct This decision 
is by some commentators received as a return to an 
expansion of liability, a retreat to ANNS v MERTON LONDON 
BOROUGH COUNCIL [1978] A C 728 136 In Ireland, proximity 
is understood as the foreseeability of the consequences of 
one's actions or statements to others
wider restriction policy
136See, inter alios, Murphy (1996) , infra Subparagraph 
2 7 7 and Greenfield & Osborne (1995) , infra Subparagraph 
2 7 8
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Chapter 10
Professional Autonomy and Responsibility
10.1. Introduction
10.1.1 The thesis has analyzed and described m  the 
previous Chapters the concept of professional negligence m  
Ireland It emphasized that the professions have a certain 
autonomy accorded to them m  solving matters of negligent 
conduct The thesis pointed out that the professions are m  
most cases well capable to take this responsibility
Although it may appear to be something of a big jump, 
the thesis analyzes m  this Chapter the decision m  RE A 
WARD OF COURT [1995] 2 I L R M 401 This case has little
to do with the concept of professional negligence, it dealt 
with the withdrawal of treatment of a non compos mentis 
patient However, the case does show what is at present 
wrong with the medical profession m  Ireland The decision 
m  RE A WARD OF COURT seems to indicate that the medical 
profession is less likely to take responsibility of 
decisions for which they are best equipped
This is not to say that all decisions m  the realm of 
the doctor-patient relationship require clinical or 
professional judgment Decisions on controversial medical
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matters deserve a balanced discussion within the medical 
profession m  order to provide the individual practitioners 
with a set of parameters within which they can exercise 
their duties This discussion involves not only clinical 
considerations but must also include matters of an ethical 
and professional nature, having regard to (1 ) the 
requirements of society and (1 1 ) the demands of the 
individual practitioner
The medical profession, and indeed other professions, 
must adopt a "front-runner" role m  fulfilling medical 
questions and dilemmas The legislature can anticipate on 
it and may consider whether certain issues demand 
legislation for the protection of the public and the 
medical practitioner alike In each instance, a long term 
option must be preferred for the solution of societal 
problems The courts should not only attempt to solve 
individual problems piecemeal In situations where the 
courts are asked to adjudicate on these matters they seek 
to do this with the utmost clarity and understanding The 
decision, subsequently, must be adhered to
It may well be that the medical profession's status or 
autonomy is under threat An example of the unwillingness 
to accept responsibility is found m  the medical 
profession's reaction to the decision m  RE A WARD OF 
COURT, on the withdrawal of treatment The court laid down 
the foundation upon which life can legitimately be 
withdrawn It also defined types of treatment and cause of 
death Normally, this is or should be a task for the
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Indeed, it now appears as if the medical profession 
seems unwilling to give effect to the judgment However, m  
the long run it is unlikely that the medical profession, or 
professions generally, will fail to give effect to a 
conclusive order Nevertheless, the reluctance that is 
shown by the Medical Council may indicate that the medical 
profession may effectively be uttering its "last gasp"
The decision m  RE A WARD OF COURT [1995] 2 I L R M
4 01 raised a number of issues that involved questions about 
the scope and autonomy of professional medical judgment In 
this sense the decision may be relevant to the concept of 
professional negligence The case illustrated the surfacing 
conflicts between judicial authority and professional 
discretion, whereby the autonomy of the medical profession 
must yield for the application of the law and, perhaps, the 
common good In the words of O'Flaherty J
[I]t would be strange if our courts which are 
called upon to pronounce on so many issues 
touching the welfare of the individual [ ]
would not be regarded as having the necessary 
jurisdiction, not to say expertise, to adjudicate 
on an issue of such paramount importance as is 
embraced by the instant case 1
10.1,2. This Chapter sets out the implications of the 
recent Supreme Court decision and examines its significance 
for professional negligence with regard to consent and
medical profession
1 [1995] 2 I L R M 401 at 430-431
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allied issues It also discusses the discrepancy between
professional and ethical conduct and sets out the
consequences for the medical profession m  Ireland
10.2. RE A WARD OF COURT The Facts
This case dealt with a woman who for some twenty years 
suffered grave brain damage following a minor 
gynaecological operation under general anaesthetic As a 
result she had since then spent her life m  a persistent, 
or near persistent, vegetative state (P V S )  Completely 
dependant on others she required full time nursing care 
The early signs of recovery faded She was artificially 
fed, first by means of a nasogastric tube which, after 
having found this to be distressing, was replaced under 
general anaesthetic by a gastrostomy tube m  1992 This 
tube had to be surgically replaced several times Her 
routine medication included morphine, valium and mellenl 
Her cognitive functions appeared to be minimal eye- 
trackmg, showing distress or recognition, reaction to 
pain-stimuli and pulling out of the nasogastric tube
However, there was little or no evidence whether these 
reactions were intentional or whether they were reflexes 
from the brain stem During this time the patient was made 
a ward of court
In the spring of 1995 the Committee (the mother) and 
the family of the ward applied to the trial judge, assigned
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by the President of the High Court with the jurisdiction,2 
requesting an order enabling the family to withdraw the 
artificial means of nourishment They also asserted that, 
according to Article 41 1 of the Constitution, 7 it was the 
family's prerogative, acting m  the best interest of the 
Ward [sic] , to decide whether the life support [ ] should
be maintained or withdrawn' 3
The trial judge, Lynch J , agreed that the Committee 
and the family acted bona fides and acted, as they did, 
solely m  the best interest of the ward He consented, on
behalf of the ward, to (i ) the withdrawal and termination
of the abnormal and artificial means of nourishment, (n) 
the non-treatment of infection or other pathological 
conditions and (in) he authorized the family to make such 
arrangements to transfer the ward to an institution whose 
ethics and philosophy agreed to pursue the above two 
declarations
Lynch J rejected, however, the argument that it was 
the family's prerogative to decide whether treatment should 
continue The views of the family carried weight m  his
decision, but the trial judge held that it was for him to
decide being endowed with the parens patriae jurisdiction 4
The Attorney General, the institution m  which the
2See subsection 9(1) of the Courts of Justice Acts, 
1936 and section 9 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) 
Act, 1961
3 [1995] 2 I L R M 401 at 413
4Cf RE J (A MINOR) [1990] 3 All E R 930 at 941, per
Balcombe J
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ward was treated and the Solicitor General who was made 
Guardian Ad Litem appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Court The Committee and the family applied to vary the 
judgment The appellants generally held that the decision 
of the trial judge was contrary to the Constitution and 
that he was not entitled to make such a decision
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal (Egan J
dissenting) and maintained that the withdrawal of treatment 
was lawful But, the Supreme Court failed to support its 
decision with a clear and convincing analysis of the
various constitutional issues 5
10.3. Artificial Hydration and Nutrition
Treatment or Not7
10 3.1. An important aspect of the WARDSHIP case was 
whether the nourishment of the ward, by means of a 
nasogastric and later a gastrostomy tube, constituted 
medical treatment for which consent was required It was
held by the trial judge that the provision of nourishment
constituted medical treatment This finding was supported 
by the Supreme Court The trial judge found that it was 
artificial and therefore abnormal In this he was 
supported, according to Blayney J ,6 by 'clear expressions
5For a comprehensive review of these (and other)
aspects of the case, see Tomkm & Me Auley (1995b 45-50)
6 [1995] 2 I L R M 401 at 443
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of opinion' made m  an American case In CRUZAN v 
DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (1990) 110 S Ct
2841 it was held that, because the feeding-technique 
involved a surgical operation implanting the gastrostomy 
tube into the patient's stomach through incisions m  her 
abdominal wall, ' [a]rtiflcial feeding cannot readily be 
distinguished from other forms of medical treatment' 7
The submission that the treatment became normal 
because it had been administered for so long was not upheld 
by both the High and Supreme Court Lynch J m  the High 
Court argued that the essential nature of the treatment 
could not be changed by reason of duration In addition, he 
stated that, m  his view, "normal" must be regarded 
differently from "getting used to" In other words, '[l]t 
may be that a patient may get used to the abnormal 
artificial method of providing nourishment [ ], but that
does not make the tube feeding normal' 8
Another factor which was considered, was whether the 
artificial nourishment by means of a nasogastric and, 
later, a gastrostomy tube was an intrusive and invasive 
type of treatment which interfered with the bodily 
integrity of the ward Denham J argued that the exercise 
of medical duties constitute treatment if consent is 
needed, and it is invasive if there is no element of co­
operation by the patient If there was co-operation,
7 (1990) 110 S Ct 2841 at 2857, per O'Connor J
8RE A WARD OF COURT, High Court, Unreported, 5 May 
1995, Lynch J at 21
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according to Denham J , m  the form of, for example, 
ingesting or inhaling, the voluntary effort would each time 
reveal the patient's consent to her carers Consequently, 
it did not matter whether the treatment was 'ordinary' (a 
simple medical procedure) or 'extraordinary', constituting 
a gross and disproportionate interference with the ward's 
bodily integrity 9
It was also debated whether the provision of
nourishment and hydration merely constituted ordinary care 
It was submitted that they were basic needs of every living 
being, even where a person cannot take m  nutrition
voluntarily and on his own account This was not upheld 
Both Lynch J m  the High Court and the Chief Justice
compared the provision of nutrition to an involuntary
patient with the insulin injection for the diabetes and the 
mechanical provision of oxygen to those who cannot take m  
air voluntarily It was not an issue whether or not 
treatment was curative and merely intended to prolong life 
In the context of the ward's situation therefore, food or 
insulin or air prolonged life as a matter of treatment In 
all other situations medical practice was not treatment but 
simply medical care
10.3.2. The consequences of this aspect of the decision 
require analysis On the one hand, it may seem unimportant 
that nutrition and hydration constitute "medical 
treatment", it could be argued that this is a forensic
9RE A WARD OF COURT [1995] 2 I L R M 401 at 456
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truism But, on the other hand, it could be argued that m  
distinguishing, as Lynch J did, between various sorts of 
medical treatment, and consenting to the withdrawal of 
nutrition and hydration, but permitting the continuation of 
administration of medication such as morphine and valium, 
the Court is effectively making a complex decision, with an 
end point that is far from clear Surely, the consequence 
of Lynch J 's judgment must be that, m  withdrawing 
nutrition and hydration, but permitting the continuance of 
palliative care involving morphine and valium, the High 
Court is effectively "easing the transition between life 
and death"
Were the High and Supreme Court judgments to be taken 
literally, it can only be that they are permitting or even 
compelling what would otherwise be explicitly 
unprofessional conduct, namely the termination of life by 
withdrawal of some medical treatment and the continuation 
of other medical treatment Hence, we pass from a world m  
which the limits of medical treatment are defined by the 
Medical Council under statute, to a situation m  which, m  
exceptional circumstances, the judiciary may decide what is 
permissible and not permissible
Notwithstanding the fact that the courts have now 
become the adjudicator of the moment when medical care may 
be withdrawn, the Medical Council chose to re-emphasize its 
own pre-existing Guideline,10 and to purport thereby to
10See A Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour and to 
Fitness to Practice (1994) 4th Edition, Dublin The 
Medical Council (Article 43)
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suggest that withdrawal of treatment on the lines suggested 
by the decision m  RE A WARD OF COURT [1995] 2 I L R M 401 
could be legally permissible but nevertheless constitute a 
breach of professional ethics, or professional 
misconduct 11 That the Medical Council has no power to 
assert that withdrawal of treatment constitutes a breach of 
professional conduct ex ante is supported by a reading both 
of the Medical Practitioners Act 1978 and the Constitution 
Any alternative reading would be to usurp the functions of 
the legislature and courts 12
Hence, the first problem posed by this decision is 
that it represents one of the most significant departures 
by the Supreme Court into the area of medical practise m  
this generation, and the predictable reaction by the 
Medical Council must be ineffective
The second problem is the nature and extent of this 
departure or intervention Is the Supreme Court permitting 
euthanasia by another name, and if not, why does the order 
ensure that some but not all forms of medical treatment may 
be withdrawn’
10.4 Consent to Treatment
The Implications of the Decision
10.4.1. It could be said that the WARDSHIP case defines
i:LSee, inter alios, Kerrigan (1995)
12See also Tomkin (1995), supra Subparagraph 2 6 7
All
medical treatment and consent thereto symbiotically 
Medical treatment is dependent on consent, if there is no 
consent it is either a crime, a tort or a breach of the 
constitutional rights of a patient It is at least arguable 
that what defines medical treatment and sets it apart from 
the general run of unwarrantable interference with personal 
rights, is the particular nature of the consent 
accompanying it
According to the WARDSHIP case it seems that medical 
duties which are intrusive and invasive, m  the sense that 
they make up a violation of the right to bodily integrity 
(whether they are curative or not), constitute medical 
treatment for which consent is required If this consent is 
not acquired by the doctor the violation of bodily 
integrity is unlawful and unconstitutional, except m  
certain circumstances of emergency 13
However, the Supreme Court's decision is ambiguous 
about the status and nature of consent to medical treatment 
m  relation to other constitutional rights, other than the 
right to bodily integrity On the one hand, treatment 
without consent is a breach of the "fundamental right of 
autonomy" But on the other, the fundamental and principal 
right is the right to life, and the principle of autonomy 
is - or must be - subordinated to the right to life These 
principles are starkly contradictory, and explain why the 
right to resist medical treatment may involve the right to 
privacy or the right to be treated with dignity or the
13See Tomkm & Hanafin (1995 36)
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This c o n t r a d i c t i o n  c o u l d  be explained, m  the o p i n i o n  
of this researcher, m  that there is no s uch right as a 
right to a u t o n o m y  A u t o n o m y  or s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  is a 
device b y  w h i c h  m a n  can e x e r c i s e  his f u n d a mental rights, 
such as the right to life, the right to b o d i l y  integrity, 
etc B e i n g  able to chuse for one self, to take 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for one's o w n  a ctions is the e s s e n c e  of 
a u t o n o m y  In the W A R D S H I P  case the w a r d  cannot e x e r c i s e  h e r 
a u t o n o m y  It can e ven be a s s e r t e d  that she has lost her 
a u t o n o m y  on the b a s i s  that she is n o n  compos mentis As a 
consequence, it can be d e b a t e d  w h e t h e r  a u t o n o m y  can be 
e x e r c i s e d  on h e r  b e h a l f  Nonetheless, it does not a l t e r  the 
fact that the court shou l d  come to a d e c i s i o n
F urthermore, the q u e s t i o n  r emains w h e t h e r  D e n h a m  J is 
right m  a s s e r t i n g  that the refusal m a y  be " u n r e a s o n a b l e " 7 
She m a y  be right m  the sense that t r e a t m e n t  can be r e f u s e d  
for o t h e r  t hen m e d i c a l  reasons 14 W hat seems u n r e a s o n a b l e  
from a d o c t o r ' s  or an o u t s i d e r ' s  p o i n t  of v i e w  m a y  seem 
r e a s o n a b l e  m  the eye of the p a t i e n t  T h e s e  " u n r easonable 
reasons" n e e d  not be m e d i c a l  reasons per se, but can be 
b a s e d  on p e r s o n a l  or p r i v a t e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  15 In addition, 
it m a y  not be facile to asse s s  w h e t h e r  r e f u s a l  of treatment 
is u n r e a s o n a b l e  or not In most cases this d e m a n d s  a 
s u b j e c t i v e  judgment However, if there are no g r o u n d s  b a s e d
right to autonomy
14 [1995] 2 I L R M  401 at 454
15S e e , for example, RE C (ADULT R E F U S A L  OF TREATMENT)
[1994] 1 W  L R 29
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on morality, c o m m o n  g o o d  or p u b l i c  o r d e r  to d e n y  the 
pa t i e n t ' s  r efusal it seems inev i t a b l e  that a d o c t o r  must 
respect the p a t i e n t ' s  r efusal to give consent to treatment 
This line of t hought was e x p r e s s e d  in, inter alia, R v 
HALLSTROM, EX PARTE W  (NO 2), R v  G A R D N E R  & ANOTHER, EX 
PARTE L [1986] Q B 1090 L o r d  Goff s t a t e d  that -
unle s s  clear s t a t u t o r y  a u t h o r i t y  exists, no one 
is to be d e t a i n e d  m  hosp i t a l  or to u n d e r g o  
m e d i c a l  treatment or e ven to submit h i m s e l f  to a 
m e d i c a l  e x a m i n a t i o n  w i t h o u t  his c onsent This is 
true of a m e n t a l l y  d i s o r d e r e d  p e r s o n  as of anyone 
else 16
The W A R D S H I P  case throws a n e w  light u p o n  the concept 
of c onsent a n d  m e d i c a l  t r e atment Its i m p l i c a t i o n s  s eem to 
d i f f e r  f rom p r e v i o u s  decisions, w h i c h  r equire a n a l y s i s  The 
d e v e l o p m e n t  of the concept can be d i v i d e d  into three 
stages First, the stage b e f o r e  the d e c i s i o n  m  W A L S H  v  
F A M I L Y  P L A N N I N G  SERV I C E S  LTD [1992] 1 I R 486 Second,
the d e c i s i o n  m  W A L S H  and third, the d e c i s i o n  m  the 
W A R D S H I P  case 17
10 4 2 P r e v i o u s  to W A L S H  the c oncept of consent to 
m e d i c a l  t r e a t m e n t  was g o v e r n e d  b y  the d e c i s i o n s  m  two 
E n g l i s h  cases B O L A M  v  F R I E R N  H O S P I T A L  M A N A G E M E N T  
C O M M I T T E E  [1957] 2 All E R 118 and S I D A W A Y  v  B E T H L E M
R O Y A L  H O S P I T A L  G O V E R N O R S  A N D  OTHE R S  [1985] 1 A l l  E R 643
16 [1986] Q B 1090
17The d e c i s i o n  m  W A L S H  has a lso b e e n  d i s c u s s e d  
c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y  m ,  supra S u b p a r a g r a p h  5 6 1
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Generally, the test m  B O L A M  e x p r e s s e d  the idea that a 
do c t o r  is o b l i g e d  to give c e r t a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  to his 
p a t i e n t  m  o r d e r  to g a i n  his c onsent w i t h  r espect to 
m e d i c a l  t r e a t m e n t  The q u a n t i t y  and q u a l i t y  of this 
i n f o r m a t i o n  is a s s e s s e d  b y  the d o c t o r  h i m s e l f  a n d  he is not 
ne g l i g e n t  as long as he has c o m p l i e d  w i t h  a p r a c t i c e  
a p p r o v e d  of b y  a b o d y  of m e d i c a l  o p i n i o n  The same test was 
u s e d  for d i a g n o s i s  and treatment
In S I D A W A Y  this test was a g a i n  a p p l i e d  b y  a m a j o r i t y  
of the H o u s e  of L o r d s  (Lord S c a r m a n  dissenting) In their  
v i e w  the a p p l i c a t i o n  of the test was j u s t i f i e d  b y  the fact 
that a p r a c t i t i o n e r ' s  d u t y  to w a r n  was 'as m u c h  an e x ercise  
of p r o f e s s i o n a l  skill and judgment as a n y  o t h e r  part of the 
d o c t o r ' s  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  d u t y  of care to the i n d i vidual 
patient' 10 However, L ord S c a r m a n  o p p o s e d  this line of 
thought 19 In his v i e w  it left the d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of a legal 
du t y  to the judgment of d o c t o r s  He s u p p o r t e d  the idea that 
the p a t i e n t  has a right to make up his o w n  m i n d  m  the 
light of the relevant i n f o r m a t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  treatment
In I r e l a n d  the law g o v e r n i n g  m e d i c a l  n e g l i g e n c e  was 
d e b a t e d  m  D U N N E  v  N A T I O N A L  M A T E R N I T Y  H O S P I T A L  [1989] I R 
91 It was h e l d  that - but o n l y  w i t h  r e g a r d  to diag n o s i s 
a nd t r e a t m e n t  - the B O L A M  test does a p p l y  but subject to 
pate n t  d e f e c t s  This meant that w h e r e  a d o c t o r  r e l i e d  u p o n  
a g e n e r a l  and a p p r o v e d  p r a c t i c e  w h i c h  d i d  not c a r r y  an 
inherent defect, he is not liable
18 [1985] 1 All E R 643 at 659, per Lord Diplock
19Ibid, at 645
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A n  a c t i o n  b a s e d  on a lack of consent was not yet an 
issue In D A N I E L S  v  H E S K I N  [1954] I R  73 the issue of 
i n f o r m a t i o n  was addressed, but it must be p o i n t e d  out that 
this b e c a m e  an issue a f t e r  t r e a t m e n t  h a d  c o m m e n c e d  
N evertheless, it was h e l d  that n o n - d i s c l o s u r e  of 
i n f o r m a t i o n  m ust be r e a s o n a b l e  m  the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  b a s e d  
on the p r o f e s s i o n a l  judgment of the m e d i c a l  p r a c t i t i o n e r
10.4.3. So far, lack of consent, b a s e d  on the 
insu f f i c i e n t  p r o v i s i o n  of i n f o r m a t i o n  lead to l i a b i l i t y  m  
the tort of n e g l i g e n c e  In W A L S H  - the first Irish case to 
deal c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y  w i t h  i n f o r m a t i o n  and c onsent - a 
n u m b e r  of facts were a d d r e s s e d
First, it was a r g u e d  w h e t h e r  an a c t i o n  c o u l d  be 
b r o u g h t  m  a ssault or b a t t e r y  m  f a i l i n g  to a d v i s e  a 
pa t i e n t  r e g a r d i n g  the c o n s e q u e n c e s  of a n  o p e r a t i o n  It was 
h eld b y  the S upreme Court, r e v e r s i n g  the H i g h  Court's 
d e c i s i o n  on this point, that an a c t i o n  c o u l d  be b r o u g h t  m  
b a t t e r y  or a ssault o n l y  w h e n  there was no c onsent g i v e n  
p r i o r  to the treatment, or 'where an appa r e n t  c onsent has 
b een v i t i a t e d  b y  fraud or deception' 20 In cases where lack 
of i n f o r m e d  c onsent is a r g u e d  an a c t i o n  must be d e t e r m i n e d  
on o r d i n a r y  n e g l i g e n c e  p r i n c i p l e s
It is clear that m  W A L S H  the concept of c onsent was 
a d d r e s s e d  t w o - f o l d  The S upreme Court first a d d r e s s e d  the 
s i t u a t i o n  w h e r e  no consent was g i v e n  p r i o r  to trea t m e n t 
This c o u l d  l ead to a ssault or b a t t e r y  Secondly, the court
20 [1992] 1 I R 496 at 513, per Finlay C J
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dealt w i t h  the s i t u a t i o n  w h e r e  consent w a s  g i v e n  p r i o r  to 
the t r e atment b a s e d  on the p r o v i s i o n  of information, but it 
a p p e a r e d  that this i n f o r m a t i o n  was i n s u f f i c i e n t  and 
t h e r e f o r e  the consent was u n s u p p o r t a b l e  It was a r g u e d  m  
r e t r o s p e c t  that the i n f o r m a t i o n  was not s u f f i c i e n t  for the 
p a t i e n t  to c onsent to treatment
Second, the case a d d r e s s e d  the issue of p r o f e s s i o n a ­
lism the n a t u r e  of the d o c t o r - p a t i e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
r e g a r d i n g  the p r o v i s i o n  of i n f o r m a t i o n  W hat k i n d  of 
i n f o r m a t i o n  is n e e d e d  is it c o n f i n e d  s o l e l y  to trea t m e n t 
o ptions or does it go b e y o n d  that, t a k i n g  into a ccount the 
p a t i e n t ' s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  w i t h  r e g a r d  to, for example, the 
p e r f o r m e r  of the operation, as was the case m  W A L S H ’ At 
this stage a d i s t i n c t i o n  must be m ade b e t w e e n  the s i t u a t i o n  
w h e r e  p a r t i c u l a r  i n f o r m a t i o n  has not b e e n  g i v e n  a n d  the 
s i t u a t i o n  w h e r e  i n f o r m a t i o n  has b e e n  g i v e n  but was not 
c o m p l i e d  w i t h  R e g a r d i n g  the latter it can be a r g u e d  that 
the c o u n s e l l o r / d o c t o r  has r a i s e d  the l e g i timate 
e x p e c t a t i o n s  of the pati e n t
Third, the judges are d i v i d e d  w i t h  r e g a r d  to the 
p r i n c i p l e s  g o v e r n i n g  the q u a n t u m  of i n f o r m a t i o n  a medi c a l  
p r a c t i t i o n e r  is o b l i g e d  to p r o v i d e  It m ust a lso be borne 
m  m i n d  that an o p e r a t i o n  can e i t h e r  be e l e c t i v e  or 
r e q u i r e d  For the former, a h i g h e r  amount of i n f o r m a t i o n  
m a y  be e x p e c t e d
Two o p i n i o n s  were e x p r e s s e d  b y  the S u p r e m e  Court m  
W A L S H  A c c o r d i n g  to M c C a r t h y  J ,21 d i s c l o s u r e  is a q u e s t i o n
21 [1992] 1 I R 486 at 520
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of p r o f e s s i o n a l  skill and judgment the d o c t o r  has a duty  
to p r o v i d e  i n f o r m a t i o n  w h i c h  is o b v i o u s l y  n e c e s s a r y  for the 
p a t i e n t  to m ake an i n f o r m e d  choice
O ' F l a h e r t y  J , on the o t h e r  h a n d , 22 e x p r e s s e d  the 
o p i n i o n  that a p a t i e n t  has an almost a b s o l u t e  right to be 
i n f o r m e d  of all c o n s e q u e n c e s  of treatment, m  p a r t i c u l a r  m  
the event of e l e c t i v e  surgery, r e g a r d l e s s  the d i s c r e t i o n  of 
the d o c t o r  However, this abso l u t e  right is qualified, if 
"therapeutic p rivilege" d e m a n d s  the n o n - d i s c l o s u r e  of 
i n f o r m a t i o n
10.4 4. In the RE A  W A R D  OF C O U R T  [1995] 2 I L R  M  401
it was a g a i n  f i r m l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  that consent is a p r e ­
c o n d i t i o n  to m e d i c a l  treatment, i e a r t i f i c i a l  n u t r i t i o n  
and h y d r a t i o n  A  p a t i e n t  has a right to refuse trea t m e n t  
The c onsent is, a c c o r d i n g  to D e n h a m  J , 'a m a t t e r  of 
choice It does not n e c e s s a r i l y  have to be b a s e d  on medi c a l  
considerations' 23
However, this right is not an a b s o l u t e  It can be 
o v e r r u l e d  b y  pu b l i c  order, the comm o n  g o o d  or m o r a l i t y  For 
example, m  cases of cont a g i o u s  d i s e a s e s  the right to 
refuse t r e a t m e n t  can be set aside m  the n ame of the c o m m o n  
g o o d  or p u b l i c  o r d e r  The right to b o d i l y  i n t e g r i t y  m a y  
also be o v e r r u l e d  w h e n  it cannot be h a r m o n i z e d  w i t h  a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  right of a n o t h e r  or w h e n  it c o n f l i c t s  w i t h
22Ibid, at 535
23 [1995] 2 I L R M 401 at 454, per Denham J
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m o r a l i t y  24
It is c l e a r  from the W A R D S H I P  case that the right to 
refu s e  t r e atment i m p l i e d  the a p p l i c a t i o n  of a n u m b e r  of 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  rights However, it has not b e e n  m ade clear 
m  w h i c h  o r d e r  those rights shou l d  have b e e n  r a n k e d  First, 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  right to b o d i l y  integrity, second, the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  right to p r i v a c y  and third the c o n s t i t u ­
tional right to life At the same time the right to refuse 
treatment i m p l i e d  the e x e r c i s e  of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and 
i ndividual a u t o n o m y  For this r e a s o n  it s e e m e d  that D e n h a m  
J a s s e r t e d  that the right to consent did not n e c e s s a r i l y  
have to be b a s e d  on m e d i c a l  considerations, a l t h o u g h  this 
is p a r a m o u n t  m  a norm a l  s i t u a t i o n  Instead, D e n h a m  J 
a s s e r t e d  that the right to c onsent is a m a t t e r  of choice 
In this case it was a choi c e  to have t r e atment c o n t i n u e d  or 
withdrawn, or, less e u p h e m i s t i c a l l y  spoken, a choice 
b e t w e e n  life and d e a t h  This s t r o n g l y  i m p l i e d  the e x e r c i s e  
of the right to life, w h i c h  is m a t e r i a l i z e d  b y  r e f u s i n g  
treatment to m a i n t a i n  the right to b o d i l y  i n t e g r i t y  and  
p r i v a c y  It follows that the right to life m ust be r a n k e d  
h i g h e r  than the o t h e r  rights m  this case The latt e r  are 
s u b o r d i n a t e d  to the right to life The w a r d  was not anxious 
to give an i n f o r m e d  consent, she d i d  not want to consent at 
all
24For example, m  the s i t u a t i o n  of a p r e g n a n t  women, 
w h o  r efuses to give consent to her d o c t o r  for t r e a t m e n t  m  
o r d e r  to save the life of the u n b o r n  c h i l d  she is c a r r y i n g  
A  c o m p l i c a t i o n  m a y  be a d d e d  w h e t h e r  it is the c h i l d  who 
needs t r e a t m e n t  m  the w o m b  or w h e t h e r  the w o m a n  needs 
t r e a t m e n t  herself, w h i c h  c o u l d  result m  the d e a t h  of the 
c h i l d  if it is not c a r r i e d  out
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In this sense, a v i o l a t i o n  of the right to consent may  
lead, a c c o r d i n g  to the d e c i s i o n  m  W A L S H  v  F A M I L Y  P L A N N I N G  
SERV I C E S  L T D  [1992] 1 I R 486, to a ssault or b a t t e r y  if
consent was not g i v e n  or v i t i a t e d  b y  f r a u d  or d e c e p t i o n  
A l t e r natively, it m a y  lead to a b r e a c h  of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  right to b o d i l y  i n t e g r i t y  if this v i o l a t i o n  
was deliberate, c o n s c i o u s  and u n j u s t i f i a b l e  25
10.4.5. It follows that w ith r e g a r d  to the concept of 
consent two p o s i t i o n s  must be firm l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  In the 
first p o s i t i o n  no consent is g i v e n  w h a t s o e v e r  In the 
seco n d  p o s i t i o n  consent is g i v e n  but is b a s e d  on 
i n s u f f i c i e n t  or inad e q u a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n
W i t h  r e g a r d  to the former p o s i t i o n  it implies a right 
to b o d i l y  i n t e g r i t y  In the r e s e a r c h e r ' s  view, it deals 
wi t h  cases w h e r e  a d o c t o r  goes b e y o n d  the p o w e r s  g r a n t e d  to 
him b y  his p a t i e n t  The p a t i e n t  did not c onsent to a 
specific form of t r e a t m e n t  or a n y  t r e a t m e n t  For example, 
if a d o c t o r  real i z e s  d u r i n g  the first o p e r a t i o n  that the 
p a t i e n t  needs a seco n d  o p e r a t i o n  w h i c h  he can p e r f o r m  at 
the same time he will v i o l a t e  the p a t i e n t ' s  b o d i l y  
i n t e g r i t y  if he does not ask for consent w i t h  r e g a r d  to the 
s e c o n d  o p e r a t i o n  The excuse that it w o u l d  be c o n v e n i e n t  
for the d o c t o r  cannot be u p h e l d  It must be necessary, ì e 
it w o u l d  be u n r e a s o n a b l e  to p o s t p o n e  the s e c o n d
25Cf K E N N E D Y  Sc A R N O L D  v  I RELAND [1987] I R 587,
[1988] I L R  M  472
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o p e r a t i o n  26 D e n h a m  J a r g u e d  therefore, q u i t e  rightly, m  
h e r  s u m m a r y  that consent s h o u l d  be o b t a i n e d  b e f o r e  m e d i c a l  
t r e a t m e n t  is a d m i n i s t e r e d  However, in cases of emergency, 
c onsent is i m p l i e d  if the p a t i e n t  is u n c o n s c i o u s  a n d  the 
t r e a t m e n t  was r e q u i r e d  m  o r d e r  to save the life of the 
p a t i e n t  or to p r e s e r v e  his h e a l t h  27
W h e r e  a b r e a c h  of consent leads to n e g l i g e n c e  it is 
a s s e r t e d  that it implies a v i o l a t i o n  of the right to be 
i n f o r m e d  It i n d icates that the p a t i e n t  a l r e a d y  made a 
c o n c e s s i o n  t o w a r d s  his d o c t o r  to have a m e d i c a l  p r o b l e m  
solved, be it elec t i v e  or r e q u i r e d  In this s i t u a t i o n  a 
do c t o r  o m i t t e d  to p r o v i d e  suff i c i e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  failed  
to r e g a r d  the (legitimate) e x p e c t a t i o n s  of a p r u d e n t  
pa t i e n t  or the d o c t o r  did not a d h e r e  to an a p p r o v e d  or 
a c c e p t e d  p r a c t i c e
However, a d o c t o r  can u n d e r  specific c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
rely on t h e r a p e u t i c  p r i v i l e g e  This p r i v i l e g e  implies that 
a d o c t o r  can m a k e  the n e c e s s a r y  d e c i s i o n s  he thinks are fit 
to m ake d u r i n g  the course of the d o c t o r - p a t i e n t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  It does not s o l e l y  a p p l y  on e m e r g e n c y  
situations, a d o c t o r  m a y  r ely on this p r i v i l e g e  'where 
p r e v a i l i n g  m e d i c a l  s t a ndards h o l d  that d i s c l o s u r e  of 
c e r t a i n  facts w o u l d  have a d e t r i m e n t a l  effect on the
26Cf M U R R A Y  v  M C M U R C H Y  (1949) 2 D L R 442 a n d  M O H R  
v W I L L I A M S  (1905) 104 N  W  12
27Cf M A R S H A L L  v  C U R R Y  (1933) 3 D L R 260 at 275 In
P A R M L E Y  v  P A R M L E Y  A N D  Y U L E  (1945) 4 D L R 81, the
C a n a d i a n  S u p r e m e  Court s t a t e d  that m  an emergency, g r e a t e r  
l e e w a y  m ust be g i v e n  to doctors
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p a t i e n t ' 28 T his is a m a t t e r  of m e d i c a l  judgment, m  other 
words, a l t h o u g h  a d o c t o r  is o b l i g e d  to i n f o r m  his patient, 
this o b l i g a t i o n  is, to a large extend, r e s c i n d e d  by his 
th e r a p e u t i c  p r i v i l e g e
Thus, there m a y  be two types of u n l a w f u l  treatment 
(1 ) v i o l a t i o n  of the right to b o d i l y  i n t e g r i t y  with o u t  
consent a n d  (1 1 ) v i o l a t i o n  of the right to be i n f o r m e d  
pr i o r  to consent The first type m a y  lead to assault or 
b a t t e r y  (WALSH) or a b r e a c h  of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  rights (RE A  
W A R D  OF COURT) The seco n d  type m a y  lead to n e g l i g e n c e  
(WALSH) It is b a s e d  on the fact that a p a t i e n t  w o u l d  not 
have u n d e r g o n e  trea t m e n t  if she h a d  b e e n  p r o p e r l y  i n f o r m e d  
Her right to be i n f o r m e d  was v i o l a t e d  and t h e r e f o r e  the 
p a t i e n t  c o u l d  not m a k e  a p r o p e r  d e c i s i o n  towa r d s  the 
e x e r c i s e  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of t r e atment It is not the fact 
that she d i d  not c onsent to treatment, but the fact that 
she was not p r o p e r l y  i n f o r m e d  It was not h e r  b o d i l y  
in t e g r i t y  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  violated, it h a d  b e e n  i n t e r f e r e d  
w i t h  a l r e a d y  It was r a t h e r  the v i o l a t i o n  of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  d o c t o r  a n d  p a t i e n t  m  w h i c h  the 
pa t i e n t  is b o t h  object and subject
Finally, it must be a d d e d  that a cause of a c t i o n  b a s e d  
on the insu f f i c i e n t  p r o v i s i o n  of i n f o r m a t i o n  is a m o d e r n  
d e v e l o p m e n t  in I reland a n d  E n g l a n d  It is a s s e r t e d  that it 
has m  recent y e a r s  b e c o m e  a right to be p r o p e r l y  informed, 
w h i c h  c a n  lead to n e g l i g e n c e  w h e n  it is shown that consent  
c o u l d  not have b e e n  v a l i d l y  g i v e n  The idea that a pati e n t
28See Tomkm & Hanafm (1995 30)
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r equ i r e s  p r o p e r  p r o v i s i o n  of i n f o r m a t i o n  - i n f o r m e d  consent 
- stems f rom a n u m b e r  of A m e r i c a n  cases 29 It e x p r e s s e s  the 
idea of the p a t i e n t ' s  a u t o n o m y  30 In C A N T E R B U R Y  v  SPENCE 
(1972) 464 F 2d 772 the court s t a t e d  that the s t a n d a r d
w i t h  r e g a r d  to the p a t i e n t ' s  right to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  on 
his t r e a t m e n t  or t h e r a p y  was a m a t t e r  of judi c i a l  judgment, 
not m e d i c a l  31 H o w e v e r  this is l a r g e l y  n u l l i f i e d  b y  the 
e x c e p t i o n  of t h e r a p e u t i c  p r i v i l e g e
In I r e l a n d  the n o t i o n  of " i n formed consent" is not 
new, but it has, as of yet, not b e e n  d e f i n e d  or d e s c r i b e d  
by  eith e r  the j u d i c i a r y  or l e g i s l a t u r e  N evertheless, it 
can be m ade clear that a d o c t o r  is o b l i g e d  to p r o v i d e  his 
p a t i e n t  (or p a t i e n t ' s  g u a r d i a n  or parent) w i t h  i n f o r m a t i o n  
about the c o n d i t i o n  of the patient, the (side-) e ffects of 
treatment, a n d  a l t e r n a t i v e  forms of t r e a t m e n t  The q u a n t u m  
of i n f o r m a t i o n  d e p e n d s  on (i ) the p a t i e n t ' s  c a p a c i t y  to 
c o m p r e h e n d  and deci d e  on the relevant issues, ( n )  the
q u a n t u m  and natu r e  of the risks involved, ( i n )  the 
p a t i e n t ' s  w i s h  to be informed, ( i v ) the n a t u r e  of the
p r o c e d u r e  and (v) the effect of i n f o r m a t i o n  on the
p a t i e n t  32
29See, for example, S A L G O  v  L E L A N D  S T A N F O R D  JR 
U N I V E R S I T Y  B O A R D  OF T R U S T E E S  (1957) 154 Cal A p p  2d 560, 
317 P 2d 170 and C A N T E R B U R Y  v  SPEN C E  (1972) 464 F 2d
772
30Cf S C H L O E N D O R F F  v  S O C I E T Y  OF N E W  Y O R K  H O S P I T A L  
(1914) 105 N  E 92
31 (1972) 464 F 2d 772 at 784
32For a c o m p r e h e n s i v e  r e v i e w  on c o n s e n t  m  Ireland, 
see T o m k m  & H a n a f i n  (1995 30-49)
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and P r o f e s s i o n a l  D i s c r e t i o n
10.5.1. This s e c t i o n  a d d r e s s e s  the v a l u e  of the argu m e n t s  
m  the r e s p e c t i v e  j u d gments w i t h  r e g a r d  to the q u a l i t y  of 
life and life itself What is the v a l u e  of the d i s s e n t i n g  
judgment of E g a n  J a n d  what is the role of the m e d i c a l  
p r a c t i t i o n e r  m  p r o l o n g i n g  life and m a i n t a i n i n g  the q u a l i t y  
of l i f e 7
The m a j o r i t y  of the S upreme Court h e l d  that in the 
u n d e r l y i n g  case, the q u a l i t y  of the w a r d ' s  life was n e v e r  
an issue and h a d  n e v e r  b e e n  an issue She was alive but, 
a c c o r d i n g  to O'Flaherty, 'she ha[d] no life at all' 33 The 
w a r d  h a d  to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from a s e v e r e l y  m e n t a l l y  
h a n d i c a p p e d  person, who is 'conscious of h e r  s i t u a t i o n  and  
is capa b l e  of o b t a i n i n g  p l e a s u r e  and e n j o y m e n t  of l i f e ' , 
even w h e n  she was not fully P V  S 34
S o m e h o w  this a p p e a r e d  to be an a r b i t r a r y  statement, 
b e c a u s e  it was not m ade clear m  the e v i d e n c e  w h e t h e r  the 
wa r d  was f u l l y  P V  S or w h e t h e r  she h a d  some, a l t h o u g h  
e x t r e m e l y  minimal, c o g n i t i v e  func t i o n  However, a c c o r d i n g  
to this researcher, the s u p p o s i t i o n  a p p e a r e d  to be 
j u s t i f i e d  b y  the m a j o r i t y  judges w i t h  the a r g u m e n t  that the 
case was not about w h e t h e r  life was m e a n i n g f u l  or not, and 
on that b a s i s  h ave t r e a t m e n t  w i t h d r a w n  Instead, the case 
was about h a v i n g  natu r e  take its course, b a s e d  on the
10.5. The Quality of Life Argument
33RE A  W A R D  OF COURT [1995] I L R M  401 at 432
34 Ibid
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p r e s u m p t i o n  that e v e r y  i ndividual has a right to life w h i c h  
is e x e r c i s e d  m  this p a r t i c u l a r  case b y  r e f u s i n g  treatment 
E gan J c o u l d  not agree w i t h  this line of thought 35 
In his v i e w  it w o u l d  r equire a stro n g  and cogent r e a s o n  to 
justify, m  the light of the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  guarantees, the 
taki n g  of a life He a r g u e d  that the w a r d  still h a d  some 
c o g n i t i v e  f u n c t i o n  Therefore, it was impo s s i b l e  and 
p r o h i b i t e d  to d r a w  a line He d i d  not seek a c o m m o n  
p r i n c i p l e  found m  o t h e r  cases 36 C o g n i t i v e  f u n c t i o n  was 
absent or not If it was not, a n y  effo r t  to m e a s u r e  its 
value w o u l d  h ave b e e n  d a n g e r o u s  Hence, the court c o u l d  not 
have b e e n  able to m ake a d e c i s i o n  w h e t h e r  t r e a t m e n t  should 
have b e e n  w i t h d r a w n
W h e r e b y  the m a j o r i t y  of the S upreme Court q u e s t i o n e d  
the m a i n t e n a n c e  of life itself, E gan J a r g u e d  that the 
j u d i c i a r y  cannot make a d e c i s i o n  to w i t h d r a w  treatment 
w h i c h  is b a s e d  on an a s s e s s m e n t  of the q u a l i t y  of life In 
his view, a c c o r d i n g  to this researcher, this can o n l y  be 
done b y  the p a t i e n t  or w a r d  h erself if she h a d  h a d  a moment 
of compos mentis A  d e c i s i o n  w h i c h  c o u l d  lead to an 
i nevitable o u t c o m e  is not one the court can m ake on behalf 
of a p a t i e n t  w h o  has some c o g n i t i v e  function, d e s p i t e  a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g u a r a n t e e  of e q u a l i t y  u n d e r  the law If she 
was fully P V  S a v a l u e  judgment n e e d  not be m ade In this 
s i t u a t i o n  the q u a l i t y  of life is not an issue, n o r  n e e d  it
35Ibid , at 437
36S e e , for example, A I R E D A L E  N  H S T R U S T  v  B L AND 
[1993] A  C 789
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be an issue
10.5 2. W h e r e  a d e c i s i o n  needs to be m a d e  the judges 
agree that this must be done m  the best interest of the 
p a t i e n t  The m a j o r i t y  of the S upreme Court a g r e e d  that a 
d e c i s i o n  can be m ade rega r d l e s s  of the m e n t a l  state of the 
patient, b e c a u s e  it a t t a c h e d  v a l u e  to the e q u a l i t y  rule 
E gan J a r g u e d  that a d e c i s i o n  can o n l y  be m ade w h e r e  a 
p a t i e n t  has no q u a l i t y  of life w h a t s o e v e r  In a n y  o t her 
s i t u a t i o n  it is not up to the court to come to a d e c i s i o n  
This does not mean, m  the o p i n i o n  of this researcher, that 
a p a t i e n t  is left to her own fate
The m e d i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n  m  this case was p r e d o m i n a n t l y  
c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  the m a i n t e n a n c e  of life itself This is 
i l l u s t r a t e d  w i t h  the fact that the d o c t o r  a r g u e d  that, even 
if the w a r d  was fully P V  S , his atti t u d e  w o u l d  not have 
c h a n g e d  t o w a r d s  the t r e a t m e n t  she received, a l t h o u g h  it did 
not improve the q u a l i t y  of the w a r d ' s  life W h e t h e r  this is 
s t a n d a r d  m e d i c a l  p r a c t i c e  is a n o t h e r  q u e s t i o n  a n d  diff e r s  
from c o u n t r y  to country, b a s e d  on moral, ethical, social 
and p h i l o s o p h i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  It can, however, be 
a s s e r t e d  that the M e d i c a l  C ouncil a ccepts the m a i n t e n a n c e  
of life m  this p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n  (a non compos mentis 
p a t i e n t  w h o  has e x t r e m e l y  m i n i m a l  c o g n i t i v e  function) as 
s t a n d a r d  m e d i c a l  p r a c t i c e  and n o n - c o m p l i a n c e  m a y  c o n s t i t u t e  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  m i s c o n d u c t  a l t h o u g h  l e g a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e  In 
norm a l  s i t u a t i o n s  the m e d i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n  has the d i s c r e t i o n  
to deci d e  or advi s e  what is m  the best interest of the
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p a t i e n t  37 The d o c t o r ' s  a u t o n o m y  is n o r m a l l y  v i t a l l y  
important w i t h  r e g a r d  to d e c i s i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  the q u a l i t y  
of life However, m  this case (a w a r d  m  a p a r t i c u l a r  
m e d i c a l  exigency) the parens patriae j u r i s d i c t i o n  of the 
court o v e r r u l e d  the a u t h o r i t y  of the m e d i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n
w i t h  r e g a r d  to the exer c i s e  of its m e d i c a l  a n d  legal
duties
Can it be a r g u e d  that m  cases w h e r e  a d o c t o r  cannot 
s a t i s f y  the d e m a n d s  of a p a t i e n t  and a conf l i c t  arises
b e t w e e n  s u p p l y  and demand, the m e d i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n  loses its 
c o l l e g i a t e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  and one or b o t h  p a r t i e s  i n s tigate  
m e d i a t i o n  f rom a t h i r d  p a r t y ’
In a n o r m a l  s i t u a t i o n  - w h e r e  a p a t i e n t  is compos 
mentis - a d o c t o r - p a t i e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is, a c c o r d i n g  to 
T o m k i n  & H a n a f i n , 38 and a r g u e d  b y  this r e s e a r c h e r  
t h r o u g h o u t  the thesis, g o v e r n e d  b y  a c o l l e g i a t e  model In 
this m o del the d o c t o r  d e f i n e s  the needs of the p a t i e n t  and 
d e t e r m i n e s  the w a y  those needs are s a t i s f i e d , 39 for 
example, the type of trea t m e n t  and the degr e e  of
i n f o r m a t i o n  w h i c h  s h o u l d  be p r o v i d e d  to the p a t i e n t  In 
d o ing so, it is b e t w e e n  the d o c t o r  a n d  p a t i e n t  to come to 
d e c i s i o n s  w i t h  r e g a r d  to t r e atment a n d  o t h e r  forms of 
m e d i c a l  care
In the u n d e r l y i n g  case there was a c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n
37See, for example, the d e c i s i o n  m  G I L L I C K  v  W E S T  
N O R F O L K  A N D  W I S B E C H  A R E A  H E A L T H  A U T H O R I T Y  A N D  A N O T H E R  
[1985] 2 B M  L R 11
38 (1995 12)
39See Turner (1987 136-137)
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the p a t i e n t  and the m e d i c a l  carers w i t h  r e s p e c t  to her 
needs and her desi r e  m  the w a y  those needs s h o u l d  have 
b e e n  s a t i s f i e d  Here, w h e r e i n  the p a t i e n t  is non compos 
mentis, the d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  ente r s  a d e a d - l o c k  
w h i c h  n e e d s  to be r e s o l v e d  b y  t h i r d  p a r t y  i n t e r v e n t i o n  The 
status of the p a t i e n t  m  the u n d e r l y i n g  case - a w a r d  of 
court - m ade it o b v i o u s  that i n t e r v e n t i o n  n e e d e d  to be 
judicial 40
However, it was s u b m i t t e d  b y  the c ounsel for the 
i n s t i t u t i o n  w h e r e  the w a r d  was c a r e d  for that, m  r e l a t i o n  
to the e x e r c i s e  of s elf-determination, no one c o u l d  have 
made a d e c i s i o n  on her behalf, due to her i n c a p a c i t y  she 
had lost the 'right of choice' 41 In these situ a t i o n s  the 
d e c i s i o n  s h o u l d  have b e e n  m ade b y  the court u s i n g  an 
'objective m e d i c a l  standard', t a k i n g  into account, inter 
a h a ,  'the v i e w s  and o p i n i o n s  of the m e d i c a l  a t t e n d a n t s  and 
carers' 42 In o t h e r  words, the court shou l d  have a p p l i e d  a 
s t a n d a r d  w h i c h  c o n f o r m e d  to a c c e p t e d  m e d i c a l  p r a c t i c e  
which, m  this case, a p p e a r e d  to n e c e s s i t a t e  the 
c o n t i n u a t i o n  of t r e atment or, a c c o r d i n g  to appellants, 
normal m e d i c a l  care
This was not u p h e l d  b y  the S upreme Court The w a r d ' s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  rights c o u l d  not be r e s t r i c t e d  It w o u l d
40In RE D A N I E L  FIORI (1995) 652 A  R 2d 1350 the
m a j o r i t y  of the court h e l d  that o n l y  w h e r e  a conflict 
arises b e t w e e n  the m e d i c a l  carers and the f a m i l y  (or o t h e r  
carers) w i t h  r e g a r d  to the w i t h d r a w a l  of treatment, court 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  was n e c e s s a r y
41 [1995] 2 I L R M  401 at 451, per D e n h a m  J
42 Ibid
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have meant a v i o l a t i o n  of her right to e q u a l i t y  u n d e r  
A r t i c l e  40 1 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n  The d e c i s i o n  m ust be made 
on h e r  beha l f  and m  her best interest, t a k i n g  into account 
the w i s h e s  of the family
At this m o m e n t  the d o c t o r - p a t i e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  came 
e f f e c t i v e l y  to an end The m e d i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n  c o u l d  no 
longer and was no longer a s k e d  to defi n e  the needs of the 
pa t i e n t  m  this p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n  Instead, the needs 
were d e f i n e d  b y  the fami l y  on beha l f  of the w a r d  a n d  u n d e r  
A r t i c l e  41 1 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n  Subsequently, the court 
was a s k e d  to i n t ervene and come to a d e c i s i o n  This hints 
towards a n o t h e r  m o d e l  m e d i a t i o n  In this m o d e l  a t h ird 
p a r t y  (often the State) i ntervenes b e t w e e n  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
p e r s o n s  a n d  t h e i r  c lients 43 In this case the court was 
a s k e d  to i n t e r v e n e  b e t w e e n  the m edical p r o f e s s i o n  and its 
p a t i e n t  to r e g u l a t e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a c t i v i t i e s  a n d  p r a c t i c e  
Generally, it is a r g u e d  that m  the a p p l i c a t i o n  of this 
model the State i n c reases its control and m a n a g e m e n t  of the 
p r o f e s s i o n s  44
This needs careful c o n s i d e r a t i o n  The court, e n d o w e d  
w i t h  the parens patriae a c t e d  on b e h a l f  of the patient, as 
if it was the p a t i e n t  h e r s e l f  m a k i n g  the d e c i s i o n  At the 
same time however, it was forc e d  to r esolve a c o nflict 
b e t w e e n  two p a r t i e s  A  n u m b e r  of a spects m a y  h e l p  c l a r i f y  
this p o s i t i o n  F i r s t , the test w h i c h  was u s e d  - the "best 
interest" test - needs c o n s i d e r a t i o n  Second, the role and
43See Turner (1987 137)
44 Ibid
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natu r e  of the court m  this d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  dema n d s 
deliberation, ought its role to be a d v e r s a r i a l  or 
i n q u i s i t o r i a l 9
10 5.3 In d e c i d i n g  this case the court e m p l o y e d  the 
"best interest" test This test is l o g i c a l l y  not d e t e r m i n e d  
b y  m e a n s  of p r o f e s s i o n a l  judgment, w h e r e i n  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
o p i n i o n  o b v i o u s l y  does not a l t e r  b y  an e x p r e s s  desire of a 
p a t i e n t  (or a desire s u b m i t t e d  on her behalf) This is 
evident b e c a u s e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  judgment e x e r c i s e s  a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  c e n t r e d  approach, it r e f l e c t s  a c e r t a i n  
me d i c a l  p r a c t i c e  b a s e d  on e s o t e r i c  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  n o r m a l l y  
a c c e p t e d  or a p p r o v e d  of by the m e m b e r s  of the p r o f e s s i o n  45 
In addition, the d e c i s i o n  m  this case was one w h i c h  was 
thought of not b e i n g  e x c l u s i v e l y  m  the d o m a i n  of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  o p i n i o n  or expe r t i s e
However, the trial judge also c o n s i d e r e d  e v i d e n c e  w i t h  
rega r d  to the ward ' s  d i s l i k e  of h o s p i t a l s  and t r e atment and 
ot h e r  factors In d o i n g  so, he took into a ccount the w i s h e s  
of the w a r d  a n d  c o n c l u d e d  that the e v i d e n c e  was c l e a r  and 
c o n v i n c i n g  that the w a r d  - if she had a m o m e n t  of mental
45H o w e v e r , m  F v W E S T  B E R K S H I R E  H E A L T H  A U T H O R I T Y
[1989] 4 B M L R  1 at 2, it was h e l d  that ' m  d e t e r m i n i n g  
w h e t h e r  the o p e r a t i o n  [sterilization] was m  the best 
interest of the p a t i e n t  the court s h o u l d  a p p l y  the 
e s t a b l i s h e d  test of what w o u l d  be a c c e p t e d  as a p p r o p r i a t e  
t r e a t m e n t  at a time b y  a reas o n a b l e  b o d y  of m e d i c a l  o p i n i o n  
s k i l l e d  m  that p a r t i c u l a r  form of t r e a t m e n t 7 , the B O L A M  
test a p p l i e d  In this case the p a t i e n t  s u f f e r e d  f rom a 
ment a l  d i s a b i l i t y  and h a d  the c a p a c i t y  of a c h i l d  She had 
f o r m e d  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  a m a l e  p a t i e n t  m  the hosp i t a l  
and the staff c o n s i d e r e d  that, b a s e d  on m e d i c a l  evidence, 
it w o u l d  be m  h e r  best interest to s t e r i l i z e  her
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co m p e t e n c e  - w o u l d  d e n y  trea t m e n t  This is a s u b s t i t u t e d  
j u d g m e n t , w h i c h  has b e e n  a p p l i e d  on its o w n  in o t her 
cases 46 The courts use this test w h e n  the s u r rogate 
d e c i s i o n  m a k e r  can d e m o n s t r a t e  the p r e f e r e n c e s  of the 
i n c o m petent p a t i e n t  w i t h  r e a s o n a b l e  c e r t a i n t y  A c c o r d i n g  to 
O' F l a h e r t y  J , this test cannot be a d o p t e d  m  this case 
w i t h o u t  the f o r esight of the w a r d  to 'provide for future 
e ventualities' 47 It s e e m e d  to h i m  that the e v i d e n c e  was 
not s u f f i c i e n t  m  this case to r e a s o n a b l y  a s c e r t a i n  the 
ward ' s  own v i e w  For this reas o n  the "acid test" h a d  to be 
m  the best interest of the w a r d
The court was a s s u m e d  to adopt the atti t u d e  of a 
'responsible parent' and h a d  to come to its d e c i s i o n  m  the 
best interest of the w a r d  48 This i m p l i e d  that the wishes 
of the f a m i l y  or othe r s  c o n c e r n e d  c o u l d  not prevail, but 
were t a k e n  into a ccount The natu r e  of the parens patriae 
was t h e r e f o r e  " c h i l d - o r - i n d i v i d u a l  c e n t r e d " , r a t h e r  then 
" p a r e n t - o r - c a r e r  centred" Nonetheless, this can be a r g u e d  
The best interest test r emains an e x t r e m e l y  s u b j e c t i v e  test 
and its d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  is not w i t h o u t  p r e j u d i c e  
t owards the patient, the f a m i l y  and p e r h a p s  s o c i e t y  as a 
whole A n  o b j e c t i v e  m e d i c a l  test on the contrary, b a s e s  its 
d e c i s i o n  on k n o w l e d g e  and e x p e r t i s e  and the o u t c o m e  is not 
an a s s e s s m e n t  of o t h e r  considerations, it is "professional-
46R e f e r e n c e  was m ade to the d e c i s i o n  m  RE D A N I E L  FIORI
(1995) 652 A  R 2d 1350
47RE A  W A R D  OF C O U R T  [1995] 2 I L R M 401 at 434
48Cf RE J (A MINOR) [1990] All E R 930 at 941, per
B a l c o m b e  J
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centred"
In e x e r c i s i n g  this p a r e n t a l  d u t y  it b e c a m e  c l e a r  that 
there was a conf l i c t  b e t w e e n  this d u t y  and the m e d i c a l  d u t y 
of those u p o n  w h o m  the w a r d  r e l i e d  for care and trea t m e n t  
In o t h e r  words, a conflict b e t w e e n  p r o f e s s i o n a l  d i s c r e t i o n  
and the law It a p p e a r e d  that the p r o f e s s i o n a l  d i s c r e t i o n  - 
the m e d i c a l  d u t y  - d i d  not take into a ccount the best 
i nterest of the w a r d  f rom h e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  Instead, it 
e m p l o y e d  a p r o f e s s i o n a l  a n d  c o l l e c t i v e  a n d  c o m m o n  c e n t r e d 
atti t u d e  b y  a s s e r t i n g  that the w a r d  was best s e r v e d  by 
e m p l o y i n g  a m e d i c a l  s t a n d a r d  and h o l d i n g  that ' [1 ] f s o c i e t y  
can s u s t a i n  life t hen life must be sustained' 49 This was 
b a s e d  on the c o n t e n t i o n  that the w a r d  was not t e r m i n a l l y  
ill and that there was an element of c o g n i t i o n
The court o r d e r  b y  L y n c h  J p r e v a i l e d  o v e r  the d u t y  of 
a d o c t o r  to his p a t i e n t  ' [t]he d e c i s i o n  of the Court is m  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  the C o n s t i t u t i o n  and the law a n d  is w i d e r  
than the d o c t o r ' s  clinical judgment' 50 It was s aid to be 
wider, b e c a u s e  it t ook into account o t h e r  factors Those 
factors w ere o n l y  p a r t i a l l y  a d d r e s s e d  b y  the S u p r e m e  Court 
judges the best interest of the w a r d  and the w i s h e s  of the 
f ami l y  T o m k i n  & Me A u l e y 51 have p r o p o s e d  a n u m b e r  of o t her 
factors w h i c h  the courts m a y  take into account, 1  e the 
degree of h u m i l i a t i o n  and dignity, the v a r i o u s  treatment
49 [1995] 2 I L R  M  401 at 448
S0Ibid , at 462
51 (1995 48) In d o i n g  so the w r i t e r s  r e l i e d  on, i n t e r
alia, the d e c i s i o n  m  RE D A N I E L  FIORI (1995) 652 A  R  2d
1350
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o ptions and their effect on life e x p e c t a n c y  a n d  p r o g n o s e s
However, the case m ade c l e a r  that the court h a d  to 
c o n s i d e r  legal ethics a gainst m e d i c a l  ethi c s  The former 
e n c a p s u l a t e d  the idea that the ward ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  rights 
could not be t a k e n  a w a y  or r e p l a c e d  b y  some o t h e r  (medical) 
s t a n d a r d
10.5.4. It was a r g u e d  b y  B l a y n e y  J w h e t h e r  the court's
f unc t i o n  m  the W A R D S H I P  case was e i t h e r  a d v e r s a r i a l  
w h e r e b y  the court shou l d  a p p r o a c h  the case as lis inter 
partes, or i n q u i s i t o r i a l  of c h a r a c t e r  52 In the former, the 
court is c o n f i n e d  to the evid e n c e  p r o d u c e d  b y  the o p p o s i n g  
parties, on the b a sis of w h i c h  the court m ust come to a 
d e c i s i o n  B l a y n e y  J , however, e x p r e s s e d  the o p i n i o n  that 
m  the u n d e r l y i n g  case the trial judge n e e d  not have 
e x e r c i s e d  the a d v e r s a r i a l  f u n c t i o n  He e s t a b l i s h e d  this 
finding, r e l y i n g  on the judgment of L o r d  A s h b o r n e  m  RE 
BI R C H  (1892) 29 L R Irl 274 His L o r d s h i p  s t a t e d  that
b e i n g  e n d o w e d  w i t h  the j u r i s d i c t i o n  of a w a r d  of court the 
a s s i g n e d  judge is free m  d i r e c t i n g  'such e n q u i r i e s  and 
e x a m i n a t i o n s  as justice [ ] m a y  require' 53
This line of thought l o g i c a l l y  c o r r e l a t e s  w i t h  the 
"best interest" test If a judge c o n s i d e r s  that further 
i n q u i r y  is n e c e s s a r y  to come to a p r o p e r  d e c i s i o n  m  the 
interest of the ward, he shou l d  be free to c onduct such 
inquiries
52 [1995] 2 I L R M  401 at 444-445
53 (1892) 29 L R Irl 274 at 276
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M e d i c a l  P r o f e s s i o n
10.6.1. M o d e r n  m e d i c a l  t e c h n o l o g y  a ppears to give rise to 
two p r o b l e m s  First, the W A R D S H I P  case c l e a r l y  i l l u s t r a t e d  
that legal issues arose from c o n f l i c t s  b e t w e e n  m o d e r n  
m e d i c i n e  a n d  m e d i c a l  ethics Second, there a p p e a r s  to be a 
conflict b e t w e e n  the law and e thical a n d / o r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
guidelines, issu e d  b y  the M e d i c a l  C ouncil The m e d i c a l  
p r a c t i t i o n e r  m  the W A R D S H I P  case could, a c c o r d i n g  to the 
M e d i c a l  Council, be a c c u s e d  of p r o f e s s i o n a l  m i s c o n d u c t  m  
f o l l o w i n g  a court o r d e r  (the t e r m i n a t i o n  of treatment)
This d e m a n d s  careful c o n s i d e r a t i o n  If so, it w o u l d  
m e a n  that a p r o f e s s i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w h i c h  is s t a t u t o r i l y  
recognized, m a y  have s a n c t i o n i n g  p o w e r s  as to what is 
lega l l y  p e r m i t t e d  w i t h  r e g a r d  to m e d i c a l  care and 
t reatment
On the one h and the law r e s t r i c t s  m e d i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t 
on the basis of ethical and o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
(pharmaceutical testing, g e n e t i c a l  r e s e a r c h ) , 54 but on the 
other h a n d  the law v a l u e s , m  the W A R D S H I P  c a s e , m e d i c a l  
ethics as b u r d e n s o m e  for the s o l u t i o n  of p a r t i c u l a r  legal 
and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o b l e m s
It is m ade c l e a r  from the case that p r e v i o u s  
c e r t a i n t i e s  are a f f e c t e d  b y  m o d e r n  m e d i c i n e  The c oncept of 
d e a t h  has c h a n g e d  The time and m a n n e r  of d e a t h  are no
54See, for example, the P h a r m a c y  Act, 1977, the Misuse 
of D r u g s  Act, 1977 a n d  the Control of C l i n i c a l  T r i a l s  and 
D r ugs Act, 1990
10.6. The Consequences for the
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longer d i c t a t e d  b y  natu r e  but are, m  m a n y  instances, 
d e t e r m i n e d  b y  h u m a n  d e c i s i o n s  At the same time there seems 
to be a conf l i c t  as to who must take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for 
these d e c i s i o n s  M o d e r n  m e d i c a l  t e c h n o l o g y  has r e s u l t e d  m  
some i n s t a n c e s  m  -
r e n d e r i n g  a p a t i e n t  a p r i s o n e r  m  a w a r d  from 
w h i c h  there m a y  be no r elease for m a n y  y e ars 
wi t h o u t  a n y  e n j oyment or q u a l i t y  of life indeed  
wi t h o u t  life m  a n y  a c c e p t a b l e  m e a n i n g  of that 
concept except m  the sense that b y  m e a n s  of 
va r i o u s  m e c h a n i s m s  life is kept m  the b o d y  55
The curr e n t  state of the w a r d  was a resu l t  from an 
a p p l i c a t i o n  of m o d e r n  m e d i c a l  science, a c c o r d i n g  to D e n h a m  
J W i t h o u t  it, she said, 7 she w o u l d  not have long s u r v i v e d  
a c a t a s t r o p h e  o v e r  t w e n t y  y e a r s  ago' 56 The case 
i l l u s t r a t e d  the p r o b l e m s  a r i s i n g  out of m o d e r n  m e d i c a l  
t e c h n o l o g y  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t  legal issues
In C R U Z A N  v DIRECTOR, MISS O U R I  D E P A R T M E N T  OF H E A L T H
(1990) 497 U  S 261, 110 S Ct 2841, B r e n n a n  J p o s e d  the 
q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  the w a r d  is a 'prisoner of medi c a l  
t e c h n o l o g y ' 757 If so, 'is it', a c c o r d i n g  to D e n h a m  J , 'm
55RE A  W A R D  OF COURT [1995] 2 I L R M  401 at 433 See
also R A S M U S S E N  B Y  M I T C H E L L  v  F L E M I N G  (1987) 154 Ariz
207, 741 P 2d 674 In this case the S u p r e m e  Court of
A r i z o n a  s t a t e d  [a]s m ore i n d i v iduals assert t h e i r  right to 
refuse treatment, m ore f r e q u e n t l y  do the d i s c i p l i n e s  of 
law, medicine, philosophy, technology, and r e l i g i o n
collide'
56Ibid , at 445
57 ( 1990) 110 S Ct 2841 at 2864
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ke e p i n g  w i t h  her right as a h u m a n  p e r s o n  to d i g n i t y ' 958
W i t h  r e g a r d  to the conflict b e t w e e n  the law and 
m e d i c a l  ethics m  the u n d e r l y i n g  c a s e , the p a r a m o u n t  
q u e s t i o n  is not w h e t h e r  care can be given, but w h e t h e r  care 
shou l d  be g i v e n
10.6.2. The d e c i s i o n  of the S u p r e m e  Court, a p p r o v i n g  of 
the court o r d e r  d i r e c t e d  b y  L y n c h  J , p e r m i t t e d  the 
w i t h d r a w a l  of t r e atment from a n e a r l y  P V  S patient, who 
was a w a r d  of court Apart from the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  this case r a i s e d  and a f f e c t e d  s o c i e t y  as a 
whole, a n u m b e r  of o t her c o n s e q u e n c e s  have b e e n  i n f e r r e d  m  
this s e c t i o n  m  r e l a t i o n  to the m e d i c a l  and p a r a - m e d i c a l  
p r o f e s s i o n s
W i t h  r e g a r d  to the m e d i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n  the case m a y  
indicate a d e c l i n e  of its a u t o n o m o u s  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  status 
t owards those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  It is a s s e r t e d  b y  T o m k i n  & 
H a n a f m , 59 and this researcher, that the m e d i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n  
e mploys a c o l l e g i a t e  model, w h e r e b y  the d o c t o r  is the gap- 
f i l l m g  a u t h o r i t y  b e t w e e n  esot e r i c  k n o w l e d g e  and its 
p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  60 However, d i d  the issues at stake 
d e m a n d  the p r a c t i c a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  of e s o t e r i c  know l e d g e  
o n l y 7 The d i s c u s s i o n  show e d  that the issues p r i m a r i l y  
e v o l v e d  a r o u n d  the right to life This was i n t e r p r e t e d  by 
a m a j o r i t y  of the S u p r e m e  Court to a l l o w  n a t u r e  take its
58RE A  W A R D  OF C O U R T  [1995] 2 I L R  M  401 at 461
59 (1995 11-12)
60See Turner (1985 42)
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course b y  r e f u s i n g  to consent to t r e a t m e n t  (as an act of 
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and i ndividual autonomy)
The u n d e r l y i n g  case dealt w i t h  a p a t i e n t  w h o  was a 
w a r d  of court a n d  was n e a r l y  P V  S w i t h  some, but 
e x t r e m e l y  m i n i m a l  c o g n i t i v e  func t i o n  This g ave rise to a 
nu m b e r  of c o n f l i c t s  regarding, inter alia, the natu r e  of 
the treatment, the natu r e  of the illness, p r o f e s s i o n a l  
d i s c r e t i o n  a n d  m e d i c a l  duty, p r o f e s s i o n a l  judgment, m o d e r n  
m e d i c i n e  and the q u a l i t y  of life In o t h e r  situ a t i o n s  this 
conflict does not s eem to appe a r  It is known, a c c o r d i n g  to 
C u s a c k , 61 that m  cases of p a t i e n t s  w i t h  severe c o m p r o m i s e d  
lung function, t r e atment is o f t e n  w i t h d r a w n
The thesis a s s e r t e d  that the S u p r e m e  Court was a
m e d i a t o r  m  s o l v i n g  the disp u t e s  The court e x p l a i n e d  the
es s e n c e  of the d i s p u t e  and d e f i n e d  m a t t e r s  of a m e d i c a l
natu r e  It d e f i n e d  the natu r e  of the t r e atment as m e d i c a l  
t r e atment (not m e d i c a l  care) and it d e f i n e d  the n a t u r e  of 
the illness as b e i n g  terminal, s t a t i n g  that the initial 
o p e r a t i o n  w o u l d  be the w a r d 7 s cause of d e a t h
The court p r o c e e d e d  to set a s t a n d a r d  b y  w h i c h  the
demands or d e s i r e s  of the p a t i e n t  c o u l d  be a s s e s s e d
Instead of d e p e n d i n g  on p r o f e s s i o n a l  and m e d i c a l  judgment, 
the court f a v o u r e d  to take into a ccount the best interest
of the p a t i e n t  The problems, c o n s t i t u t e d  b y  m o d e r n
medicine, w ere a d d r e s s e d  f r o m  a legal p o i n t  of view, not by  
me d i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  alone
Regretfully, the court e m p l o y e d  an a d v e r s a r i a l
61Cusack (1995)
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a p p r o a c h  It was c o n f i n e d  to the evid e n c e  p r o d u c e d  b y  the 
o p p o s i n g  p a r t i e s  If it h a d  o p t e d  for an i n q u i s i t o r i a l 
approach, as s u g g e s t e d  b y  B l a y n e y  J , it w o u l d  have b e e n  
free to c onduct i n q uiries on its own b e h a l f  a n d  to exercise 
its j u r i s d i c t i o n  s o l e l y  m  the interest of the w a r d
Essentially, the role of the m e d i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n  m  
this case was d e c r e a s e d  to m a i n t a i n  or p r o l o n g  life The 
m e d i c a l  p r a c t i t i o n e r s  i n v o l v e d  m  this case were u n w i l l i n g  
to c o n s i d e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and were, subsequently, u n w i l l i n g  
to exer c i s e  the court o r der
O ' M o r a i n , 62 a m o n g  others, i n d i c a t e d  that the issues 
w h i c h  r e m a i n  u n r e s o l v e d  include the w a y  the relevant  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  b o d i e s  shall r e s p o n d  to the d e c i s i o n  A n  B o r d  
A l t r a n a i s  (the N u r s i n g  Authority) t old its m e m b e r s  that m  
this case t h e y  c o u l d  not 'participate m  the w i t h d r a w a l  and 
t e r m i n a t i o n  of the m e a n s  of n u t r i t i o n  a n d  h y d r a t i o n  b y  
tube' 63 The atti t u d e  of the M e d i c a l  C ouncil remains 
u n r e s o l v e d  thus far 64 It o n l y  s t i p u l a t e d  that access to 
n u t r i t i o n  a n d  h y d r a t i o n  was one of the b a s i c  needs of h u m a n  
beings It c o u l d  not advise its m e m b e r s  m  i n d i vidual 
cases It a ppears that p a r t i c i p a t i o n  m  the court o r d e r  
c o u l d  lead to an act of p r o f e s s i o n a l  m i s c o n d u c t  It is h ard 
to see h o w  p r o f e s s i o n a l  bodi e s  can p u n i s h  m e m b e r s  for 
acti n g  m  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  a ruli n g  of the S upreme Court It 
implies, a c c o r d i n g  to this researcher, a conf l i c t  b e t w e e n
62 (19 9 5)
63Xbid
64 Ibid
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The role of the m e d i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n a l  p e r s o n  is 
e f f e c t i v e l y  r e d u c e d  m  this case to f o l l o w i n g  an o r der 
w h i c h  c o n t r a v e n e s  w i t h  his m e d i c a l  duti e s  His p r o f e s s i o n a l  
d i s c r e t i o n  is at stake His legal p o s i t i o n  is u n c e r t a i n  and 
the p o s i t i o n  of the M e d i c a l  C ouncil t owards the aspects 
d i s c u s s e d  m  the W A R D S H I P  case is not yet c l e a r  Is it 
e f f e c t i v e l y  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  the State (or c o u r t s ) , or shall 
it be able to m ake up its own m i n d  and r e g a i n  its a u t o n o m y  
m  the e x e r c i s e  of m e d i c a l  d u t i e s 7 If not, w hat w o u l d  be 
the c o n s e q u e n c e s  m  the context of p r o f e s s i o n a l  n e g l i g e n c e 7 
Generally, it can be a s s e r t e d  that the medi c a l  
p r o f e s s i o n  is close to losi n g  its a u t o n o m y  and self-esteem, 
if it does not p r o v i d e  g u i d e l i n e s  to d e m o n s t r a t e  that it is 
able to adapt to societal chan g e  C a n  it d e c i d e  on the 
m a i n t e n a n c e  of h u m a n  life and o t h e r  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  m a t t e r s 7 
Legislation, subsequently, must p r o v i d e  the f r a m e w o r k  for 
this b u r d e n s o m e  p r o s p e c t
the law, medical ethics and professional conduct
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S u m m a r y  of S t u d y
Chapter 11
The thesis anal y z e s  the d u t y  a n d  s t a n d a r d  of care of 
the p r o f e s s i o n a l  service p r o v i d e r  m  I r e l a n d  T a k i n g  three 
p r o f e s s i o n s  as examples, it expl a i n s  a n d  d i s c u s s e s  v a r i o u s  
mode l s  of p r o f e s s i o n a l  n e g l i g e n c e  The thesis c o n c e n t r a t e s  
on d e s c r i b i n g  a n d  d e f i n i n g  the d u t y  a n d  s t a n d a r d  of care m  
the c ontext of p r o f e s s i o n a l  negligence, since these are 
c l e a r l y  seen to be the two d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  factors m  the 
p r e f e r r e d  v e r s i o n  of the v a r i o u s  m o d e l s  a n a l y z e d  and 
d i s c u s s e d
The t h e s i s 7 n o v e l t y  lies m  the w a y  m  w h i c h  it seeks 
to tie q u e s t i o n s  of d u t y  a n d  s t a n d a r d  of care to the 
c oncept of the profession, to r e c e i v e d  ideas about what 
c o n s t i t u t e s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  c o n d u c t ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  generally, and the scope and extent of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  duti e s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
The thes i s  r eviews the case law a n d  lite r a t u r e  on 
n e g l i g e n c e  g e n e r a l l y  and p r o f e s s i o n a l  n e g l i g e n c e  m  
p a r t i c u l a r  In the context of this review, the r e s e a r c h e r  
e s t a b l i s h e s  that there does inde e d  exist a special concept 
of p r o f e s s i o n a l  n e g l i g e n c e  m  Irish j u r i s p r u d e n c e
T h o u g h  a c o m p l e t e  r e v i e w  of the i n d i v i d u a l  features of
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p r o f e s s i o n a l  n e g l i g e n c e  w o u l d  be out of p l a c e  m  this 
context, it is s u g g e s t e d  that the thes i s  c l e a r l y  
de m o n s t r a t e s  that two of the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  f actors are the 
m a n n e r  m  w h i c h  the courts first impose a d u t y  of care and 
seco n d  asse s s  w hat is the r e q u i r e d  s t a n d a r d  of care
The r e v i e w  f urther e x p l a i n e d  that the concept of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  n e g l i g e n c e  does not refer s o l e l y  to a gene r a l  
or a " broad-spectrum" d u t y  to take o r d i n a r y  care This is 
e ndemic to all n e g l i g e n c e  cases S p e c i f i c a l l y  m  the 
c ontext of p r o f e s s i o n a l  negligence, the courts c o n c e n t r a t e 
on the c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of the spec i f i c  o b l i g a t i o n s  and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of the indi v i d u a l  p r o f e s s i o n a l  These 
o b l i g a t i o n s  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  are not c o n f i n e d  to the 
m u t u a l l y  a g r e e d  o b l i g a t i o n s  w i t h i n  the p r o f e s s i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  T h e y  o f t e n  r e a c h  f urther This is 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  c l e a r  m  cases w h e r e  there is, p r i o r  to the 
n e g ligent event, no p r e - e x i s t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  the 
p l a i n t i f f  and d e f e n d a n t  Thus, the thesis e m p h a s i z e s  the 
r e c i p r o c i t y  of conduct and c o n c e n t r a t e s  on the a c t i v i t i e s 
of the p r o f e s s i o n a l  p e r s o n  rath e r  t han s i m p l y  e x a m i n i n g  the 
p r o b l e m  m  terms of status
The thesis also shows that the c oncept of p r o f e s s i o n a l  
n e g l i g e n c e  is a p p l i c a b l e  to those p r o f e s s i o n s  to w h i c h  
c e r t a i n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  can be a t t r i b u t e d  A  k e y  fact o r  is 
u n i f o r m i t y  of a c c e p t e d  p r a c t i c e  w i t h i n  the "professional" 
cadre
T h r e e  of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  features c o n t r i b u t e  to 
this u n i f o r m i t y  These involve education, e x a m i n a t i o n  and,
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subsequently, r e s t r i c t i o n  of e n t r a n c e  to the p r o f e s s i o n  
All three are w i t h i n  the context of s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n  and a 
r e q u i r e m e n t  to adhe r e  to codes of conduct
The thesis expl a i n s  that these features are b a s e d  on 
a t h e o r e t i c a l  u n d e r p i n n i n g  to the m ore c o m m o n l y  u n d e r s t o o d  
skills a n d  k n o w l e d g e  w h i c h  c h a r a c t e r i z e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
conduct The p r o f e s s i o n  will m  g e n e r a l  m ake sign i f i c a n t  
and e x t e n s i v e  d e c i s i o n s  about this t h e o r e t i c a l  
underpinning, a l t h o u g h  there m a y  be input from o u t s i d e  the 
p r o f e s s i o n  Not o n l y  the natu r e  but the amount of skill and 
k n o w l e d g e  is d e c i d e d  by the p r o f e s s i o n  Hence, the 
p r o f e s s i o n  itself b o t h  by choice of the t h e o r e t i c a l  
u n d e r p i n n i n g  as well as its e n d o r s e m e n t  of p r a c t i c a l  
s t a ndards c reates a basis for some c o n s e n s u s  or u n i f o r m i t y  
of p r a c t i c e  w i t h i n  the p r o f e s s i o n
The e x i s t e n c e  of some degr e e  of u n i f o r m i t y  w i t h i n  the 
p r o f e s s i o n s  a s s i s t s  the courts t owards a p a r t i c u l a r  m e t h o d  
of i n q u i r y  of a s s e s s m e n t  of q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  to b o t h  d u t y  
and s t a n d a r d  of care The thesis e x p l a i n s  that this is 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  m a r k e d  m  the w a y  m  w h i c h  courts c o n s i d e r  
g eneral a n d  a c c e p t e d  practice, and the extent to w h i c h  
d e v i a t i o n s  are not m e r e l y  p e r m i t t e d  but e n c o u r a g e d  Here, 
the thesis shows a n o t h e r  specific feature inherent m  the 
concept of p r o f e s s i o n a l  n e g l i g e n c e  the f r e e d o m  to devi a t e  
from a d e c i d e d  p r a c t i c e  w i t h i n  c e r t a i n  limits
Yet a n o t h e r  feature of p r o f e s s i o n a l  n e g l i g e n c e  is the 
w a y  m  w h i c h  the courts b o t h  can and m ust intervene, where 
e xperts of equal s t a n d i n g  d i s a g r e e  on m a t t e r s  w h i c h  are not
capable of s o l u t i o n  b y  r e f e r e n c e  to a g r e e d  p r o f e s s i o n a l  or 
s cie n t i f i c  o p i n i o n
Up to this stage of the thesis, the r e s e a r c h e r  
c o n c e n t r a t e s  u p o n  those features of the p r o f e s s i o n s  w h i c h  
are to some degr e e  c o m m o n  The r e s e a r c h e r  then m o v e d  to 
e xamine the d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  three p r o f e s s i o n s  (medical 
practitioner, s o l i c i t o r  and a uditor/accountant) and h o w 
these d i f f e r e n c e s  m a y  be e x p l a i n e d  S i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
were s h o w n  to be r e f e r a b l e  first to the natu r e  and extent 
of "client" input into the d e f i n i t i o n  of the relationship, 
and s e c o n d  to m o d i f i c a t i o n  b y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of p u b l i c  
p o l i c y  a n d  t h i r d  p a r t y  e x p e c t a t i o n
The thesis expl a i n s  that there are a c e r t a i n  c a t e g o r y  
of d e c i s i o n s  for w h i c h  p r o f e s s i o n s  are u n w i l l i n g  to take 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  G e n e r a l l y  these d e c i s i o n s  c o n c e r n  m a t t e r s  
wh e r e  b r o a d e r  societal i m p l i c a t i o n s  are c o n c e r n e d  
P a r t i c u l a r l y  m  Ireland, t h o u g h  also m  other 
jurisdictions, the courts assume a special role This is 
done e ven where, m  so doing, the cour t s  m a y  curb the 
a u t o n o m y  of the p r o f e s s i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  E n d o r s e m e n t  is 
e t h i c a l l y  and p r o f e s s i o n a l l y  not d e s i r e d  b y  the p r o f e s s i o n  
Subsequently, n o n - a d h e r e n c e  to a court o r d e r  m a y  
e f f e c t i v e l y  r e n d e r  the p r o f e s s i o n  as b e i n g  o u t - p l a y e d  m  
m a t t e r s  of societal impo r t a n c e  This m a y  have w i d e r  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  for the p r o f e s s i o n 's a u t o n o m o u s  p o s i t i o n  to 
set s t a n d a r d s  of p r o f e s s i o n a l  conduct a n d  p r a c t i c e  It is 
up to the p r o f e s s i o n  itself to o v e r c o m e  this
The thesis c o n c l u d e s  w i t h  a q u e s t i o n  as to h o w  if b o t h
509
s o c i e t y  a n d  p r o f e s s i o n s  w i t h i n  s o c i e t y  evolve, s uch changes 
c o n t r i b u t e  to the f o r m a t i o n  of "new" professions, and the 
d e c a y  of e x i s t i n g  p r o f e s s i o n s  T h o u g h  the r easons for this 
m u t a t i o n  are b e y o n d  the scope of the thesis, the s t u d y  does 
e x p l a i n  that one of the v i r t u e s  of the concept of 
p r o f e s s i o n a l  n e g l i g e n c e  i d e n t i f i e d  m  this thesis is that 
it is able to a c c o m m o d a t e  such c hanges The concept employs 
c e r t a i n  c r i t e r i a  that n e c e s s i t a t e s  a degr e e  of formal 
u n i f o r m i t y  w i t h i n  i ndividual p r o f e s s i o n s  w h i c h  ensure 
c e r t a i n t y  and c o n s i s t e n c y  This is p a r t i c u l a r l y  important 
m  the c ontext of c urrent c hanges w i t h i n  society, b o t h  as 
to h o w  i n f o r m a t i o n  is p r e s e n t e d  and used, a n d  h o w  the 
p r o f e s s i o n s  m ust rede f i n e  t h e m s e l v e s  b y  r e a s o n  of the m a j o r  
changes m  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o v i s i o n  The p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n  of 
h o w  such c h a n g e s  will affect future p r o f e s s i o n s  is h o w e v e r  
b e y o n d  the scope of this p a r t i c u l a r  w o r k
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